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2024 DIGILAW 42 (PNJ)

Neha Sharma v. CBI

2024-01-05

ALOK JAIN

body2024
JUDGMENT Mr. Alok Jain, J. (Oral) The present petition has been preferred by the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. inter alia praying that this court may: - (a). Issue appropriate directions to Respondent No. 1 CBI to take over all inquiries/investigations relating to C. No. VIII(AP) 10/P&I/2410-C/Arrival/2019/7355 dated 15.07.2019 initiated by the office of Respondent No. 4 for the purported violations under the Customs Act, 1962 and conduct a fair, unbiased and impartial inquiry/ investigation; (b) Direct the Respondent No. 4 Commissioner of Customs, New Custom House, IGI Airport, New Delhi to transmit the entire record pertaining to C. No. VIII(AP) 10/P&I/2410- C/Arrival/2019/7355 dated 15.07.2019 to Respondent No. 1 CBI so that the role of all concerned, who may have indulged in fabrication of evidence etc. is scanned and scrutinized independently; (c). Direct Respondent No. 3 Detaining Authority to produce before this Hon'ble Court the entire record including the file notings pertaining to the consideration that may have been bestowed upon the Representation dated 30.09.2019 (Annexure P-6) made on behalf of the petitioner in terms of section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Cofeposa, 1974, 1974- for brevity) for revocation of the Order of Detention bearing No. PD/12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.07.2019 as well as the subsequent reminders dated 21.09.2021 and 08.06.2022 (Annexure P-7 & P-8) along with the final decision, if any, taken thereon; (d). Quash and set aside the Order of Detention bearing No. PD/12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.7.2019 passed in purported exercise of powers under Section 3(1) of ('Cofeposa, 1974') by Respondent No. 3 and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom including the Order dated 14.11.2019 published in the Official Gazette of Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) (Central Economic Intelligence Bureau) (Cofeposa, 1974 Wing) vide S.O. 4117(E) (Annexure P-5) whereby action in terms of Section 7(1)(b) thereof has purportedly been taken against the petitioner; (e). Restrain the Respondent No. 2 (DGP Haryana) not to take any coercive action against the petitioner and consequently not to execute the impugned order of detention (Annexure P-5) in terms of the proceedings under Section 7(1)(b) of the Cofeposa, 1974; (f). Stay the operation and execution of the impugned Order of Detention as well as all Proclamation Proceedings against the petitioner. 2. Stay the operation and execution of the impugned Order of Detention as well as all Proclamation Proceedings against the petitioner. 2. The factual matrix of the case as detailed by the counsel for the petitioner is asunder: - (ababab) Date (ababab) Event 16.05.2019 One Raju Singh Sachdeva was apprehended by the Customs department at Terminal-1, Domestic Airport, New Delhi for carrying 232 Gold metal rings weighing a total of 2.1 Kgs while he was travelling from Varanasi to New Delhi. 16.05.2019 In his statement under section 108 of the Customs Act, Raju Singh Sachdeva stated that he had to hand over the recovered gold to one Ms. Neha Sharma (Petitioner herein) and his relative Sh. Greeshm Sharma. He further allegedly confessed that he has already smuggled a total of 16 Kgs of gold on 8 previous occasions. 30.06.2019 Greeshm Sharma, who was named along with the petitioner by Raju Singh Sachdeva, was apprehended and he testified that he worked at the behest of the petitioner and her husband who had indulged in smuggling of gold on previous 29 visits to Bangkok. 19.07.2019 Annexure P-4 In this background, four detention orders in purported exercise of power under Section 3(1) of Cofeposa, 1974 by the Joint Secretary, Cofeposa, 1974, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau were issued against Raju Singh Sachdeva, Greeshm Sharma, petitioner and her husband. One of them being detention order PD-12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19/7/19 against the petitioner. 14.11.2019 Annexure P-5 Petitioner was called upon by way of publication of a notification in the official gazette of Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) (Central Economic Intelligence Bureau) (Cofeposa, 1974 Wing) Vide S.O. 4117(E) whereby, in purported exercise of powers under Section 71111b') of the Cofeposa. 1974, (ababab)to appear before the DGP Harvana. Sector 6. Panchkula. Nov. 2019 till date Petitioner learnt that certain attempts have been made by the Haryana police as well as the officials of sponsoring authority to execute the order of detention at the petitioner's parental house i.e. at Faridabad in Haryana. 30.09.2019 Petitioner's father-in-law made representation for revocation of the impugned detention orders against his son and daughter-in-law (petitioner) addressed to the Detaining Authority (Respondent No. 3) as well as the copy whereof was sent to Zonal Member (Delhi) Ministry of Finance and Secretary (Revenue), Ministry of Finance. 30.09.2019 Petitioner's father-in-law made representation for revocation of the impugned detention orders against his son and daughter-in-law (petitioner) addressed to the Detaining Authority (Respondent No. 3) as well as the copy whereof was sent to Zonal Member (Delhi) Ministry of Finance and Secretary (Revenue), Ministry of Finance. 