ORDER : 1. By filing this writ petition the petitioner has assailed the order dated 14.01.2020 passed by the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Sub-District Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur (Office of Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur) [For short ‘the Disciplinary Authority’], whereby he was dismissed from service after exercising the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short ‘the Rules of 1958’). The petitioner has also assailed the order dated 16.12.2020 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Bharatpur Range, Bharatpur (for short ‘the Appellate Authority), whereby the appeal of the petitioner filed against the punishment order dated 14.01.2020 was dismissed and the penalty imposed upon him of dismissal from service was upheld. 2. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that no opportunity of hearing was accorded to the petitioner before his dismissal from service after exercising the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958, which is ex-facie arbitrary, illegal and is a sheer case of misuse of the powers. Counsel further submitted that neither any notice to show- cause nor any notice of hearing was served upon the petitioner nor any inquiry was conducted into the allegations leveled against him. Counsel further submitted that the petitioner has been dismissed from service on the basis of the preliminary enquiry report, observing that the allegations against him while working on the post of Assistant Sub Inspector, have diminished the image of the Police Department saying that the act committed by him is a heinous offence involving the moral turpitude. Counsel further submitted that the allegations leveled in the FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur and also allegations leveled in FIR No.0117/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur were made the basis of dismissal of the petitioner from service. Counsel further submitted that the FIR No.0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court vide order dated 18.02.2021 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 343/2021 and the Negative Final Report has been filed by the Investigating Agency in FIR No.0117/2019 stating to be a case of civil nature. Counsel further submitted that the FIR No.0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court vide order dated 18.02.2021 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 343/2021 and the Negative Final Report has been filed by the Investigating Agency in FIR No.0117/2019 stating to be a case of civil nature. Counsel further submitted that in view of the fact that FIR No. 0626/2019 has been set aside and Final Negative Report has been filed in FIR No.0117/2019, no material remains with the respondents to sustain the dismissal of the service of the petitioner and to keep the petitioner out of service. Counsel further submitted that the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 are to be exercised by the respondents in a rare case where it seems to the authorities that it would be undesirable to continue the delinquent in service further. For exercising the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958, reasons have to be assigned for the same but in the instant case, no specific and satisfactory reasons have been assigned for invoking such powers. 3. Counsel further submitted that no full fledged inquiry was conducted in regard to the allegations leveled against the petitioner and the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the service is violative of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Counsel further submitted that the allegations leveled in the FIRs registered against the petitioner are false and fabricated without there being any legal sanctity. Counsel further submitted that the FIR No.0117/2019 was registered after a delay of more than six years and the allegations leveled in the FIR do not constitute any kind of offence against the petitioner which involves moral turpitude. Counsel also submitted that the service record of the petitioner is unblemished and he has been awarded various appreciation certificates for performing the duties. Therefore, imposing penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner from service without conducting an inquiry is in no manner can be said to be justified in the eye of law. 4. Mr. Rupin Kala, learned Government Counsel appearing for the respondents State submitted that in view the changed circumstances i.e. filing of Negative Final Report in FIR No.0117/2019 and quashing of FIR No.0626/2019 by the High Court, the respondents are ready to reconsider the case of the petitioner. 4. Mr. Rupin Kala, learned Government Counsel appearing for the respondents State submitted that in view the changed circumstances i.e. filing of Negative Final Report in FIR No.0117/2019 and quashing of FIR No.0626/2019 by the High Court, the respondents are ready to reconsider the case of the petitioner. Government Counsel further submitted that at the relevant time when the order of dismissal was passed, there was sufficient material before the respondents to invoke the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and to dismiss him from service who was working on the post of Assistant Sub Inspector which is a post of disciplinary force. 5. Considered the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Government Counsel appearing for the respondent State. 