JUDGMENT : H.P. Sandesh, J. This second appeal is filed questioning the judgment and decree dated 12.12.2017 passed in R.A.No.29/2017 setting aside the judgment and decree dated 06.03.2017 passed in O.S.No.11/2016 and granting the relief in favour of the plaintiff. 2. The factual matrix of the case of the plaintiff before the Trial Court is that the defendant had borrowed loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from the plaintiff on 19.03.2013 and agreed to repay the same with interest at 2% per month. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had executed an on demand promissory note for having availed the loan and agreed to repay whenever he demands. Inspite of demand, he did not pay the principal amount or the interest. Hence, he issued legal notice on 10.12.2015 and the same was served and untenable reply was given and hence he filed a suit for recovery of Rs.8,61,000/- with interest. In pursuance of the suit summons, the defendant appeared and admitted that he had borrowed loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from the plaintiff and at the time of borrowing, the plaintiff had collected three cheques drawn on SBM Bank, Mandya. It is also contended that the plaintiff had taken a blank stamp paper signed by the defendant. As agreed, the defendant had paid the interest regularly and he also paid the entire principal amount to the plaintiff on 05.05.2013 in the presence of two witnesses, namely Sri N. Raju and Sri Ramesha T.L., residents of Agasanapura Village and Talagavadi Village respectively. When the amount was repaid, the plaintiff did not return the blank cheque and promissory note saying that he has misplaced them. It is also contended that the plaintiff had misused the cheque, which he had collected and filed a case against him in C.C.No.910/2015 and the same is pending adjudication. It is also contended that the plaintiff has misused the promissory note and filed a frivolous suit and hence prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. 3. The Trial Court having considered the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that, the defendant has borrowed a loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from him on 19.03.2013 for his legal necessities agreeing to pay interest at the rate of 2% per month by executing promissory note before the witnesses? 2. 3. The Trial Court having considered the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that, the defendant has borrowed a loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from him on 19.03.2013 for his legal necessities agreeing to pay interest at the rate of 2% per month by executing promissory note before the witnesses? 2. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff has misused the promissory note and issued legal notice on 10.12.2015 calling upon him to pay the principal amount of Rs.5,00,000/- along with interest? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief sought for? 4. What order or decree? 4. In order to prove his case, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and examined two witnesses as P.W.2 and P.W.3 and got marked the documents at Exs.P.1 to 4. On the other hand, the defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and examined one witness as D.W.2 and got marked the documents at Exs.D.1 to 10. The Trial Court having considered both oral and documentary evidence placed on record, answered issue Nos.1 and 3 in the negative and issue No.2 in the affirmative and dismissed the suit. 5. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal in R.A.No.29/2017. The First Appellate Court having considered the grounds urged in the appeal memo and the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC to produce the bank statement and other documents, formulated the following points for consideration: 1. Whether I.A.No.1 filed by appellant/plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC deserves to be allowed? 2. Whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendant had borrowed a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from him agreeing to repay the same with interest at 2% per month by executing a pronote on 19.03.2013? 3. Whether the defendant has proves that he has repaid the entire loan of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest as pleaded in para No.5 of the written statement? 4. What order? 6. 3. Whether the defendant has proves that he has repaid the entire loan of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest as pleaded in para No.5 of the written statement? 4. What order? 6. The First Appellate Court having considered the grounds urged in the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient materials to pronounce the judgment, as such no necessity of considering the additional documents to dispose of the appeal and hence answered point No.1 in the negative and point No.2 in the affirmative considering the admission on the part of D.W.1 in the cross-examination that he had taken money on 19.03.2013 and when there is a clear admission on the part of D.W.1, the Trial Court ought not to have dismissed the suit. The First Appellate Court with regard to the defence of the defendant that he had repaid the money, answered point No.3 in the negative and granted the relief of decreeing the suit directing the defendant to pay the principal amount with interest at 2% per month to the plaintiff from 19.03.2013 till the date of realization. 7. Being aggrieved by the reversal of the judgment of the Trial Court by the First Appellate Court, the present second appeal is filed by the defendant before this Court. 