JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition is filed by the petitioner mainly against the order of imposing punishment and quantum of punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and subsequently, thereafter, confirmed by the appellate authority and revisional authority on the ground that though the petitioner has filed his explanation before the Disciplinary Authority against the charge levelled against him and as the Government has recovered the amount of loss which is incurred, due to the fault of the petitioner and therefore, the imposition of punishment against the present petitioner is very harsh and disproportionate and therefore, the present petition is filed with the following prayers:- “9(a) Be pleased to admit and allow this petition. (b) Be pleased to issue a writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions and be pleased to quash and set aside the termination Order No.TCAL/HR/Private/DA/DBS/3838, dated 14.12.2009 issued by the respondents and also quash and set aside the order of rejecting the appeals of the petitioner dated 22.05.2010 and 01.06.2010 and further be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with continuity and with all benefits available to the petitioner in the interest of justice. (c) Be pleased to stay the termination Order No.TCAL/HR/Private/DA/DBS/3838, dated 14.12.2009 issued by the respondents and also quash and set aside the order of rejecting the appeals of the petitioner dated 22.05.2010 and 01.06.2010 and further be pleased to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service, hearing and final hearing of this petition by way of interim relief in the interest of justice. (d) Such other and further relief(s) as are deemed fit in the interest of justice and equity be granted.” 2. The fact of the present case is mentioned in Para-3 of the petition. 2.1 It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed by the respondent authorities by issuing the appointment Letter No. TCG /EST/DR-1 14 dated: 01/04/1991 and since then the petitioner was serving with the respondents sincerely and honestly without any spot or any adverse remarks. 2.2 It was alleged and charged by the respondents that during the period from August 2003 to March 2007 the petitioner along with other five persons has fraudulently tempered with the accounts of the respondents in collusion and misappropriate the total amount worth Rs. 14,86,668/- as per the report dated: 27/04/2007. 2.2 It was alleged and charged by the respondents that during the period from August 2003 to March 2007 the petitioner along with other five persons has fraudulently tempered with the accounts of the respondents in collusion and misappropriate the total amount worth Rs. 14,86,668/- as per the report dated: 27/04/2007. That after the aforesaid allegation the petitioner and other as per the report dated: 27/04/2007 are suspended from service by order dated: 30/04/2007. 2.3 The petitioner submits that, thereafter the respondents had issued a charge sheet against the petitioner and other five persons by Order No.TDA/Administration/KHAPA/Private/111, dated: 30/05/2007 and made certain financial allegation. It is further stated that the petitioner has also given reply to the charge sheet dated: 02/01/2008 after asking certain dates for filling reply to the charge sheet. Thereafter the petitioner has also given further reply dated: 12/02/2009 after inquiry to defend the case to the respondent authorities and explained each and every aspects. 2.4 The petitioner submits that thereafter departmental inquiry was held against the petitioner wherein the petitioner was remained present and defended the case and placed all the evidence on record and he has also given the reply to all the allegations properly and honestly. It is stated that after the departmental inquiry was over the respondents has issued show cause notice dated: 03/10/2009 stating that all the allegations as per the charge sheet are proved and why the petitioner should not be terminated from the service. That the petitioner had given the reply to the aforesaid show cause notice dated: 05/11/2009 to the respondents. 2.5 That after the departmental inquiry, only the petitioner was terminated from service by Order No. TCAL/HR/Private/DA/DBS/3838 dated: 14/12/2009 issued by the respondents. It is the say of the petitioner that thereafter against the order of termination dated 14/12/2009 from service, he has preferred Appeal No.JETCO/HR/DA/APPEAL/DBS/65 dated: 04/01/2010. The said appeal preferred by the petitioner rejected by the respondents by order dated 22/03/2010. 2.6 That thereafter against the order of dismissal of the aforesaid appeal dated: 22/05/2010, the petitioner has preferred Second Appeal No. JETCO/HR/DA/SECOND APPEAL/DBS/116 dated: 01/04/2010, which was rejected by the respondents vide order dated 01/06/2010. The said appeal preferred by the petitioner rejected by the respondents by order dated 22/03/2010. 2.6 That thereafter against the order of dismissal of the aforesaid appeal dated: 22/05/2010, the petitioner has preferred Second Appeal No. JETCO/HR/DA/SECOND APPEAL/DBS/116 dated: 01/04/2010, which was rejected by the respondents vide order dated 01/06/2010. It is the case of the petitioner that, thereafter, the petitioner had made so many request to reinstate in service as other persons against whom same charges are given and all are taken back in service, but the respondent has not considered the request. Thereafter, the petitioner has issued legal notice dated: 25/10/2011 for reinstatement of the petitioner in service, but the said notice is not replied by the respondents. Hence, the petitioner is here with the present petition. 3. MR. Barot, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the charge-sheet issued against the concerned six persons, out of that, the present petitioner is the only person, who has faced the order of punishment and remaining other persons are exonerated from the departmental inquiry. He has submitted that the punishment imposed by the respondent – authority is very harsh and disproportionate to the charge levelled against him. It is also submitted that as such the respondent – State has not incurred any monitory loss due to fault on the part of the petitioner as the same is already recovered from him and therefore, the impugned order of punishment deserves to the quash and set aside. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner has also submitted that as the defence raised by the petitioner is not considered in its true and proper spirit, the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority is erroneous, illegal and therefore, the same is deserves to be quashed and set aside. 5. As against that, Mr. S.P. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the respondents has vehemently opposed the present petition without filing any affidavit-in-reply on the ground that since the Disciplinary Authority, after going through the record and proceedings and the inquiry report, passed an order of imposition of penalty and subsequently, the said order was confirmed by the appellate authority and the revisional authority. S.P. Hasurkar, learned advocate for the respondents has vehemently opposed the present petition without filing any affidavit-in-reply on the ground that since the Disciplinary Authority, after going through the record and proceedings and the inquiry report, passed an order of imposition of penalty and subsequently, the said order was confirmed by the appellate authority and the revisional authority. He has submitted that it is settled law that while exercising the power under Article 226 an 227 of the Constitution of India, there is very limited scope to interfere in the findings recorded by the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings. He has submitted that when the disciplinary authority has passed the order of imposition of punishment, after going through the records and after considering the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the respondents, and after considering the defence, the impugned order of punishment was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, no interference is to be necessitated. 6. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. 7. Now, the view is very settled by the series of the judgments. Since 2005 onwards, the Hon’ble Apex Court has time and again clarified that while exercising the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot see into appeal where the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority after evaluating the evidence and after going through the preliminary inquiry report and the report of the inquiry authority is made on the basis of the evidence, which is come on record and there is a very limited scope to interfere in light of the reported decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 8. In the case of S.B.I. Vs. A.G.D. Reddy reported in 2023 (3) SCC 117, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “Scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings 32. From the above discussion, it is clear that it could not be said that the Enquiry Report, the findings of the Disciplinary Authority and the order of the Appointing Authority are based on no evidence or are perverse. Even if we eschew the report insofar as the aspect of non- submission of control form, the transgression of the area of operation and non-declaration of the immovable property and certain other charges are concerned, the order of penalty can be sustained. 33. Even if we eschew the report insofar as the aspect of non- submission of control form, the transgression of the area of operation and non-declaration of the immovable property and certain other charges are concerned, the order of penalty can be sustained. 33. As has been demonstrated above, the aspects of failure to conduct periodic inspection and the negligence in not stipulating the taking of immovable property as collateral security in the case of M/s Saraswathi Fabricators in spite of the party offering it, constrain us to conclude that there was material on record for the appellant to pass the order of penalty. 34. Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned Senior Counsel, relying upon the judgments of this Court in Nand Kishore Prasad vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1978) 3 SCC 366 and Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and Others, (1985) 3 SCC 378 contends that the Disciplinary Authority should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence with some degree of definiteness pointing to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. He would contend that a suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof and scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished by recording findings merely based on ipse dixit of the Enquiry Officer. We are unable to accept the contention that the principles laid down in the above judgments are attracted to the present case. The judgments cited are clearly distinguishable, for the reasons that we have set out hereinabove, while analyzing the facts of the present case. 35. Shri Sanjay Kapur, learned counsel for the Bank relies on State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 249 . In that judgment the scope of judicial review of departmental proceedings was set out and the principle laid down in State of A.P. vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , was reiterated, which reads as follows:- "This Court has held in State of A.P. and Others v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 , para 7): "7. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence." 13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and independent finding on the evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by the impugned judgment the High Court has re-appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any material on record and the allegations leveled against the respondent no.1 do not constitute any misconduct and that the respondent no.1 was not guilty of any misconduct." 36. It is now well settled that the scope of judicial review against a departmental enquiry proceeding is very limited. It is not in the nature of an appeal and a review on merits of the decision is not permissible. The scope of the enquiry is to examine whether the decision-making process is legitimate and to ensure that the findings are not bereft of any evidence. If the records reveal that the findings are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a judicial review to re-appreciate the same and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. This lakshman rekha has been recognized and reiterated in a long line of judgments of this Court. 37. If the records reveal that the findings are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a judicial review to re-appreciate the same and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. This lakshman rekha has been recognized and reiterated in a long line of judgments of this Court. 37. In the present case, it could certainly not be said that the report is based on no evidence or that it is perverse. The learned Single Judge transgressed the limits of judicial review in setting aside the enquiry proceedings and the punishment imposed. The Division Bench, in a short order has, after extracting a part of the learned Single Judge's judgment, gone on to hold that having perused the records of the enquiry they do not find that the charges have been dealt with in any manner of specificity. Thereafter they conclude that the learned Single Judge was justified in arriving at its conclusion. We are not able to sustain the orders of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench. Severability of charges 38. The question that remains is, in the light of the findings above, does the order of penalty imposed call for any interference? 