JUDGMENT : P.G. AJITHKUMAR, J. 1. This appeal was filed under Section 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 2. The appellants were the sureties of the accused in S.C. No. 1396/2019 before the Assistant Sessions Court, Karunagappally. As per the impugned order, the appellants were directed to pay a penalty Rs. 40,000/- each. The appellants impugn the said order in this appeal. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Public Prosecutor. 4. It is not in dispute that the appellants were the sureties of the accused in S.C. No. 1396/2019. That is a case initiated against the accused, alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 55(g) of the Abkari Act. 5. The contention of the appellants is that they stood as sureties on the insistence of the counsel appearing for the accused, and therefore they wanted to get discharged from the bond they had executed. It was for that purpose that they produced the accused on 16.12.2023 and sought discharge. The trial court, instead of discharging them forthwith, adjourned the case to 21.12.2023. On that day, finding that the accused failed to appear before the court, the proceedings were initiated, and the penalty was imposed on the same day. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that not only that the trial court violated the provisions of Section 444 of the Code inasmuch as the request for discharge was declined, but also the provisions of Section 446(1) of the Code were totally disregarded while imposing penalty on 21.12.2023, the day on which proceedings were initiated against the appellants. 7. I have perused the trial court records, in order to ascertain the correctness of the submissions. 8. The proceedings dated 16.12.2023 in S.C. No. 1396/2019 reads as follows: Accused is present. CW-1 and CW-4 present. CW-3 absent and Public Prosecutor informed that the said witness is in Tamil Nadu and will appear. Counsel for the accused filed memo relinquishing the vakalath. Sureties are present and they informed that they are not ready to continue. Sureties cannot be discharged at the moment. Accused informed that he will arrange fresh sureties by 20.12.2023 and will also appeared fresh sureties. Therefore, sureties will continue till the next date and they will appear. CW-1 and CW-4 are not examined today and they will appear on the next date. Call on 21.12.2023. 9. Sureties cannot be discharged at the moment. Accused informed that he will arrange fresh sureties by 20.12.2023 and will also appeared fresh sureties. Therefore, sureties will continue till the next date and they will appear. CW-1 and CW-4 are not examined today and they will appear on the next date. Call on 21.12.2023. 9. The said proceedings would show that on 16.12.2023 the appellants produced the accused before the Court and sought discharge from the bond they had executed. Section 444 of the Code enables sureties for attendance and appearance of a person who is released on bail claim discharge at any time during the proceedings of the case. Section 444 reads: 444. Discharge of sureties. (1) All or any sureties for the attendance and appearance of a person released on bail may at any time apply to a Magistrate to discharge the bond, either wholly or so far as relates to the applicants. (2) On such application being made, the Magistrate shall issue his warrant of arrest directing that the person so released be brought before him. (3) On the appearance of such person pursuant to the warrant, or on his voluntary surrender, the Magistrate shall direct the bond to be discharged either wholly or so far as relates to the applicants, and shall call upon such person to find other sufficient sureties, and, if he fails to do so, may commit him to jail. 10. On a reading of the said provisions, it is quite clear that the sureties have absolute right to claim discharge from the bond at any time of the proceedings, even without producing the accused before the court. What is required on the part of the court is to ensure that the plea for discharge is a bonafide one, that is to say before abscondance of the accused. It is for the court, on making such a request, to get the presence of the accused by issuing a warrant for his arrest. When that is the provision regarding discharge contained in Section 444 of the Code, the trial court ought not have declined the plea made by the appellants for their discharge after producing the accused before the court. When that is the provision regarding discharge contained in Section 444 of the Code, the trial court ought not have declined the plea made by the appellants for their discharge after producing the accused before the court. Therefore, the order of the trial court on 16.12.2023 to continue the bond by declining the plea for discharge despite appearance of the accused before the court is against the provisions of Section 444 of the Code and is illegal. 11. On 21.12.2023, the appellants appeared before the court. The accused remained absent. That prompted the trial court to initiate action under Section 446(1) of the Code. When the appellants have a right to get discharged from the bond and they requested for the same on 16.12.2023, the initiation of proceedings under Section 446(1) of the Code on 21.12.2023 was unwarranted. Upon initiating the proceedings on 21.12.2023, no opportunity to show cause was given to the appellants. The proceedings in the M.C case show that the appellants filed a report, but no such report is seen with the records forwarded to this Court by the trial court. It is therefore inferrable that the appellants did not file any report. Be that as it may, the trial court proceeded to impose penalty forthwith. It is the obligation of the court, in view of the provisions of Section 446(1) of the Code to record the grounds for recording forfeiture of the bond. It is also essential to give a reasonable opportunity to the sureties to show cause before imposing penalty. When the proceedings were initiated on 21.12.2023 and it was while the plea for discharge by the appellants was pending consideration, imposing penalty forthwith without affording the appellants a reasonable opportunity to offer their explanation, there occurred total disregard of the provisions of Section 446(1) of the Code. Thus, the impugned order is violative of the provisions of Sections 444 and 446 of the Code and it is liable to be set aside. 12. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.