ORDER : (Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J.) 1. Since the matters involved are regarding the same Petitioner on similar issues, these Writ Petitions are being disposed of by this common order. Brief Pleadings of the W.Ps. 2. Before venturing into the determination, it is essential to draw the contours of necessary facts that are emanating from the W.Ps. A. W.P.No.14280 of 2019 3. The brief facts as stated in the Writ Petition, are that; a) Petitioner was initially appointed as a Forest Section Officer by way of direct recruitment on 05.12.2005. Thereafter, he was promoted as Deputy Range Officer in June, 2009 and as such, posted to Vijayawada territorial section. b) On 09.12.2013, the Conservator of Forests, Rajahmundry/ Respondent No.3, based on the report of the Divisional Forest Officer, (D.F.O.) Vigilance III, Hyderabad, dated 20.11.2012, issued Articles of Charge under Rule-20 of Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control And Appeal) Rules, 1991,[Hereinafter referred to as A.P.C.S.(CCA) Rules, 1991] alleging that the Petitioner failed to detect unauthorized saw mills, private timber depots and saw mill-cumdepots in Vijayawada Range until the same were detected by the D.F.O. Vigilance-III, Hyderabad. c) Petitioner submitted his reply dated 13.02.2013, denying the charges stating that in August, 2011, he submitted report to the Forest Range Officer (F.R.O.) about running of unauthorized saw mills in Vijayawada, duly furnishing the electricity service numbers and made a request to disconnect the electricity connections to the said saw mills and that in October, 2011, he also addressed a report to the F.R.O. to take necessary action against the said saw mills. It was also stated that the then F.R.O. Vijayawada submitted a report to the D.F.O. Krishna Division and as such there has been no negligence on his part in not detecting the unauthorized saw-mills, depots or in reporting the matter to the higher officers. d) Respondent No.3 appointed the D.F.O. Vijayawada as the enquiry officer for conducting enquiry and the F.R.O., Mylavaram was appointed as Presenting Officer in January, 2014. e) On 10.10.2014, Petitioner attended the enquiry, and his statement was recorded in the presence of the Presenting Officer. No witnesses including the DFO, Vigilance-III, Hyderabad, were examined. No enquiry was conducted as contemplated under Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991. e) On 10.10.2014, Petitioner attended the enquiry, and his statement was recorded in the presence of the Presenting Officer. No witnesses including the DFO, Vigilance-III, Hyderabad, were examined. No enquiry was conducted as contemplated under Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991. f) The enquiry officer submitted report stating that the charges were proved, based on the report of Vigilance & Enforcement, which is preliminary in nature by not examining the owners of the timber depots/saw mills. In the absence of any material either oral or documentary, major punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect was imposed. g) Petitioner requested the Respondent No.3, vide letter 23.11.2017 to supply the authenticated charge memo, signed penalty orders, appointment order of presenting officer and his brief. Till date, no such copies were supplied. h) As per list of seniority prepared by the circle on 01.01.2017, Petitioner stood at S.No.10 in the category of Deputy Range Officer. One Sri B.V. D.Prasad, who stood at S.No.11 was promoted in 2017. In 2018 four juniors, and in August, 2019, four more junior were promoted, which is during pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Being aggrieved thereby, this W.P. has been filed seeking a Mandamus for; “…declaring the orders passed by the 1st respondent in Rc.No.213/2013-M8, dated 7.6.2017 imposing the penalty of stoppage of two Annual Grade Increments with cumulative effect without furnishing the copies of the documents requested under letter dated 2.1.2018 and effecting promotions to the juniors in the guise of pendency of disciplinary proceedings as illegal, arbitrary and violates Articles 14, 16, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution of India and consequently declare that the punishment is illegal and the petitioner is entitled for all benefits like promotions, seniority on par with the juniors to petitioner in the post of Forest Range Officer without reference to the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment imposed ……….” Counter by the Respondent No.3 4. In this W.P., a counter affidavit was filed by respondent No.3 on behalf of all the Respondents denying all the contentions made by the petitioner except those, which were specifically admitted. The brief averments are that; a) Petitioner belongs to Scheduled Caste (S.C.) category and his name was figured at Serial No.3 in the seniority list of the Deputy Range Officers of Rajahmundry Circle of Zone-II as on 01.01.2019. The brief averments are that; a) Petitioner belongs to Scheduled Caste (S.C.) category and his name was figured at Serial No.3 in the seniority list of the Deputy Range Officers of Rajahmundry Circle of Zone-II as on 01.01.2019. b) Petitioner was involved in grave irregularities which caused impact to the forest protection and wealth. He failed to perform his legitimate duties while working as D.R.O., Vijayawada, which got unearthed by the surprise visit of the D.F.O., Vigilance, Hyderabad on 18.10.2012. It was found that the Petitioner permitted the running of unauthorized saw mills and timber depots by neither seizing nor reporting. c) Charge memos were issued by the various competent authorities to four staff members who are found responsible for the same. Based on the instructions of Respondent No.2, who is competent authority, the Respondent No.3 issued charge memo dated 09.02.2013 to the Petitioner. d) As the enquiry officer submitted the report to the Respondent No.3 on 18.06.2015 holding that the charge against the Petitioner was proved, Respondent No.3 vide proceedings dated 28.06.2015 issued a final notice along with the copy of the findings of the enquiry officer dated 04.08.2015. e) Accordingly, penalty of stoppage of two (02) future increments with cumulative effect, was awarded, vide proceedings dated 07.06.2017. Petitioner did not prefer any appeal as per Rule-33 of the A.P.C.S.