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2024 DIGILAW 420 (CHH)

Padman Singh Diwaan, S/o. Late Shri K. R. Diwaan v. State of Chhattisgarh, Through P. S. Kotwali, Rajnandgaon, Dist. Rajnandgaon (C. G. )

2024-05-24

PARTH PRATEEM SAHU

body2024
ORDER : 1. Challenge in this criminal revision is to the order dated 5.9.2023 whereby learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTC) Rajnandgaon has framed charges under Sections 304, 427 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against accused/applicant. 2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that complainant lodged written report in concerned police station mentioning that on 23.5.2022 his son namely Yash Chouthwani was returning home from his Activa vehicle bearing registration number CG04-HK-4924 and at about 12:15 p.m., when he reached near Agrawal Petrol Pump, at that time, accused/applicant driving Bolero vehicle bearing registration mark CG09-5161, rashly and negligently in high speed, dashed Activa vehicle of his son and caused accident. As a result, his son suffered head injury along with multiple injuries all over body. He was immediately taken to the hospital where he was declared brought dead by the doctor. Based on said complaint, the offence under Section 279, 304A, & 337 of IPC was registered against applicant. After due investigation, police found that act attributed to applicant falls within the category of Section 304 of IPC and accordingly submitted final report against applicant for commission of offence under Sections 427 & 304 of IPC. The trial Court after hearing the parties, framed the charges under Sections 427 & 304 of IPC. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that initially whole case in the FIR and attending material is of accidental death because there was nothing to show that that applicant and deceased were known to each other or applicant drove the vehicle with an intention to cause death of deceased. However, the prosecution ignoring aforesaid aspect of the matter, has submitted the charge sheet under Section 304 of IPC, against applicant, which is per se illegal. He further contended that even if the entire prosecution case is taken to be true, then also there is no material to satisfy that petitioner had knowledge that those injuries, if inflicted on deceased, would cause his death and as such, at the most charge under Section 304A of IPC can be framed against the applicant i.e. for being negligent in driving the vehicle on road, and not under Section 304 of IPC as is framed by trial court. Therefore, the order impugned framing charge under Section 304 of IPC is liable to be quashed. Therefore, the order impugned framing charge under Section 304 of IPC is liable to be quashed. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the decision rendered in case of Prabhakaran vs. State of Kerala, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 269 . 4. Per contra, learned State Counsel opposing the submissions of learned counsel for applicant would submit that, there are sufficient materials to attract the offences under Sections 304 & 427 of IPC. There is no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order and, as such, the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401 of CrPC vested with this Court cannot be invoked. Reliance is placed on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alister Anthony Pareira vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 648 . 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed along with revision. 6. The primary question that arises for consideration is whether the trial Court is justified in framing charge under Section 304 of IPC? 7. Section 299 of IPC explains ‘culpable homicide’. It provides that if an act is done with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing bodily injury that is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death and if ultimately death ensues, then it amounts to culpable homicide. Culpable homicide is of two types i.e. murder, and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 8. Section 304 of IPC reads as under:- "304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to muder. - Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 9. 9. Plain reading of Section 304 of IPC makes it clear that it is in two parts. Both parts deal with punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. First part applies where the accused causes death to the victim with the intention to cause such bodily injury that is likely to cause death. The second part of Section 304 IPC comes into play when the act is done without any intention to cause death or bodily injury as is likely to cause death, but with the knowledge that his act is likely to cause death. 10. Section 304-A of IPC reads as under:- "304A. Causing death by negligence.- Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." 11. Bare reading of above quoted Section 304A IPC, would demonstrate that it speaks of causing death by negligence. This Section applies to rash and negligent act and does not apply to cases where death has been voluntarily caused. It is also apparent that Section 304A IPC applies to cases which are out of the purview of culpable homicide. 