ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition assailing the order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the Appellate Authority by which the order passed by the disciplinary authority dated 04.04.2005 has been modified to the extent that recovery to the tune of Rs. 5,90,000/- and stoppage of 5 increments with cumulative effect have been set aside, however, the Appellate Authority has affirmed dismissal from service w.e.f. 04.04.2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority. 2. The brief facts as reflected from the record are that the petitioner was the then Branch Manager of the Sarguja Kshetriya Bank (Now Chhattisgarh Gramin Bank) and in the intervening night of 29/30.06.2001, incident of theft of Rs. 5,90,000/- has taken place in the Kelhari Branch of the respondent Bank. As such, the petitioner was charge-sheeted on 09.11.2001 and following charges were levelled against the petitioner :- 3. The service condition of the employees and officers of the Bank are governed by the Sarguja Kshetriya Gramin Bank Adhikari Aum Karmchari Seva Vinium, 2000 (in short ‘the Regulation of 2000’). The Regulation of 2000 has been framed by the Bank under Section 30 of the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976 by the Board of Directors of Central Bank which is sponsored bank and with the consultation of NABARD and prior approval of the Central Government. As such, it has statutory force. Clause 38 of the said Regulation defines ‘Misconduct’ and the charges levelled against the petitioner fall within the ambit of major misconduct as defined in the Regulation. Clause 38 of the Regulation also provides procedure for imposing major penalty by conducting inquiry wherein the delinquent should be given proper opportunity to defend his case. Accordingly, the respondent Bank appointed Inquiry Officer vide order dated 09.01.2001 who has conducted inquiry as per the procedure prescribed under the Regulation of 2000. The Inquiry Officer after appreciating the evidence and materials on record submitted his report on 12.10.2004. The Bank has forwarded the inquiry report on 19.10.2004 to the petitioner and directed him to submit explanation with regard to filing of the inquiry report. The petitioner who was in jail at Manendragarh has submitted his reply on 30.10.2004 wherein he has stated that he could not produce the defence witness therefore, he did not want to inquiry proceeding and has submitted reply to the show cause notice on 02.04.2005. The petitioner who was in jail at Manendragarh has submitted his reply on 30.10.2004 wherein he has stated that he could not produce the defence witness therefore, he did not want to inquiry proceeding and has submitted reply to the show cause notice on 02.04.2005. The Disciplinary Authority after going through the records of the inquiry proceeding, reply submitted by the petitioner vide order dated 04.04.2005 has imposed punishment of removal from service, withholding of 5 increments with cumulative effect and also ordered for recover of loss caused to the Bank to the tune Rs. 5,90,000/-. 4. Being aggrieved with the order the petitioner has preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. Board of Directors but the Board of Directors has rejected the said appeal vide its order dated 26.10.2007. Being aggrieved with this order the petitioner has preferred Writ Petition No. 7535/2007 which has been partly allowed by this Court vide order dated 09.01.2018 Annexure P/4 by setting aside the order dated 26.10.2007 passed by this Appellate Authority and remitted the matter before the Appellate Authority to decide the appeal strictly in accordance with law and to pass a reasoned and speaking order within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. The appeal was not decided by the Appellate Authority within the stipulated time period given by this Court, therefore, the petitioner has filed WPS No. 4541/2018. This Court vide order dated 07.07.2023 has disposed off the petition by imposing cost of Rs. 3,00,000/- on the count of in-action on part of the Bank in deciding the appeal within the stipulated time period given by this Court and also directed to decide the appeal within 3 months from the date of passing of the order. Being aggrieved with the imposition of cost the respondent Bank has preferred Writ Appeal before the Hon’ble Division Bench and the Hon’ble Division Bench has reduced the cost from Rs. 3,00,000/- to Rs. 1000/-. Thereafter, the appeal was decided by the Board of Directors vide its order dated 11.09.2023 and partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the penalty of recovery of Rs. 5,90,000/- which has been caused due to negligence of the petitioner and withholding of 5 increments with cumulative effect but affirmed the order of removal from service w.e.f. 04.04.2005. 1000/-. Thereafter, the appeal was decided by the Board of Directors vide its order dated 11.09.2023 and partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the penalty of recovery of Rs. 5,90,000/- which has been caused due to negligence of the petitioner and withholding of 5 increments with cumulative effect but affirmed the order of removal from service w.e.f. 04.04.2005. The petitioner being aggrieved with this order has filed the present writ petition and prayed for quashing of the order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the Appellate Authority and to direct the respondent Bank to release the Provident Fund, Earned Leave, Gratuity, pension and all other retiral dues as in the meanwhile the petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner has received notice for hearing in the departmental inquiry initiated against him but he could not participate in the inquiry as he was in jail as under-Trial accused, therefore, he prayed for stay of inquiry proceeding vide letter dated 02.02.2005, 02.04.2005, which were received by the respondent on 04.04.2005 and without giving him any opportunity of hearing the inquiry officer has completed the inquiry proceeding. It has also been contended that the petitioner has been acquitted in criminal case No. 691/2004 by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Korea on 27.09.2004 for commission of offence punishable under Sections 409, 450, 380, 381, 201 IPC, as such, the dismissal from service deserves to be set aside by this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that in absence of all the Board members the appeal has been decided which is illegal. She would further submit that the petitioner received the information under RTI that the then Area Manager of Baikunthpur office who was one of the witnesses MW-01 in favour of the management in the D.E. (Departmental inquiry), the same person who has represented the petitioner before the Board of Directors, as such he represented both the side (for management/respondent Bank and also for the petitioner) which is against the principle of natural justice. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that up-holding of punishment of the dismissal from service with effect from order dated 04.04.2005 is completely perverse and un-sustainable in the eyes of law. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that up-holding of punishment of the dismissal from service with effect from order dated 04.04.2005 is completely perverse and un-sustainable in the eyes of law. The conclusion upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the Appellate Authority is perverse and suffers from patent error on the face of record as the appellate authority has given reason for imposing punishment upon the petitioner on the basis of FIR but ignored the written complaint made by the petitioner himself with regard to loss/theft of the keys wherein he has informed the police on 30.06.2001 itself that the keys have been theft from his residence. She would further submit that against the petitioner a Criminal Case bearing No. 691/2004 was registered against the petitioner for commission of offence under Section 409, 380, 381, 201 IPC wherein the learned Judicial Magistrate has recorded its finding that charges of theft against the petitioner for Rs. 5,90,000/- have not been found proved, therefore, he was acquitted as such in the departmental inquiry the charges should not have been held to be found proved. She would further submit that acquittal from the criminal case clearly proves that he was not involved in the conspiracy of theft, therefore, he cannot be said that he failed to discharge his duties with sincerity, thus, she would pray for quashing of the punishment order. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the incident of theft is an accidental incident that can happen to anyone as the petitioner has acted as per normal banking procedure like every day. It is also submitted that the petitioner has obtained an information with regard to the punishment given to the employee of the bank if keys are lost due to negligence of that employee, then in the history of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Gramin Bank, on employee/officer of the bank has been ever served with such serious and 3 major punishments and in such cases the employees/officer shall be punished with minimum punishment only, thus, the petitioner is subjected to hostile discrimination while imposing the major punishment and would pray for setting aside the impugned order dated 11.09.2023 passed by the Appellate Authority and direction to the respondent to provide all retrial dues of the petitioner i.e. provident fund, earned leave, gratuity, pension and all dues. 9. 9. The petitioner has also submitted the written synopsis reiterating the submission which has already been made before this Court. To substantiate her submission she would refer to the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Bhagat Ram vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others { AIR 1983 SC 454 }, B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India {1995 SCC (6) 749, Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran { (2015) 2 SCC 610 }, Allahabad Bank and Others vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari { (2017) 2 SCC 308 }, Rakesh Kumar Pandey vs. State of U.P. {Case No. 18642/2018 dated 20.02.2019}. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the appellate authority after granting opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner has passed the well reasoned order partially allowing the Petitioner's appeal by setting aside two penalties and affirmed the penalty of dismissal from service. He would further submit that in the inquiry proceeding proper opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner as reflected from the record that petitioner and his representatives appeared in the inquiry proceeding from 20.02.2002 to 30.12.2003 and inquiry was completed. Thereafter, the inquiry officer has submitted report which was forwarded to the petitioner on 12.10.2004 to submit their defence with regard to the findings of the report. This was replied by the petitioner by saying that he was in jail therefore, he had prayed for stay of the proceeding which was not considered as the inquiry proceeding has already concluded and submission with regard to inquiry report was only to be given. It has also been submitted that even thereafter, extended opportunity of 15 days time was given to the petitioner along with proposed punishment vide memo dated 23.02.2005 which has been received by the petitioner on 20.03.2005 and thereafter he has submitted reply on 02.04.2005. Thus, it is evident that in every steps Principle of Natural Justice has been fully complied with. He would further submit that in the pleading also the petitioner has nowhere alleged about non compliance of Principle of Natural Justice or violation of rules of inquiry proceeding. Thus, it is quite vivid that the bank has given proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He would further submit that in the pleading also the petitioner has nowhere alleged about non compliance of Principle of Natural Justice or violation of rules of inquiry proceeding. Thus, it is quite vivid that the bank has given proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. He would further submit that even if the petitioner has been acquitted in criminal case it has no bearing in departmental proceeding as standard of proving in criminal trial is on the basis of strict law of proving the offence committed whereas in the departmental inquiry proceeding the misconduct can be proved on the basis of principle of preponderance. The inquiry officer after appreciating the entire evidence, materials collected during inquiry has held that all the charges have been proved. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment on 04.04.2005 which has been modified by the Appellate Authority on 11.09.2023, thus, order passed by the Appellate Authority is legal, justified and does not warrant interference by this Court. He would further submit that the punishment affirmed by the Appellate Authority is proportionate to the misconduct as the petitioner being Branch Manger and the Bank is custodian of the public money, as such, the petitioner should have been more vigilant to discharge duties which he utterly failed to discharge. It is further submitted that as stated by the petitioner that the keys were stolen from the house of the petitioner then also it is quite vivid that he was negligent to discharge his duties in keeping the keys under proper custody, thus, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed by this Court. 11. The respondent has also filed written submission reiterating his submission already made. To substantiate his submission he would refer to judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Sardar Bahadur { (1972) 4 SCC 618 }, State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao { AIR 1963 SC 1723 }, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu { (2014) 4 SCC 108 }, Union of India vs. Subrata Nath {2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617}. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 13. This Court directed the counsel for the bank to produce the record of the inquiry proceeding to ascertain whether opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner or not. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 13. This Court directed the counsel for the bank to produce the record of the inquiry proceeding to ascertain whether opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner or not. In pursuance of direction the bank has produced the record. From the order sheets of the inquiry officer it is quite vivid that inquiry was started on 30.01.2002, on that date the petitioner remained absent therefore, a short adjournment was given. On behalf of the petitioner, application has moved to engage the lawyer in the inquiry which was objected by the Presenting Officer by stating that there is no such provision for appointing the lawyer in the inquiry as per the procedure for inquiry prescribed by the NABARD. The Inquiry Officer has rejected the same and has allowed him to engage defence representatives and fixed the proceeding on 20.02.2002. On that date also the petitioner sought adjournment which was considered and the proceeding was adjourned to 05.03.2002. On 05.03.2002 the petitioner appeared and denied the charges. The Inquiry Officer in compliance of the principle of natural justice directed the petitioner to give consent for engaging defence counsel. The Presenting Officer was directed to produce all the documents and accordingly the proceedings were adjourned to 22.02.2002 and various dates. On 21.06.2002, the proceedings were again adjourned as the Presenting Officer was not present however the petitioner was present. On 05.07.2002 the Presenting Officer has submitted documents in 2 sets which were exhibited from PD-2 to 14 & 14-A. The copies of the documents were given to the petitioner and proceedings were adjourned to 18.07.2002 but the proceeding was taken up on 28.08.2002, on that date the petitioner appeared and informed that he wants to keep one Kumud Maheshwar Shukla as defence representative and does not want to keep any other person and prayed for allowing him to participate in the inquiry. The Inquiry Officer has given its finding that since Kumud Maheshwar Shukla is already conducting inquiry and as per the rules, only in one departmental inquiry he can act as defence representative. The Inquiry Officer has given its finding that since Kumud Maheshwar Shukla is already conducting inquiry and as per the rules, only in one departmental inquiry he can act as defence representative. The Inquiry Officer has directed the departmental representative to call the witnesses for examining the correctness of the documents which were vehemently objected by the petitioner by saying that unless his defence representative appears in the inquiry till then management should not submit their stand otherwise it will be denial of principle of natural justice. Subsequently the petitioner submitted consent for engaging defence representative which was exhibited as D/4. The petitioner has raised no objection about the documents presented by the management. The petitioner was directed to appear on the next date of hearing along with his representative. The proceedings were taken up on 02.09.2002, on that date the petitioner appeared along with defence representative Kumud Maheshwar Shukla but the same was rejected and permission was granted to engage one Anil Kumar Sinha as defence representative. The documents were tallied with the original records. On 20.01.2003, the petitioner appeared and again sought permission to engage Kumud Maheshwar Shukla which was allowed with condition that inquiry proceeding should not be stalled and proceedings were adjourned to 07.02.2003 which were again adjourned to 28.04.2003, 05.06.2003 and was fixed on 25.07.2023. The Presenting Officer was directed to present the case and witnesses namely Anil Kumar Sinha and Dinesh Gupta were examined and cross-examined and the proceedings were adjourned to 18.07.2003. On 18.07.2003, the Presenting Officer has submitted his case. The Inquiry Officer has directed the petitioner to submit his witnesses and documents then the petitioner has informed the inquiry officer that on the next date of hearing he will submit the witness and documents, accordingly the proceedings were adjourned to 07.11.2003. On the request of the petitioner the proceedings were adjourned to 30.12.2003. On 30.12.2003, the petitioner has submitted documents which were referred in Ex.P/10 and also submitted documents in his defence and closed his defence. The Inquiry Officer has directed the defence representative and the departmental representative to submit written brief in two sets. 14. From the above stated facts, it is quite vivid that proper opportunity to defence his case has been extended to the petitioner. As such , it is held inquiry has been conducted in accordance with the