JUDGMENT : 1. Looking to the similar controversy involved though both the cases were heard on different dates whereas by a common order, they are being disposed of by this Court. Facts of WPS No. 404 of 2024 are narrated hereunder. 2. This petition has been filed by the petitioner to set aside and quash the show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 (Annexure P/1) by which the petitioner has been directed to submit his representation against the proposed action of removal from service and also to quash the whole departmental enquiry proceedings and also to reinstate the petitioner back in service along with all the consequential benefits. 3. The brief facts as reflected from record are that the petitioner applied for the post of drawing and painting teacher and was called for interview on 22.08.1999. The petitioner was selected on the said post vide order dated 21.10.1999. The Principal issued notice to the petitioner on 30.06.2022 (Annexure P/3) and sought explanation regarding incident of argument between him and a student of Class-XII leading to an intense dissension scene. The petitioner submitted reply to the notice on 02.07.2022 (Annexure P/4) explaining that the student is having obnoxious behavior on which the petitioner has given him advice as a teacher to behave oneself even though the student was misbehaving with the teacher in most unfortunate manner, the petitioner was warned by respondent No. 5 vide letter dated 07.07.2022 (Annexure P/5) that if incident is taken place again, action will be initiated against him but all of a sudden, the petitioner was suspended on 20.07.2022 (Annexure P/6) without any reason, without any sanction from the competent authority i.e. respondent No. 2 who is Chairman of Local Management Committee ( for short “the LMC”). 4. It has been further contended that after a month of issuance of suspension order dated 20.07.2022, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner wherein charges levelled against him pertaining to period of 2019 and 2021 and also on the basis of alleged complaint made by Master Swaraj Tiwari for which the petitioner has been reprimanded vide letter dated 07.07.2022. 5. The petitioner submitted reply to the charge-sheet on 12.08.2022 (Annexure P/8) denying the charges levelled against him and has prayed for revocation of suspension order and also prayed for closing of the enquiry proceedings. 5. The petitioner submitted reply to the charge-sheet on 12.08.2022 (Annexure P/8) denying the charges levelled against him and has prayed for revocation of suspension order and also prayed for closing of the enquiry proceedings. Respondent No. 5 & 6 were not satisfied with the explanation given by the petitioner, therefore, respondent No. 6 appointed enquiry officer and presenting officer on 29.07.2022. In pursuance of the order of appointment, the enquiry officer conducted the enquiry and submitted his report to the management. On the basis of the enquiry report which was forwarded to the petitioner on 11.10.2023. The petitioner was directed to submit explanation to the enquiry report. The petitioner has submitted his explanation on 31.10.2023 which was found unsatisfactory, therefore, disciplinary authority issued show cause notice dated 19.12.2023, which is being assailed in this petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that respondent No. 6 who is manager is not appointing authority, as such it cannot be said to be disciplinary authority as petitioner was appointed by respondent No. 3, therefore, initiation of departmental enquiry and further proceeding till the issuance of show cause notice for removal from service void ab initio. He would further submit that departmental enquiry has been conducted in a biased manner with a prejudice to prove the alleged charges, therefore, the same is bad in law as no approval has been granted by respondent No. 2 who is Chairman of the LMC for initiation of departmental enquiry who is ultimate authority to initiate enquiry against any of the staff of D.A.V. Public School, Gevra Project. He would further submit that from bare perusal of the language used in the show cause notice as also the conduct of respondents, it is clear that result of enquiry is pre-determined, which is against principle of natural justice and fair play. He would further submit that the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses by the presenting officer vitiates the whole enquiry as from perusal of the documents produced by the petitioner, it is clear that respondent No.5 was interfering in the enquiry and was pressurizing the witnesses who are subordinate to him. This fact was brought to the notice of higher authorities but it was not remedied. Hence the whole enquiry is bad in law, deserves to be vitiated and would pray for setting aside the impugned show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 (Annexure P/1). 7. This fact was brought to the notice of higher authorities but it was not remedied. Hence the whole enquiry is bad in law, deserves to be vitiated and would pray for setting aside the impugned show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 (Annexure P/1). 7. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and others Vs. V.R. Rudani & others, reported in 1989 (2) SCC 691 , Ratnesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab & other, [Civil Appeal No 8634-2013], Dr. Janet Jeyapaul Vs. SRM University, reported in 2015 (16) SCC 530 , Union of India Vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma, reported in AIRONLINE 2018 SC 527 & the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in case of M.M. Mishra Vs. State of Chhattisgarh [WP No. 1828/2003, decided on 10.01.2018]. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 & 2/SECL opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the appointing & disciplinary authority of the petitioner is DAV and the DAV Schools operative all over in India including the DAV school of Gevra Project are managed under the administrate control of employee of DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi. The DAV is a private, unaided educational institution run-on non-profit basis by DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi which is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. The DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi does not get any financial aid from Government/SECL to run the petitioner school. There is no administrative and financial control of Government/SECL over the affairs of the DAV. The DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi and the School have their own corpus and generate their own funds for running and administering the institute and no financial assistance is given by SECL to DAV Institutions for running, administering, or controlling the concerned school or for payment of salary to the staff and teachers. SECL does not have any control or managerial interference with the management of the said school. He would further submit that in case of "deficit cost" which SECL gives to the DAV for providing training and education to the wards of SECL employees at a subsidized fee, which SECL compensates the school in case of any deficit. SECL does not have any control or managerial interference with the management of the said school. He would further submit that in case of "deficit cost" which SECL gives to the DAV for providing training and education to the wards of SECL employees at a subsidized fee, which SECL compensates the school in case of any deficit. The payment of such deficit cost is not in lieu of any management control over the said school meaning thereby that the loss or deficit caused to the DAV while providing education at a subsidized fee to the wards of SECL employees are compensated by SECL. It is again reiterated that no financial support is extended by SECL for running or administering the school. He would further submit that besides the wards of SECL employees the wards of outside residents are also studying in DAV school, Gevra. It has been contended that merely on the count that SECL is providing some financial assistance for training and education would not in any manner mean that any grant in aid or financial assistance is given by SECL. He would further submit that the SECL as a goodwill measure spends some ex-gratia amount towards maintaining infrastructure conducting, some programmes, functions, etc., therefore, the SECL have representatives in the LMC of the petitioner but merely because of the reason that some officers are ex-officio member of the LMC would not imply that there is financial or administrative control of SECL over the DAV. He would further submit that all the teachers and employees were employed by the DAV Society and they only supervise or control over it. The SECL has no role to play in their disciplinary or service matter. He would further submit that similarly Kendriya Vidyalaya School, Bilaspur is operative within the command Area of South Eastern Railways is operative and may be like SECL. He would further submit that the petitioner has preferred the present petition espousing a private service dispute between him and DAV, the respondent No.3 to 6 and imploded party to SECL respondent No.1 & 2 without its no role in such action against the petitioner. The respondent school is a private entirely governed by its own by-laws, therefore, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction in a matter not evolving a public law and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. The respondent school is a private entirely governed by its own by-laws, therefore, not amenable to the writ jurisdiction in a matter not evolving a public law and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 to 6/DAV opposing the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the DAV. Public School, Gevra is a private institution run, managed and controlled by the DAV College Management Committee, New Delhi, under the Dayanand Auglo Vedic College Trust & Management Society, therefore, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable as it falls within ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that the respondent/SECL have expressly stated in their reply that the DAV College Managing Committee is a private unaided educational institution run on a non-profit basis and is not a recipient of any financial aid from SECL or the Government for the purpose of running of DAV Public School. He would further submit that a writ petition would not be maintainable against respondent institution unless there is a public law element involved. The instant dispute involves an inter-se service between the employer and the employee, therefore, it is purely in the realm of a private dispute. He would further submit that the remedy sought by the petitioner in this petition is a private law remedy and it is settled law that the writ petition would be lie against a private institution/ organization, if there is an element of public law involved. The petitioner is challenging show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 arising out of departmental enquiry, therefore, the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent institution is an inter-se service dispute concerning the conditions of service and the same does not involve any public law element. He would further submit that it is well settled position of law that against the show cause notice, the writ petition is not maintainable as it is premature stage and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. To substantiate this submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in case of Manohar Lal Saha Vs. The Institution of Engineers (India) & others [W.P. No. 2374/2023], Alka Mathur Vs. Shri Shankara Education Society & others [W.P.(S) No. 1969/2023], Smt. Makhmoor Jahan Vs. 10. To substantiate this submission, he would refer to the judgment rendered by this Hon’ble Court in case of Manohar Lal Saha Vs. The Institution of Engineers (India) & others [W.P. No. 2374/2023], Alka Mathur Vs. Shri Shankara Education Society & others [W.P.(S) No. 1969/2023], Smt. Makhmoor Jahan Vs. Secretary, Subhania Anjuman Islamia & others [W.P. No. 4133/2004], Mukul Ranjan Ganguly Vs. Board of Secondary Education & others [W.P. No. 523/1999], Bhuvaneshwari Jaiswal Vs. The Director, D.A.V. College Managing Committee [W.P. (S) No. 3592/2015] and the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of St. Mary’s Education Society & another Vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & others, reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498 , Sushmita Basu & others Vs. Ballygunge Siksha Samity & others, reported in (2006) 7 SCC 680 & Ramesh Ahluwalia Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 331. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents place on record. 