JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. This writ petition has been filed with the prayer for issuance of an appropriate writ or writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the actions and decisions of the Respondent No.1 including the order dated 05.08.2014 passed by the Respondent no.1 by which the Respondent No.1 has not followed the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 and failed to refund Rs.50,20,106/- out of 59,06,007/- paid by the petitioner to Respondent No.1 as transfer fees for the concerned plot No. M-35, Phase –IV, Industrial Area, Adityapur, Jamshedpur and secondly for issuance of an appropriate writ or a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondents to refund Rs.50,20,106/- to the petitioner and other reliefs. 3. The brief fact of the case is that the said Plot No. M-35 was allotted by the Respondent No.1 to M/s Food Marketing Centre of Xavier Labour Relations Institute. Subsequently, M/s. Conditioners India purchased the lease hold rights of M/s Food Marketing Centre of Xavier Labour Relations Institute for the concerned plot and consequently applied to Respondent No.1 for approving the said transfer of the concerned plot. The Respondent No.1 vide its order dated 24.07.1976 approved the transfer of the concerned plot in favour of M/s Conditioners India. M/s Conditioners India was a sole proprietorship firm of Mr. Pratap Singh. Mr. Pratap Singh faced financial difficulty in the year 2011. The petitioner agreed to provide financial assistance to M/s Conditioners India and to enter into a partnership with Mr. Pratap Singh. Consequently, on 01.03.2011, Mr. Pratap Singh, the sole proprietor of M/s Conditioners India entered into a partnership agreement with the petitioner making M/s Conditioners India a partnership firm. The partnership firm M/s Conditioners India on 03.03.2011 informed the Respondent No.1 about the change in constitution of the firm and requested the Respondent No.1 to make necessary changes in the record and to grant approval for such changes in the constitution of the firm. The Respondent No.1 vide its letter dated 20.06.2011 directed M/s Conditioners India to pay the total value of plot amounting to Rs.59,06,007/- to the Respondent No.1. The amount of Rs.59,06,007/- was paid on 07.09.2011. On 17.10.2011 Mr. Pratap Singh retired from the partnership firm namely M/s Conditioners India and it was agreed that the petitioner shall carry on as the sole proprietor of M/s Conditioners India with effect from 17.10.2011. The amount of Rs.59,06,007/- was paid on 07.09.2011. On 17.10.2011 Mr. Pratap Singh retired from the partnership firm namely M/s Conditioners India and it was agreed that the petitioner shall carry on as the sole proprietor of M/s Conditioners India with effect from 17.10.2011. The petitioner informed the same to the Respondent No.1 on 17.10.2011. The respondent no.1 vide letter dated 24.12.2011 approved the change; i.e. the petitioner becoming the sole proprietor of M/s Conditioners India. The Respondent No.2 being the State of Jharkhand, on 16.06.2012 notified the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 and made it effective retrospectively from 01.04.2011. Clause 12.12.2 of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 provided that the transfer fees of any plot shall be charged by any Industrial Authority at the rate of 15% of the present value of the land in case of M.S.M.E. unit and at the rate of 25% for others. Thus the petitioner requested the respondent no.1 on 17.10.2012 to refund Rs.50,20,106/- to the petitioner and to keep only Rs.8,85,901/- as it amounted to being 15% of the total value of plot calculated as Rs.59,06,007/-. Same request was again made by the petitioner on 22.03.2014 but the respondent no.1 arbitrarily and without proper appreciation of the law and facts; by the impugned order dated 05.08.2014, rejected the said request of the petitioner to refund Rs.50,20,106/- out of Rs.59,06,007/- paid by the petitioner to the respondent no.1 as transfer fees for the concerned plot. Vide letter dated 06.01.2015, the petitioner requested the respondent no.1 to reconsider and review its order dated 05.08.2014 but the respondent no.1 did not respond to the letter dated 06.01.2015 of the petitioner nor it responded to the two reminder letters dated 12.11.2015 and 18.09.2016. The principal basis of the action or decision of the respondent no.1 in passing inter-alia the order dated 05.08.2014 was that since a partnership agreement/deed was entered on 01.03.2011 between the petitioner and Mr. The principal basis of the action or decision of the respondent no.1 in passing inter-alia the order dated 05.08.2014 was that since a partnership agreement/deed was entered on 01.03.2011 between the petitioner and Mr. Pratap Singh constituting the partnership firm in the name and style of M/s Conditioners India prior to the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 becoming effective from 01.04.2011, 15% of the present value of the land in case of M.S.M.E. as provided for in Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 is not applicable to the case of the petitioner and at the relevant time, there was no provision in law specifically in Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 1974 or the Rules