JUDGMENT : G. Narendar, J. 1. Heard Sri P.V.Krishnaiah, learned counsel for the Appellant. 2. The Writ Appeal was listed in the Forenoon session and Sri G.Raju, learned Advocate is represented on behalf of Sri P.V.Krishnaiah, learned Counsel for the Appellant. The learned Counsel Sri G.Raju and the learned Counsel for the respondents were heard in the Forenoon session and the Court made it clear to the learned Counsel that the Writ Appeal was not maintainable as the Appellant had no locus standi to question the interim order granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court in a petition preferred by the Respondent impugning the order of the Disciplinary Authority. 3. At this juncture, the learned Counsel sought time and this Court put the learned Counsel on notice stating that it had no objection for granting time and hearing the petition further, but in the event the Appellant is unable to convince this Court with regard to the locus standi of the Petitioner to impugn the interim order granted by this Court, the Appeal would be dismissed by imposing exemplary costs. Despite the same, the Counsel had sought for passing over the matter. 4. When the Appeal was called out in the Afternoon session, Sri P.V.Krishnaiah, learned Counsel on record, would appear and contend that the Appellant be heard as the appeal is maintainable and Appellant has a locus standi on the ground that the interim order is not sustainable in law and that is ground enough to maintain the same. 5. Upon hearing, Sri P.V.Krishnaiah, learned Counsel, would reiterate the arguments that were canvassed in the Forenoon session i.e., the interim order granted by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition has come in the way of the Appellant from being promoted. The Appellant being next in the line in the order of seniority behind the Respondent and the Respondent having suffered a punishment, the path had opened up to the Appellant to be promoted to the promotional post. But on account of the interim order granted by the learned Single Judge, the promotional path of the Appellant has been closed and that the interim order suffers from various lacunas and hence, the learned Single Judge has seriously erred in granting the interim order of this nature and that too after a prolonged period. But on account of the interim order granted by the learned Single Judge, the promotional path of the Appellant has been closed and that the interim order suffers from various lacunas and hence, the learned Single Judge has seriously erred in granting the interim order of this nature and that too after a prolonged period. The later part of the arguments is clearly on the merits of the order. 6. Learned Counsels were clearly put on notice by this Court with regard to the maintainability and they were also put on notice that if another round of hearing was to be granted to them, the Appellant would be visited with exemplary costs. Despite the said fact, the Counsels have insisted that they be heard again resulting in this Court extending time which otherwise could have been profitably utilized to hear another case. 7. We have queried the learned Counsel for the Appellant as to whether the right to promotion is a vested right, to which the learned Counsel has fairly submitted that it is not a vested right but the party has a right to be considered for promotion. We have also queried the learned Counsel for the Appellant as to whether the employer has intimated him that his case for promotion is not being considered in the light of the interim order granted by this Court, to which also the learned Counsel would fairly submit that there is no such intimation nor any endorsement issued by his employer. He would in fact state that no employer would issue such a clarification or issue such intimation that the case of the juniors is not being considered for leapfrogging a senior because of any interim order by the Court. To state the least, the said statement that no employer would express inability or helplessness to grant promotion contrary to any interim order, appears to be ill-founded. It is well known fact that the State and its functionaries are duty bound to obey the orders issued by the Courts and more so when the order is injunctive in nature or the order is of such nature that binds or ties down the employer from conferring any benefit to any other person and where the order is at the instance of an aggrieved party. 8. 8. It is not the case of the Appellant that any proceedings have been conducted or that he has been shortlisted or that the competent committee like the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) has recommended his name for being considered for promotion. Even if that were to be the case and the name of the Appellant had been considered but no promotions have been granted, the employer would be completely justified in the light of the interim order. 9. It is not the case of the Appellant that the employer or the competent authority is not arrayed as a party. Apparently, the Appellant has no stakes in the order imposing punishment. His mere position as a junior in the pecking order by itself would not confer a right for him to step into the shoes of the Disciplinary Authority or the Competent Authority to defend the correctness of the order imposing any punishment. 10. Admittedly, the Petitioner is the senior and the Appellant is his junior and it is not the case of the Appellant that he is entitled to leapfrog the Petitioner on account of any independent right vested for him. 11. In the usual course, the Appellant would be entitled for consideration only after the Petitioner has been considered for promotion or along with the Petitioner. If the stand of the Appellant is accepted, it would result in an explosion of dockets where all internecine wars that are being fought out in the offices, would be fought out in the Court rooms. Today, it would be the immediate junior, the next day it would be the junior after, the day after that would be the junior after his junior and so on and so forth and it would be an endless round of litigation whereby the hands of this Court could get tied down resulting in a piquant situation where a person who otherwise is entitled to have his case considered on merits would be deprived of a hearing in view of the successive petitions being filed which would result in stalling the hearing endlessly. That apart, if the Appeal is accepted, it would virtually amount to turning the proceedings into a public litigation which is unknown to service jurisprudence. 12. That apart, if the Appeal is accepted, it would virtually amount to turning the proceedings into a public litigation which is unknown to service jurisprudence. 12. In view of the above reasoning, we are of the considered opinion that the Appellant has no locus standi to maintain the Appeal much less demand opportunity of being heard in the Writ Petition. 13. In that view of the matter, I.A.No.2 of 2024 and the Writ Appeal are dismissed with costs quantified at Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty five thousand only). The costs shall be deposited with the Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of release of this Order, failing which the Registrar General shall take necessary steps to recover the same. There shall be no order as to costs. In view of the disposal of the Writ Appeal, the pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.