39. The law is well-settled that if in a disciplinary proceeding, the order of penalty can be imposed on the charges proved and the punishment imposed is lawfully sustainable on those charges, it is not for the Court to consider whether those grounds alone would have weighed with the authority in imposing the punishment. No doubt, on the facts of the present case, on some aspects of the charge, the proof may have been found wanting. However, since the law laid down by this Court is that unless punishment imposed is only co-relatable to any of those charges found not proved, the penalty cannot be set aside. In this case, the punishment can be sustained even if the charges held not proved are severed. [See State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 648 and Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 ]. 40. Then the only question is does the penalty imposed shock the conscience of the Court? [See State of Orissa vs. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 648 and Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 ]. 40. Then the only question is does the penalty imposed shock the conscience of the Court? In the oral arguments as well as in the written submissions, the respondent contended that there was no charge of financial misappropriation or of causing any financial loss to the Bank. This submission was countered by the appellant by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum- Regional Manager and Others vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 , particularly, the holding of the Court in para seven thereof to contend that the test is really not of loss having been resulted or profit having been made. The test is whether the delinquent employee, has observed the prescribed norms of the Bank. The penalty imposed in this case is "reduction in basic pay to the lowest stage in Scale-I" as envisaged under Rule 49 (e) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules and further, to treat the period spent by the delinquent officer under suspension from 18.08.1990 till the date of his reinstatement as suspension only. Since the charge of not conducting periodical inspection and the failure to complete the formalities for creating equitable mortgage with regard to M/s Saraswathi Fabricators are supported by evidence, we do not think that the penalty as imposed is disproportionate so as to shock the conscience of the Court. We maintain the penalty as imposed in the order of the Appointing Authority dated 31.01.1995 and as confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 41. For the reasons stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench were in error in allowing the writ petition and interfering with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the decision of the Disciplinary Authority, the order of the Appointing Authority and the decision of the Appellate Authority. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench and dismiss the Writ Petition No. 29547 of 1997 filed by the respondent. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed, with no order as to costs. 9. In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water supply and sewerage board and others Vs. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench and dismiss the Writ Petition No. 29547 of 1997 filed by the respondent. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed, with no order as to costs. 9. In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water supply and sewerage board and others Vs. TT Muralibabu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a Government servant, expressed the afore-stated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is willful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is willful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorized absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Singla the Court, dealing with unauthorized absence, has stated thus: - “11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorized absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: - “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorized absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat and another, the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organization such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced. 27. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Singla (supra). 28. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinize whether the High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. 27. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Singla (supra). 28. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinize whether the High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. Doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. In this regard a passage from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another v. Ashok Kumar Arora is worth reproducing: - “20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee.” 29. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, the Court analysed the conception of proportionality in administrative law in England and India and thereafter addressed itself with regard to the punishment in disciplinary matters and opined that unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary role that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. 30. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, the Court, after analyzing the doctrine of proportionality at length, ruled thus: - “19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well- recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision- maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well- recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision- maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reason for his absence by stating that he did not have intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company’s rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” After so stating the two-Judge Bench proceeded to say that one of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment is whether any reasonable employer would have imposed such punishment in like circumstances taking into consideration the major, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances after excluding irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 31. 