JUDGMENT : The plaintiff is before this Court in the Regular Second Appeal assailing the legality and correctness of the judgment and decree dated 24.04.2010 in RA No.75/2007 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Gulbarga (Hereinafter referred to as ‘first Appellate Court’ for the sake of convenience), confirming the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2002 in O.S. No.38/2003 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) at Aland (Hereinafter referred to as ‘trial Court’ for the sake of convenience), whereby, the suit seeking for declaration and possession was dismissed by the Courts below. 2. Parties herein are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. This Court while admitting the appeal on 31.08.2020 framed the following substantial questions of law, which reads as under: “i. Whether the Courts below committed an error in construing the order dated 12.08.1981 passed by the Land Tribunal, Aland as a grant to the family or whether it was self-acquisition of the plaintiff? ii. Whether withdrawal of O.S. No.132/1990 debarred the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit?” 4. Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Sri Vikram Vijayakumar and Sri D. P. Ambekar, learned counsels for the respondents are heard on the substantial questions of law framed by this Court. 5. It is the argument of Sri Ameet Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, that withdrawal of the suit in O.S. No.132/1990 was in the nature of the prosecuting the other suit which was filed for partition and separate possession and the withdrawal of the suit in O.S.No.132/1990 is not abandonment of the claim of the plaintiff and the plaintiff is not precluded from filing the fresh suit. Taking this Court to Order XXIII Rule 1 and Rule 1(4)(a) of Civil Code of Procedure (for short ‘the CPC’), the decision of Himachal High Court in the case of Smt. Nirmala Vs. Harisingh, (2001) Himachal Pradesh 1 and Mumbai High Court in the case of Surjansingh v. Smt. Jasbir Kaur and Ors., 2008 A I H C 1328 learned Senior Counsel submits that the subject matter not only includes the property, but also the cause of action and the suit with a “different cause of action” is not barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(a) CPC, even though the suit is in respect of the same property. Learned Senior Counsel submits that O.S. No.207/1995 (present suit) is filed in light of the intervening facts, which gives the appellants/plaintiffs a new cause of action. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the trial Court answered issue No.7 holding that the present suit is not barred by provision of Order XXIII Rule 1 and Rule 1(4)(a) CPC and the first Appellate Court, without assigning any reasons, has held that the suit is barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(a) CPC and the substantial question of law No.2 needs to be answered in favour of the appellant/plaintiff. 6. Regarding substantial question of law No.1, learned Senior Counsel taking this Court to Ex.D.10 and D.11 Form No.1 filed by Gurubasayya, the Mathadipathi for grant of occupancy rights, submitted that the application filed by Gurubasayya is in his individual capacity as tenant for his own benefit and not as a holder of the Matha. The re-grant to Gurubasayya is in his individual capacity and the suit lands were personally cultivated till his death. Gurubasayya died unmarried and the plaintiff being the real brother succeeds to property of Gurubasayya, as the grant in favour of Gurubasayya was in his individual capacity and not as Mathadipathi. Leaned Senior Counsel taking this Court to Sections 25 to 28 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 (herein after referred to as “the Act” for short) submits that the said provisions of the Act does not disentitle any person who becomes a Sanyasi from acquiring any property. 7. Urging these grounds learned Senior Counsel submits that the substantial questions of law need to be answered in faovur of the appellant/plaintiff. 8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, taking to the plaint averments, contends that no different cause of action is disclosed or made out by the plaintiff to maintain the present suit and the plaint in the present suit is verbatim of the previous suit and the suit is not maintainable/barred in light of the Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(a) CPC and superfluous reasons are assigned for withdrawal of the suit by the plaintiff. 9. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that the suit lands were granted to Gurubasayya as a Mathadipathi after he has taken Sanyasa, the lands granted to Gurubasayya is not in his individual capacity, but under the Inam Abolition Act to the agricultural lands owned by the Mathadipathi and the plaintiff cannot be succeed by an ascetic – one who enters into religious order severs his connection with the members of his natural family. In support of his contention, learned counsel relies upon the following decisions: i. SHRI KRISHNA SINGH Versus MATHURA AHIR AND OTHERS, (1981) 3 Supreme Court Cases 689 ii. MATH SAUNA AND OTHERS V. KEDARNATH ALIAS UMA SHANKAR AND OTHERS, AIR 1981 SUPREME COURT 1878 iii. VALLABH DAS V. DR. MADANLAL AND OTHERS, AIR 1970 SUPREME COURT 987 10. During the course of the arguments, learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellant apprehends that subsequent Mathadipathi will use the grant of land for his own benefit. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 on instructions from respondent No.1/defendant No.3, who is present before the Court, submits that the suit properties are the properties of the Matha and not the individual properties of the Mathadipathi. The said submission is recorded. 11. For the sake of convenience and for better understating, the 2nd substantial question of law is first taken for consideration. 2nd Substantial question of law: 12. In order to answer the 2nd substantial question of law, the relevant provisions of CPC needs to be placed: i. Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC reads as under: “1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.— (1) At any time after, the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim: Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other person to whom the provisions contained in rules 1 to 14 of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court. (2) An application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend and also, if the minor or such other person is represented by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor or such other person. (3) Where the Court is satisfied— (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. (4) Where the plaintiff— (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. (5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the Court to permit one of the several plaintiffs to abandon a suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw, under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the consent of the other plaintiffs.” ii. Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC reads as under: “3A. Bar to suit-No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.” 13. Plain reading of Rule 1 and Rule 1(4)(a) of Order XXIII CPC enables the plaintiff at any time after the institution of the suit to abandon his suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1) he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim. Order XXIII permits the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit brought by him with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject matter of that suit on such terms as it thinks fit. The expression “subject matter” in Order XXIII Rule 1 means a bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. It refers to the right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the subsequent suit and the previous suit are not the same, the subsequent suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject matter as the previous suit. 14. Coming to the facts of the instant case, Ex.D3 is the plaint in previous suit O.S. No.132/1990. The suit is instituted by Siddalingayya (plaintiff herein), the prayer sought in the said suit was for declaration, to declare the plaintiff as owner of suit lands bearing Sy.No.28 measuring 21 acres 17 guntas and Sy.No.12 measuring 19 acres 6 guntas of Village Bhusnoor, Taluk Aland, District Gulbarga and for possession, the cause of action in earlier suit arose on 15.09.1981, when Gurubasayya expired and immediate cause of action arose in the year 1985 when the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit lands. 15. Ex.D.4 is the petition/application filed under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC for withdrawal of the suit. Ex.D.4 reads as under: “A suit for partition and separate possession of the suit properties i.e. Sy.No.28 and sy. No.12 of Bhusnoor has been filed in the Munsiff Court, Aland in O.S.No.91/93 and the same is rending. The said suit of O.S.No.91/93 has been filed by Revansiddayya who is defendant No.1 of the suit. I have been added as defendant No.1 in O.S. No.91/93 before the Munsiff Magisterate, Aland. In view of the suit for partition filed by Revansiddayya in O.S.No.91/93 in Munsiff Magistrate, Court, Aland. I donot want to proceed with this suit. PRAYER Hence, prayed that in view of the partition suit pending in Munsiff Magistrate Court, Aland, Permission may kindly be accorded to the Plaintiff to withdraw this suit in the interest of justice.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. Ex.D.5 is the order passed in O.S.No.132/1990, wherein, the permission was granted to Siddalingayya to withdraw the suit. PRAYER Hence, prayed that in view of the partition suit pending in Munsiff Magistrate Court, Aland, Permission may kindly be accorded to the Plaintiff to withdraw this suit in the interest of justice.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. Ex.D.5 is the order passed in O.S.No.132/1990, wherein, the permission was granted to Siddalingayya to withdraw the suit. The relevant portion of the order reads as under: “In this case an application Under Or. 23 R 1 CPC is filed seeking permission to withdraw the suit. It is stated therein that a suit for partition and separate possession of the Sy.No.28 and 12 of Bhusnoor village has been filed before the Munsiff-Court, Aland in O.S.No.91/1993 and the same is pending and in the said suit the 1st defendant is the pltff. and the plaintiff herein is the 1st defendant. Therefore in view of the said suit pending, the plaintiff is not pressing this suit and therefore the same may be dismissed. The other side has pressed for compensatory costs of Rs.2000/- According to him the suit has been filed on false ground and some important issues were there in this suit which ought to have been suitably replied. I do not see any serious objection by the other side not to grant permission to withdraw the suit. They are withdrawing the suit unconditionally. Further pendency of the suit for partition before the learned Munsiff, Aland is not in dispute. Hence, the following order. ORDER The application is allowed. The suit is permitted to be withdrawn. Accordingly it is dismissed as withdrawn. No costs.”