8. The main contention urged in the second appeal is that the lower appellate Court committed an error in reversing the finding of the Trial Court and the respondent has categorically admitted that he has filed a cheque bounce case and he had misused the cheque taken from the defendant along with promissory note and such material has not been considered by the First Appellate Court. It is also contended that the learned Trial Judge rightly appreciated the material on record, particularly in paragraph No.17 and P.W.2 categorically admitted that he never read over the contents of Ex.P.1 and he did not know the contents of Ex.P.1. When such answer is elicited from the mouth of P.W.2, the Trial Court taken note of the contradictions in the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 and rightly dismissed the suit. But the First Appellate Court committed an error in re-appreciating the evidence. When such answer is elicited from the mouth of P.W.2, the Trial Court taken note of the contradictions in the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 and rightly dismissed the suit. But the First Appellate Court committed an error in re-appreciating the evidence. The First Appellate Court not appreciated the evidence of D.W.1 and D.W.2, who have deposed against the respondent herein for having repaid the amount and their evidence has not been considered by the First Appellate Court. 9. This Court having considered the grounds urged in the appeal, at the time of admission framed the following substantial question of law: “Whether the lower appellate Court was right in reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court? 10. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant would vehemently contend that there is a divergent finding and the First Appellate Court failed to appreciate the material available on record and ought not to have reversed the finding of the Trial Court. The Trial Court discussed in detail the material available on record. The learned counsel contend that the transaction was taken place on 19.03.2013 and promissory note was executed on the very same day and the suit was filed on 19.03.2016 and the same is barred by limitation. Though the said ground was not raised before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the Court itself ought to have taken note of the said fact into consideration and there is no bar in raising the issue of limitation in the second appeal and hence contend that the suit is barred by limitation. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff would contend that there is no dispute with regard to the execution of the promissory note on 19.03.2013 and payment was made through cheque and cheque is dated 20.03.2013 and the same was encashed on 20.03.2013 and hence the suit is in time. With regard to the issue of limitation, the learned counsel contend that, for the first time, the said issue is raised before this Court. Both in the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, the said issue was not raised. The learned counsel contend that the defendant in the written statement categorically admitted availing of loan and the only contention of the defendant is that the amount was repaid and when he took the contention of discharge, the question of raising limitation does not arise. 12. The learned counsel contend that the defendant in the written statement categorically admitted availing of loan and the only contention of the defendant is that the amount was repaid and when he took the contention of discharge, the question of raising limitation does not arise. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent in support of his arguments filed in detail the synopsis regarding the reason given by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and reversing of the judgment. The learned counsel contend that the First Appellate Court having taken note of the admission on the part of D.W.1, rightly granted the decree and with regard to the discharge is concerned, the defendant has not proved the same. With regard to the limitation is concerned, the learned counsel would contend that the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- by way of cheque dated 20.03.2013 and the same was encashed on 20.03.2013. The defendant borrowed the amount with an assurance that he would return the money on demand with interest at 2% per month. It is contended that the suit relating to the present transaction is bound by Articles 21 or 35 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘the said Act’ for short). Article 21 of the Act says: “For money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation is three years from which period begins to run when the loan is made.” Article 35 of the Act says: “On a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, the period of limitation is three years and time from which period begins to run is from the date of bill or note.” 13. The learned counsel referring these two Articles would contend that time to file the suit in the present case begins from 20.03.2013 and the plaintiff has filed the suit on 19.03.2016 and as such, the defendant would contend that suit filed by the respondent is short of one day and hence the learned counsel would contend that Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act would come to the aid of the plaintiff in filing the present suit on 19.03.2016. Section 12(1) of the Act reads as follows: “12. Section 12(1) of the Act reads as follows: “12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.– (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.” 14. The learned counsel submits that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 specifically exclude the first in series of days or any other period of time to use the word ‘from’. For ease reference of the Court, Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, is culled out hereinbelow: 9. Commencement and termination of time.— (1) In any (Central Act) or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. (2) This section applies also to all (Central Acts) made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.” 