01.07.2022 Annexure P-9 After a gap of three years, the Petitioner's father and her father-in-law had approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide W.P. (Crl.) 1452 of 2022 seeking directions calling upon the authorities to place on record the outcome of the representation made to the authorities under Section 11 of the Cofeposa, 1974. 14.09.2022 Petitioner filed the instant petition for quashing of the detention order at pre-execution stage. 18.10.2022 In the wake of the present writ petition, the petitioner's father-in-law withdrew the writ petition filed before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court. 3. The above factual matrix was partially objected to by the counsel for the official respondents, who have reserved their right to detail the same in due course. 4. The matter has been pending before this Court since September 2022 during which, various interim orders were passed and few important orders are as under: - i. Order Dated 13/02/2023: "Let the petitioner justify her bonafide and take all legal requirements regarding Annexure P-13 and to enable her to do so, the impugned order of detention shall be kept in abeyance till the next date. This order is passed keeping in view that she is mother of a child less than one year of age." ii. On 18/08/2023 certain directions were issued by this court to the petitioner, the relevant part of which is reproduced as under: "The petitioner is directed not to keep more than one prepaid SIM, i.e., one pre-paid mobile phone number for a period of five years i.e. up to 31.07.2028; however, this restriction is only on prepaid SIMs [mobile numbers] and not on post-paid connections or landline numbers. The petitioner must comply with this condition within fifteen days." The issue of compliance or non-compliance of these orders is not being discussed as the same is not necessary for deciding the present petition as the petitioner claims to have complied with them but the respondent authorities claim defiance to the same. 5. The petitioner must comply with this condition within fifteen days." The issue of compliance or non-compliance of these orders is not being discussed as the same is not necessary for deciding the present petition as the petitioner claims to have complied with them but the respondent authorities claim defiance to the same. 5. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner opened his arguments by touching upon the term 'preventive detention', which is detention without trial, and is not punitive in nature. He is taken this Court to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India and Ors., 1980 (4) SCC 531 (Para 8): "The right to be supplied copies of the documents, statements and other material relied upon in the grounds of detention without any undue delay flows directly as a necessary corollary from the right conferred on the detenu o be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the detention, because unless the former right is available, the latter cannot be meaningfully exercised. " 6. The learned Senior counsel has submitted that the definition of the word 'smuggling' as provided in Cofeposa, 1974 is the same as defined under Section 2 (39) of Customs Act, 1962. He has also touched upon Section 3 of Cofeposa, 1974 regarding the parameters, which must be met before making an order of detention. He emphasizes on the word 'may if satisfied' which are the opening lines of Section 3 and also on the words 'it is necessary to do so make an order directing that such person be detained' suggesting that the authority making the detention order must satisfy itself about the necessity to pass an order under Section 3, hence, giving rise to an element of subjective satisfaction. Learned Senior Counsel has also relied upon the provisions of Section 4 of the Copeposa Act to demonstrate that once a detention order is executable at any place in India, then a person residing within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court would be entitled to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for relief against the said order as the place of residence is a valid ground to invoke the jurisdiction of a High Court for protection of any fundamental or legal right of a citizen. 7. 7. Taking his arguments further learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also addressed on the issue of the rights of the petitioner qua a preventive detention order at the pre-execution stage, to approach the Court and he presses upon the judgment in the case of Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Ors v. Smt Alka Subash Gadia and Anr. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: 'a person may challenge a preventive detention order at the pre-execution stage if the courts are prima facie satisfied: (i) that the order is not passed under the Act under which it is purported to have been passed, (ii) that it is sought to be executed against a wrong person, (iii) that it is passed for a wrong purpose, (iv) that it is passed on vague, extraneous, and irrelevant grounds or (v) that the authority which passed it had no authority to do so.' 8. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, to substantiate his arguments, relies upon the following judgements: - (i) Rajinder Arora v. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 796 (Para 18 and 19): "It is beyond anybody's comprehension as to why despite a long passage of time, the respondents have not been able to gather any material to lodge a complaint against the Appellant. Furthermore no explanation whatsoever has been offered by the respondent as to why the order of detention has been issued after such a long time. The said question has also not been examined by the authorities before issuing the order of detention. " (ii) Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2008) 16 SCC 14 (Para 16): "A judgement is not a statute, and hence cannot be construed as such. In Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's Case this Court only wanted to lay down the principle that entertaining a petition against a preventive detention order at a pre-execution stage should be an exception and not the general rule. We entirely agree with that proposition. However, it would be an altogether different thing to say that the five grounds for entertaining such a petition at a pre-execution stage mentioned in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case are exhaustive. In our opinion they are illustrative not exhaustive. " (iii) Subash Popattal Dave v. Union of India & Anr. We entirely agree with that proposition. However, it would be an altogether different thing to say that the five grounds for entertaining such a petition at a pre-execution stage mentioned in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia's case are exhaustive. In our opinion they are illustrative not exhaustive. " (iii) Subash Popattal Dave v. Union of India & Anr. (2014) 1 SCC 280 (Para 40): "Since it was the intention of the sponsoring authorities that a person having criminal propensities should be prevented from indulging in the same to the prejudice of the public at large and also from indulging in economic offences against the revenue, it would have to be established that the intention with which the preventive detention order had been passed continued to subsist so that the same could be executed even at a later date. In none of the instant cases, have the sponsoring or detaining authorities been able to establish that after the passing of the detention order the roposed detenues had continued with their activities as enumerated in the detention orders, which would support the proposition that the object of the detention orders continued to be valid, even after the lapse of several years. Having regard to the above, where the detention orders in the instant group of cases have not been executed for more than two years and there is no material on record to indicate that the proposed detenue had, in the meantime, continued his anti-social activities, it has to be held that the detention orders in respect of such proposed detenues were no longer relevant and must be quashed. " 9. Per contra learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection on the issue of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He has taken this Court through the preventive detention order dated 19.07.2019 (Annexure P-4) to demonstrate that the entire cause of action against the petitioner was conceived in Delhi and not anywhere else in India. He submits that the alleged violation of the Customs Act took place in Delhi and the ordinary place of residence of the petitioner was and in fact, is in Delhi. He submits that the alleged violation of the Customs Act took place in Delhi and the ordinary place of residence of the petitioner was and in fact, is in Delhi. It is evident by the act and conduct of the petitioners themselves that they were aware that this Court does not have jurisdiction in the present case as they approached the Delhi High Court by filing a CWP(Annexure P-9) at the first instance and not this Court. However, the said writ petition in Delhi was withdrawn after filing of the present petition. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondent relies upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of other co-detenues and has taken this Court through the findings in the same. To buttress his arguments, he submits that the petitioner is the main handler of the entire racket and has been avoiding the process of law on one pretext or another. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the grounds of detention and the actions taken thereof which all took place in Delhi. It was only on the account of the impugned preventive detention order having remained unexecuted that the provisions of Section 7 were invoked, in pursuance of which all the other known addresses of the petitioner were investigated and subsequently an order by the detaining authority was issued. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon on the following: - i. Annexure P-13, where the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi had issued an order qua an application under section 82/83 CRPC against the petitioner on 06.07.2020, the relevant part of which reads as under: "In view of the material on record i.e., order dated 19.07.2019, issued by Joint Secretary to the Government of India and gazette notification dated 14.11.2019,1 am satisfied that before initiating proceedings under Section 82 CRPC, a notice of the proceedings is required to be issued against the respondent as along with application no documents showing attempt made for service of the said order dated 19.07.2019 and Report dated 17.01.2020 are annexed. Hence, notice be issued to Neha Sharma through applicant department along with copy of order dated 19.07.2019, Report dated 17.01.2020 to answer the said notice in person or thru pleader before this Court on 28.07.2020 at 10 a.m." ii. Hence, notice be issued to Neha Sharma through applicant department along with copy of order dated 19.07.2019, Report dated 17.01.2020 to answer the said notice in person or thru pleader before this Court on 28.07.2020 at 10 a.m." ii. The incident report dated 04.09.2022 to submit that the permanent address of the petitioner is in Delhi and on inquiry it came out that the petitioner had not been living with her family in Haryana and had shifted her residence to Rohini, Delhi since long. iii. Annexure P-6 (page 94) to substantiate that the petitioner admits herself to be working in Delhi and also demonstrating that her ordinary place of residence is in Delhi. 13. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has relied upon the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Arun Mahajan v. State of Haryana in CRWP-340-2012 dated 23.08.2017 and the judgments Brahm Pal Panchal v. Union of India 2014 (12) RCR (Criminal) 894, Avinash Kumar Sharma v. Union of India 1997 (4) RCR (Criminal) 359, Rajendra Bissani v. Union of India 1995 (77) ELT 68 (M.P.) to substantiate his arguments and upon Alchemist Limited v. State Bank of Sikkim 2007 VoL 11 SCC 335 (para 37-38) which reads as under: - "37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless, it must be a "part of cause of action", nothing less than that. 38. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral, or material facts so as to constitute a part of "cause of action" within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition. " 14. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition. " 14. He further submits that, in fact, during the pendency of the petition, the petitioner has been apprehended in another case, for which she is in custody. This demonstrates that the decision to issue a preventive detention order against the petitioner was justified. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that Petitioner is indulging in forum shopping by approaching this Court even though this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to hear the present case. Neither any cause of action or even a part thereof, has arisen in favor of the Petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court nor the Detaining or Sponsoring Authorities i.e. Respondent No. 3 & 4 are situated within the territorial limits of this Hon'ble Court. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that from the time of issuance of preventive Detention Order PD-12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.07.2019, the petitioner evaded service of the same and absconded from the process of law so that the order could not be executed. Be that as it may, after the said detention order is served upon the petitioner, she would always have the right to challenge the same. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Pankaj Kumar Sharma v. Union of India (2019) 262 DLT 481 held that publication in the Official Gazette under Section 7(1)(b) of Cofeposa, 1974 constitutes deemed knowledge to the proposed detenue. 17. On the strength of the above, the learned counsel for the respondents prays for dismissal of the present petition, primarily on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court and in the alternative, on merits also. 18. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner in response to the preliminary objection raised by the respondent has addressed arguments on the issue of territorial jurisdiction qua the maintainability of this present petition and he has taken this Court through the provisions of Article 226(2) of the Constitution and vehemently submits that the cause of action or a part thereof besides Delhi, accrued in the state of Haryana as well, to bring his case within the rigors of Article 226 (2) as: (a). The order passed under Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974 Act dated 14.11.2019 itself mentions the address of the petitioner to be situated in Haryana. (b). The order passed under Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974 Act dated 14.11.2019 itself mentions the address of the petitioner to be situated in Haryana. (b). The petitioner was directed to appear before the DGP, Haryana in pursuance of order dated 14.11.2019. He has emphasized on the principle that where-ever a fundamental right is violated or is going to be violated, the jurisdiction of the Court would open. As regards the specific issue of territorial jurisdiction Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of D.N. Anand v. Union of India 1993 (2) RCR (Criminal) 104; Trilok Nath Mittal v. Union of India, 2003 (1) RCR (Criminal) 168 and has submitted that this Court shall have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. He has also submitted that there are conflicting judgments on the issue of territorial jurisdiction, however, the judgments pronounced later in time shall prevail. 19. While summarising and concluding his arguments, the learned Senior counsel has submitted that since the address in the order dated 14.11.2019 specifically records it to be an address within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court coupled with the fact that the petitioner has been directed to appear before the DGP, Haryana and most importantly claiming the plea of dominus litis, has stated that the petition is maintainable before this Court. He further submits that the impugned orders, are punishment without trial and hence, violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of India. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to invoke the powers of Article 226 of the Constitution of India to protect her fundamental rights. 20. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Based on the arguments and the pleas raised in the petition, the following issues emanate and are relevant for deciding the present petition: - (i). Whether this court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? (ii). If yes, whether the preventive detention order dated 19/7/19 can be challenged at the pre-execution stage? 21. Whether this court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? (ii). If yes, whether the preventive detention order dated 19/7/19 can be challenged at the pre-execution stage? 21. At the outset, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and the relevant provisions of Cofeposa, 1974 Act, 1974 Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs: (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories (3) Where any party against whom an interim order; whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated (3) The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32 Relevant Provisions of the Cofeposa, 1974 ACT, 1974: Section 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from- (i) smuggling goods, or (ii) abetting the smuggling of goods, or (iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (iv) dealing in, smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, or (v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) When any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order. (3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention. Section 4. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). Section 5A. Grounds of detention severable. Section 4. Execution of detention orders. A detention order may be executed at any place in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). Section 5A. Grounds of detention severable. Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly (a) Such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are- (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever, and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in subsection (1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention; (b) The Government or office making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said subsection (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 22. The first issue for consideration is that whether this court has territorial jurisdiction in the present case or not: It is a settled principle of law that the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution are unfettered and whenever there is an actual or apparent violation of fundamental rights, the Courts can exercise their powers against the said violation and can issue orders/directions to protect the same. It is not only for the purpose of securing the rights under Part III of the Constitution but for any other purpose that powers under Article 226 can be exercised. 23. However, the said powers must be exercised with circumspection and only in cases when the requirements under Article 226(2) are met. Any Direction, writ or order can be issued only when the cause of action, wholly or in part arises within the jurisdiction of the High Court where the purported violation of any fundamental or legal right takes place. 23. However, the said powers must be exercised with circumspection and only in cases when the requirements under Article 226(2) are met. Any Direction, writ or order can be issued only when the cause of action, wholly or in part arises within the jurisdiction of the High Court where the purported violation of any fundamental or legal right takes place. Therefore, the question, whether this Court has territorial jurisdiction or not can be answered only if the cause of action arose within the territories over which this Court has Jurisdiction. 24. The grounds on which the jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by the petitioner in the present case are: - I. Residence: That the petitioner claims to reside at her parental home at Faridabad, Haryana. II. The order under Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974 Act: Apprehension that the preventive detention order may be executed in Haryana and that the petitioner was directed to appear before the DGP, Haryana. 25. These grounds, as per the petitioner, are sufficient to invoke Article 226 as the cause of action 'partly' arose in the state of Haryana. 26. The expression 'cause of action' has not been defined in the Constitution. The classic definition of 'cause of action' was given by Lord Brett in Cooke v. Gill (1873) 8 CP 107 that "cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. 27. What constitutes cause of action for the purposes of Article 226(2) has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of Goa v. Summit online trade solutions (P) Ltd. 2023 AIR (Supreme Court) 1536. ' The Constitutional mandate of clause (2) under Article 226 is that the 'cause of action', referred to therein, must at least arise in part within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by clause (1) are proposed to be exercised, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person is not within those territories. It is axiomatic that without a cause, there cannot be any action. It is axiomatic that without a cause, there cannot be any action. However, in the context of a writ petition, what would constitute such 'cause of action' is the material facts which are imperative for the writ petitioner to plead and prove, to seek relief as claimed. 