(Emphasis supplied) 17. Ex.D.6 is the order sheet in O.S. No.91/1993 filed by Revanasiddyya seeking partition and separate possession and the suit of the plaintiff therein was dismissed as abated on 31.10.2003. The present suit came to be filed on 27.08.1997 and the old number was O.S.No.225/1997 and renumbered now as O.S.No.38/2003. Paras-16 and 17 of the plaint reads as under: “16. The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration and possession in respect of the suit land against the defendants no. O.S.No.132/90. However the defendant No.1 herein filed a suit for partition and separate possession against the present plaintiff and the defendants in O.S.No. 207/95. The plaintiff was wrongly advised that he would get possession in that suit. The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration and possession in respect of the suit land against the defendants no. O.S.No.132/90. However the defendant No.1 herein filed a suit for partition and separate possession against the present plaintiff and the defendants in O.S.No. 207/95. The plaintiff was wrongly advised that he would get possession in that suit. Therefore the plaintiff filed an application to withdraw the suit U/O 23 Rule 1 C.P.C. The court permitted the plaintiff to withdraw the suit. The suit was withdrawn without any decision on merits. Therefore the earlier withdrawal will not bar the present suit and the earlier withdrawal will not operate as res-judicata. The relief of possession is still in type. Therefore the plaintiff has a right to file this suit and can maintain the suit. 17. The plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit land in first week of September 1985. The present suit filed within 12 years of the date of the dispossession. Therefore the suit is in time.” (Emphasis supplied) 18. Perusal of the plaint averments indicate that no different cause of action is pleaded and the entire plaint averments are verbatim of the previous suit and more particularly, the cause of action mentioned in the present suit. It is necessary to state here that before the dismissal of the suit for partition in O.S.No.91/1993, the present suit has been instituted by the plaintiff on 27.08.1997. On perusal of Ex.D.4 and Ex.D.5 it clearly indicates that the plaintiff withdrew the suit unconditionally without obtaining the leave of the Court to institute a fresh suit. The bundle of facts which has to be proved which refers to the “subject matter” in Order XXIII Rule 1 and the cause of action and the relief claimed in the instant suit and previous suit are one and the same, the second suit cannot be brought in respect of the “same subject matter” without obtaining liberty to file fresh suit in respect of “such subject matter”. 19. The present suit is barred under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(a) CPC. The Apex Court in the case of Vallabdas stated supra has held at paragraph No.5 as under: “5. 19. The present suit is barred under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(a) CPC. The Apex Court in the case of Vallabdas stated supra has held at paragraph No.5 as under: “5. Rule 1, Order 23, Code of Civil Procedure entitles Courts to permit a plaintiff to withdraw from the suit brought by him with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of that suit on such terms as it thinks fit. The term imposed on the plaintiff in the previous suit was that before bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action, he must pay the costs of the defendants. Therefore we have to see whether that condition governs the institution of the present suit. For deciding that question we have to see whether the suit from which this appeal arises is in respect of the same subject-matter that was in litigation in the previous suit. The expression "subject-matter" is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It does not mean property. That expression has a reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit. Now coming to the case before us in the first suit Dr. Madan Lal was seeking to enforce his right to partition and separate possession. In the present suit he seeks to get possession of the suit properties from a trespasser on the basis of his title. In the first suit the cause of action was the division of the status between Dr. Madan Lal and his adoptive father and the relief claimed was the conversion of joint possession into separate possession. In the present suit the plaintiff is seeking possession of the suit properties from a trespasser. In the first case his cause of action arose on the day he got separated from his family. In the present suit the cause of action, namely, the series of transactions which formed the basis of his title to the suit properties, arose on the death of his adoptive father and mother. In the