ORDER : I.A. No. 6116 of 2023 1. The present Interlocutory Application has been filed for condonation of delay of 68 days in filing the instant appeal. 2. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 3. Having regard to the averments made in this application, we are of the view that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. 4. Accordingly, I.A. No. 6116 of 2023 is allowed and the delay in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No. 373 of 2022 5. The instant intra-Court appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 06.12.2021 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 3144 of 2019 whereby and whereunder the decision dated 24.06.2017 as communicated by letter dated 13.07.2017 by which the prayer for appointment of the writ petitioner on compassionate ground has been rejected, has been quashed and set aside with a direction upon the respondents to consider the matter afresh within a period of three weeks. If the case of the petitioner is found to be fit, letter of appointment be issued in his favour within a further period of two weeks thereafter. 6. The brief facts of the case which need to be enumerated herein, read as under: The case of the petitioner is that his father was appointed on 16.09.1994 and was posted at N.S.D. Colliery, Dhori (K), P.O. Phusro, District-Bokaro and was to superannuate on 12.09.2018. As per the service record, during the service period, the deceased-father of the petitioner, fell ill on 20.05.2003 and the illness continued for a longer period and it was in the year 2014, he succumbed to illness and died on 20.03.2014. 7. It is the further case of the petitioner that though there are other two brothers but they never claimed compassionate appointment rather they gave no objection and in view of that, petitioner claimed compassionate appointment by filing an appropriate application before the authorities within the prescribed period of limitation. The respondent- Management has rejected case of the petitioner on the sole ground that the deceased-father remained unauthorisedly absent for 11 years and has not worked and, as such, petitioner is not entitled for compassionate appointment. 8. The respondent- Management has rejected case of the petitioner on the sole ground that the deceased-father remained unauthorisedly absent for 11 years and has not worked and, as such, petitioner is not entitled for compassionate appointment. 8. Being aggrieved with the said rejection order, the writ petitioner approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3144 of 2019 on the ground that the petitioner is struggling for his survival and is hand to mouth, and, as such a direction may be given to the respondents to reconsider case of the petitioner for compassionate appointment. 9. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly deceased – father did not work for the period he was under illness as he was apprehending from attending duties/work due to his serious illness. 10. The respondents appeared before the writ court and filed counter affidavit taking the ground that the petitioner and his entire family have survived for 11 long years without any financial assistance and further, that since the father of the petitioner never worked for 11 long years and hence, no case is made out for any appointment on compassionate ground. 11. Learned Single Judge after hearing the parties, vide order dated 06.12.2021 quashed and set aside the rejection order dated 24.06.2017 as communicated by letter dated 13.07.2017 by which the prayer of the petitioner for compassionate appointment was rejected and directed the respondents to consider the matter afresh within a period of three weeks. If the case of the petitioner is found to be fit, letter of appointment be issued in his favour within a further period of two weeks thereafter. 12. Being aggrieved with the order dated 06.12.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge, the instant Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the C.C.L. 13. It is evident from the factual aspect that the father of the writ petitioner was appointed on 16.09.1994 and while working, he died in harness on 20.03.2014. The petitioner claimed his appointment on compassionate ground on the basis of National Coal Wage Agreement, but the same was rejected vide order dated 24.06.2017, communicated by letter dated 13.07.2017, taking the ground therein that it is not a case where any financial assistant is required due to the reason that the father of the writ petitioner was absented himself from duty for a long period of 11 years. 14. 14. The petitioner, being aggrieved with the said order, has approached to this court by filing writ petition. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration the order passed by this Court in Nuri Ekka @ Nuhri Ekka vs. M/s. Central Coalfields Limited and Others in W.P. (S) No. 1400 of 2014, which was affirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 267 of 2017, has quashed and set aside the decision rejecting the claim of appointment on compassionate ground, which is the subject matter of the instant appeal. 15. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the Central Coalfields Limited, has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order: (i) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that the very purpose to provide appointment on compassionate ground is to provide financial assistant and when the father of the petitioner was having no financial aid from the employer due to his long absence from duty, hence, it is not a case where any requirement is there to provide the petitioner appointment on compassionate ground. (ii) It has been contended that the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration, hence, the present appeal. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. and Others vs. B.S. Bhadoria, passed in C.A. No. 4588 of 2014 (Arising out of S.LP (C) No. 34238 of 2012). However, Mr. Das, in all fairness, has also placed an unreported judgment/order passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 141 of 2022 [M/s Central Coalfields Limited and Others vs. Jai Murti Devi] wherein in similar circumstances of long unauthorized absence, this Court has declined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby and whereunder the decision taken by the authority concerned refusing to provide appointment on compassionate ground was quashed and set aside. 