28. Determination of the question as to whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the cause of action are sufficient to attract clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. 29. In so determining, it is the substance of the matter that would be relevant. It, therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ jurisdiction must disclose that the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action do constitute a cause empowering the High Court to decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the cause of action to move the High Court arose within its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a nexus with the subject matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer would not give rise to a cause of action conferring jurisdiction on the court. These are the guiding tests.' 30. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Anti-corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Narayan Diwakar, (1999) 4 SCC 656 : JT 1999 (3) SC 635, A was posted in Arunachal Pradesh. On receiving a wireless message through Chief Secretary of the State asking him to appear before CBI Inspector in Bombay, A moved the High Court of Guwahati for quashing FIR filed against him by the CBI. An objection was raised by the department that the High Court of Guwahati had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. But it was turned down. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the objection that Guwahati High Court could not have entertained the petition. 31. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 : JT 2001 (9) SC 162, a question of territorial jurisdiction came up for consideration. A filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme under the EXIM policy. Passport was issued by Chennai Office. 31. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 : JT 2001 (9) SC 162, a question of territorial jurisdiction came up for consideration. A filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme under the EXIM policy. Passport was issued by Chennai Office. Entries in the Passport were made by authorities at Chennai. None of the respondents was stationed within the State of Gujarat. It was, therefore, contended that Gujarat High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The contention, however, was negatived and the petition was allowed. The respondents approached the Supreme Court. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that none of the facts pleaded by A constituted a cause of action. "Facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned" 32. Based on the above principle of law, the question that needs to be answered is that whether the facts as averred by the petitioner that she usually resides at her parental home at Faridabad and the Order under Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974 directing her to appear before the DGP, Haryana would constitute integral grounds for her to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court challenging and seeking quashing of the order bearing No. PD/12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.7.2019 passed under Section 3 of the Cofeposa, 1974 Act. 33. Before this question be answered, the other facts which are relevant in determining the cause of action in the present petition are as under: A. Raju Singh Sachdeva was apprehended by the Customs at Terminal-1 Domestic Airport, Delhi, this means that the alleged offence based on which the Preventive detention orders were subsequently issued was committed in Delhi. B. The Sponsoring authoring i.e. Respondent no.4 and the Detaining authority i.e. Respondent no.3 are situated in Delhi and not within the territorial limits of this court. C. The Preventive detention order was passed in Delhi and the Petitioner is to be detained at Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi. B. The Sponsoring authoring i.e. Respondent no.4 and the Detaining authority i.e. Respondent no.3 are situated in Delhi and not within the territorial limits of this court. C. The Preventive detention order was passed in Delhi and the Petitioner is to be detained at Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi. D. The father of the petitioner and two other individuals namely Vikas Kumar and Monish Kumar whose names had come up in the present case as the other accomplices of the petitioner and who are undergoing detention had also filed W.P. (CRL) 3253/2019 before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court but the same was dismissed as withdrawn. E. Mr. Balesh Kumar Jain, father-in-law of the petitioner had also approached the Hon'ble Delhi Court by filing W.P. (CRL) 1452/2022, but the same was withdrawn. F. The residential address of the husband of the petitioner is B-15, Shakti Apartment, Rohini, Sector- 9, Plot No.5, New Delhi-110085. G. The Incident report under section 82 CRPC dated 04.09.2022 mentions the following: "On reaching the premises Enquiry was made about Neha Sharma and it was informed by the neighbours that she was living here with her family 15-20 years ago. Now she has shifted her residence to Rohini, Delhi. Now, tenants are living there." 