15. The learned counsel referring these two provisions would contend that if the day from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned has been excluded, in the present case i.e., 19.03.2013, then the plaintiff has three years of time to file the suit which comes to end upto 19.03.2016 and the suit is filed on the very day of 19.03.2016 and hence the same is within time and prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal. 16. In reply to the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent, the learned counsel for the appellant would contend that for having paid the amount and encashment of the said cheque on 20.03.2013, no document is placed on record. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that an application is filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC before the First Appellate Court, which discloses the payment on 20.03.2013. The First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient materials and no need to place the same on record by allowing the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. 18. The First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient materials and no need to place the same on record by allowing the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. 18. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent and also keeping in view the judgment of the First Appellate Court and also the substantial question of law framed by this Court, this Court has to examine whether the First Appellate Court committed an error in reversing the judgment of the Trial Court. This Court has to re-analyse the same, since there is a divergent finding. 19. Having heard the respective learned counsel and also on perusal of the material on record, it is not in dispute that promissory note is executed in terms of Ex.P.1 and the same is dated 19.03.2013. It is important to note that the defendant has filed the written statement, wherein he has categorically admitted borrowing of loan of Rs.5,00,000/- and it is the contention of the plaintiff that amount was paid through cheque and the defendant agreed to pay interest at 2% per month. But in the written statement, categorical defence is taken by the defendant in paragraph No.5 that for the purpose of his contract work, he had borrowed the loan. The defendant contend that three cheques were taken at that time and also taken his signature on blank stamp paper and also admitted that the plaintiff has advanced the said loan of Rs.5,00,000/- with a condition that the defendant has to pay interest at 2% per month. He contend that he has paid the interest regularly and also repaid the entire principal amount to the plaintiff on 05.05.2013 in the presence of Sri N.Raju and Sri Ramesha T.L. Having taken note of this specific written statement plea of borrowing of loan and agreeing to pay interest with 2% per month and also having paid the amount on 05.05.2013, it is very clear that there was a transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. 20. 20. Having taken note of the admission of the defendant in paragraph No.5 of the written statement and also in the evidence, the First Appellate Court even extracted the admission of D.W.1 in paragraph No.13 of the judgment while answering point No.2, wherein categorical admission is given that he had borrowed the loan amount of Rs.5,00,000/- from the plaintiff. No doubt, it is his contention that he has discharged the loan amount and examined D.W.2. He has categorically stated in the written statement the fact that he had given three cheques and the plaintiff had taken his signature on blank stamp paper and once he made the payment, he did not collect the same. It is emerged in the evidence that he is a graduate, but he says that the plaintiff told that he misplaced those documents. Even if he has not re-collected those documents, for having repaid the amount, no receipt is produced and not taken any receipt. Hence, the First Appellate Court rightly comes to the conclusion that no document is placed before the Court for having repaid the amount and when he took the specific defence of discharging of loan, an observation is made that the Trial Court has not framed the issue with regard to discharge is concerned. The First Appellate Court framed the point for consideration regarding discharge of the amount is concerned and also an observation is made that the First Appellate Court being fact finding Court is empowered to raise proper point for consideration. The First Appellate Court taken note of the fact that notice was issued and reply was given and in the reply, nothing is stated with regard to the discharge is concerned and if he really had discharged the loan, the same would have been in the knowledge of the defendant and ought to have given reply stating that the same was discharged in the presence of two witnesses and nothing is stated. Hence, the First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that the said defence is taken while filing the written statement and the same is afterthought and in the reply, very receipt of the amount is disputed and contended that the plaintiff misused the cheque and the paper, which had taken. Hence, the First Appellate Court not accepted the contention of the defendant that he had discharged the same. Hence, the First Appellate Court not accepted the contention of the defendant that he had discharged the same. Hence, I do not find any error committed by the First Appellate Court in reversing the finding of the Trial Court. The Trial Court ventured to discuss in detail the unwanted material when there is a categorical admission in the written statement of the defendant for having borrowed the loan and also did not consider the admission on the part of D.W.1 when there is an admission for having availed the loan and when he took the contention of discharge also, the Trial Court committed an error in answering issue No.1 in the negative and the judgment of the Trial Court is against the material on record. The First Appellate Court rightly comes to the conclusion that there was a transaction and the defendant has not proved the discharge contention and hence I do not find any error committed by the First Appellate Court in reversing the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, I answer the substantial question of law in the negative. 