17. This Court has heard learned counsel for the appellant and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order. 18. The undisputed fact in this case is that the petitioner who is claiming to be a dependant under the National Coal Wage Agreement has made an application for appointment on compassionate ground in terms of the condition stipulated under the National Coal Wage Agreement as under Clause 9.3.0. 19. 18. The undisputed fact in this case is that the petitioner who is claiming to be a dependant under the National Coal Wage Agreement has made an application for appointment on compassionate ground in terms of the condition stipulated under the National Coal Wage Agreement as under Clause 9.3.0. 19. The aforesaid claim has been rejected on the ground that the father of the petitioner was on unauthorized absence for a period of about 11 years, hence the concerned authority has rejected the claim by taking the ground that when the father was unauthorizedly absent and he even though was surviving without any financial help, then there was no requirement to provide compassionate appointment on the ground of financial assistance. 20. This Court, before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, needs to refer herein the basic object while entering into an agreement (NCWA) with the Union by the mother company, the Coal India Limited. 21. The basic object of the National Coal Wage Agreement is to provide social security among the workmen/employees working in the Coal India Limited and its sister companies, like the appellant herein, i.e. C.C.L. 22. It needs to refer herein that the National Coal Wage Agreement is a bipartite agreement which is under the provisions of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such agreement has been arrived at in between the Coal India Limited and the Union, outside the conciliation proceeding. The reference needs to be made of the provision of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for the purpose of making such observation that the National Coal Wage Agreement is in view of provision of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which reads hereunder as: “18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding: (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of Section 10A or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has become enforceable shall be binding on: (a) all parties to the industrial dispute. (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause. (c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates. (d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.” 23. The issue of binding effect of the National Coal Wage Agreement has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohan Mahto vs. Central Coal Field Ltd. and Others, (2007) 8 SCC 549 wherein as per Para-10, the implication of the National Coal Wage Agreement has been taken into consideration and by referring to the provision of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the National Coal Wage Agreement has been construed to have the statutory fervor, for ready reference, paragraph-10 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted hereunder as: “10. A settlement within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act is binding on both the parties and continues to remain in force unless the same is altered, modified or substituted by another settlement. No period of limitation was provided in the settlement. We would assume that the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds. No period of limitation was provided in the settlement. We would assume that the respondent had jurisdiction to issue such circular prescribing a period of limitation for filing application for grant of appointment on compassionate grounds. But, such circular was not only required to be strictly complied with but also was required to be read keeping in view the settlement entered into by and between the parties. The expanding definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act would confer a right upon the appellant to obtain appointment on compassionate grounds, subject, of course, to compliance with the conditions precedent contained therein.” 24. It is evident from the National Coal Wage Agreement that various provisions have been made to provide monetary compensation and to provide appointment. The condition to provide appointment is under Clause 9.3.0. The Clause 9.3.0 to Clause 9.3.4 are being referred hereunder as: “9.3.0 Provision of Employment to Dependants 9.3.1 Employment would be provided to one dependant of workers who are disabled permanently and also those who die while in service. The provision will be implemented as follows. 9.3.2 Employment to one dependant of the worker who dies while in service In so far as female dependants are concerned, their employment/payment of monetary compensation would be governed by Para 9.5.0. 9.3.3 The dependant for this purpose means the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependant is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law or son-in-law residing with the deceased and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased may be considered to be the dependant of the deceased. 9.3.4 The dependants to be considered for employment should be physically fit and suitable for employment and aged not more than 35 years provided that the age limit in case of employment of female spouse would be 45 years as given in Clause 9.5.0. In so far as male spouse is concerned, there would be no age limit regarding provision of employment.” 25. Since the National Coal Wage Scheme is by way of social security measure, in order to deal with the predicament of the deceased employee, the decision has been taken by entering into bipartite agreement that the employment is to be provided in case one or the other employees dies in harness. 26. Since the National Coal Wage Scheme is by way of social security measure, in order to deal with the predicament of the deceased employee, the decision has been taken by entering into bipartite agreement that the employment is to be provided in case one or the other employees dies in harness. 