(CC&A) Rules, 1991. f) Petitioner through one Sri A.B.Avadhamulu made a petition under RTI, to the Respondent No.3, which was received on 11.6.2018 and another letter dated 20.07.2018 for supply of copies of authenticated enquiry report of the Divisional Forest Officer, Vigilance, A.P. Hyderabad, charge memo, signed copy of penalty orders and appointment order of Presenting Officer and Presenting Officer’s brief etc., In reply, information as sought, were furnished. g) In addition to the penalty in the present enquiry, the Petitioner was awarded two other punishments for other charge memos by the Respondent No.3, vide Proc.Rc. No.7767/2012-M8(i) dated.31.5.2017 and vide Proc.Rc. No.1149/2016-M8, dated.18.09.2019. Further, three charge memos issued ford different irregularities are pending Therefore, his case cannot be considered for promotion to the category of Forest Range Officer, since the three punishments are under force upto 18.09.2021 and he should wait for completion of punishment period for consideration of his promotion. Since Petitioner suppressed the above facts, the W.P. is not sustainable. B. W.P.No.14283 of 2019 5. Since Petitioner suppressed the above facts, the W.P. is not sustainable. B. W.P.No.14283 of 2019 5. The brief facts, as stated in the Writ Petition, are that; a) For a period of three months, during 2011, Petitioner worked as in charge Forest Range Officer. Based on report of the D.F.O. Flying Squad, Rajamahendravaram dated 30.11.2012, Petitioner was kept under suspension vide Rc.No.7767/2012-M8 dated 30.11.2012. b) On 11.2.2013, vide Rc.No.7767/2012/M8, Articles of Charge were issued by the respondent No.3 framing four charges along with statement of imputations. During the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, on 16.02.2013, the petitioner was reinstated into duty and posted to Eluru. c) Petitioner submitted a reply dated 13.02.2013 to the charges framed. The disciplinary authority found charge Nos.,1 & 3 as not proved; charge Nos.,2 and 4 as proved. d) On 02.01.2018, the petitioner has submitted an application for furnishing authenticated articles of charge and penalty imposed to take further steps and as on this date, no documents were communicated. e) During pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, eight of his juniors were promoted in the year 2017, 2018 and 2019. Being aggrieved thereby, this W.P. is filed seeking a Mandamus for; “…declaring the orders passed by the 3rd respondent in Rc.No.7767/2012/M8 dated 31.5.2017 imposing penalty of stoppage of two Annual Grade Increments with cumulative effect which will have effect on pension and treating the period of suspension as not on duty as illegal, arbitrary and violates Articles 14, 16, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution of India and contrary to Rule 20 of the APCS (CC&A) Rules, 1991 and consequently declare that the petitioner is entitled for promotion to the post of Forest Range Officer from the date of his immediate juniors in the senior without reference to the disciplinary proceedings …..” Counter by the Respondent No.3 6. In this W.P., as well, a counter affidavit was filed by respondent No.3 on behalf of all the Respondents denying all the contentions made by the petitioner except those, which were specifically admitted. The brief averments are that; a) Having inspected the forest area of Nunna Village, on 19.11.2012, 20.11.2012 and 23.11.2012, the D.F.O. Flying Squad, found that the petitioner has not maintained the boundaries of reserved forests under his control and failed to perform his preliminary duty. The brief averments are that; a) Having inspected the forest area of Nunna Village, on 19.11.2012, 20.11.2012 and 23.11.2012, the D.F.O. Flying Squad, found that the petitioner has not maintained the boundaries of reserved forests under his control and failed to perform his preliminary duty. b) Petitioner recommended sanction of no-objection certificates in the reserved forests to an extent of Ac.27.00 to few applicants for the purpose of obtaining pattadar passbooks from revenue authorities. c) Role of twelve (12) officers and staff belonging to various categories was found and the Conservator of Forests, Rajahmundry/the competent authority, placed the petitioner under suspension vide Rc.No.7767/2012-M8, dated 30.11.2012 and later issued charge memo dated 11.02.2013. d) Petitioner submitted his explanation to the said charges and he was reinstated into duty by order dated 16.02.2013 without prejudice to finalization of disciplinary proceedings pending against him. The charges 2 and 4 were proved against the petitioner. The respondent No.3 issued a final notice to the petitioner calling for his defence statement. Having received the same, the petitioner did not submit any further defence statement. e) Respondent No.3 awarded penalty of withholding of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect which will have effect on pension, if applicable. The suspension period is treated as not on duty. The Petitioner did not