and Regulations made thereunder which provided for joining of a new partner in a firm or conversion of a sole proprietorship firm to a partnership firm would amount to transfer of the concerned plot. It is next pleaded by the petitioner that Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 is a beneficial policy adopted by the Respondent-State for promoting the growth of industries within the State and the Respondent No.1 being statutory machinery and a statutory body ought to have given the benefit under the said industrial policy to the petitioner which is a small enterprise in terms of M.S.M.E. Another ground for turning down the request of the petitioner for refund of the said money is that the Board of Directors of the petitioner-company in their meeting dated 28.02.2011 passed a Resolution taking away all the rights from Mr. Pratap Singh in relation to M/s Conditioners India and passed on all such rights to Mr. Deepak Dokania. 4. It is contended by Mr. M.S. Mittal, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the said basis of the respondent no.1 is totally erroneous and false as the said Board Resolution of the petitioner-company has not taken away any right from Mr. Pratap Singh in respect of M/s Conditioners India or in respect of the concerned plot but the said Board Resolution only permitted the petitioner-company to enter into a partnership with M/s Conditioners India and for the said purpose appointed Mr. Deepak Dokania, director of the company to sign the deed of partnership on behalf of the petitioner-company and Mr. Deepak Dokania was appointed to represent the petitioner-company before the respondent no.1 for the purpose of seeking necessary approval for bringing in effect the said partnership. 5. Deepak Dokania, director of the company to sign the deed of partnership on behalf of the petitioner-company and Mr. Deepak Dokania was appointed to represent the petitioner-company before the respondent no.1 for the purpose of seeking necessary approval for bringing in effect the said partnership. 5. It is next submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner relying upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. and Another v. Assam State Electricity Board and Others, reported in (2019) 19 SCC 529 , para -61 of which reads as under:- “61. We have noticed above that the incidence of applicability of the liability under the Act is supply of goods or rendering of service. In event the supply of goods and rendering of services is subsequent to the Act, can liability to pay interest on delayed payment be denied on the ground that agreement in pursuance of which supplies were made were entered prior to enforcement of the Act? Entering into an agreement being not expressly or impliedly referred to in the statutory scheme as an incident for fastening of the liability, making the date of agreement as date for imposition of liability does not conform to the statutory scheme. This can be illustrated by taking an example. There are two small scale industries which received orders for supply of materials. ‘A’ received such orders prior to the enforcement of the Act and ‘B’ received the order after the enforcement of the Act. Both supplied the goods subsequent to enforcement of the Act and became entitled to receive payment after the supply, on or before the day agreed upon between the supplier and buyer or before the appointed day. Payments were not made both to ‘A’ and ‘B’ as required by Section 3. Can the buyer who has received supplies from supplier ‘A’ escape from his statutory liability to make payment of interest under Section 3 read with Section 4? The answer has to be No. Two suppliers who supply goods after the enforcement of the Act, become entitled to receive payment after the enforcement of the Act one supplier cannot be denied the benefit of the statutory protection on the pretext that the agreement in his case was entered prior to enforcement of the Act. The answer has to be No. Two suppliers who supply goods after the enforcement of the Act, become entitled to receive payment after the enforcement of the Act one supplier cannot be denied the benefit of the statutory protection on the pretext that the agreement in his case was entered prior to enforcement of the Act. When the date of agreement is not referred as material or incidence for fastening the liability, by no judicial interpretation the said date can be treated as a date for fastening of the liability. The 1993 Act being beneficial legislation enacted to protect small scale industries and statutorily ensure by mandatory provision for payment of interest on the outstanding money, accepting the interpretation as put by the learned counsel for the Board that the day of agreement has to be subsequent to the enforcement of the Act, the entire beneficial protection of the Act shall be defeated. The existence of statutory liability depends on the statutory factors as enumerated in Section 3 and Section 4 of the 1993 Act. Factor for liability to make payment under Section 3 being the supplier supplies any goods or renders services to the buyer, the liability of buyer cannot be denied on the ground that the agreement entered into between the parties for supply was prior to the 1993 Act. To hold that liability of buyer for payment shall arise only