26. It also needs to refer herein that the purport to provide offer of appointment as per the National Coal Wage Agreement is different in object and consideration in comparison to that of the appointment to be provided under the general scheme floated by the State or the Central Government or any other establishment. The dependants have been defined therein, meaning thereby, the consideration has been given in the said agreement that the primary concern is to provide financial assistance to the dependant of the worker who dies while in service depending upon the subsisting employer employee relationship. 27. Adverting to the facts of this case, the respondents have not disputed the question of dependency of the present petitioner with the employee. 28. The only ground has been taken that the concerned employee had remained absent from duty for a period of about 11 years, said to be unauthorized. But, it is admitted fact, as has been admitted by the appellant that even though the father of the writ petitioner had been found to be on unauthorized absence for 11 years but no proceeding has ever been initiated so as to separate the father of the writ petitioner from service by striking off his name from the roll of the employer. Therefore, the employer employee relationship in between the appellants and the father of the writ petitioner has not been disputed. 29. This Court is of the view that the employer-employee relationship is not in dispute then as to whether declining to provide appointment in pursuance to the National Coal Wage Agreement can be said to be proper and if it is not proper, then can the employer be allowed to take such ground contrary to the object and intent of the National Coal Wage Agreement wherein there is no discussion that what is to be done in such circumstances. 30. 30. The law is well settled that when any agreement is reached in between the parties which is a contract, then there cannot be any deviation from either of the parties, otherwise, the very purpose of entering into the contract will be redundant and if such will be allowed, the same will be unilateral deviation of the agreement on behalf of one of the signatories, i.e. the appellant herein. 31. It is further settled position of law that in any agreement there cannot be insertion of new things like that of statutory provision wherein the statute is to be read out in the way as is stipulated by the legislature and there cannot be any deviation from the same, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Others, AIR 1964 SC 358 , wherein it has been held at paragraph 8 as under: “25.....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” 32. In the case of Babu Verghese and Others vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 422 , wherein it has been held at paragraphs 31 & 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad vs. King Emperor who stated as under: “Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. State of U.P. and again in Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh vs. State of U.P. and again in Deep Chand vs. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” 33. However, the National Coal Wage Agreement is not construed to be a statutory rule but it has got statutory fervor in view of the fact that the agreement has been arrived outside the conciliation proceeding and hence, in view of the provision of Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it has got the statutory fervor. The moment it has got the statutory fervor then it is not available for one of the parties to deviate from the same, rather, the entire condition as contained in the agreement is to be read out as it is. 34. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid position of law and taking into consideration the admitted fact that the father of the petitioner had never been terminated from service, hence, since the employer-employee relationship was existing the day when the father of the writ petitioner had died, as such, the condition stipulated under the National Coal Wage Agreement will be applicable in the case of the writ petitioner. 35. So far as the consideration of the candidature of the petitioner is concerned, as has been observed by the learned Single Judge that the eligibility is to be considered, we are not making any remark on that. 36. This Court also is of the view that the reference of a judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench is required to be referred herein wherein in similar circumstances the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6669 of 2014 has been declined to be interfered with vide order dated 27.03.2023 passed in L.P.A. No. 141 of 2022 [M/s Central Coalfields Limited and Others vs. Jai Murti Devi], for ready reference the relevant para of the said judgment is being referred herein: “5. Dhaneshar Mallah, the husband of the writ petitioner, was admittedly an employee under the Central Coalfields Limited. He was mentally unfit, thus he had undergone treatment. Dhaneshar Mallah, the husband of the writ petitioner, was admittedly an employee under the Central Coalfields Limited. He was mentally unfit, thus he had undergone treatment. Though, he did not attend his duties, yet he was kept in the roll of the company. There was no disciplinary proceeding initiated against the husband of the writ petitioner by the employer nor any adverse order was passed. On 11.12.2011, the employee expired. On 9.1.2012, an application was filed by the respondent-writ petitioner, claiming compassionate appointment for her son in terms of National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA). These are the admitted facts. 6. It is an admitted fact that till the date of death of the employee, his name was there in the “Manpower Rolls” maintained by the company. The name of the employee was struck off on 15.3.2012 i.e. after the death of the employee and after the application for compassionate appointment was made. This fact clearly suggests that on the date of death of the employee, he was in the rolls of the company. 7. As per NCWA, the compassionate appointment is granted to one of the dependents of the employee, who dies in harness. Admittedly, the employee-Dhaneshar Mallah died in harness as his name was there in the rolls of the company at the time of his death. 8. Since at the time of death, the deceased was an employee under the Central Coalfields Limited, the Central Coalfields Limited could not have rejected the claim for compassionate appointment of the son of writ petitioner. Thus, the learned Single Judge rightly appreciating the aforesaid fact has allowed the writ petition with a direction to consider grant of compassionate appointment to the son of the writ petitioner, as the case in hand is a case of death in harness. 