prefer any appeal to the appellate authority within 90 days of receipt of the copy of the order, vide Rule-33 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991. f) Petitioner made a representation dated 02.01.2018 requesting to supply documents connected to the disciplinary case. Since the matter is finalized, the disciplinary authority is no way competent to reopen the case and supply the record and it is only the appellate authority competent to examine the case. Petitioner made a petition under R.T.I. Act to the respondent No.3 to supply certain documents and the office of the respondent No.3 supplied the documents. g) In view of rule position, since the petitioner was awarded punishments in three different disciplinary cases and as well as due of the pendency of three charge memos as on the date, petitioner was not found eligible for consideration of promotion to the category of Forest Range Officer. Therefore, dismissal of the W.P. was prayed for. Written Instructions Placed 7. Written instructions have been filed by the Respondent No.3 which are in similar lines of the counter affidavit. Therefore, dismissal of the W.P. was prayed for. Written Instructions Placed 7. Written instructions have been filed by the Respondent No.3 which are in similar lines of the counter affidavit. Additionally, it is stated that the proof of evidence required in a disciplinary or departmental proceedings is preponderance of probabilities, that the Petitioner is involved in several cases, conclusion of the same cannot be done within the time limit of 3-6 months as prescribed by the G.O. It is also stated that after following the procedure as laid down under Rule- 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991 and as per the material available on record and circumstantial evidence, penalties were imposed on the petitioner and therefore, the same cannot be set aside. It is further stated that the Petitioner submitted representation dated 02.01.2018 to the Respondent No.3 requesting to supply certain documents connected to the disciplinary cases, but the disciplinary authority is no way connected to reopen the case and supply records afresh to the petitioner. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 8. Heard Sri P.V. Ramana, learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Services-I for the Respondents. Perused the material on record. 9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner in elaboration to what was stated in the Writ Affidavits would contend that the enquiry was conducted without examining any witnesses or the authors of the report, which formed the basis for the framing of charge. Learned counsel stated that the imposition of punishment of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect, will have an effect on the pension of the petitioner. It is further pointed out that under the guise of disciplinary action and punishment, the petitioner was denied promotion while standing at No.10, whereas on the other hand, eight juniors, i.e., four each in 2018 and in 2019 were promoted. 10. Learned counsel on the aspect of alternate remedy would submit that the since the impugned order is passed in utter violation of the procedure contemplated under Rule-20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC&A) Rules, 1991 and principles of natural justice, writ petition can as well be entertained. It is further urged by the learned counsel that the enquiry officer simply based on the preliminary enquiry report, passed orders without examining any witnesses and thereby, depriving the petitioner to cross-examine them. 11. It is further urged by the learned counsel that the enquiry officer simply based on the preliminary enquiry report, passed orders without examining any witnesses and thereby, depriving the petitioner to cross-examine them. 11. It is also pointed by the learned counsel that charges were framed in both the cases based on the reports dated 20.11.2012 and 30.11.2012, respectively, whereas enquiry concluded after a period of five years in 2017. Stating so, learned counsel would submit that as per the circular instructions issued by the Government, disciplinary proceedings must be finalized, for simple cases in three months and for complicated cases, within the period of six months. Finally, the learned counsel seeks this Court to set aside the impugned orders dated 07.06.2017 and 31.05.2017 respectively. 12. In contrast, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the Respondents would primarily submit that an appeal lies before the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and without availing the said remedy, the present writ petitions have been preferred, which are liable to be dismissed. Further, learned Government Pleader submits that due to the negligence and failure of the Petitioner in performing his preliminary duties, great loss is caused. 