21. During the course of argument, the learned counsel for the appellant raised a ground before the Court that the suit is barred by limitation. No doubt, the said defence was not taken before the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and the same is admitted by the learned counsel for the appellant. However, he contend that the issue of limitation can be urged in second appeal also. No doubt, in the second appeal, the appellant can urge the issue of limitation and the same is also settled law. However, the issue of law of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and no such defence was taken and no evidence was let in before the Trial Court regarding limitation is concerned. The documentary evidence is very clear and having taken note of documentary evidence as well as oral evidence on record, this Court has to consider the issue of law of limitation. The documentary evidence is very clear and having taken note of documentary evidence as well as oral evidence on record, this Court has to consider the issue of law of limitation. Admittedly, the transaction was taken place on 19.03.2013 and Ex.P.1 promissory note is also dated 19.03.2013, wherein it is stated that in the presence of the parties, he has availed the loan of Rs.5,00,000/- through cheque drawn on SBM Bank, Malavalli Branch, bearing Cheque No.381826 and agreed to pay interest at the rate of 2% per month, but the contention of the defendant is that the amount was paid by cash and not through cheque. An attempt was made before the First Appellate Court to produce the additional document to evidence the said fact and also produced the document and an endorsement issued by the bank for having made the payment in favour of the defendant and also the copy of the cheque. The First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that there is no need of producing the said document and there are other sufficient materials before the Court. While filing the application, an affidavit is sworn to contending that for having advanced the amount through cheque, a narration is made in the promissory note itself. Hence, he had applied for the drawee bank to see whether the said cheque was encashed by the defendant or not. The drawee bank had issued the certified xerox copy of the said cheque, wherein the defendant had signed backside of the cheque and obtained the payment by cash from the Bank. It is stated that an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- has been debited from his account and also he had obtained account extract statement from the said bank for the said period. Hence, filed the bank statement. When there is a clear admission with regard to payment is concerned in the pronote itself since the same is not disputed and hence, the Court has to take note of the said fact into consideration. 22. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Court has to compute the period of limitation and Section 12(1) of the Act is very clear about exclusion of time in legal proceedings. 22. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Court has to compute the period of limitation and Section 12(1) of the Act is very clear about exclusion of time in legal proceedings. The day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded and the same is in respect of exclusion of time in legal proceedings is concerned and not in respect of suing based on the cheque. The limitation provided under the Act is for a period of three years. Article 19 of the Act says for money payable for money lent, the period of limitation is three years from when the loan is made. The learned counsel for the respondent also brought to the notice of this Court Article 21 of the Act, which says for money lent under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, the period of limitation is three years from when the loan is made. The learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court Article 35 of the Act which says on a bill of exchange or promissory note payable on demand and not accompanied by any writing restraining or postponing the right to sue, the period of limitation is three years from the date of the bill or note. Hence, it is clear that three years is stipulated for recovery of money. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that Section 12(1) of the Act is applicable for the reason that the same is in respect of exclusion of time in legal proceedings in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Section 12(1) of the Act comes to the aid of the respondent/plaintiff and exclusion of time in legal proceedings is very clear in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded and hence 19.03.2013 has to be excluded as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. 23. 23. This Court would like to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of SAKETH INDIA LIMITED v. INDIA SECURITIES LIMITED reported in (1993) 3 SCC 1 , wherein scope of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act is explained in following words: “The aforesaid principle of excluding the day from which the period is to be reckoned is incorporated in Section 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 12(1) specifically provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. Similar provision is made in Sub-section (2) for appeal, revision or review. The same principle is also incorporated in Section 9 of General Clauses Act, 1897 which, interalia, provides that in any Central Act made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'from', and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word 'to'.” 