12. On the pleading of the parties, the points emerged for determination by this Court are:- (1) Whether against show cause notice, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable or not ? (2) Whether a service dispute espoused by a teacher (staff) of a private educational institution, being a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960, maintainable by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or not? Point No. 1 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the show cause notice dated 19.12.2023 (Annexure P/1) by which removal from service has been proposed is predetermined show cause notice to remove the petitioner, as such the writ petition is maintainable. This was vehemently objected by learned counsel for the respondents and would submit that since it is a show cause notice and it is well settled position of law that writ petition against the show cause notice is not maintainable in view of the various judgments passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. This was vehemently objected by learned counsel for the respondents and would submit that since it is a show cause notice and it is well settled position of law that writ petition against the show cause notice is not maintainable in view of the various judgments passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court. The record of the case would show that the show cause notice has been issued by the disciplinary authority of the institution and the petitioner has not raised about competency of disciplinary authority to issue a show cause notice and in view of well settled position of law that unless the competency of authority to issue show cause notice is raised normally against show cause, the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not maintainable. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Union of India & another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 has held at paragraph 13, 14 & 15 as under:- “13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467 , Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001(10) SCC 639 , State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc. 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or chargesheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet.” 14. In the light of the above stated position, it is held that the against the show cause notice, the writ petition is not maintainable. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered against the petitioner. Point No. 2 15. From the submissions made by the parties, pleadings made by them, it is quite vivid that the DAV Schools operative all over in India and are managed under the administrative control of DAV College Managing Committee, New Dehli which is a private, unaided educational institution run-on non-profit basis by DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi and registered under the Societies Registration Act. The petitioner has not disputed that the DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi is not getting any financial aid either from the Government or SECL to run the school and there is no administrative and financial control of the Government or SECL over the affairs of the DAV. It is also not disputed that the DAV College Managing Committee, New Delhi and the School have their own corpus and generate their own funds for running and administering the institute and no financial assistance is given by SECL to DAV Institutions for running, administering, or controlling the concerned school or for payment of salary to the staff and teachers and providing some financial assistance for maintaining infrastructure or for activity and also on the count that some representatives of SECL are member of the LMC, which does not grant status to the petitioner as an employee of the SECL for maintaining the writ petition of this Court. Even the petitioner has not filed any document to demonstrate that he was employed by the SECL in the school run and managed by DAV Society. 16. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of National Aluminium Company Limited & others Vs. Even the petitioner has not filed any document to demonstrate that he was employed by the SECL in the school run and managed by DAV Society. 16. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of National Aluminium Company Limited & others Vs. Ananta Kishore Rout & others, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 756 has considered the criteria for determining the employee and employer relationship and has held in paragraphs 12 & 13, 24, 28 to 32 as under:- “12. It cannot be disputed that as per these Rules, it is the Managing Committee’s of the schools, which are registered as societies under the Societies Registration Act, undertake the recruitment of the teaching and other staff, issue appointment letters and take all other decisions in respect of the services of teaching and other staff including promotion, pay fixation, seniority, grant of leave, disciplinary action, retirement, termination etc. This has been so demonstrated by NALCO by producing copies of the orders issued by the MCs relating to each of the aforesaid aspects. Not only this, it has been so provided under the Rules as well. Rule 4 prescribes the method of recruitment; Rule 2(a) defines the appointing as MC; Rule 4(11) deals with the cadre of posts; Rule 20 touches the aspect of termination of service; and Rule 24 deals with the discipline and disciplinary action. 13. From these facts, narrated above, one can easily find out as to what are the respective cases of both the parties. The employees of both schools filed the writ petitions to lay the claim that they are the employees of the NALCO on the ground that real control and supervision of the schools, including the staff is that of NALCO which has the final say in all vital matters. It was their argument that though the appointments are made by the Managing Committees of the schools, it is on the recommendation of the Selection Committee of which the authorities of NALCO are the members. Further, since inception of the school, an officer in the rank of General Manager of NALCO has been functioning as the President of the Managing Committee, and an officer in the rank of Chief Manager/DGM (Personal Admn.), and the DGM (Finance) are the other two members. That apart, the building furniture/fittings and all necessary paraphernalia for running of the schools is provided by and is the responsibility of NALCO. That apart, the building furniture/fittings and all necessary paraphernalia for running of the schools is provided by and is the responsibility of NALCO. Even the finances are provided by NALCO the financial budget is approved by the Board of Director of the NALCO. NALCO even fixes the tuition fee. No transaction of the schools can be made without the approval of DGM (Finance), NALCO which includes the expenditure with regard to the salary component, provident fund, medical reimbursement, leave travel concession, festival advance, increments, etc. Teaching and non-teaching staff of the schools are allotted with residential quarters by the NALCO. It was thus argued that NALCO plays a decisive role in the matter of appointment of the employees as well as in the management of the schools. 