13. Learned Government Pleader prays for dismissal of the writ petitions stating that the petitioner is not entitled for promotion to the post of Forest Range Officer since three charge memos for grave charges for different irregularities are still pending against him. It is also stated that that punishment imposed against the petitioner is under force up to 18.09.2021 and hence, his case was not considered for promotion for the year 2017. Finally, the learned Government Pleader seeks this Court to dismiss the petitions. Points for Determination 14. Having heard both the learned counsel, the points that would emerge for determination are: I. Whether the impugned orders dated 07.06.2017 and 31.05.2017 are passed in violation of principles of natural justice and in contravention of the provisions of law and the governing Rules? Whether the present W.Ps. are maintainable, without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal before the concerned authorities? II. Whether delay in completing the disciplinary proceedings can itself be a ground for quashment of the disciplinary proceedings and consequential orders in the present case? III. Whether the Petitioner is entitled for the reliefs prayed for? Determination by the Court 15. Whether the present W.Ps. are maintainable, without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal before the concerned authorities? II. Whether delay in completing the disciplinary proceedings can itself be a ground for quashment of the disciplinary proceedings and consequential orders in the present case? III. Whether the Petitioner is entitled for the reliefs prayed for? Determination by the Court 15. The entry of the petitioner into the Forest Department was by way of his appointment dated 05.12.2005 as a direct Recruitee Forest Section Officer. He was promoted as Deputy Range Officer in 2009. While so, vide orders dated 07.06.2017 and 31.05.2017 which are under challenge in these writ petitions, he was imposed with punishment of deferment of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect respectively in each case. 16. Coming to the enquiry which is in issue in W.P.No.14280 of 2019, this is based on the report of the D.F.O., Vigilance, dated 20.11.2012. For ready reference, the charge framed in this enquiry is extracted herein below: Article-I: That he had exhibited negligence in duty and failed to detect the unauthorized Saw Mills, Private depots and Saw Mill cum Depots in Vijayawada Range until the same were detected by the Divisional Forest Officer, Vig.III. 17. The explanation of the petitioner to the said charge is that he has submitted a report to forest range officer, Vijayawada in August, 2011 about running of unauthorized saw mills duly furnishing the electricity service connection numbers of respective saw mills and requested to address the Executive Engineer to disconnect the power supply, another report was also submitted on October, 2011 to the Forest Range Officer for taking action on unauthorized saw mills, in turn, Forest Range Officer, Vijayawada submitted a report to the DFO, Krishna Division and no orders were issued thereafter. 18. Coming to the other enquiry, it is relevant to extract the charges framed and denial of the Petitioner in W.P.No.14283 of 2019, which are: Article of Charge Reply from the Petitioner Article -I:- That he had exhibited negligence in duty and failed to supervise the maintenance of the boundary lines and boundary marks in his jurisdiction, resulting encroachers have encroached an extent of 27.00 Acres in Adavinekkalam R.F. Issuing no objection certificate, letters were prepared in Division Office, Vijayawada. He was forced to obey the instructions of the DFO to sign. He is not the recommending authority of no objection certificate. He was forced to obey the instructions of the DFO to sign. He is not the recommending authority of no objection certificate. Article:-II: That he had exhibited negligence in duty and recommended to issue irregular "No objection certificates" resulting in encroachment of extent of 27.00 Acres in Adavinekkalam R.F. Encroachments are very old, but not during his tenure. Article-III: That he had exhibited negligence and allowed encroachers to grow Palm oil garden over an extent of 27.00 Acres in Adavinekkalam R.F. He never allowed encroachers to raise palm oil gardens, which are of the age of 8to15 years, which is evident from the findings of the D.F.O., Rajahmundry. Encroachments are of more than 20 to 30 years. Article-IV That he had exhibited negligence and not submitted his reports in the capacity of Deputy Range Officer to the concerned Range Office and submitted reports directly to the Division office without knowing the fact to the Range office. He also failed to retain office copy in Range office in the capacity of incharge Range Officer. Letters have been prepared in Division Office and concerned Assistant has obtained the signature forcibly under the direction of DFO without giving office copies 19. The basis for this enquiry is the report of the Flying Squad Division, Rajamahendravaram, dated 30.11.2012. After preliminary enquiry, on 06.11.2013, the Petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority held that Charges II and IV were proved and Charges I and III were not proved. Point I 20. The pivotal contention of the Petitioner is that the enquiries conducted in both these matters are not in compliance to Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC & A) Rules, 1991. An elaborate procedure in provided in Rule 20 for imposing major penalties. This Rule is placed in the Part-V i.e., Procedure for Imposing Penalties, of the Rules of 1991. It is also relevant to mention that vide Art 311 of the Constitution of India, no civil servant can be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. This is however as mentioned in relation to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It is beneficial to refer to few relevant sub-rules as contained in Rule 20. 21. This is however as mentioned in relation to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It is beneficial to refer to few relevant sub-rules as contained in Rule 20. 21. Sub Rule 4 of Rule 20 states that the Government servant who is to face an inquiry must be delivered a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and copies of the statements of witnesses by which each article of charge is proposed to be sustained, in order to enable him to file a written statement of defence. 