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2024 DIGILAW 424 (JHR)

Kiran Kumar Xalxo, son of Late Franklin Xalxo v. Yusuf Khan, son of Late Matbar Khan

2024-04-19

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2024
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 26.09.2022 passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Khunti in Original Suit No. 20 of 2019 whereby and whereunder the petition filed on behalf of the applicants, namely, Anita Rani Tirkey daughter of Late Kalyan Tirkey and Grace Panna Tirkey on 13.01.2021 under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. for impleadment as party to the suit, has been allowed. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant petition which are required to be enumerated, read hereunder as :- It is the case of the petitioner that the plaintiff filed Title Suit No.20 of 2019 in the court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Khunti against the Defendants praying therein decree for declaration of his right, title, interest and possession as well as the Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 over Schedule-A lands and also for declaration that the Sale Deed dated 24.07.2018 is illegal and the same may be cancelled. 3. The case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint is that the lands of R.S. Khata No.136 of Village Lodhma was recorded as Bakast Malik in the name of Mr. A.T.PEE PEE Saheb and he died leaving behind two daughters namely Penelope Elsie Wilson Ross Hurst and Mrs. Justina Marion Noe Deery and they became the tenure holder of the lands and settled the lands measuring 17.80 Acres of Plot Nos. 451, 469, 474, 477, 478, 475 and 476 of Khata No.136 of the said village to Ida Khalkho, Hitkari Dadel and Grace Panna Tirkey by Registered Deed of Settlement in the year 1952 and the settlee came into possession over the same and after vesting Jamabandi with respect to the aforementioned lands was opened in their names and they continued in possession over the same. 4. Ida Khalkho died leaving behind his only son Kiran Kumar Xalxo who is the plaintiff in the present suit and Hitkar Dadel died leaving behind two sons namely Lalit Salil J. Minz and Srikant Minz who are Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and as such the Plaintiff and the Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are the absolute owners of the suit property fully described in Schedule-A to the plaint. 5. 3 and 4 and as such the Plaintiff and the Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are the absolute owners of the suit property fully described in Schedule-A to the plaint. 5. The plaintiff came to know that the Defendant No.1 without having any right, title, interest and possession, executed sale deed in favour of the Defendant No.2 on 24.07.2018 practicing fraud although the mother of the plaintiff acquired the land in 1952 by virtue of Registered Deed and continued in possession thereof being the rightful owner so long alive and at present the plaintiff is in possession over the lands which was allotted in the share of the mother of the plaintiff. 6. In the above suit, the Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 filed their written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff. The case was posted for hearing final arguments and the argument of the plaintiff was heard in part on 22.09.2022. 7. The Intervenors filed a separate petition in the said suit under Order I Rule 10 (2) read with Section 151 C.P.C. praying therein for their addition as Defendants in the suit on the ground that they have got 1/3rd share in the suit property. 8. The plaintiff filed rejoinder to the said petition stating therein that the claim of the Intervenor is completely different as they are claiming 1/3rd share in the suit property which cannot be allowed in the instant suit moreover the Judgment and Decree passed in Partition Suit No. 191 of 1964 is nullity and the same was never given effect to nor Grace Panna Tirkey ever came in possession over the suit property on the strength of the said judgment and as such the Intervenors are neither necessary parties nor proper parties in the above suit and the petition has been filed at belated stage when the suit was posted for hearing final arguments. 9. The learned court, by terms of order dated 26.09.2022, allowed the petition filed by the Intervenors under Order I Rule 10 (2) read with Section 151 C.P.C. and impleaded them as Defendant Nos. 6 to 9 in the above suit , which is the subject matter of the present petition. 10. It is evident from the factual aspect that a declatory suit has been filed by the plaintiff, namely, Kiran Kumar Xalxo for declaration of right and title over the lands measuring 17.80 Acres of Plot Nos. 6 to 9 in the above suit , which is the subject matter of the present petition. 10. It is evident from the factual aspect that a declatory suit has been filed by the plaintiff, namely, Kiran Kumar Xalxo for declaration of right and title over the lands measuring 17.80 Acres of Plot Nos. 451, 469, 474, 477, 478, 475 and 476 of Khata No.136 of Village Lodhma. 11. The suit has proceeded and at the stage of hearing, Anita Rani Tirkey daughter of Late Kalyan Tirkey and Grace Panna Tirkey filed petition on 13.01.2021 under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. for their impleadment as party to the aforesaid suit. 12. The ground has been taken that she along with Vineeta Tirkey and Lalita Shila Tirkey are the daughter of Grace Panna Tirkey, wife of Kalyan Tirkey, and as such, she claims interest over the property in question for which the declaratory suit has been filed by the plaintiff, namely, Kiran Kumar Xalxo. 13. The applicant has taken the ground that after the death of her father, namely, Kalyan Tirkey, sometime in the year 1978, the Opposite Party Ila Xalxo and Hitkari Dadel/Xalxo filed a suit before the competent court of civil jurisdiction but without impleading the applicant, namely, Anita Rani Tirkey, as party, and got their name mutated in their favour and in favour of the Opposite Party No.3 and 4 and based upon that the land falling under Khata Nos. 136 and 139 has been apportioned in the ratio of 50% which has never been informed to the other successors in interest of Grace Panna Tirkey. However, she claimed that she is also having right over the property in question to the extent of 1/3. 14. The learned trial court, after considering the genealogical table, has allowed the said application considering the fact that the applicant, namely, Anita Rani Tirkey, is having interest over the property in question and hence, she has been considered to be a necessary party to the proceeding. The said order is under challenge by filing the instant petition. 15. Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the order impugned is not sustainable in the eyes of law, since, it has been filed belatedly, i.e., at the stage of hearing. 16. The said order is under challenge by filing the instant petition. 15. Mr. Amar Kumar Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that the order impugned is not sustainable in the eyes of law, since, it has been filed belatedly, i.e., at the stage of hearing. 16. It has further been contended by referring to the pleading made at paragraph 5 of the plaint, as has been appended as Annexure-1 to the paper book, showing the fact that the applicant has got no right over the property in question. 17. The learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has submitted that the learned trial court while allowing the application filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C., has committed patent illegality and, as such, the said order is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 18. This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner and gone across the finding recorded by the learned trial court in the impugned order. 