34. Firstly, the petitioner has taken the residential address of her parents to be one of the grounds for invoking the Jurisdiction of this Court, however the principal place of residence of the petitioner is at Delhi as she is a married woman, staying with her husband-Tarun Jain. Also, the address of Faridabad is that of the father of the petitioner and as per the report received by the authorities, the said house has been locked since last couple of years. It further becomes evident that she is living in her matrimonial home from the fact that the petition filed at Hon'ble Delhi High Court (Annexure P-9) by her father-in-law mentions the address of the petitioner as B-15, Shakti Apartment, Rohini, Sector- 9, Plot No.5, New Delhi-110085, the same as her husband's address. 35. The Second ground to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by the petitioner is that the Preventive detention order may be executed in Haryana and that she was directed to appear before an authority situated in Haryana, as per the order dated 14.11.2019. 36. 35. The Second ground to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court by the petitioner is that the Preventive detention order may be executed in Haryana and that she was directed to appear before an authority situated in Haryana, as per the order dated 14.11.2019. 36. It is necessary to reproduce the grounds of detention qua the petitioner and other accused (order under Section 3 of the Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.07.2019), Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974 and the order of the detaining authority under Section 7 of the Act dated 14.11.2019. A. Grounds of detention (Annexure P-5): "As may be seen from the evidences recovered from the mobile phone; statements of you i.e. Shri Raju Singh Sachdeva, copies of tickets and Ledger of Shri Tarun Jain maintained and recovered from M/s Travel in Style (Travel agency), it has emerged that a syndicate of smugglers of currency and Gold is being operated by Shri Tarun Jain and Ms. Neha Sharma, and Shri Raju Singh Sachdeva i.e. you are one of the members of that syndicate engaged in smuggling of Currency to outside and Gold inside India. Neha Sharma, and Shri Raju Singh Sachdeva i.e. you are one of the members of that syndicate engaged in smuggling of Currency to outside and Gold inside India. " B. Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974: Powers in relation to absconding persons: (1) If the appropriate Government has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that Government may- (a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first-class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resides; and thereupon the provisions of sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall apply in respect of the said person and his properly as if the order directing that he be detained were a warrant issued by the Magistrate; (b) by order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order; and if the said person fails to comply with such direction, he shall, unless he proves that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the period specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reason which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be cognizable. C. Order of the detaining authority under Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974: "Whereas the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, specially empowered under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974) issued Order No. PD-12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.07.2019 under the said sub-section directing that Ms. C. Order of the detaining authority under Section 7 of the Cofeposa, 1974: "Whereas the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, specially empowered under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (52 of 1974) issued Order No. PD-12002/09/2019-Cofeposa, 1974 dated 19.07.2019 under the said sub-section directing that Ms. Neha Sharma, D/o Shri Nand Kishore Sharma, R/o of (i) House No. 35, Ward No.2, Ahirwara, Ballabgarh, Faridabad, Haryana- 121004 and (ii) w/o Shri Tarun Jain (co-accused), R/o B-15, Shakti Apartment, Rohini Sector- 9, Plot No. 5, New Delhi-110085 be detained and kept in Central Jail, Tihar, New Delhi, with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods, abetting the smuggling of goods and dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, in future. 2. Whereas the Central Government has reasons to believe that the aforesaid person has absconded or has been concealing herself so that the said Order cannot be executed. 3. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the said Act, the Central Government hereby directs the aforesaid person to appear before the Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters., New Delhi or Director General of Police (Haryana), Police Headquarters, Sector-6, Panchkula, Haryana, within 7 days of the publication of this Order in the Official Gazette. " 37. From the conjoint reading of the order above, it is safely comprehensible that the petitioner was either directed to appear before the Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters, New Delhi, or Director General of Police (Haryana), Police Headquarters, Sector-6, Panchkula, Haryana, within 7 days of the publication of the order. Since the petitioner was absconding from the process of law and the authorities were not able to discern with certainty about her whereabouts, she was directed to appear before the competent authorities, either in New Delhi or in Haryana. It was due to the fact that the Authorities, at that time, had reasonable grounds to believe that she may be either found in Delhi (her matrimonial home) or within the territorial limits of Haryana, as the records demonstrated her parental home to be situated in Haryana. 