22. Sub Rule 10 of Rule 20 provides that on the days fixed for recording the evidence, oral and documentary evidences must be produced and the witnesses shall be examined by the presenting officer first, who may later be cross-examined by or on behalf of the civil servant. It is further provided that the presenting officer is also entitled to re-examine the witnesses on the point that they were cross-examined on. 23. By virtue of Sub-Rule 18 of Rule 20, it is necessary that on conclusion of inquiry, the report which is prepared shall have to contain the articles of charge and the statement of the imputation of misconduct or misbehavior; defense in respect of each charge; assessment of evidence in respect of each article of charge and the findings on each article of charge and the reasons thereof. Further, the Rule embodies that if inquiring authority is not the disciplinary authority, report forwarded to such disciplinary authority shall include the enquiry report as discussed; written statement of defence; and oral and documentary evidence, written briefs if filed by any party. The above sub-rules as contained in the Rules provide a snapshot of how the procedure is built to protect the interests of the employee in these proceedings. 24. A disciplinary proceeding cannot be an exploratory mission with no basis. It is desirable that some prima facie material must be there for its institution. However, material which is obtained during the preliminary enquiry cannot be the mere basis for imposing a penalty. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 299 held that a preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry that is conducted after issuance of chargesheet. However, material which is obtained during the preliminary enquiry cannot be the mere basis for imposing a penalty. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 1 SCC 299 held that a preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry that is conducted after issuance of chargesheet. It was also stated that a preliminary enquiry is to find out whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated or not. 25. In a disciplinary enquiry, the opportunity to cross-examine a witness who is providing deposition as against the delinquent employee plays a vital role in unearthing the factual aspects of the charge. There could be instances where the witness in his chief examination speaks of those that are favourable to his version alone. Denying the opportunity for cross-examination would lead to anomalous consequence of presuming the charge without testing the correctness or credibility of the witnesses. This is the reasonableness and the indication of adherence to the principles of natural justice, which the law seeks to protect by virtue of Rule 20. 26. As the mode and manner of conducting the cross-examination is nowhere defined in the Rules, it is necessary that it should abide by the settled principles under the law of Evidence. On this aspect, it is apt to refer to the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the Petitioner i.e., Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows; “23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” (emphasis supplied) 27. Further in Moni Shankar v. Union of India, (2008) 3 SCC 484 while explaining the nature of the departmental proceedings and the necessity to adhere to the principles of natural justice, it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court as follows; “17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of proportionality. (See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava [ (2006) 3 SCC 276 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 521] and Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [ (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68] )” (emphasis supplied) 28. (See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava [ (2006) 3 SCC 276 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 521] and Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [ (2007) 4 SCC 669 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68] )” (emphasis supplied) 28. More so, a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Amalendu Ghosh v. District Traffic Supdt., North Eastern Railway, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 65 observed that that any order passed without conducting a property enquiry or without giving a reasonable opportunity to meet the charge is vitiated and must be set aside. 29. In Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301 which is relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the Hon’ble Supreme Court once again explained the pertinence of adherence to the principles of natural justice in cases, where civil consequences follow. Relevant paras from the decision are; “45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to crossexamine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice. 46. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of Maharashtra [ (2013) 4 SCC 465 : AIR 2013 SC 58 ] this Court while placing reliance upon a large number of earlier judgments held that cross-examination is an integral part of the principles of natural justice, and a statement recorded behind back of a person wherein the delinquent had no opportunity to cross-examine such persons, the same cannot be relied upon. 47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry. 48. “A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the case were [to be] believed. 