12. In the case at hand, the contents of FIR reflects that the accident occurred on 23.5.2022, which resulted into death of deceased Yash, was witnessed by Vikas Sharma and Sunny Chawla. In the course of investigation, police recorded statement of aforementioned witnesses and according to them, on 23.05.2022 at about 12:15 p.m. when they were returning to Rajnandgaon, near Yog Ashram, Near GE Road, they saw that one Bolero vehicle driven at high speed dashed Activa vehicle, coming down the road dashed tractor standing in front of tractor showroom, due to impact of accident, standing tractor moved 8-10 foot ahead and dashed with other Bolero vehicle. They went near and saw that driver of Bolero is sitting alone inside and driver of Activa two wheeler was drenched in blood. On being asked, driver of Bolero told his name to be ‘Diwan’ and at that time he was in drunken condition and smell was emanating from his mouth. They went near and saw that driver of Bolero is sitting alone inside and driver of Activa two wheeler was drenched in blood. On being asked, driver of Bolero told his name to be ‘Diwan’ and at that time he was in drunken condition and smell was emanating from his mouth. Statement of Manohar Lal Totwani, Proprietor of Swaraj Tractor Showroom, Rajnandgaon is also recorded during investigation and he has stated that upon hearing sound of dashing of vehicles, he came out from showroom and saw that stationary tractor was hit by a bolero vehicle. On being asked, driver of Bolero vehicle told his name and he was in drunken condition. 13. Spot map also shows that the accident occurred beside the road and not on the main road. As per material available in the charge sheet, the incident occurred at 12:10 in the afternoon in the month of May, 2022, therefore, it is not the case where the applicant was not able to see the deceased on the side of the road. 14. In the matter of Alister Anthony Parieira (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed thus:- “40. The question is whether indictment of an accused under Section 304 Part II and Section 338 IPC can coexist in a case of single rash or negligent act. We think it can. We do not think that two charges are mutually destructive. If the act is done with the knowledge of the dangerous consequences which are likely to follow and if death is caused then not only that the punishment is for the act but also for the resulting homicide and a case may fall within Section 299 or Section 300 depending upon the mental state of the accused viz., as to whether the act was done with one kind of knowledge or the other or the intention. Knowledge is awareness on the part of the person concerned of the consequences of his act of omission or commission indicating his state of mind. There may be knowledge of likely consequences without any intention. Criminal culpability is determined by referring to what a person with reasonable prudence would have known. 41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Criminal culpability is determined by referring to what a person with reasonable prudence would have known. 41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held guilty not only of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law - in view of the provisions of the IPC- the cases which fall within last clause of Section 299 but not within clause ‘fourthly' of Section 300 may cover the cases of rash or negligent act done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its dangerous consequences and may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304A IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act amounting to culpable homicide of either description. 46. While observing that Section 304A speaks of causing death by negligence and applies to rash and negligent acts and does not apply to cases where there is an intention to cause death or knowledge that the act will in all probability cause death and that Section 304A only applies to cases in which without any such intention or knowledge death is caused by a rash and negligent act, on the factual scenario of the case, it was held that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304A IPC and not Section 304 Part II IPC Prabhakaran, does not say in absolute terms that in no case of an automobile accident that results in death of a person due to rash and negligent act of the driver, the conviction can be maintained for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC even if such act (rash or negligent) was done with the knowledge that by such act of his, death was likely to be caused. Prabhakaran14 turned on its own facts.” 15. Prabhakaran14 turned on its own facts.” 15. In the case at hand, the applicant, driver of offending vehicle, is holding the post of Sub-Divisional Officer, Public Works Department, and as such, had the knowledge that if the vehicle is driven at an excessive high speed and in dangerous manner, that too in inebriated condition, it may cause fatal accident. It is seen from the statements of the witnesses, who were present on the spot, the offending Bolero vehicle was being driven at such high speed that it had first dashed backside of Activa two-wheeler of deceased and then collided with a tractor parked in front of tractor showroom, due to impact of accident, stationary tractor moved 8-10 feet ahead and dashed another vehicle. Thus, it is clear that applicant was driving the vehicle in drunken condition at utmost high speed, he could not able to come out of the vehicle for long time. The condition, conduct and act of applicant shows that in spite of having knowledge being a prudent person that such reckless driving may cause death of any by-stander, himself or his fellow passengers as well as damage or loss to the amount of Rs.50/- or upwards. A prudent person will not drive a vehicle at a very high speed and in dangerous manner which he cannot control because a man of prudence has the knowledge that there is obvious chance of fatal accident if a vehicle is driven at very high speed and in dangerous manner, that too under the influence of liquor or drug. 16. In the cases of like nature, there cannot be any direct evidence of knowledge or intention of the offender. It can be only ascertained through circumstantial evidence. The test adopted by the Courts under such circumstances is the test of prudent person under the same facts and circumstances. A prudent person is someone who acts sensibly and takes proper precautions to protect themselves and others. 