38. It was due to the fact that the Authorities, at that time, had reasonable grounds to believe that she may be either found in Delhi (her matrimonial home) or within the territorial limits of Haryana, as the records demonstrated her parental home to be situated in Haryana. 38. In the present case the warrant of preventive detention was issued on 19.07.2019 and more than 04 years have since elapsed but still the prevention detention order remains unexecuted, mainly due to the pendency of the present petition. The argument raised by the counsel for the petitioner that the detention order was only to be implemented within the jurisdiction of this Court as one of the addresses mentioned in the said detention order is of Faridabad is unsustainable. 39. This Court in Gurdeep Kaur v. Union of India 1990 (2) RCR (Criminal) 20, Rajinder Nanda v. Union of India 1998 (1) RCR (Criminal) 155 and Arun Mahajan v. State of Haryana CRWP No.340 of 2012 dated 23.08.2017 held that mere residence or even service of the detention order at a particular place does not constitute a cause of action for the purpose of determination of territorial jurisdiction of a Court. 40. The petitioner has, hence, failed to prove the material and integral facts which are imperative for her to obtain relief from this Court under Article 226(2) as per the guiding tests laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of Goa (supra). The pleaded facts do not have a nexus with the subject matter of challenge based on which the prayer can be granted. 41. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the petitioner, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India as the present residential address of the petitioner remains up in the air and it cannot be answered with certainty as to where the impugned preventive detention order shall ultimately be executed. Interestingly the petitioner is trying to blow hot and cold in the same breath as on one hand, she is trying to take benefit by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court on the strength of the address mentioned in the detention order to be that of Haryana (although the said detention order till date has not been served upon the petitioner) but at the same time much before the order dated 14.11.2019, whereby the authorities in exercise of the powers under Section 7(1)(b) of Cofeposa, 1974 passed the order (Annexure P-5), the father-in-law of the petitioner made a comprehensive attempt by submitting a representation to the authorities seeking revocation of the order dated 19.07.2019on 30.09.2019. The reason for highlighting this fact is that, although the petitioner is trying to demonstrate that she was not aware of the order dated 19.07.2019 against her but that is certainly not the case. It apparently seems that the petitioner is abusing the process of law. 42. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Arvind Shergill (2000) 7 SCC 601 gave the following findings: - "The High Court should be slow to assume jurisdiction over a matter on which a sister court can with more efficacy, promptitude and exactitude hold an enquiry and grant relief. It would, therefore, be the High Court in the State which passed the detention order which could grant adequate relief to the proposed detenu as that Court has the necessary equipment and all the means to expand and inquire into the subject. " 43. The mere fact that an order conveyed at some old residential address shall not confer any jurisdiction to the Court under which a former residence falls. Therefore, the appropriate remedy is to approach the Court where: - A. The alleged offence took place, based on which the Preventive detention orders were subsequently issued; and B. The Sponsoring authoring i.e., Respondent no.4 and the Detaining authority i.e., Respondent no.3 are situated.; and C. The Preventive detention order was passed and where the Petitioner is to be detained; and D. The principal place of residence of the petitioner falls. 44. 44. In light of the facts and circumstances of this case and considering the ratio in the case of Arun Mahajan v. State of Haryana CRWP No.340 of 2012 dated 23.08.2017 in which all the judgments relied upon and referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner have been considered, the powers under Article 226 need not be exercised in the present case qua the petitioner as the rigors of Article 226(2) are not met out. 45. Accordingly, the preliminary objection with regard to the territorial jurisdiction is upheld for the reasons recorded above and this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. 46. As regard the other issues, considering the settled proposition of law in the case of Smt Alka Subash Gadia (Supra), the present petition is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to take all other grounds after the preventive detention order is served upon her as the petitioner has failed to come within the parameters laid down in the said judgment, as discussed above. 47. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed. 48. All interim orders stand vacated.