48. “A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the case were [to be] believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out or not the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence.” (Vide Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee [ AIR 1958 SC 79 ] , AIR p. 85, para 27) [See also Bangalore Woollen Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. B. Dasappa [ AIR 1960 SC 1352 ] , V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [1980 Supp SCC 249 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 849 : AIR 1980 SC 1382 ] , Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [ (1992) 1 SCC 719 : AIR 1993 SC 276 ] and Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam [ (2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 395 : AIR 2005 SC 570 ] .]” (emphasis supplied) 30. In Sher Bahadur v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 142 the Hon’ble Apex Court had stressed on the “sufficiency of evidence” in service matters. It was observed as follows; “7. It may be observed that the expression “sufficiency of evidence” postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. The mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report, “in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry”, would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence. Though, the disciplinary authority cited one witness Shri R.A. Vashist, Ex. CVI/Northern Railway, New Delhi, in support of the charges, he was not examined. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of appointment of the appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge. Regarding documentary evidence, Ext. P-1, referred to in the enquiry report and adverted to by the High Court, is the order of appointment of the appellant which is a neutral fact. The enquiry officer examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge. The statement of the appellant recorded by the enquiry officer shows no more than his working earlier to his re-engagement during the period between May 1978 and November 1979 in different phases. Indeed, his statement was not relied upon by the enquiry officer. The finding of the enquiry officer that in view of the oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence, the charge against the appellant for securing the fraudulent appointment letter duly signed by the said APO (Const.) was proved, is, in the light of the above discussion, erroneous. In our view, this is clearly a case of finding the appellant guilty of charge without having any evidence to link the appellant with the alleged misconduct…….” (emphasis supplied) 31. Emphasizing on the necessity to adopt caution in dealing with the disciplinary proceedings, a Division Bench of this Court in J.Venkatamani v. Prl. Scy. Vigilance and others, (2022) 3 ALT 730 observed as follows; “15….In the considered opinion of this Court, the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings thoroughly failed in appreciating the evidence available on record from proper perspective and came to the conclusions without there being any foundation and basis. While dealing with the career and future of an individual, the Inquiring and Disciplinary Authorities are required to conduct the proceedings with care, caution and circumspection and cannot jump into conclusions on the basis of assumptions and presumptions…” (emphasis supplied) 32. Keeping in view the above principles, the impugned orders are to be scrutinised. A quick look at the order dated 31.05.2017, vide proceeding Rc.No.7767/2012-M8(i), would show that there has been a reiteration of the contents of the report submitted by the Divisional Forest Officer, Flying Squad Division, dated 30.11.2012. Thereafter, the brief contents as stated in the written statement of defence were mentioned. Next, it was mentioned that “ detailed enquiry was conducted into the charges and the delinquent officer attended to the enquiry and deposed that there is nothing to add except mentioned in the written statement of defence”. Finally, it was concluded that the Charges I and III are not proved, whereas the Charges II and IV are not proved. Next, it was mentioned that “ detailed enquiry was conducted into the charges and the delinquent officer attended to the enquiry and deposed that there is nothing to add except mentioned in the written statement of defence”. Finally, it was concluded that the Charges I and III are not proved, whereas the Charges II and IV are not proved. A fair glance at the order dated 07.06.2017, vide proceeding Rc.No.213/2013-M8, would indicate that after mentioning that the basis for framing the charge was the enquiry report dated 20.11.2012, reiteration of the contents thereof followed. After this, it was stated that “ from the above it is construed that the charged officer failed to discharge his duties….”. Thereafter, without mentioning the details of the enquiry that was conducted in compliance to the Rules, it was concluded that the since the delinquent officers had not seized and booked offences, and only wrote reports to the higher officials, the charge stands proved. 