first case his cause of action arose on the day he got separated from his family. In the present suit the cause of action, namely, the series of transactions which formed the basis of his title to the suit properties, arose on the death of his adoptive father and mother. It is true that both in the previous suit as well as in the present suit the factum and validity of adoption of Dr. Madan Lal came up for decision. But that adoption was not the cause of action in the first nor is it the cause of action in the present suit. It was merely an antecedent even which conferred certain rights on him. Mere identity of some of the issues in the two suits does not bring about an identity of the subject matter in the two suits. As observed in Rakhma Bai v. Mahadeo Narayan, ILR 42 BOM 155, the expression "subject matter" in Order 23, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure means the series of acts or transactions alleged to exist giving rise to the relief claimed. In other words "subject matter" means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. We accept as correct the observations of Wallis C.J. in Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, ILR 39 Mad 987 that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject matter as the first suit.” 20. The judgment relied by the learned Senior Counsel in the case of Surjansingh stated supra is distinguishable as in the said case, the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit were not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit and therefore, in that circumstances, the Court observed that the suit filed by the appellant therein was not barred and hence, the said decision is not applicable to the present facts. 21. The Apex Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service Vs. 21. The Apex Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P. Gwalior and Others Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior, and Ors., (1987) 1 SCC 5 has held at para No.7 as under: “7. The Code as it now stands thus makes a distinction between ‘abandonment’ of a suit and 'withdrawal' from a suit with permission to file a fresh suit. It provides that where the plaintiff abandons a suit or withdraws from a suit without the permission, referred to in sub- rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code, he shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim. The principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the court to file fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will loose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reason the Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained in Section 11 of the Code which provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue is a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yet the Code provides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order XXI of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. For the forgoing reasons the 2nd substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered against the appellant holding that the suit of the plaintiff is barred under Rule 1(4)(a) of Order XXIII CPC. 1st Substantial question of law: 23. It is necessary to cull out the family pedigree which is as under: 24. At the cost of repetition, it is necessary to state few relevant facts. The practice in the family of late Sanganabasayya is that one of the son of the family should be installed as a Mathadipathi of the Matha at Bhusnoor and remain unmarried and others could marry and lead married life. Accordingly, late Gurusiddayya S/o Sanganabasayya was installed as Mathadipathi and after his death, Gurubasayya S/o Revayya the grand-son of Sanganabasayya was made as the Mathadipathi and other son of Revayya lead married life. The plaintiff – Siddalingayya is the real brother of Gurubasayya-who was the Mathadipathi of the Math, the suit lands were inam lands attached to the services of the Matha and Gurubasayya-Mathadipathi filed application for grant of occupancy rights in his name as tenant, which was granted by the Land Tribunal. The claim of the plaintiff is that though Gurubasayya was the Mathadipathi of the Matha and the suit lands were the service inam lands attached to the service of Matha and the grant of occupancy rights in the name of Gurubasayya was of personal cultivation and occupation till his death and on his death, the other brothers succeeded since Gurubasayya had died unmarried. 25. Exs.D.10 and 11 are the Form No.1 filed by Gurubasayya, in the application the name of the applicant is shown as Gurubasayya Gurusiddayya. 25. Exs.D.10 and 11 are the Form No.1 filed by Gurubasayya, in the application the name of the applicant is shown as Gurubasayya Gurusiddayya. Ex.D.12 is Form No.2 the registration certificate of Inamdar/tenant as occupant of the land was issued in favour of Gurubasayya Gurusiddayya. One material aspect that is noted by this Court is the mentioning of the applicants name in Form No.1 as Gurubasayya Gurusiddayya which clearly indicates that Gurusiddayya was the earlier Mathadipati and after his demise, Gurubasayya succeeded to become the Mathadipati of the Matha. Thus, Form No.1 was filed by Gurubasayya when he was a Mathadipathi (Sanyasi). The law is well settled that one who enters into the religious order, severs his connection with the members of his natural family. He is accordingly excluded from inheritance. Neither he nor his family members or his natural relatives can succeed to each other’s property. In other words, “a person who become a Sanyasi, he renounces his world”, in other words, it is a civil death. 26. The Apex Court in Krishna Singh’s case stated supra has held at paragraph Nos.30 and 31 and 64 as under: “30. The law is well settled that succession to mahantship of a math or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment: vide Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri [1886] 13 Indp Appellant 100 (PC) 31. One who enters into a religious order severs his connection with the members of his natural family. He is accordingly excluded from inheritance. Entrance to a religious order, is tantamount to civil death so as to cause a complete severance of his connection with his relations, as well as with his property. Neither he nor his natural relatives can succeed to each other's properties. Any property which may be subsequently acquired by persons adopting religious orders passes to their religious relations. The persons who are excluded on this ground come under three heads, the Vanaprastha or hermit; the Sanyasi or Yati, or ascetic, and the Brahmachari, or perpetual religious student. In order to bring a person under these heads it is necessary to show an absolute abandonment by him of all secular property, and a complete and final withdrawal from earthly affairs. In order to bring a person under these heads it is necessary to show an absolute abandonment by him of all secular property, and a complete and final withdrawal from earthly affairs. The mere fact that a person calls himself a Byragi, or religious mendicant, or indeed that he is such, does not of itself disentitle him to succeed to property. Nor does any Sudra come under this disqualification, unless by usage. This civil death does not prevent the person who enters into an order from acquiring and holding private property which will devolve, not of course upon his natural relations, but according to special rules of inheritance. But it would be otherwise if there is no civil death in the eye of the law, but only the holding by a man of certain religious opinions or professions. Special rules are propounded for succession to the property of a hermit, of an ascetic, and of a professed student. Yajnavalkya states a special rule of succession in regard to the wealth of ascetics and the like: "The heirs who take the wealth of a Vanaprastha (a hermit), of a Yati (an ascetic) and a Brahmachari (a student) are in their order, the preceptor, the virtuous pupil, and one who is supposed brother and belonging to the same order". The Mitakshara explains thus: "A spiritual brother belonging to the same hermitage (dharmabhratrekatirthi) takes the goods of the hermit (vanaprastha). A virtuous pupil (sacchishya) takes the property of a yati (as ascetic). The preceptor (acharya) is heir to the Brahmachari (professed student). But on failure of these, any one belonging to the same order or hermitage takes the property; even though sons and other natural heirs exist. 64. In order to prove that a person has adopted the life of a sanyasi, it must be shown that he has actually relinquished and abandoned all worldly possessions and relinquished all desire for them or that such ceremonies are performed which indicate the severance of his natural family and his secular life. It must also be proved, in case of orthodox sanyasis, that necessary ceremonies have been performed, such as Pindadana or Biraja Homa or Prajapathiyesthi without which the renunciation will not be complete. ” (Emphasis supplied) 27. It must also be proved, in case of orthodox sanyasis, that necessary ceremonies have been performed, such as Pindadana or Biraja Homa or Prajapathiyesthi without which the renunciation will not be complete. ” (Emphasis supplied) 27. The Apex Court observed that when a Sanyasi enters into a religious order, is a tantamount to civil death, so as to cause a complete severance of his connection with his relations, as well as with his property. This civil death does not prevent the person who enters into an order from acquiring and holding private property which will devolve, not of course upon his natural relations, but according to the special rules of inheritance and the “normal line of succession then gets broken”. 28. Bearing in mind the principles laid down in Krishna Singh’s case stated supra, the facts in this present appeal can be gathered that Gurubasayya when he was serving as a Mathadipathi filed an application for grant of occupancy rights, the Land Tribunal granted occupancy rights in favour of Gurubasayya and the grant in faovur of Gurubasayya is not in his individual capacity but as the Mathadipati and the grant is for the benefit of the Matha. 29. The 1st substantial question of law framed by this Court is answered holding that the order of the Land Tribunal granting occupancy right in favour of Gurubasayya is as a Mathadipathi and not in his individual capacity. The plaintiff is not entitled for declaration as prayed and accordingly, 1st substantial question of law is answered against the appellant. Accordingly, this Court pass the following: ORDER (i) The Regular Second Appeal is hereby dismissed. (ii) The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court stands confirmed.