when agreement for supply was entered into subsequent to enforcement of the Act, it shall be adding words to Section 3 which is not permissible under the principles of statutory construction.” (Emphasis supplied) Submits that when the date of agreement is not referred as material or incidence for fastening the liability, by no judicial interpretation the said date can be treated as a date of fastening of the liability and in this case, as the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 provides for 15% present value of land to be charged as transfer fee and the transfer fee can be charged only after, in this case, the respondent no.1 has approved the proposal of the petitioner which was done on 20.06.2011, so the fee chargeable on 20.06.2011 is to be realized and in this case, the same is 15% of the present value on 20.06.2011 which was Rs.8,85,901/-. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer as made by the petitioner be allowed. 6. Mr. Hence, it is submitted that the prayer as made by the petitioner be allowed. 6. Mr. V.P. Singh, the learned senior counsel for the respondent no.1 on the other hand challenges the maintainability of the writ petition on two grounds. First is that, the prayer of the petitioner being for recovery of the money, a civil suit ought to have been filed and secondly, as this is a case of unjust enrichment, hence in view of the principle of law settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 536 para 108(iii) of, which reads as under:- “108. The discussion in the judgment yields the following propositions. We may forewarn that these propositions are set out merely for the sake of convenient reference and are not supposed to be exhaustive. In case of any doubt or ambiguity in these propositions, reference must be had to the discussion and propositions in the body of the judgment. (iii) A claim for refund, whether made under the provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition (ii) above, can succeed only if the petitioner/plaintiff alleges and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. Whether the claim for restitution is treated as a constitutional imperative or as a statutory requirement, it is neither an absolute right nor an unconditional obligation but is subject to the above requirement, as explained in the body of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can legitimately claim its refund. Where the burden of the duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can legitimately claim its refund. But where such person does not come forward or where it is not possible to refund the amount to him for one or the other reason, it is just and appropriate that that amount is retained by the State, i.e., by the people. There is no immorality or impropriety involved in such a proposition. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched.” (Emphasis supplied) as the petitioner has neither claimed nor established that it has not passed on the burden/duty to another person, his refund claim shall not be allowed/decreed in this writ petition. 7. It is then submitted by Mr. Singh, the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 that as all the terms and conditions of both the units that is M/s Conditioners India and the petitioner has been finalized and made effective from 01.03.2011, hence the transfer fees which was payable on 01.03.2011 is applicable in this case and which is Rs.59,06,007/- and thus the petitioner is not entitled for any refund nor there is any illegality in the order dated 05.08.2014 passed by the respondent no.1. It is next submitted by Mr. Singh, as an alternative, that as M/s Conditioners India applied for transfer on 03.03.2011 before the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 was made effective, so 03.03.2011 is the reckoning date to calculate the transfer fee to be paid. It is next submitted by Mr. It is next submitted by Mr. Singh, as an alternative, that as M/s Conditioners India applied for transfer on 03.03.2011 before the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 was made effective, so 03.03.2011 is the reckoning date to calculate the transfer fee to be paid. It is next submitted by Mr. Singh that as per the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012, 15% of the value of the land as transfer fee is payable only in respect of units which have not violated the condition of allotment and who have set up the plant and made functional and operational but M/s Conditioners India defaulted in paying the amount of Rs.16,26,999/- which was due and payable by the said unit consequent upon the earlier partnership firm in the name and style of M/s Conditioners India consisting of Ranjit Sinha, Ajit Sinha, Anand Swaroop Choudhary was converted to a proprietorship firm as Mr. Pratap Singh was the sole proprietor of M/s Conditioners India but the said default amount of Rs.16,26,999/- was paid only on 21.04.2011. Therefore, on this score also, the petitioners are not entitled for the benefit of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012. Hence, it is submitted that this writ petition being without any merit be dismissed. 