33. It is common in both these proceedings that they are heavily based on the preliminary enquiry reports. Compliance to the Rule 20 of the A.P.C.S. (CC & A) Rules, 1991 cannot be an empty formality. It is trite to observe that the standard of proof in a disciplinary enquiry is preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, it is important that the proceedings in a disciplinary inquiry are clothed by fairness and reasonableness. As discussed supra in the precedents, reliance on the evidence recorded in the preliminary inquiry cannot be utilised in the regular inquiry, as in the former, the charged employee is not provided an opportunity to participate. As such, reliance on the same as in the present cases would tantamount to violation of the principles of natural justice and statutory rules calling for a detailed enquiry. Maintainability of W.P.s vis-à-vis Alternate Remedy 34. A Division Bench of this Court in Richmark Shipping & Logistics (P) Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs, 2023 SCC OnLine AP 1162 reiterated the settled legal position on alternate remedy vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction vide Art. 226 as follows; “17. Maintainability of W.P.s vis-à-vis Alternate Remedy 34. A Division Bench of this Court in Richmark Shipping & Logistics (P) Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs, 2023 SCC OnLine AP 1162 reiterated the settled legal position on alternate remedy vis-à-vis exercise of jurisdiction vide Art. 226 as follows; “17. Further, the position of rule of alternate remedy vis-à-vis maintainability of writ petitions, has been examined by several judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court as well, but it is profitable to refer to a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771 relying on Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 summed up the principles at para 27 which read thus; “27.1 The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2 The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3 Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4 An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5 When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. 27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” 35. It is settled position of law that a High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in so far as disciplinary proceedings are concerned. The jurisdiction of the High Court in these matters are to be applied only in cases of non-observance of principles of natural justice; findings based on extraneous considerations, bias, perversity, or no evidence; disproportionate punishment, etc. The principles underlying the interference of the High Court under Articles 226/227 are discussed in a catena of judgments viz., Chatrapal v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. [2024] 2 S.C.R. 348 at para 12, State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao, 1976 (1) SCR 521 at paras 21-23, and State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491 at para 4. 36. For a quick glance on the scope of interference, it is trite to refer to the law laid down in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 at paras 12 and 13, which reads as follows; “12……..The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” (emphasis supplied) 37. As discussed supra, since the impugned orders dated are vitiated for non-compliance of principles of natural justice and statutory rules, this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with the same, despite availability of the alternate remedy. Accordingly Point Answered in favour of the Petitioner. Point No. II 38. It is an undisputed fact that the authorities took not less than the five years’ time to complete the enquiry. In the decision in the State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 , it was held as under: "….The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” (emphasis supplied) 39. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr v. Akhilesh Jha & Anr., LL 2021 SC 436; (2021) 12 SCC 460 held as follows; “13……..Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry…..” (emphasis supplied) 40. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Y. Ashok Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, W.P.No.17458 of 2021, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, dated 28 April, 2023 endorsed the settled position that delay cannot by itself vitiate the proceedings, in the absence of the pleadings as to the prejudice caused. Learned counsel also placed reliance on the decision rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.25793 of 2022 dated 10.07.2023, where taking note of the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the orders imposing penalty of stoppage of one annual grade increment were set aside, having noted the prejudice that was caused. 41. The fulcrum of the above discussion when applied to the present set of facts would indicate that there has been no indication of the prejudice caused by the delay in conducting the enquiry. 41. The fulcrum of the above discussion when applied to the present set of facts would indicate that there has been no indication of the prejudice caused by the delay in conducting the enquiry. This Court takes note of the aspect that the Petitioner herein ventilated that his promotion could not be proceeded and his juniors were promoted in his place. As has been noted in Akhilesh Jha & Anr. (referred supra), that itself cannot be a ground to vitiate the entire disciplinary enquiry. Accordingly Point No.II is answered against the Petitioner. Point III 42. On conglomeration of the facts and circumstances of the case with the settled principles of law, since this Court is satisfied that the order by which imposition of penalty in the both cases on the Petitioner stands vitiated for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice and the statutory rules. 43. In the result, these Writ Petitions are allowed. The impugned order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the Respondent No.3 (W.P. No.14283 of 2019) and the impugned order dated 07.06.2017 passed by the Respondent No.1 (W.P.No.14280 of 2019) are hereby set aside. Further, the respondent authorities are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion, keeping in view the governing rules and due process and subject to the eligibility and suitability of the petitioner. No order as to costs. As a sequel, pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, shall also stand closed.