24. Merely because the schools are set up by NALCO or they have agreed to take care of the financial deficits for the running of the schools, according to us, are not the conclusive factors. Such aspects have been considered by this Court in various cases. In the case of RBI (Supra), question was as to whether workers of the canteens which were established and even financed by the RBI, were the workers of RBI. Various canteens were set up by the RBI which were being run through a Cooperative Society. They were established in the Bank's premises for the benefit of its employees. The Bank was reimbursing the charges incurred in getting various statutory licenses. Even prior permission of the RBI was required to increase the strength of the employees. Holding that these canteen workers were not the employees of RBI, the court observed: “10. The Bank does not supervise or control the working of the canteens or the supply of eatables to employees. The employees are not under an obligation to purchase eatables from the canteen. There is no relationship of master and servant between the Bank and the various persons employed in the canteens aforesaid. The Bank does not carry any trade or business in the canteens. The staff canteens are established only as a welfare measure. Similar demands made by the staff canteen employees and the request made to the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication was rejected by the Central Government and the challenge against the same before the Calcutta High Court was unsuccessful. The staff canteens are established only as a welfare measure. Similar demands made by the staff canteen employees and the request made to the Central Government to refer the dispute for adjudication was rejected by the Central Government and the challenge against the same before the Calcutta High Court was unsuccessful. According to the Bank, it has no statutory or other obligation to run the canteens and it has no direct control or supervision over the employees engaged in the canteens. It has not right to take any disciplinary action or to direct any canteen employee to do a particular work. The disciplinary control over the persons employed in the canteens does not vest in the Bank nor has the Bank any say or control regarding the allocation or work or the way in which the work is carried out by the said employees. Sanctioning of leave, distribution of work, maintenance of the Attendance Register are all done either by the Implementation Committee (Canteen Committee) or by the Cooperative Society or by the contractor.” 28. More significant case, having close proximity with the present one is the judgment in SC Chandra & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors. 2007 (8) SCC 279 . In that case Hindustan Copper Limited (HCL), the Government of India enterprise, had established a school. Employees of that school claimed that their real employer was HCL. Admitted facts were that school was established by the HCL with the object of benefiting children of the workers of the HCL. Even the financial assistance was provided to the schools. The Court however, came to the conclusion that only by giving financial assistance the HCL did not become the employer of teachers and staff working in the school. They were held to be the employees of the Managing Committee of the school. That apart of the discussion which has direct bearing on the present case runs as follows:- “8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The basic question before us is whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against the management of HCL. The learned Single Judge relying on the Division Bench in an identical matter pertaining to Bharat Cooking Coal Limited dismissed the writ petition of the appellants. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The basic question before us is whether a writ of mandamus could be issued against the management of HCL. The learned Single Judge relying on the Division Bench in an identical matter pertaining to Bharat Cooking Coal Limited dismissed the writ petition of the appellants. This issue was examined in an analogous writ petition and in the aforesaid case, this issue was extensively considered as to whether the management of the school is the direct responsibility of HCL or not. After considering the matter in detail, the learned Single Judge relying on the aforesaid judgment found that there is no relationship of master and servant with that of the teachers and other staff of the school with HCL as the management of the school was done by the Managing Committee though liberal financial grant was being made by the Corporation. By that there was no direct connection of the management of HCL with that of the management of the school. Though through various communication an impression was sought to be given that the school is being run by HCL but in substance HCL only used to provide financial assistance to the school but the management of the school was entirely different than the management of HCL. Giving financial assistance does not necessarily mean that all the teachers and staff who are working in the school have become the employees of HCL. Therefore, we are of the view that the view taken by the learned Single Judge appears to be correct that there was no relationship of the management of HCL with that of the management of the school though most of the employees of HCL were in the Managing Committee of the school. But by that no inference can be drawn that the school had bee n established by HCL. The children of workers of HCL were being benefited by the education imparted by this school. Therefore the management of HCL was giving financial aid but by that it cannot be construed that the school was run by the management of HCL. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge appears to be correct.” 29. Therefore the management of HCL was giving financial aid but by that it cannot be construed that the school was run by the management of HCL. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge appears to be correct.” 29. From the reading of Para 20 in that judgment it can be discerned that the Managing Committee which was managing the school was treated as an independent body. This case is relevant on the second aspect as well viz. the claim of school employees predicate upon the financial burden that is assured by NALCO. To that aspect we shall advert to little later in some detail. 30. No doubt, there may be some element of control of NALCO because of the reason that its officials are nominated to the Managing Committees of the schools. Such provisions are made to ensure that schools runs smoothly and properly by the society. It also becomes necessary to ensure that the money is appropriately spent. However, this kind of 'remote control' would not make NALCO as the employer of these workers. This only shows that since NALCO is shouldering and meeting the financial deficits, it wants to ensure that money is spent for rightful purposes. 31. It was argued that the Managing Committee cannot be the employer as it would lose its identity on the termination of agreement between NALCO and SVS. However, even that by itself cannot be the determinative factor. When the agreement was earlier entered into between NALCO and CCMT, and staff was appointed in the school by CCMT, NALCO ensured that such staff is taken over by SVS. For this purpose a specific clause is provided in agreement between NALCO and SVS which reads as under: “That if any of the parties hereto at any time wishes to terminate this arrangement, it may do so on giving of least six months prior notice in writing to the other party, of such an intention, provided that such termination shall be effective only at the close of the academic session. Provided further that in the event of such termination, the services of the staff employed by the school shall, subject to any agreement to the contrary between the two parties hereto, be terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment in the Chinmaya Vidyalaya, Damanjodi.” 32. Provided further that in the event of such termination, the services of the staff employed by the school shall, subject to any agreement to the contrary between the two parties hereto, be terminated in accordance with the terms of their appointment in the Chinmaya Vidyalaya, Damanjodi.” 32. Only because SVS agreed to take over the employees, would not mean that NALCO becomes the employer. On the contrary, this clause suggests that but for the intervention of NALCO, the school staff that was engaged by CCMT would have been dealt with by CCMT. It is a matter of record that CCMT runs other schools as well. In that eventuality it would have taken these employees with themselves or retrench these employees in accordance with law. Same is the position of SVS who have other schools also. However, this kind of situation is not going to arise in the present case. We place on record the assurance given by the learned Senior Counsels appearing for NALCO that the teaching and other staff of the two schools would not lose their jobs even if present agreement of NALCO with SVS comes to an end and the management is taken over by some other agency for running the schools. We direct that NALCO shall stand committed by this assurance and would adhere to the same for all times to come. The position which emerges, in view of the aforesaid assurance, is that the service tenure of these employees is protected.” 17. Again Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of St. Mary's Educational Institute (supra) in paragraph 75 has held as under:- “75. We may sum up our final conclusions as under:- 75.1 An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. 75.2 Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. 75.3 It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a "public function" or "public duty" be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service. 75.4 Even if it be perceived that imparting education by private unaided the school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non-teaching staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of contract between a school and non-teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non-teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered by the court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in discharge of public duty. 75.5 From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element and writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character.” 18. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is answered against the petitioner and it is held that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by employee of the educational society, is not maintainable before this Court. 19. From the above stated legal position, it is quite vivid that writ petition assailing the show cause notice of termination by teaching staff of unaided private institution is not maintainable as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of National Aluminium Company Limited (supra) & St. Mary's Educational Institute (supra) and also on the count that against the show cause notice, the writ petition is not maintainable. Therefore, the writ petition for these reasons is not maintainable. This writ petition is disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to take remedy available to him under law before appropriate forum. 20. Mary's Educational Institute (supra) and also on the count that against the show cause notice, the writ petition is not maintainable. Therefore, the writ petition for these reasons is not maintainable. This writ petition is disposed of granting liberty to the petitioner to take remedy available to him under law before appropriate forum. 20. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observation with regard to the merit of the case. The facts which have been discussed above are only with regard to determination of points crop up in the matter. The authorities are directed to decide the matter in accordance with law without being influenced from any of the observation made by this Court. 21. With this observation and liberty granted in favour of the petitioner, both the writ petitions are disposed of.