31. It is apt to note here that in the said case the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violated any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is telltale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the court at his own will. 32. The learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of “habitual absenteeism” is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India and another v. George Philip: - “18….In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. Article 51-A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same.” We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and re- state with the hope that employees in any organization should adhere to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for collective good of an organization. When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An amiable atmosphere in an organization develops the work culture and the employer and the employees are expected to remember the same as a precious value for systemic development. 34. Judged on the anvil of the aforesaid premises, the irresistible conclusion is that the interference by the High Court with the punishment is totally unwarranted and unsustainable, and further the High Court was wholly unjustified in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do. 35. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do. 35. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgments and orders passed by the High Court are set aside leaving the parties to bear their respective costs.” 10. In the case of Bhikhubhai Kamabhai Dabhi Vs. Surat Municipal Corporation and reported in 2017 LawSuit (Guj) 9 this Court has held as under:- “17. It is now well settled by a plethora of judgments of the Supreme Court that in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should not venture into the reappreciation of evidence or interfere with the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority in the inquiry proceedings, if the same are conducted in accordance with law or go into the reliability /adequacy of evidence, or interfere, if there is some legal evidence on which the findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks the conscience. 18. It is equally well settled that the High Courts in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 can only consider whether the inquiry held by the competent authority was in accordance with the procedure established by law, and the principles of natural justice, whether irrelevant or extraneous consideration and/or exclusion of admissible or material evidence or admission of inadmissible evidence being influenced the decision rendering it vulnerable. 21. In a very recent pronouncement in the case of Union of India and others v. P. Gunasekaran [ 2015(2) SCC 610 ], the Supreme Court in details has explained the position of law so far as the scope of interference in the matter relating to the disciplinary proceedings is concerned. I may quote the observations made by the Supreme Court from paras 12 to 20 as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No.1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The finding on Charge No.1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a). the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b). the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c). there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d). the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e). the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f). the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g). the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h). the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i). the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13 Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). reappreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14 In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: "7. .....The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." 15 In State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. Chitra Venkata Rao [ (1975) 2 SCC 557 ], the principles have been further discussed at paragraphs 21 to 24, which read as follows: "21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao ( AIR 1963 SC 1723 ). First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh ( AIR 1969 SC 966 ) said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh case this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ). 24. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ). 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do." 16 These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh [ (1977) 2 SCC 491 ]. To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: "4. ...... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. ..…" 17 In all the subsequent decisions of this Court up to the latest in Chennai Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T. T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 : ( AIR 2014 SC 1141 ), these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything. On Article I, the disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement in the impugned order dated 28.02.2000, had arrived at the following findings: "Article was held as proved by the Inquiry authority after evaluating the evidence adduced in the case. Under the circumstances of the case, the evidence relied on viz., letter dated 11.12.92 written by Shri P. Gunasekaran, provides a reasonable nexus to the charge framed against him and he did not controvert the contents of the said letter dated 11.12.92 during the time of inquiry. Nor did he produce any defence witness during the inquiry to support his claims including that on 23.11.92 he left the office on permission. There is nothing to indicate that he was handicapped in producing his defence witness.. … " 19 The disciplinary authority, on scanning the inquiry report and having accepted it, after discussing the available and admissible evidence on the charge, and the Central Administrative Tribunal having endorsed the view of the disciplinary authority, it was not at all open to the High Court to re appreciate the evidence in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 20 Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. 20 Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values." 11. Considering overall facts and circumstances of the case and the decisions of this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that no interference is required in the present petition and the present petition is devoid of merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 12. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated forthwith. No order as to cost.