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2024 DIGILAW 412 (KER)

Anand Joseph S/o Joseph v. District Collector and Ex-Officio President of the Ernakulam

2024-04-01

EASWARAN S.

body2024
JUDGMENT : 1. Based on the averments contained in the writ petition, the pivotal question that arises for consideration is whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against the Ernakulam District Rifle Association and further that a writ of mandamus could be issued to the District Collector who is an ex officio president of the 3rd respondent association. 2. Before appreciating the averments in the writ petition, its apposite to extract the reliefs sought for in the writ petition: (i) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other 1stappropriate writ or order commanding the respondent to take note of the illegalities committed and perpetuated as evident from Exhibits P6 to P8 and highlighted in Exhibit P12 and take appropriate action under the Arms and Rules. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order commanding the 1 respondent to take action on the basis of the voluntary disclosure made in Exhibit P14 to the effect that Arms are kept in the residence of the Secretary. (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order commanding the 4th respondent to take up Exhibit P16 and initiate prompt action thereon as expeditiously as possible. (iv) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order commanding the 5th respondent to conduct an impartial and unbiased investigation into the various complaints projected in the writ petition as expeditiously as possible. 3. Grievance of the writ petitioner is with regard to the functioning of the 3rd respondent, Ernakulam District Rifle Association, which is a society registered under the provisions of Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act, 1955. The petitioner contends that there are serious irregularities in the functioning of the 3rd respondent Association. Essentially the grievance is about lack of shortage of pistols for shooting, proper shooting range etc. which the petitioner has voiced under Exhibit P5. The petitioner further submits that under Exhibit P6 he is required to pay the requisite fee, if he wants to purchase pistols through the Association. According to the petitioner, the said condition is in violence to the provisions under Rule 37(3) and (4) of the Arms Rules, 2016. which the petitioner has voiced under Exhibit P5. The petitioner further submits that under Exhibit P6 he is required to pay the requisite fee, if he wants to purchase pistols through the Association. According to the petitioner, the said condition is in violence to the provisions under Rule 37(3) and (4) of the Arms Rules, 2016. Since the illegalities were perpetuated by the 3rd respondent, the petitioner seems to have approached the 1st respondent with a representation to look into the alleged illegalities being committed by the 3rd respondent. It is further contented that the petitioner’s name has been forged in the memorandum of association (Exhibit P15) and the same is submitted for registration. It is stated further that the arms that are purchased by the Association are now stored at the residence of the secretary of the Association which is again a blatant violation of the Arms Rules. Therefore, essentially the grievance in the writ petition is with regard to certain irregularities in the manner of functioning of the 3rd respondent Association. Hence, the petitioner is seeking a writ of mandamus requesting the 1st respondent, District Collector, to look into Ext.P14 representation and further the 4th respondent be directed to look into Ext.P16 and initiate appropriate action in this regard. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. While considering the writ petition, this Court raised a preliminary issue on the maintainability of the writ petition against the 3rd respondent, which is a society registered under the Travancore Cochin, Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act 1995. The counsel for the petitioner submits that 1st respondent being the District collector and who is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this court, the writ petition is maintainable. The learned Counsel further submitted that the 3rd respondent has now been de-recognized by the Sports Counsel of India. If that be so, the 3rd respondent cannot now hold any arms license, contends the learned counsel. To a specific query made by this Court as to whether the 3rd respondent is now holding any arms license under the Arms Act and the Rules, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, in view of the de-recognition, they are not entitled to hold the licence under the Arms Act and the Rules. 6. To a specific query made by this Court as to whether the 3rd respondent is now holding any arms license under the Arms Act and the Rules, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, in view of the de-recognition, they are not entitled to hold the licence under the Arms Act and the Rules. 6. The question as to whether a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shabajit Tewary vs. Union of India, 1975 (1) SCC 485 , wherein it was held that societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 will not come under the definition of “other authorities” as defined under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The question as to whether a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 would come within definition of “other authorities” came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sheravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 . After analysing the facts of the case, the Apex Court held that the Society registered under the J&K Societies Registration Act and running an engineering college falls within the ambit of “other authorities” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. However, in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111 , the Apex Court while deviating from the principles laid down in Ajay Hasia (supra) reiterated that Shabarjit Tewary (supra) was rightly decided and the principles in Ajay Hasia (supra) is not rigid and cannot be universally applied. The Apex Court went on to hold that only if the control of the State over such body is deep and pervasive, the same would come within the definition of State. On the other hand, if the control is merely regulatory whether under the Statute or otherwise then it would not serve to make the body a State. 7. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the affairs of the 3rd respondent is not maintainable. 8. On the other hand, if the control is merely regulatory whether under the Statute or otherwise then it would not serve to make the body a State. 7. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the affairs of the 3rd respondent is not maintainable. 8. As far as the plea of the petitioner for a direction to the District Collector who is the Ex-officio President of the 3rd respondent Association, to look into the internal mismanagement of the 3rd respondent Association, is concerned, I am afraid that this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to the 1st respondent who is only the Ex-officio President of the 3rd respondent, which is a society registered under the Provisions of the Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act, 1955. It is now indisputable that no writ petition is maintainable against a Society registered under the provisions of the Travancore Cochin, Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act, 1955. If that be so, the 1st respondent, who is officiating as the Ex-officio President of the 3rd respondent, is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. However the learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the 1st respondent has the authority under the Arms Act and the Rules and, hence, he has the power to look into the affairs of the 3rd respondent. However, I am not impressed by the said plea especially since the relief now sought for against the 1st respondent is not in terms of the provisions under the Arms Act, 1959. No proceedings are now brought on records to show that the petitioner has moved the District Collector, who exercises his power as District Magistrate under the Arms Act, 1959 and Rules framed thereunder. Hence, this Court declines to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on facts of this case. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that by Ext.P6 letter, the petitioner was informed that if the request for purchasing the pistol is approved by the Executive Committee, 3rd respondent shall inform the petitioner regarding the cost and taxes. This according to the petitioner is in violation to provisions of the Arms Act and the Rules. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that by Ext.P6 letter, the petitioner was informed that if the request for purchasing the pistol is approved by the Executive Committee, 3rd respondent shall inform the petitioner regarding the cost and taxes. This according to the petitioner is in violation to provisions of the Arms Act and the Rules. However, this Court cannot test the validity of Ext.P6 in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, if the petitioner’s application for arms licence has been processed and rejected by the authorities constituted under the Arms Act, certainly it will give rise to a cause of action to approach this Court, in which case, the validity of such action could be tested by this Court in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. Be that as it may, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the 3rd respondent has now been de-recognised and it is also brought to the notice of this Court that such de-recognition is separately challenged in a writ petition before this Court. That being so, this Court deems it appropriate to dismiss the writ petition as one not maintainable. This, however, will not preclude the petitioner for agitating his grievance in an appropriate proceeding constituted under the provisions of the Arms Act or under the Travancore Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Act before the appropriate forum. 12. With the above observation this writ petition is dismissed. No order as to the costs.