17. In case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be borne in mind for proper exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or 482 CrPC, as the case may be, particularly in the context of quashing of charge. 17. In case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be borne in mind for proper exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or 482 CrPC, as the case may be, particularly in the context of quashing of charge. The principles in Amit Kapoor's case (supra) were recently quoted with approval in case of Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari & another, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1057. One of the principles on which revisional jurisdiction can be exercised is that if the allegations are patently so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. Relevant principles culled out by Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforementioned decision read thus:- “27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.” 18. In case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT Delhi), reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605 , has observed in Para-25 as under:- “25.It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for "presuming" that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (See: Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi & Ors. Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja & Ors, (1990) 4 SCC 76 ).” 19. In case of State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 659 , the Supreme Court explaining the meaning of the word 'presume' has observed thus:- “32. ...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has commuted the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage".” 20. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage".” 20. In the given circumstances of the present case, it would not be befitting to give any finding with respect to the intention or knowledge of applicant, which is a subject matter of evidence and can more appropriately be adjudicated upon by the trial court in a full fledged trial. However, at this stage, it cannot be said that the ingredients i.e. intention or knowledge of present applicant, prima facie, are lacking for the purposes of arraigning him under Section 304 of IPC. Therefore, at this stage, I am not inclined to quash the order impugned framing charges under Sections 304 & 427 of IPC and Section 146/196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the applicant. 21. Even otherwise, this Court at the stage of charge, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not required to go for mini trial as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mohan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 15 SCC 584 , in Para-7, which reads thus:- “7. We are of the view that the High Court could not have conducted a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge, and that too in revision filed against the order framing charges. We are of the view that it is impossible to state at this stage that no case could possibly be made out for ultimate conviction of Respondent No.2. This being the case, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court.” 22. So far as the decision in case of Prabhakaran (supra), which is relied upon by learned counsel for applicant, is concerned, the same is not applicable in the present case because said decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court arose against the conviction of accused therein for the offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Thus, it is apparent that said case was after the trial and conviction, whereas in the present case the order framing charge has been challenged mainly on the ground that there is no prima facie material available in charge sheet to frame charge against the applicant. Thus, it is apparent that said case was after the trial and conviction, whereas in the present case the order framing charge has been challenged mainly on the ground that there is no prima facie material available in charge sheet to frame charge against the applicant. Even the judgment in Prabhakaran (supra) does not say in specific terms that in no case of accidental death due to negligence, Section 304 of IPC would not be attracted. It has time and again been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court that if an act leading to death is so negligent that the accused ought to have known that such act is likely to cause death, Section 304 of IPC may be attracted. 23. For the foregoing discussion, I do not find any good ground to interfere with the order impugned passed by the trial Court. The criminal revision fails and same is hereby dismissed. 24. However, it is made clear that the observations made by this Court are only for the purposes of deciding present revision petition against the order framing charge and shall have no bearing on merits of case during trial. Applicant will be at liberty to raise all the grounds as are available to him, including the grounds raised in this revision petition, and the trial Court shall consider the same on its own merits in accordance with law.