ORDER : 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions quashing the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority 01.02.2011 (Annexure P/1) and the order passed by the appellate authority dated 06.08.2011 (Annexure P/6) and the petitioner may kindly be exonerated from all the charges leveled against the petitioner and respondents may kindly be directed to reinstate the petitioner in service with all the consequential benefits. 10.2 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records i.e. the documents filed by the department and the minutes of departmental inquiry proceeding from the possession of the respondents in respect of the case of the petitioner. 10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief(s) which is deemed fit and proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. The petitioner was appointed as Cashier cum Clerk vide order dated 02.03.1983 under the respondent Bank. He was promoted to the post of Training Officer with effect from 1st August, 1992. The petitioner worked as a Branch Manager at Shahapur Branch from July, 1996 to June, 1999 and thereafter, he was transferred to Pali (Birsinghpur) Branch where he worked from July, 1999 to September, 2001. The petitioner worked as Manager Credit, Commercial Branch, Gwalior from October, 2001 to December, 2003 and thereafter as Branch Manager, BSP Plant Area Branch, Bhilai from January, 2004 to February, 2004. The services of the petitioner were transferred as Manager, DBD Raipur Main Branch from March, 2004 to May, 2005. He was posted as Branch Manager, Nandani Township Branch in the month of June, 2005. The petitioner was placed under suspension from 14.08.2006 to 12.05.2007 and his services were attached with RBO, IIIrd Bhilai. On 12.05.2007, the order of suspension was revoked and he was posted at RBO, Jagdalpur as Manager Sales. A copy of the article of charges was served on the petitioner on 30.05.2009 and the following allegations were made : (i) acceptance of illegal gratification; (ii) 19 borrowers were given loans for ginger cultivation, and (iii) other loan accounts. On 22.06.2009, an Inquiry Officer was appointed. The petitioner filed a reply to the article of charges on 15.06.2009. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted the report. On 22.06.2009, an Inquiry Officer was appointed. The petitioner filed a reply to the article of charges on 15.06.2009. The Inquiry Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted the report. A notice was issued to the petitioner along with the inquiry report on 28.06.2010. The petitioner filed a detailed para-wise reply on 22.07.2010. The disciplinary authority passed the order of removal from services on 01.02.2011. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal and the same was also dismissed vide order dated 06.08.2011. 3. Mr. Paranjpe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the disciplinary authority, as well as the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the material available on record in its correct perspective, which has resulted in erroneous findings. He would further submit that the disciplinary authority initiated the departmental inquiry against the petitioner with premeditation and no material was collected by the Inquiry Officer. He would also submit that the authorities have apparently demonstrated discrimination against the petitioner as another employee of the Bank namely, H.S. Dhurve against whom similar allegations were made, was awarded punishment of stoppage of two increments, whereas, the petitioner has been inflicted with a penalty of removal from service. He would further contend that the incumbents facing charges in departmental inquiry deserve to be treated equally in the matter of punishment. He would also argue that the documents relied upon by the prosecution have been dealt with in a stereotyped and mechanical manner leading to the imposition of penalty and the documents were not proved in accordance with law. He would further state that the procedure for imposing major punishment has not been complied with. He would also argue that the punishment is disproportionate looking to the gravity of the misconduct. It is further contended that the fair and real opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner and the relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Narinder Mohan Arya Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others reported in 2006 (4) SCC 713 ; State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Rajpal Singh reported in 2010 (5) SCC 783 and Union of India and others Vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan reported in 2022 (1) SCC 373 . 4. On the other hand, Mr. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others reported in 2006 (4) SCC 713 ; State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Rajpal Singh reported in 2010 (5) SCC 783 and Union of India and others Vs. Ex. Constable Ram Karan reported in 2022 (1) SCC 373 . 4. On the other hand, Mr. Bharat, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Paranjpe. He would submit that it is a settled principle of law that the power under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is to be invoked when there is any blatant error committed by the authority and not in a routine manner. He would further submit that the High Court in a writ petition would not sit as an appellate Court. He would also submit that sufficient opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner; relevant documents were supplied and the principles of natural justice were strictly followed. He would further state that after affording the full opportunity of hearing, and following the service rules in respect of disciplinary proceedings along with the opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses, the decision was taken by the disciplinary authority. He would further argue that the disciplinary authority found allegation Nos. II(a), II(b), II(c), II(d), II(e), II(f), II(g), II(h), III(a), III(b) and III(c) proved whereas allegation Nos. I(a), I(b), I(c) and I(d) were found not proved. He would also argue that on receipt of the said findings, the disciplinary authority after perusal of the inquiry report along with the related documents entirely agreed with the findings of the inquiry officer. He would further contend that the inquiry report was served upon the petitioner and a detailed reply was also filed which was considered by the disciplinary authority. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Bank of India and another Vs. Degala Suryanarayana reported in AIR 1999 SC 2407 ; State Bank of India and another Vs. Bela Bagchi and others reported in 2005 (7) SCC 435 ; Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and another Vs. Munnalal Jain reported in 2005 (10) SCC 84 ; Ramesh Chandra Vs. Delhi University and others, reported in 2015 (5) SCC 549 and United Bank of India Vs. Bachan Prasad Lall reported in 2022 (4) SCC 358 . 5. Bela Bagchi and others reported in 2005 (7) SCC 435 ; Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and another Vs. Munnalal Jain reported in 2005 (10) SCC 84 ; Ramesh Chandra Vs. Delhi University and others, reported in 2015 (5) SCC 549 and United Bank of India Vs. Bachan Prasad Lall reported in 2022 (4) SCC 358 . 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and perused the documents placed on the record. 6. The article of charges issued on 30.05.2009 to the petitioner would reflect that certain allegations were made against the petitioner. It was alleged that the petitioner accepted the illegal gratification from Shri Bhura Singh, Shri Madanlal, Shri Chandra Prakash Mandley and Shri Goverdhan Prasad Verma. The charges (I) a to (I) d were not found proved by the inquiry officer and the same was affirmed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority too. 7. With regard to allegation No. II (a) regarding granting loan to 19 borrowers for ginger cultivation, the petitioner failed to ensure the end use of the loan amount advanced to borrowers. The loan amount of Rs.19,87,020/- was remitted to M/s. Micro Irrigation System Services, Raipur on 28.07.2005 but the petitioner failed to ensure the end use of the loan amount. With regard to allegation No. II(b), an advance payment of Rs. 35.98 lakhs was remitted to M/s. Spices and Herbs Export Pvt. Ltd. As per terms of sanction, ginger seeds procured from the Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology should have been supplied to the borrowers and the same was required to be certified but CSO did not ensure compliance with this condition and thus, the allegation was found proved. With regard to allegation No. II(c), the borrowers Shri Awadh Ram and Smt. Godavari Bai had fenced their fields prior to the sanction of the loan which included the cost of fencing in their fields but neither fencing material was supplied nor a proportionate amount was refunded to them and the loan amount was disbursed to the supplier without ensuring the end use of Bank’s funds and thus, the allegation was found partly proved. With regard to allegation No. II(d), the petitioner ignored the noting of Durg Rajnandgaon Gramin Bank dated 29.10.2009 regarding concurrent borrowings from that Bank and sanctioned the loan and thus the allegation was found proved. With regard to allegation No. II(d), the petitioner ignored the noting of Durg Rajnandgaon Gramin Bank dated 29.10.2009 regarding concurrent borrowings from that Bank and sanctioned the loan and thus the allegation was found proved. With regard to allegation No. II(e), the Bank has incurred a loss of Rs.1.31 crores in respect of cited loan accounts related to ginger cultivation. Likewise, allegation Nos. II(f), II(g) and II(h) were also found proved regarding ignoring the quotation/bills, purchasing stamp papers and incurring a loss of approximately Rs. 1.31 crores to the Bank. Allegation No. III(a) says that the petitioner failed to conduct the pre-sanction survey while sanctioning the loan proposals of Shri Balwinder Singh, Lakhbeer Singh and Surendra Singh disregarding the Bank’s instructions. The sanction memorandum was not signed by the petitioner and thus the allegations were found proved. 8. With regard to allegation No. III(b), the petitioner while discharging his function considered the scale of finance in an arbitrary manner and in utter disregard of the Bank’s laid down instructions in sanction and conduct of agriculture loans related to ginger cultivation, failed to protect the Bank’s interest. 9. The Inquiry Officer affirmed most of the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority and held that the petitioner failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, devotion and diligence and acted in a manner unbecoming of a Bank’s official, contravening Rule No. 50(1) and 50(4) of the SBIOSR, 1992 and inflicted punishment of removal from services in terms of Rule 67(i) of SBIOSR, 1992. 10.The appellate authority also affirmed the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 11. Now coming to the judgments relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner. In the matter of Narinder Mohan Arya (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 31 to 37 held as under:- “31.We may for the aforementioned purpose take note of the extant rules operating in the field. Requirements of consideration in an appeal from an order of the disciplinary authority by the appellate authority is contained in Rule 37 whereas the provisions as regards filing of a memorial are contained in Rule 40 thereof, which read as under: "37. Requirements of consideration in an appeal from an order of the disciplinary authority by the appellate authority is contained in Rule 37 whereas the provisions as regards filing of a memorial are contained in Rule 40 thereof, which read as under: "37. Consideration of Appeals- (1) In case of an appeal against an order of suspension, the appellate authority shall consider whether in the light of the provisions of Rule 20 and having regard to the circumstances of the case the order of suspension is justified or not and confirm or revoke the other accordingly. (2) In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 23, the appellate authority shall consider: (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these Rules has been complied with and if not, whether such noncompliance has resulted in failure of justice; (b) Whether the findings are justified; and (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate, and pass orders: I. setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or II. remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. "40 Memorial An employee whose appeal under these Rules has been rejected by the Chairman/Chairmancum- Managing Director or in whose case such appellate authority has enhanced the penalty either on appeal under Rule 24 or on review under Rule 39 (2) may address a memorial to the Chairman/Chairman-cum- Managing Director in respect of that matter within a period of a 6 months from the date the appellant received a copy of the order of such appellate authority." 