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2024 DIGILAW 425 (TS)

C. Harinath Goud v. M. Lalitha

2024-07-01

E.V.VENUGOPAL

body2024
JUDGMENT : (E.V. Venugopal, J.) This appeal is preferred by the appellant aggrieved by the judgment dated 07.06.2017 in C.C.No.383 of 2016 on the file of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate Court-II, Rajendranagar, R.R.District (for short, “the trial Court”) wherein and whereunder the learned Magistrate acquitted respondent/accused for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, “the NI Act”). 2. Heard Mr.Dinesh Reddy Malli Reddy, learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr.Rama Kotaiah, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent. 3. The brief facts of the case are that on 14.02.2015, respondent/accused borrowed an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- from the appellant/complainant. After receiving the said amount, the accused voluntarily executed the promissory note in favour of the complainant. But he failed to repay the amount within the stipulated time. Instead of repaying the amount, she issued cheque bearing No.304071 dated 19.08.2016 for the sum of Rs.4,00,000/- towards discharge of the existing debt. On presentation, the said cheque was returned unpaid for the reason, “funds insufficient” in the account of the accused. Then, the complainant issued legal notice to the accused on 31.08.2016 to her last known address, which was returned. It is also stated that another notice was also sent to the official address of the accused and it was delivered on the accused on 03.09.2016. Hence, the complainant filed a complaint against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, “the NI Act”). 4. The trial Court vide impugned judgment found respondent /accused not guilty for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and acquitted her. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant, who is the complainant herein filed the present appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence available on record in proper perspective and passed the impugned judgment by acquitting the accused and hence, seeks to set aside the impugned judgment. 6. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that the trial Court upon careful scrutiny of the material available on record, acquitted the accused and the interference of this Court is unwarranted. Therefore, he seeks to dismiss the appeal. 7. On behalf of the complainant, the trial Court examined PWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.P1 to P6. On behalf of the defense, CW1 was examined and Exs.X1 and X2 were marked. Therefore, he seeks to dismiss the appeal. 7. On behalf of the complainant, the trial Court examined PWs.1 to 3 and marked Exs.P1 to P6. On behalf of the defense, CW1 was examined and Exs.X1 and X2 were marked. Upon careful scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court observed that the evidence of CW1, who is the Assistant Manager in South Indian Bank, Vattinagulapally Branch, shows that the cheque in question was issued against account No.069053000000119 and it contains the signature of the drawer as M.Lalitha purported to belong to the accused. But CW1, in his chief examination, stated that the account No.06990530000119 is in the name of Mr.M.Yagadiri in South Indian Bank, Vattinagulapally branch but not in the name of the accused. It also shows that the cheque in question vide Ex P1 bearing No.30071 is part of the cheque book issued in the name of Yadagiri, the account holder but not in the name of the accused. Therefore, the trial Court found that when the cheque in question was not issued against the account of accused and when it was issued against the account of one M.Yadagiri, it can be said that the cheque in question was not issued against drawer’s account and it shows that a case under Section 138 of NI Act is not maintainable against the accused and hence, acquitted the accused. 8. It is well settled law that in an appeal against acquittal, the appellate Court is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference has to be made with the order unless the approach made by the trial Court to the consideration of evidence is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by it is such, which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously and is therefore, to be characterized as perverse. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. 9. In Mrinal Das Vs. State of Tripura, (2011) 9 SCC 479 the Apex Court held as under: “It is clear that in an appeal against acquittal in the absence of perversity in the judgment and order, interference by this Court exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction, is not warranted. However, if the appeal is heard by an appellate court, being the final court of fact, is fully competent to re-appreciate, reconsider and review the evidence and take its own decision. In other words, law does not prescribe any limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and the appellate court is free to arrive at its own conclusion keeping in mind that acquittal provides for presumption in favour of the accused. The presumption of innocence is available to the person and in criminal jurisprudence every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by the competent court. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the findings of acquittal. There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found and to come to its own conclusion. The appellate court can also review the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court with respect to both facts and law. While dealing with the appeal against acquittal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and only by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed.” 10. In Maloth Somaraju Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 8 SCC 635 the Apex Court held that there can be no two opinions that merely because the acquittal is found to be wrong and another view can be taken, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appellate Court has more and serious responsibility while dealing with the judgment of acquittal and unless the acquittal is found to be perverse or not at all supportable and where the appellate Court comes to the conclusion that conviction is a must, the judgment of acquittal cannot be upset. The appellate Court has to examine as to whether the trial Court, while upsetting the acquittal, has taken such care. 11. In view of the Judgments referred to above and for the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that there are no merits in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment dated 07.06.2017 in C.C.No.383 of 2016 on the file of the learned Special Judicial Magistrate Court-II, Rajendranagar, R.R.District. As a sequel thereto, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.