19. This Court, before going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, needs to refer herein the ground which has been taken by the applicant, namely, Anita Rani Tirkey, who is Opposite Party No.6 herein, that she claimed interest over the property in question claiming herself to be the shareholder of 1/3rd area of the said property. The application in view of such pleading was allowed. 20. The fact about the interest over the property in question has been disputed as per the statement made at paragraph 5 to the plaint. But, the question herein which requires consideration is that at the stage of impleadment of the party as per the provision as made under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C., what requirement is to be seen by the concerned court. 21. But, the question herein which requires consideration is that at the stage of impleadment of the party as per the provision as made under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C., what requirement is to be seen by the concerned court. 21. This Court, in order to consider the aforesaid fact needs to refer herein the provision of Order I Rule 10(2) C.P.C. which reads hereunder as:- “10(2) Court may strike out or add parties.—The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. 22. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the court has been empowered to implead party in course of the trial if not impleaded as party by the plaintiff showing the interest over the property in question. The court if comes to the conclusion that for the purpose of adjudication of the lis the impleadment of such person is necessary, then the requirement under the law will be to implead such applicant to be party to the proceeding. 23. Further, the general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis (the person to whom a suit belongs), may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties, reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. and Others, (2010) 7 SCC 417 , wherein at paragraph 13 it has been held as under :- “13. The general rule in regard to impleadment of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently, a person who is not a party has no right to be impleaded against the wishes of the plaintiff. But this general rule is subject to the provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (“the Code”, for short), which provides for impleadment of proper or necessary parties. … … … …” 24. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit. 25. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit. 25. It is settled position of law that a person need not have any subsisting right or interest in the suit property for being impleaded as a defendant, and that even a person who is likely to acquire an interest therein in future, in appropriate cases, is entitled to be impleaded as a party, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. [ (2007) 10 SCC 82 ], the relevant paragraph is being quoted hereunder as :- “9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal [ (2005) 6 SCC 733 ] . He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. … *** 14. … it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. … if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment.” 26. … *** 14. … it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit. … if C can show a fair semblance of title or interest he can certainly file an application for impleadment.” 26. It is, thus, evident that at the stage of allowing petition under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C., the opportunity is to be given to the party having interest over the property in question to put his or her case to substantiate, meaning thereby, the prima facie case is to be made available by the party concerned who is seeking to be impleaded as party showing interest over the property in question and in absence of such party, if the suit is being decided, the same if leads to miscarriage of justice, then the learned trial court is required to allow such application. 27. It further appears that at the stage of impleadment the adjudication cannot be said to be there, rather, only opportunity is to be given to the party concerned to substantiate his or her right if such applicant is having been able to show the prima facie right over the property in question. 28. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid legal premise and adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, has found that the applicant namely, Anita Rani Tirkey, is claiming to be the legal heir of one Grace Panna Tirkey, wife of Late Kalyan Tirkey. The fact about daughter of Grace Panna Tirkey has not been disputed as would appear from the plaint or any other document to take that stand. 29. The learned trial court after considering the fact that the said Anita Rani Tirkey is one of the successor of Grace Panna Tirkey, wife of Late Kalyan Tirkey, who also claims her right over the property in question of 1/3rd of its share, then the impleadment of such party cannot be said to suffer from impropriety. 30. 29. The learned trial court after considering the fact that the said Anita Rani Tirkey is one of the successor of Grace Panna Tirkey, wife of Late Kalyan Tirkey, who also claims her right over the property in question of 1/3rd of its share, then the impleadment of such party cannot be said to suffer from impropriety. 30. Here, this Court is only to see or the learned trial court is only to see at the time of consideration of petition filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C. the evidence to suggest that the party who is seeking to be impleaded as party in course of pendency of the suit is having prima facie interest over the property in question, so that the same be adjudicated in the suit. 31. Here, in the instant case also, similar is the position, since, Anita Rani Tirkey who happens to be the daughter of Grace Panna Tirkey has not been disputed and in that view of the matter, if the impleadment is there of Anita Rani Tirkey, by allowing the application filed under Order I Rule 10(2) of the C.P.C., the same, according to considered view of this Court, cannot be said to suffer from an error. 32. This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has got least jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned order and the same can only be exercised if there is manifest error which is apparent on the face of record. 33. It needs to refer herein the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Dealing with the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 has been pleased to laid down therein regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limitless power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limitless power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. 34. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. 35. Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 , wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent, the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. 37. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 , it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 38. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. 38. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normally annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. 39. It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. 40. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 41. This Court, having discussed the aforesaid fact and the legal issues, is of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any error. 42. Accordingly, the instant Civil Miscellaneous Petition stands dismissed.