32. The appellate authority, therefore, while disposing of the appeal is required to apply his mind with regard to the factors enumerated in sub-rule 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules. The judgment of the civil court being inter parties was relevant. The conduct of the appellant as noticed by the civil court was also relevant. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memorial could have justifiably came to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil court. But, it did apply its mind. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memorial could have justifiably came to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil court. But, it did apply its mind. It could have for one reason or the other refused to take the subsequent event into consideration, but as he had a discretion in the matter, he was bound to consider the said question. He was required to show that he applied his mind to the relevant facts He could not have without expressing his mind simply ignored the same. 33. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regard the compliance of the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules. 34. In Apparel Export Promotion Council V. A.K. Chopra [ 1999(1) SCC 759 ] which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this Court stated: "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities." (Emphasis supplied) 35. The appellate authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 36. The order of the appellate authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The appellate authority, when the rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression 'consider' is of some significance. In the context of the rules, the appellate authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the rules was complied with; (ii) the Enquiry Officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. 37. 37. In R.P. Bhatt V. Union of India [ (1986) 2 SCC 651 ] this Court opined: "4. The word "consider" in Rule 27(2) implies "due application of mind". It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the Appellate Authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such noncompliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the Appellate Authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. 5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such non- compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 12. In the matter of Rajpal Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 5 & 6 held as under:- “5.Though, on principle, the ratio in aforesaid cases would ordinarily apply, but in the case in hand, the High Court appears to have considered the nature of charges leveled against the 5 employees who stood charged on account of the incident that happened on the same day and then the High Court came to the conclusion that since the gravity of charges was the same, it was not open for the disciplinary authority to impose different punishments for different delinquents. The reasonings given by the High Court cannot be faulted with since the State is not able to indicate as to any difference in the delinquency of these employees. 6.It is undoubtedly open for the disciplinary authority to deal with the delinquency and once charges are established, to award appropriate punishment. But when the charges are same and identical in relation to one and the same incident, then to deal with the delinquents differently in the award of punishment, would be discriminatory. In this view of the matter, we see no infirmity with the impugned order requiring our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.” 13. In the present case, the position of the petitioner and respondent No. 4 was entirely different. The petitioner was posted as a Sanctioning Officer whereas respondent No. 4 was posted as a Marketing Officer. Taking into consideration the role played by the petitioner and respondent No. 4, the judgments relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help. 14.In the matter of Ex. Constable Ram Karan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 24, 25 & 26 held as under:- “24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons. 25. The principles have been culled out by a threeJudge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it was observed as under: “18. 25. The principles have been culled out by a threeJudge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India and Others 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it was observed as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being factfinding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Another vs. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 15.The petitioner was holding the position of sanctioning authority of the loan to the general public. The petitioner caused a loss of Rs. 1.31 crores to the respondent Bank; sanctioned the loan to various persons contrary to the Rules and Regulations of the Bank and also failed to ensure the end use of the loan amount. The petitioner has caused a loss to the public exchequer, therefore, the punishment cannot be said to be shocking to the conscience of the Court. 16.In the present case, the appellate authority has categorically held that the petitioner had grossly violated the Bank’s instructions, systems and procedures leading to the Bank being saddled. It is also held that the petitioner did not discharge his duties with utmost devotion, honesty and integrity. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellate authority has not complied with and has not considered the appeal properly. 17.Now coming to the judgments relied on by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents. In the matter of Degala Suryanarayana (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 11 held as under:- “11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The Court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of malafides or perversity i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings. The Court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained, in Union of India v. H.C. Gael, [1964] 4 SCR 718 the Constitution Bench has held :- "the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not." 18.In the matter of Bela Bagchi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 15 observed and held as under:- “15. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, [1996] 9 SCC 68, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, [1996] 9 SCC 68, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charge against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance. 19. In the matter of Damoh Panna Sagar Rural (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 14 to 18 held thus:- “14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesbury's case (supra) the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision- making process and not the decision. 15. To put differently unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 16. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. 17. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. 16. In the case at hand the High Court did not record any reason as to how and why it found the punishment shockingly disproportionate. Even there is no discussion on this aspect. 17. A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik ( 1996 (9) SCC 69 ), it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court. 18. It needs no emphasis that when a Court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (1971 (1) All E.R. 1148) observed "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration". In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree (1974 LCR 120) it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice". Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at". Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.” 20.In the matter of Ramesh Chandra (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 33 held as under:- “33.It was further submitted that the appellant could not file the proper reply to all the three memoranda due to non supply of documents sought by him towards submitting an effective reply. However, such submission cannot be accepted in absence of specific pleading as to which were the documents sought for but not supplied by the respondents and how they were connected with the charges leveled against the appellant.” 21.In the matter of Bachan Prasad Lall (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 10 to 12 held as under:- “10.The nature of allegation against the respondent employee was of fraudulently preparing nine credit transfer vouchers on various dates on the pretext of payment of interest towards fixed deposits and crediting the whole amount to one saving account opened in the name of one Smt. Asha Devi (admittedly the fake account prepared by respondent employee). In order to adjust the said amount, he manipulated the other book records of the Bank using forged signatures. After such nature of allegations stood proved, the disciplinary authority, after taking into consideration the record of inquiry and the post held by the respondent employee, punished him with the penalty of dismissal from service. 11. The finding of guilt recorded by the inquiry officer in his report was confirmed at all later stages by the disciplinary/appellate authority and even after judicial scrutiny by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment but still refrained from interference on the premise that the employee had superannuated in the year 2007. 12. 11. The finding of guilt recorded by the inquiry officer in his report was confirmed at all later stages by the disciplinary/appellate authority and even after judicial scrutiny by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment but still refrained from interference on the premise that the employee had superannuated in the year 2007. 12. In our considered view, looking into seriousness of the nature of allegations levelled against the respondent employee, the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon him in no manner could be said to be shockingly disproportionate which would have required to be interfered with by the Tribunal in exercise of its power under Section 11A of the Act 1947. At the same time, merely because the employee stood superannuated in the meanwhile, will not absolve him from the misconduct which he had committed in discharge of his duties and looking into the nature of misconduct which he had committed, he was not entitled for any indulgence. The Bank employee always holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are the sine qua non but it would never be advisable to deal with such matters leniently.” 22.It is also observed that the Bank employee always holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are the sine qua non but it would never be advisable to deal with such matters leniently. 23.Now coming to the facts of the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was holding a higher position in the Bank as he was the loan sanctioning authority. He misused his position and sanctioned the loan contrary to the Rules, Regulations and guidelines of the Bank. He caused a loss to the Bank to the tune of Rs.1.31 crores. The prosecution proved its case against the petitioner by leading oral as well as documentary evidence. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer were confirmed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority. With regard to the discrimination, the position of the petitioner and respondent No. 4 in the concerned Bank was different. The petitioner being a Bank officer was required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He was required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank, to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. The petitioner being a Bank officer was required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He was required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank, to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. The punishment inflicted upon the petitioner cannot be said to be shocking to the conscience of the Court and most of the allegations made against the petitioner have been found proved. 24.Taking into consideration the material available on the record and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, no case is made out for interference. Consequently, the present petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s).