9. We find no illegality in the impugned order. Accordingly, this Letter Patent Appeal is dismissed.” 37. This Court is of the view that the order passed by the Division Bench is not binding upon the Coordinate Division Bench but certainly the order passed by the Division Bench is to be followed on account of the parameter of the judicial discipline in order to avoid inconsistency in the order, if the order passed by the Division Bench is exactly on the same fact. 38. 38. This Court will fail in its duty if the reference of judgment upon which the reliance has been placed by Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the CCL, will not be referred. 39. The contention has been raised that the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the case of long absence and even if there is not adverse action against the employee concerned, then his services will be deemed to be abandoned. 40. This Court is not disputing the aforesaid fact but the law is well settled that the applicability of judgment is to be tested on the basis of the fact involved in each and every case, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, (2014) 5 SCC 75 at paragraph 47 which is quoted hereunder: “47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 41. The fact of the present case pertains to the National Coal Wage Agreement which this Court has already referred that it has got statutory fervor and there cannot be any deviation from the condition stipulated therein and so long as the employer-employee relation is existing, the condition as required to be followed by the employer and the employee as under Clause 9.3.0 in the fact of the particular case. 42. The case in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has come out with the view regarding the principle of abandonment due to the long absence, i.e. in respect of the general provision of providing appointment under the scheme. 42. The case in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has come out with the view regarding the principle of abandonment due to the long absence, i.e. in respect of the general provision of providing appointment under the scheme. Admittedly the appointment which is to be provided on compassionate ground is not a fundamental right, rather, it is exception to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Public Instructions and Others vs. K.R. Vishwanath, (2005) 7 SCC 206 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court taking into consideration its various judgment in paragraph 9 held as under: “9. As was observed in State of Haryana vs. Rani Devi, (1996) 5 SCC 308 , it need not be pointed out that the claim of person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that he was dependant on the deceased employee. Strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Die-in-harness scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased employee. In Rani Devi Case (1996) 5 SCC 308 , it was held that scheme regarding appointment on compassionate ground if extended to all types of casual or ad hoc employees including those who worked as apprentices cannot be justified on constitutional grounds. In LIC of India vs. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, (1994) 2 SCC 718 , it was pointed out that High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplates such appointments. In LIC of India vs. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, (1994) 2 SCC 718 , it was pointed out that High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplates such appointments. It was noted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138 that as a rule in public service appointment should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased.” 43. In the case of SAIL vs. Madhusudan Das, (2008) 15 SCC 560 , the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph-15 has observed as under: “15. This Court in a large number of decisions has held that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It must be provided for in the rules. The criteria laid down therefor viz. that the death of the sole bread [winner] of the family, must be established. It is meant to provide for a minimum relief. When such contentions are raised, the constitutional philosophy of equality behind making such a scheme be taken into consideration. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India mandate that all eligible candidates should be considered for appointment in the posts which have fallen vacant. Appointment on compassionate ground offered to a dependant of a deceased employee is an exception to the said rule. It is a concession, not a right.” 44. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Shashank Goswami, (2012) 11 SCC 307 has reiterated on the same line and observed at Para-9 as under: “9.…the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is based on the premise that the applicant was dependant on the deceased employee. It is a concession, not a right.” 44. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Shashank Goswami, (2012) 11 SCC 307 has reiterated on the same line and observed at Para-9 as under: “9.…the claim for appointment on compassionate grounds is based on the premise that the applicant was dependant on the deceased employee. Strictly, such a claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. Appointment on compassionate grounds cannot be claimed as a matter of right.” 45. But, here since we are dealing with the issue of National Coal Wage Agreement, which is having the statutory fervor in the light of stipulation as made under Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Hence, the factual aspect involved in the case of State of M.P. and Others vs. B.S. Bhadoria (Supra) is not applicable in this case. 46. This Court, in entirety of facts and circumstances and also taking into consideration the fact that the learned Single Judge has considered the order passed in Nuri Ekka @ Nuhri Ekka vs. M/s. Central Coalfields Limited and Others in W.P. (S) No. 1400 of 2014, affirmed by the Division Bench in L.P.A. No. 267 of 2017 coupled with the order dated 27.03.2023 passed in L.P.A. No. 141 of 2022 [M/s Central Coalfields Limited and Others vs. Jai Murti Devi] as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the impugned order needs no interference. 47. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.