principle of natural justice. The Inquiry Officer has directed the defence representative and the departmental representative to submit written brief in two sets. 14. From the above stated facts, it is quite vivid that proper opportunity to defence his case has been extended to the petitioner. As such , it is held inquiry has been conducted in accordance with the principle of natural justice. Even in the writ petition the petitioner has not taken any specific plea of non-compliance of principle of natural justice or non-supply of any document which caused prejudice to the petitioner to defend himself in the Departmental Enquiry. The record of the Inquiry proceeding could reveal that the Inquiry Officer after appreciating the evidence has recorded its finding that charge No. 1 levelled against the petitioner that he was sole incharge of the keys of the locker as well as branch and he has committed negligence in keeping the keys in safe custody. The Inquiry Officer after appreciating the evidence has recorded its finding that charge No. 2 by which the petitioner has been charged for keeping the excess amount in bank has been found proved. Similarly, Inquiry Officer has also recorded its finding with regard to charge No. 3 that due to negligence of the petitioner has bank has suffered financial loss of Rs. 5,90,000/-. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that since the respondent bank has modified the order of imposition of recovery of Rs. 5,90,000/- and withholding of 5 increments with cumulative effect, as such, charge No. 3 has been diluted therefore, the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate and would pray for interference in the quantum of punishment. This was objected by the counsel for the bank and would submit that the Appellate Authority has already modified the punishment order and the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is proportionate to the misconduct committed by the petitioner, therefore, no interference can be made by this Court. 16. It is well settled position of law that with regard to interference of court in exercise of judicial review is applicable only when (I) Rules of Natural Justice has not been complied with (ii) Finding of Misconduct is not based on any evidence (iii) Statutory Rules governing the conduct of disciplinary inquiry were not followed (iv) findings of disciplinary authority suffer from perversity (v) penalty is disproportionate to the misconduct. From the records it is quite vivid that there is no violation of princple of natural justice, findings are neither perverse nor contrary to the record as the witnesses examined before the inquiry have proved the misconduct of the petitioner. The punishment is proportionate as being the Branch Manager it was his responsibility to take care of the entire bank. The petitioner has stated that if the keys are lost then the employee/ officer has not been inflicted with major punishment but no material to substantiate this submission has been placed on record as such the bald allegation without foundation deserves to be rejected. The Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to judicial review in disciplinary inquiry matter has held that the constitutional court in exercise of power of judicial review does not assume role of Appellate Authority and its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principle of natural justice and held in case of Regional Manager, UCO Bank And Another V. Krishna Kumar Bhardwaj {[Civil Appeal No(s). 1457 of 2022 arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No(s). 13953 of 2021 decided on 18.02.2022} as under:- “18. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is well circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has earlier been examined by this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and Others; Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited Vs. Mahesh Dahiya and recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court(of which one of us is a member) in Deputy General Manager(Appellate Authority) and Others Vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava3 wherein this Court has held as under:- "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. Ajay Kumar Srivastava3 wherein this Court has held as under:- "24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact. 25. When the disciplinary inquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the inquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. 26. It is well settled that where the inquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of inquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the inquiry officer for further inquiry. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental inquiry proceedings. 27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental inquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental inquiry proceedings. 28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental inquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." 19. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the Division Bench has proceeded on the premise that the responsibility was of the Branch Manager along with the Assistant Manager(Cash). Hence, the respondent could not have been held responsible for the lapses of those officers and proceeding on the said foundation, set aside the penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent but the record of inquiry clearly manifests that it was a factual error being committed by the High Court while setting aside the domestic inquiry and the consequential punishment inflicted upon the respondent delinquent. 