24. This Court would also like to refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of B.MAHADEVAN v. K. VELMURUGAN reported in 2022 SCC Online Mad 3931. In paragraph No.10 of the judgment, the Madras High Court has held as under: “10. There is a sound purpose behind Section 12 (1) of Limitation Act, which enables exclusion of first day of limitation period. In the present case, the suit promissory note was executed on 09.09.2006. There is a possibility that an instrument could have been executed even at 11.59 p.m., on the date of execution. Therefore, if we start counting limitation from the date of execution, the entire 24 hours will not be available. In effect, there will be shortage of almost 23 hours and 59 minutes in the period of limitation allowed for filing of suit. In order to give full benefit of limitation period, Section 12(1) of Limitation Act underlines that the first day from which the limitation period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Therefore, the plaintiff will get full period of limitation allowed by law plus portion of remaining hours available on the date of execution.” 25. In order to give full benefit of limitation period, Section 12(1) of Limitation Act underlines that the first day from which the limitation period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. Therefore, the plaintiff will get full period of limitation allowed by law plus portion of remaining hours available on the date of execution.” 25. This Court would also like to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of SRI M. NARAYANA REDDY v. SRI H.C. VENKATESH reported in ILR 2009 KAR 3130. Head Note of the said judgment reads as under: “Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 7 Rule 11(d) – Limitation Act – 1963 – Section 12(1) – Rejection of plaint as barred by limitation – Appealed against – HELD, The suit for recovery of money is based on a promissory note. Promissory note came to be executed on 12.04.2000. As per Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, the date on which promissory note executed shall be excluded. Therefore, the last date for filing suit was 12.04.03. As 12.04.2003 to 15.04.2003 (both days inclusive) were general holidays, the suit filed on 16.04.2003 was well in time. The Trial Court, by a cryptic order, allowed the application filed under Order VII rule 11(d) of CPC and erred in rejecting the plaint as barred by limitation. The Trial Court has passed the impugned order in a cavalier manner and the same has resulted in delay in disposal of the suit and therefore, it is a fit case to impose exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/-.” 26. This Court would also like to refer to the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of RAJ KAMAL MISRA v. ANIL KHANNA reported in 2018 SCC Online Del 9243, wherein in a similar set of facts and circumstances, the promissory note was executed on 04.02.1954 and on the same date a post-dated cheque dated 25.02.1954 was given and the same was realized sometime after 25.02.1954 and was credited towards part payment and the same was discussed in paragraph No.18 of the judgment. The case law under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the effect that when the cheque is tendered, if the same is encashed, then the date of payment would be the date when the cheque was handed over, is not disputed. The case law under Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the effect that when the cheque is tendered, if the same is encashed, then the date of payment would be the date when the cheque was handed over, is not disputed. It is also discussed in detail regarding the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Jiwanlal Achariya v. Rameshwar Lal Agarwalla reported in AIR 1967 SC 1118 , wherein it is clearly held that whenever the payment of the cheque is conditional, the mere delivery of the cheque on a particular date does not result in the commencement of limitation period. When the cheque is post-dated, the payment is conditional, and the date on the cheque would be relevant for the purpose of limitation. The Supreme Court observed as under: "8. This brings us to the question of limitation. The facts are not in dispute now. The promissory note was executed on February 4, 1954. On the same date a post-dated cheque bearing the date February 25, 1954 was given by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-respondent, the intention being that on being realised it would be credited towards part payment. It was realised sometime after February 25, 1954 and was credited towards part payment, the appellant himself having made an endorsement admitting this part payment. But it is contended on behalf of the appellant that as the post-dated cheque was given on February 4, 1954, that must be held to be the date on which part payment was made. It has been held by the High Court that the acceptance of the post-dated cheque on February 4, 1954 was not an unconditional acceptance. Where a bill or note is given by way of payment, the payment may be absolute or conditional, the strong presumption being in favour of conditional payment. It follows from the 'finding of the High Court that the payment was conditional, i.e. that the payment will be credited to the person giving the cheque-in case the cheque is honoured. In the present case the cheque was realised and the question is what is the date of payment in the, circumstances of this case for the purpose of Section 20 of the Limitation Act. In the present case the cheque was realised and the question is what is the date of payment in the, circumstances of this case for the purpose of Section 20 of the Limitation Act. Section 20 inter alia lays down that where payment on account of debt is made before the expiration of the prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made. Where therefore the payment is by cheque and is conditional, the mere delivery of the cheque on a particular date does not mean that the payment was made on that date unless the cheque was accepted as unconditional payment. Where the cheque is not accepted as an unconditional payment, it can only be treated as a 'Conditional payment. In such a case the payment for purposes of Section 20 would be the date on which the cheque would be actually payable at the earliest, assuming that it will be honoured. Thus ,if in the present case the cheque which was handed over on February 4, 1954 bore the date February 4, 1954 and was honoured when presented to the bank the payment must be held to have -been made on February 4, 1954, namely, the date which the cheque bore. But if the cheque is post dated as in the present case it is obvious that it could not be paid till February 25, 1954 which -was the date it bore. As the payment was conditional it would only be good when the cheque is presented on the date it bears, namely, February 25, 1954 and is honoured. The earliest date therefore on which the respondent could have realised the cheque which he had received as conditional payment on February 4, 1954 was the 25th February 1954 if he had presented it on that date and 'it had been honoured. The fact that he presented it later and was then paid is immaterial for it is the earliest date on which the payment could be made that would be the date where the conditional acceptance of a post-dated cheque becomes actual payment when honoured. The fact that he presented it later and was then paid is immaterial for it is the earliest date on which the payment could be made that would be the date where the conditional acceptance of a post-dated cheque becomes actual payment when honoured. We are therefore of opinion that as a post- dated cheque 'was given on February 4, 1954 and it was dated February 25, 1954 and as this was not a case of unconditional acceptance, the payment for the purpose of Section 20 of the Limitation Act could only be on February 25, 1954 when the cheque could have been presented at the earliest for payment. As in the present case the cheque was honoured it must be held that the payment was made on February 25, 1954. It is not in dispute that the proviso to Section 20 is, complied with in this case, for the cheque itself is an acknowledgment of the payment in the handwriting of the person giving the cheque. We are therefore of opinion that a fresh period of limitation began on February 25, 1954 which was the date of the post-dated cheque which was eventually honoured." 27. In view of the discussions made by the Apex Court and also in the case on hand, though the promissory note was executed on 19.03.2013, the cheque was dated 20.03.2013 and the same was honoured on the same day. The Apex Court categorically held that fresh period of limitation began on 25.02.1954, which was the date of the post dated cheque, which was eventually honoured. Hence, it is clear that date of the cheque as well as the honouring of the cheque gives a fresh period of limitation. Hence, the suit is in time. 28. These judgments are applicable to the facts of the case on hand as Section 12(1) of the Act is applicable to the facts of the case on hand and hence there is a force in the contention of the respondent. 29. Apart from that, a document is produced before the First Appellate Court by invoking Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. The First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient other materials and there is no need of those additional material to be placed before the Court. Having perused the certified copy of the cheque issued on the date of transaction, the cheque is dated 20.03.2013. The First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that there are sufficient other materials and there is no need of those additional material to be placed before the Court. Having perused the certified copy of the cheque issued on the date of transaction, the cheque is dated 20.03.2013. On Ex.P.1 pronote, cheque number is mentioned as 381826. The cheque dated 20.03.2013 was given towards the transaction and the consideration in respect of the said pronote is the said cheque and honouring of the said cheque is very clear that cash was paid and seal is also found as 20.03.2013 and signature of the appellant is found on the overleaf of the cheque. Hence, on that ground also when the consideration was passed on 20.03.2013 on the date of the cheque and not on 19.03.2013, the suit is within time and hence it cannot be held that the same is barred by limitation in view of Section 12(1), Article 21 as well as Article 19 of the Act. Both the Articles are very clear that limitation starts from the date of loan is lent and consideration to pronote was passed onto the appellant only on 20.03.2013. Though, the application is not allowed, the First Appellate Court also not dealt with the issue of limitation, since no such ground of limitation was urged before the First Appellate Court. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that consideration of limitation is also mixed question of fact and law and the bank also issued the documents for having made the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- in favour of the defendant i.e., Annegowda and these are the additional materials produced before the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that those documents are not required for considering the germane issues involved between the parties since the said contention that the suit was barred by limitation was not raised before the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and hence the First Appellate Court comes to such a conclusion. In view of raising of limitation for the first time in second appeal, those documents are taken note of since the limitation is also mixed question of fact and law. In view of raising of limitation for the first time in second appeal, those documents are taken note of since the limitation is also mixed question of fact and law. Those documents are necessary to consider the germane issues involved between the parties and the cheque honoured found in the records and cheque contains the signature of the appellant on the overleaf and while making cash payment, bank taken the signature of the appellant and hence those documents are considered while considering this matter. I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the very suit is barred by limitation having perused the material on record. Hence, the ground of limitation also will not come to the aid of the appellant. 30. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER The second appeal is dismissed.