8. Having heard the rival submissions made at the Bar and after going through the materials available in the record, so far as the contention of the petitioner regarding the maintainability of the writ petition for recovery of the amount which has been taken in excess of the amount prescribed by the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012; as claimed by the petitioner is concerned, by now it is a settled principle of law that such money can be recovered by filing a writ petition if there is no dispute regarding the facts of the dispute and a writ petition is otherwise maintainable in law and the same has also been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (supra). Hence this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in the contention of the respondent no.1 that the writ petition is not maintainable. 9. Union of India & Others (supra). Hence this Court is of the considered view that there is no merit in the contention of the respondent no.1 that the writ petition is not maintainable. 9. So far as the contention of the respondent no.1 regarding the doctrine of unjust enrichment or for that matter the petitioner ought to have claimed and established that it has not passed on the burden of duty to another person/other person is concerned, the said maxim of unjust enrichment has been incorporated in taxing statutes and in fact the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Others Vs. Union of India & Others (supra) which relates to the refund claim under the provisions of the Central Excise Act. 10. Now coming to the facts of the case, it is neither contended nor there is any scope for the petitioner to pass on the burden of the amount it has deposited with the respondent no.1 as transfer fees; to another person/other person. Under such circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that not claiming or establishing that the petitioner has not passed on the burden to another person/other person cannot be an impediment in denying the relief claimed by the petitioner. Hence, this contention of the respondent no.1 has no merit as well. 11. The crux of the dispute between the parties is that as to which date is to be reckoned for calculating the transfer fee. Though at the time of argument, it was argued by the learned counsel for the respondent no.1 that the unit concerned has violated the condition of allotment but after carefully going through the materials in the record, it transpires that such a plea has not been taken by the respondent no.1 in its counter affidavit nor in impugned order, the claim of the petitioner for refund of Rs.50,20,106/- has been denied on the ground that the unit concerned has violated the condition of allotment rather the continuous acceptance of change of ownership of the unit upon receiving concerned amount by the respondent no.1 goes to show that there has not been any violation of any condition of the allotment or else the respondent no.1 ought not have accepted the same. More over the alleged violation took place somewhere in the year 2009. More over the alleged violation took place somewhere in the year 2009. The same has got nothing to do with the present transfer which was approved by the respondent no.1 only on 20.06.2011. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered view that the respondent no.1 became entitled to charge the transfer fee only after its approval for change in constitution of the unit from a proprietorship to partnership one which in this case was made on 20.06.2011. On the date of deposit of said total land value of Rs.59,06,007/- on 7th September, 2011 in consonance of the approval of the change in constitution of the unit on 20.06.2011, the petitioner was not aware about Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 which saw the light of the day on 16.06.2012 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2011. 12. Under such circumstances, this Court has no hesitation in holding that in view of the said Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012, the respondent no.1 is entitled to charge only 15% of the value of the land as the transfer fees for change in constitution of the unit concerned in the name and style of M/s Conditioners India. Hence, the impugned order dated 05.08.2014, passed by the respondent no.1 by which it denied refund of Rs.50,20,106/- to the petitioner as excess transfer fees in terms of the Jharkhand Industrial Policy 2012 on the ground that the partnership was entered into on 01.03.2011 or for that matter the application for change of constitution being accepted was made on 03.03.2011 is not sustainable in law. Hence, this is a fit case where the same be quashed. 13. For the same reason, this Court is of the considered view that this is a fit case where a writ of Mandamus be issued to the respondent no.1 to refund Rs.50,20,106/- to the petitioner within three months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this Judgment before the respondent no.1. 14. Accordingly, issue a writ of Certiorari quashing the order dated 05.08.2014 passed by the respondent no.1, the copy of which has been annexed as annexure-10 and also issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondent to refund Rs.50,20,106/- within three months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this Judgment before the respondent no.1. 15. Order accordingly. 16. This writ petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent only.