20. In the course of inquiry, a documentary evidence came on record that although Mr. Vinod Kumar Khanna was the Manager of the Branch but the date, i.e., 10th/11th November, 1999 on which the theft was committed, the custodian of cash were the respondent along with the Assistant Manager(Cash). The finding has been recorded by the inquiry officer in his report holding that the respondent delinquent was the custodian of cash in keeping the keys in cash safe/strong room in the almirah of the stationery room overnight and not keeping the same in his personal custody as per rules of the Bank along with Assistant Manager(Cash). The finding has been recorded by the inquiry officer in his report holding that the respondent delinquent was the custodian of cash in keeping the keys in cash safe/strong room in the almirah of the stationery room overnight and not keeping the same in his personal custody as per rules of the Bank along with Assistant Manager(Cash). The finding of fact was confirmed by the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority in upholding the guilt of the respondent as he had failed in discharge of his duties as a custodian when the theft had taken place on 10th/11th November, 1999 but the High Court in the impugned judgment has not taken pains to examine the finding recorded by the inquiry officer in reference to the responsibility which the respondent delinquent failed to discharge as a custodian of cash at the relevant point of time when the theft was committed. 21. That apart, what has been recorded by the inquiry officer has been revisited by the disciplinary/appellate authority and after re-appreciation of record of inquiry and due application of mind, the appellate authority while exonerating the respondent delinquent from charge no. 3 held charge nos. 1 and 4 proved against him and punished him by an order dated 23rd December, 2002. Neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court has taken pains to look into the finding which was recorded by the inquiry officer in reference to charge nos. 1 and 4 and appreciated thereafter by the disciplinary/appellate authority in passing of the order of penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent. 22. In our considered view, the finding which has been recorded by the High Court in the impugned order is unsustainable and not supported with the report of inquiry available on record. 17. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that since he has been acquitted in criminal case for commission of offence of theft and other offence, therefore, the punishment order of removal from service should be quashed, is misconceived and deserves to be rejected as acquittal by criminal court does not debar an employer from exercising power to conduct departmental proceeding in accordance with the rules and regulation. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental are entirely different, they operate in different fields and have different objects. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental are entirely different, they operate in different fields and have different objects. In the disciplinary proceedings the question is whether petitioner is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment can be imposed whereas in criminal proceeding question is whether the offense registered against him under IPC is established or not and the standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing the inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umesh { (2022) 6 SCC 563 } has held as under :- 16. The principles which govern a disciplinary inquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial. In a prosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results in a violation of the service rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike a criminal prosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in a disciplinary proceeding, a charge of misconduct has to be established on a preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to a criminal trial are distinct from those which govern a disciplinary inquiry. The acquittal of the accused in a criminal case does not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction. 20. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, this Court has held as under: - "9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different.” 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Union Of India & Ors. Vs Dalbir Singh { (2021) 11 SCC 321 } in paragraph 23 and 24 has held as under: - 23. This Court in Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) Limited v. M. Chandrasekaran held that in exercise of power of judicial review, the Labour Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the disciplinary authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence. The question as to decision of the disciplinary authority of dismissing the respondent is just and proper could be assailed by the respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material produced in the departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under: “11. The respondent on the other hand contends that the Commissioner has applied the well-settled legal position that there can be no presumption of misconduct by the employees. That, charge must be proved by the Department during the inquiry. Non-examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses present on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was fatal. For, it entails in not substantiating the charges against the respondent and failure to discharge the initial onus resting on the Department to prove the charge as framed. According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the tangible reasons recorded by the Commissioner as noticed by the Single Judge (reproduced above); and resultantly, the conclusion of the Commissioner of not according approval to the order of dismissal is just and proper. It is submitted that the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and issuing direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back wages and continuity of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him.” 24. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. It is submitted that the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and issuing direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back wages and continuity of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him.” 24. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors., held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. It was held as under: “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” (Emphasis Supplied).” 19. Considering the factual and legal matrix of the case, also considering that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is proportionate to the misconduct and in view of the fact that there is no circumstance available on record where this Court can interfere in the disciplinary matter, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed.