JUDGMENT : The present civil miscellaneous appeal is listed in Defects category. 2. As per office report, the appeal is time barred by 822 days and the appellant has preferred an application (IA No.1/22) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the delay in filing the appeal is not intentional. It is further submitted that due to COVID-19, the appellants could not send documents to the counsel. Further, the brother of appellant no. 2 died and due to demise of the appellant’s brother, the appellants could not prefer the present appeal within time. It is thus prayed that the present application may be allowed and the delay in filing the present appeal may be condoned. 4. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and perused the material available on record. 5. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that the learned Additional District Judge, Gulabpura, District Bhilwara passed the impugned order on 17.07.2019 in presence of learned counsel for the appellants-respondents. The appellants applied for the certified copy of the impugned judgment 05.07.2021 i.e. approximately after 2 years of passing of the impugned judgment and it was delivered to appellants on 08.07.2021. The present appeal was thereafter filed on 14.01.2022. However, no cogent reasons have been put forth by the appellant as to why he could not get certified copy of the judgment for such a long period and file the instant appeal within the period of limitation. The argument of the learned counsel that the appellants were prevented by COVID-19 from filing the appeal within limitation, cannot be termed as ‘sufficient cause’ so as to condone the delay of 822 days. The effect of COVID-19 started in March 2020 and the impugned judgment was passed on 17.07.2019. Further, the certified copy was received by the appellants on 08.07.2021 and the present appeal was filed on 14.01.2022 i.e after more than six months. Such conduct of the appellants shows that the appellants have not been diligent in pursuing their case. 6. In Basawraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “15. Such conduct of the appellants shows that the appellants have not been diligent in pursuing their case. 6. In Basawraj v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi and Ors. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260 has discussed as under: “17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is observed and held as under:— In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.” 18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran(supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed as under:— “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”” 8. It is a settled principle of law that generally justice should not be denied merely on technical grounds but if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, such delay ought not to be condoned unless the applicant is able to satisfy the court that he was prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ from prosecuting the case. Since no sufficient reasons have been put forth by the learned counsel for the appellants to explain the delay in applying for the certified copy of judgment after approximately 2 years of judgment and thereafter in filing the present appeal which is barred by 822 days, it appears that the appellant was negligent in pursuing his case. Thus, in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or even an appropriate explanation, the present application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed. 9. Consequently, the present application for condonation of delay and the appeal are hereby dismissed. 10. The stay application, if any also stands dismissed. 11. No order as to costs.