6. Though the learned Government Counsel submitted that the respondents are ready to reconsider the case of the petitioner in view of subsequent developments including quashing of FIR No.0626/2019 and filing of Negative Final Report in FIR No.0117/2019, which are main basis of the petitioner’s dismissal from service but since there is no provision under the Rules of 1958 regarding reconsideration or reviewing of the order by the same respondent- authorities, this Court itself is considering the issue on its legal and factual matrix. 7. The factual matrix of the case is that when the petitioner was posted as Assistant Sub Inspector of Police at Bharatpur, an FIR No.0117/2019 was registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur, for the offences under sections 420, 406, 387 and 506 IPC with the allegations against him that he interfered in a sale transaction after accepting some money. Another FIR No.0626/2019 was registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur, for the offences under sections 323, 342 and 384 IPC implicating the petitioner as an accused. The Disciplinary Authority i.e. the Office of Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur invoking the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and on the basis of preliminary enquiry, passed the order of dismissal service of the petitioner observing that his act and conduct has diminished the image of the Police Department. 8. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the dismissal order dated 14.01.2020 passed by the Disciplinary Authority before the Appellate Authority. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 16.12.2020. 9. 8. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the dismissal order dated 14.01.2020 passed by the Disciplinary Authority before the Appellate Authority. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 16.12.2020. 9. The petitioner also preferred S.B. Criminal Misc.Petition No.343/2021 for quashing the FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur for the offences under sections 323, 342 and 384 IPC. The aforesaid criminal misc. petition was finally disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 18.02.2021 and quashed the FIR No.0626/2019. 10. A representation was submitted by the petitioner for reinstating him in service in view of the fact that the FIR No.0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court vide order dated 18.02.2021 in SB. Criminal Misc. Petition No.343/2021 and the Investigation Agency after making a thorough investigation into the allegations of FIR No.0117/2019 has given a Negative Final report. 11. When no favourable order was passed by the respondents on the representation submitted by the petitioner, the petitioner has filed this petition for quashing and setting aside the order dated 14.01.2020 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order dated 16.12.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority. 12. The facts in regard to the order of dismissal from service is solely based on the allegations against the petitioner as leveled in the FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur for the offences under sections 323, 342 and 384 IPC and so also the allegations in the FIR No.117/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur for the offences under sections 420, 406, 387 and 506 IPC. As per the averments of the petition, the FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur, has been quashed by the High Court vide order dated 18.02.2021 in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.343/2021. The Investigating Agency has submitted the Negative Final Report after making thorough investigation into the FIR No.0117/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur. The aforestated facts have not been disputed by the counsel appearing for the respondents. 13. Petition No.343/2021. The Investigating Agency has submitted the Negative Final Report after making thorough investigation into the FIR No.0117/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur. The aforestated facts have not been disputed by the counsel appearing for the respondents. 13. The Disciplinary Authority passed the order dated 14.01.2020 with the observations as under:- ^^Jh vtqZu flga l0m0fu0 ds }kjk vkijkf/kd izdj.kks esa lafyIr jgus o vketu ls futh LokFkZifwrZ gsrqq Bxh fd;s tkus dh ?kVukvkas dk LFkkuh; ehfM;k o vU; ek/;eksa ls vketu esa izpkj&izlkj gqvk gSA l0m0fu0 ds bl vekuoh; o uSfrd iru ds d`R; us vke turk esa bl dnj ng'kr QSykbZ ftlls vke ukxfjd iqfyl dks gs; n`f"V ls ns[kus yxk vkSj ftlus Hkh bl f?kukSus d`R; ds ckjs esa lquk mlus ;gh dgk fd tc j{kd gh Hk{kd cu tk;s rks vketu dk D;k gksxk vkSj og vius vki dks dSls lqjf{kr eglwl djsxkA l0m0fu0 iqfyl cy dk lnL; gSA iqfyl foHkkx dk vkUrfjd lqj{kk dk iw.kZ nkf;Ro gS vkSj vke turk dh lqj{kk dk Hkkj Hkh iqfyl ds d/akksa ij gS vxj iqfyl cy dk dksbZ lnL; bl rjg dk vkijkf/kd d`R; djrk gS vkSj vijk/k Qjkj gksus ds ckotwn Hkh iqfyl foHkkx eas cuk jgrk gS rks tuekul dk iqfyl foHkkx ls fo'okl mB tk;sxk vkSj tuekul dh bl ekufldrk ls iqfyl foHkkx dh viw.kZuh; {kfr gksxh ftldh iwfrZ fd;k tkuk lEHko ugh gksxkA^^ 14. The Disciplinary Authority has invoked the powers of the Disciplinary Authority given in sub-rule (ii) of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 is quoted as under:- “19. Special procedure in certain cases.– Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and 18, (i) where a penalty is imposed on a Government Servant on the ground of conduct which has led to him conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said rules; or (iii) Where the Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to follow such procedure, the disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it deems fit. Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary. Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary. Note:–If any question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to give any person a opportunity of showing cause under clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss, or remove such person or to reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be subject to only one appeal to the next higher authority.” 15. The Disciplinary Authority has merely observed that it is undesirable to continue the petitioner in service and therefore invoking the powers given under sub-rule (ii) of the Rules of 1958 dismissed the petitioner from service. The Disciplinary Authority has not disclosed any reason in the impugned order that why it is not “reasonably practicable” to follow the procedure prescribed in the Rules of 1958. The dismissal from service of an employee is not only adverse to the petitioner but it has also a serious adverse impact on the petitioner and his family member’s livelihood. The Disciplinary Authority was under an obligation to disclose those reasons for which the procedure given under the Rules of 1958 is not reasonably practicable to follow. While invoking the powers under rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958, the Disciplinary Authority must have such a material before him which could not be countered and the allegations must be of such a nature that it became undesirable to continue an employee in service. From the facts narrated above it is very much clear that the FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur has been quashed by the High court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.343/2021 vide order dated 18.02.2021. The result of quashing of the FIR is that as if no any such criminal case was ever registered against the petitioner. 16. As regards the allegations of FIR No.0117/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur, the Investigating Agency has made a thorough investigation and has submitted the Negative Final Report. The ultimate result of the investigation report is that the allegations against the petitioner so as to constitute a criminal act, punishable under the IPC is not made out. It is also a fact on record that no any disciplinary proceedings in regard to the allegations leveled in the aforementioned two FIRs has ever been initiated or pending. The ultimate result of the investigation report is that the allegations against the petitioner so as to constitute a criminal act, punishable under the IPC is not made out. It is also a fact on record that no any disciplinary proceedings in regard to the allegations leveled in the aforementioned two FIRs has ever been initiated or pending. The conclusion of the above referred facts clearly speaks that there is no material with the respondent authorities to invoke the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and for dismissal of the services of the petitioner. 17. The Disciplinary Authority has not given any specific reasons for invoking the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and has also not given any reason how it has become reasonably practicable to follow the procedure given under rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1958. It is the basic principle of service jurisprudence that whenever any adverse order is passed, the concerned delinquent officer should have been allowed the proper and reasonable opportunity to show-cause and hearing. Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India also gives safeguards to the government servants from any kind of adverse order without opportunity of hearing. The facts of the case and more particularly the facts that an FIR No.0626/2019 registered at Police Station Kaman, District Bharatpur and the FIR No. 0177/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain, District Bharatpur, which were the sole basis for passing the impugned order against the petitioner, no more subsists in view of the fact that the FIR No. 0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court and in FIR No.0117/2019, the Investigating Agency after thorough has submitted the Negative Final Report. There was no any such material with the respondents to invoke the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and also to dismiss the petitioner from service without following the due procedure given under the Rules and without affording any opportunity of show-cause and hearing to him. The Disciplinary Authority has also not given any specific reasoning to uphold the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has also not given any specific reasoning to uphold the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority. No sufficient reasons have been prescribed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority for dispensing with the inquiry procedure given under Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1958 and to invoke the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the said rules. 18. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Lakha Ram vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12858/2015) decided on 20.12.2018, in paras 46 and 47 has observed as under:- “46. It cannot be disputed that the police force is a disciplined force and the respondents ought to be firm in imposing discipline amongst its personnel, but simultaneously the constitutional and statutory rigors provide for certain safeguards for all the civil servants/government servants, and in normal course, the Disciplinary Authority is not expected to dispense with the inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or merely in order to avoid holding of an inquiry. 47. This Court has also carefully gone through the record and both the impugned orders, and finds that nowhere the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority has recorded its satisfaction in writing so as to invoke powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and thus, the impugned orders suffer from basic infirmity of violating Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India as well as Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958.” The Division Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Lakha Ram (D.B. Spl. Appl. Writ No.908/2018) decided on 01.08.2018 has observed in paras 6 and 7 as under:- “6. If this is the material on which inference of misdemeanor is drawn it cannot be said to be a case where it can be said that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. In fact, a perusal of the impugned judgment would show that the entire case of the appellants was that there was material with the Department of the respondent being in touch with various persons whose names have been noted in paragraph No. 27 of the impugned order.” The Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Hanuman Ram (Deceased) through his legal representatives Bhanwari Devi & Ors. Vs. Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5574/2020, decided on 03.10.2023, has observed in paras 11, 12, 13 and 14 as under:- “11. Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 deals with special procedure for removal of a Government Servant by exempting the enquiry contained under Rule 16, 17 and 18 where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied by recording the reasons in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed under the said rule. 12. The above sub rule makes it clear that it is incumbent on the authority to record its satisfaction in writing the reason as to why it would not be reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry where the authority is empowered to dismiss a person. The word"....................reasonably practicable to hold............................." means that it is not practicable to hold the enquiry based on certain factual circumstances which are inalienable to the case which is before the Disciplinary Authority. The word "reasonably" further indicates that it is not a case of total impracticability but that holding of an enquiry is not practicable after taking a reasonable view of the relevant factual situation. What however is non-negotiable is that the Disciplinary Authority must state its reason in writing for dispensing with a disciplinary enquiry which would have an indelible impact on the person who is removed, dismissed from service or reduced in rank without an enquiry. The reasons recorded must reflect the attending circumstances which would make it reasonably impracticable for the authority to hold the enquiry before imposing the penalty. 13. The exception slips in where it is impracticable to hold the enquiry and the onus is on the authority to record its satisfaction in writing as to the reason for the impracticability. The underlying presumption in Rule 19 is that dismissal, removal of a person employed in a State service is not to be taken lightly or done without following due process. The threshold to prove dispensation of due process and compliance with the principles of natural justice is high in all matters but particularly heightened in Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. In essence, the constitutional obligation of recording reasons for departing from the norm must strictly be conformed with. Invocation of the power without bowing down to the constitutional mandate would render the order of penalty void. In essence, the constitutional obligation of recording reasons for departing from the norm must strictly be conformed with. Invocation of the power without bowing down to the constitutional mandate would render the order of penalty void. The same has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 . 14. While passing the impugned order, the respondent was of the view that the Disciplinary Authority was competent to dismiss the petitioner from service by invoking Rule 19 (ii) and that it was not "reasonably practicable" to hold an enquiry. There is no independent finding about whether the Disciplinary Authority rightly invoked Rule 19 (ii) and whether the reason for invoking the power was recorded in writing justifying the satisfaction on the part of the authority to dispense with the enquiry” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaswant Singh vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in (1991) 1 SCC 362 , in para 5 has observed as under:- “5. The impugned order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the reasons for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said order, which we have extracted earlier, gives two reasons in support of the satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the appellant. These are (i) the appellant has thrown threats that he with the help of other police employees will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and (ii) he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Now as stated earlier after the two Revision Applications were allowed on October 13, 1980. the appellant had re-joined service as Head Constable on March 5, 1981 but he was immediately placed under suspension. Thereafter, two show cause notices dated April 4, 1981 were issued against him calling upon him to reply thereto within 10 days after the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. Before the service of these notices the incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm with a knife. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he was in hospital the two show cause notices were served on him at about 10.00 p.m. on April 6, 1981. Before the appellant could reply to show cause notices the third respondent passed the impugned order on the very next day i.e. April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental enquiries were duly conducted against the appellant and there is no allegation that the department had found any difficulty in examining witnesses in the said inquiries. After the Revision Applications were allowed the show cause notices were issued and 10 days time was given to the appellant to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore, enquired from the learned Counsel for the respondents to point out what impelled respondent No. 3 to take a decision that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the services of the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by Article 311(2). The learned Counsel for the respondents could only point out Clause (iv)(a) of sub-para 29(A) of the counter which reads as under: “The order dated 7.4.81 was passed as the petitioner's activities were objectionable. He was instigating his fellow police officials to cause indiscipline, show insubordination and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment and hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged harmful.” This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph 3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to any material existing on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown threats that he and his companions will not allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and that they would not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer if any such attempt was made. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following observation at p. 270 of Tulsi Ram's case: “A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary authority lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department's case against the government servant is weak and must fail.” The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. In the counter filed by the third respondent it is contended that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given. Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given threats, etc., when he was in hospital. It is not shown on what material the third respondent came to the conclusion that the appellant had thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. This allegation is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3, 1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not forthcoming. It is no one's contention that the said SHO was threatened. The third respondent's counter also does not reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information. To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any independent material to justify the dispensing with of the inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground alone the impugned order cannot be sustained.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Niwas Gupta & Ors. vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2020) 3 SCC 153 has observed in paras 18 and 19 as under:- “18. The observations in our opinion are being misread as the afore-quoted portion refers to the legal position that normally departmental inquiry should be held. It also refers to the scenario where a departmental inquiry cannot be conducted that is, "when conducting of departmental enquiry was turning out to be a difficult task", in which case a "decision could have been taken to dispense with the enquiry; by recording specific reasons". It is observed that the principles laid down in Tulsiram Patel (supra) and Tarsem Singh (supra) have to be kept in mind. Appropriate in this regard, would be a reference to the following observations in Tulsiram Patel (supra), which read: 130. The condition precedent for the application of Clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold" the inquiry contemplated by Clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are "not reasonably practicable" and not "impracticable". According to the Oxford English Dictionary "practicable" means "Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning "possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible". Further, the words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning "possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible". Further, the words used are not "not practicable" but "not reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines the word "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by Clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. 19. Thus, the authorities to invoke the power under Clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2) to dispense with a departmental inquiry must record a finding that such an inquiry cannot be conducted and record specific reasons for the same. In this case, the Division Bench had recorded the contention of the Respondent-High Court as the disciplinary authority that it would be impossible to assimilate, collect and produce direct evidence and material as the acts and misdeeds were in another country. The Division Bench having found that reasons had not been recorded for dispensing with the inquiry, has neither accepted nor rejected this contention of the High Court. It will not be appropriate and correct to interpret the decision of the Division Bench by reading one or more sentences of a paragraph in isolation. The entire judgment has to understand the ratio and finding and the observations must be read in the context in which they have been made.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case Mathura Prasad vs. Union of India, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 437 in paras 19 and 20 has observed as under:- “19. When an employee, by reason of an alleged act of misconduct, is sought to be deprived of his livelihood, the procedures laid down under Sub- rules are required to be strictly followed. It is now well settled that a judicial review would lie even if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. When an employee, by reason of an alleged act of misconduct, is sought to be deprived of his livelihood, the procedures laid down under Sub- rules are required to be strictly followed. It is now well settled that a judicial review would lie even if there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If statutory authority uses its power in a manner not provided for in the statute or passes an order without application of mind, judicial review would be maintainable. Even an error of fact for sufficient reasons may attract the principles of judicial review. 20. In Shri S.N. Chandra Shekhar and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. this Court held: (SCC pp. 221-22, paras 34-36) “34. The Authority, therefore, posed unto itself a wrong question. What, therefore, was necessary to be considered by BDA was whether the ingredients contained in Section 14-A of the Act were fulfilled and whether the requirements of the proviso appended thereto are satisfied. If the same had not been satisfied, the requirements of the law must be held to have not been satisfied. If there had been no proper application of mind as regards the requirements of law, the State and the Planning Authority must be held to have misdirected themselves in law which would vitiate the impugned judgment. 35. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, this Court referring to Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam held: (SCC p. 637, para 14) ‘14. Even a judicial review on facts in certain situations may be available. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, this Court observed: (SCC 253, paras 34-35) “34...It is now well settled that a quasi-judicial authority must pose unto itself a correct question so as to arrive at a correct finding of fact. A wrong question posed leads to a wrong answer. In this case, furthermore, the misdirection in law committed by the Industrial Tribunal was apparent insofar as it did not apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur which was relevant for the purpose of this case and, thus, failed to take into consideration a relevant factor and furthermore took into consideration an irrelevant fact not germane for determining the issue, namely, that the passengers of the bus were mandatorily required to be examined. The Industrial Tribunal further failed to apply the correct standard of proof in relation to a domestic enquiry, which is "preponderance of probability" and applied the standard of proof required for a criminal trial. A case for judicial review was, thus, clearly made out. “35. Errors of fact can also be a subject- matter of judicial review. (See E. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt). Reference in this connection may also be made to an interesting article by Paul P. Craig, Q.C. titled "Judicial Review, Appeal and Factual Error" published in 2004 Public Law, p. 788.” (See also Sonepat Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ajit Singh, SCC paras 23 & 24.) 36. The order passed by the statutory authority, it is trite, must be judged on the basis of the contents thereof and not as explained in affidavit. (See Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah). The said dicta shall apply to the facts of the present appeal also.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 has observed in para 12 as under:- “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Amarendra Kumar Pandey vs. Union of India & Ors., (Civil Appeal Nos. 11473-11474 of 2018) decided on 14.07.2022 has observed in para 29 as under:- “29. The action based on the subjective opinion or satisfaction, in our opinion, can judicially be reviewed first to find out the existence of the facts or circumstances on the basis of which the authority is alleged to have formed the opinion. It is true that ordinarily the court should not inquire into the correctness or otherwise of the facts found except in a case where it is alleged that the facts which have been found existing were not supported by any evidence at all or that the finding in regard to circumstances or material is so perverse that no reasonable man would say that the facts and circumstances exist. The courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of the authority’s opinion as to the existence of matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated.” 19. The courts will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of the authority’s opinion as to the existence of matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated.” 19. The Government Counsel appearing for the respondents did not controvert the facts that the FIR No.0626/2019 has already been quashed by the High Court vide order dated 18.02.2021 and the Investigating Agency has submitted the Negative Final Report in connection with the allegations leveled in FIR No. 0117/2019. 20. The Disciplinary Authority while passing the order dated 14.01.2020 dispensing with the procedure given under rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1958 has observed as under:- ^^mijksDr foospuk ls eSa vuq'kklfud vf/kdkjh Jh vtqZu flag l0m0fu0 dks iqfyl foHkkx esa cuk;s j[kuk vokaNuh; ekurs gq, bl izdj.k esa jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa iquZjkosnu½ fu;e 1958 ds fu;e 19¼2½ ds rgr dk;Zokgh fd;k tkuk mfpr ekurk g¡wA^^ 21. The reason given above is not convincing to the Court in view of the provisions of law and various pronouncements of the Courts as referred in the foregoing paras. 22. The Appellate Authority while dismissing the appeal of the petitioner has observed as under:- ^^eSaus i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr vfHkys[kkas dk/;kuiowZd xgurk ls voyksdu dj euu fd;kA vihykFkhZ }kjk dkfjr vkijkf/kd d`R;ksa tSls f?kukSus o uSfrd v/kerk ds d`R; ls iqfyl foHkkx dh Nfo ij izfrdwy izHkko iMk gSA vihykFkhZ dkuwu ls Hkyh izdkj ifjfpr tulsok gsrq fu;qDr dehZ dk gksus ls ;g d`R; ?kksj funauh; gSA vihykFkhZ us ,d i'ksosj vijk/kh dh rjg [kkSQukd rjhds ls vkijkf/kd ?kVukvksa dks yxkrkj vtake fn;k gSA vihykFkhZ Jh vtqZu flga HkwriwoZ l0m0fu0 mDr vkijkf/kd d`R;ksa dks vtake nsdj vius fjgk;'kh LFky ls Qjkj py jgk gS ftlds fo:) ekuuh; U;k;ky; ls/kkjk 37 tk0QkS0 ds rgr fxjrkjh okj.V Hkh tkjh fd;s gq;s gSA mijksDr foospuk ls vuq'kklfud vf/kdkjh }kjk Jh vtqZuj flga l0m0fu0 dks iqfyl foHkkx esa cuk;s j[kuk vokNauh; ekurs gq, bl izdj.k esa jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;=a.k ,oa iquZjkosnu½ fu;e 1958 ds fu;e 19¼2½ ds rgr dh x;h dk;Zokgh dks mfpr ekurs gq;s fuEu vkns'k ikfjr fd;s tkrs gSaA^^ 23. The observations of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority cannot be accepted because the sole basis for passing the impugned order against the petitioner are two FIRs i.e. FIRs No.0626/2019 and 0117/2019 but one FIR No.0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court and in other FIR No.0117/2019, the Investigating Agency has submitted the Negative Final Report. Now there is no material with the respondents to substantiate the allegations against the petitioner for dismissing him from service and to invoke the powers given under rule 19(ii) of the rules of 1958. 24. While disposing of this writ petition, this Court is also conscious of the allegations levelled against the petitioner in FIR No.0117/2019 registered at Police Station Uchhain District Bharatpur for the offences under sections 420, 406, 387 and 506 IPC. First of all mere registration of a criminal case without ascertaining the credibility of the allegations any harsh decision including dismissal of an employee from service is not tenable. On perusal of the allegations as made in the FIR, this Court is of the view that a detailed inquiry/investigation was required to ascertain whether the allegations are genuine or are false or fabricated. The Investigating Agency in connection with the investigation into the allegations levelled in FIR No.0117/2019 has come to the conclusion that no criminal case is made out from the contents of the FIR. The allegations levelled against the petitioner are not of such a nature that the respondents were required to invoke the powers given under rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 and to punish the petitioner without making any inquiry into the allegations without allowing any opportunity to show-cause and hearing to the petitioner and without adhering to the procedure given under Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the Rules of 1958. 25. There are certain cases registered against the government employees in view of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on they being caught red handed taking the bribe. In the matters registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the department awaits the results of the investigation followed by the conclusion of the judicial proceedings before the trial court, though the concerned employee was caught red handed taking bribe which might be a serious offence involving the moral turpitude. In such cases the respondents never invokes the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. In such cases the respondents never invokes the powers given under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958. But surprisingly the respondents have invoked the powers under Rule 19(ii) of the Rules of 1958 in the present case where the allegations are not of such a nature but are merely in regard to some transactions and that too not related to the official duty. The allegations in the FIR lodged against the petitioner warranted a detailed investigation before taking any action against the petitioner but the respondents have failed in doing so and have dismissed the petitioner from service without there being any inquiry. Such action of the respondents is illegal, arbitrary and unjustified and more particularly in view of the fact that FIR No.0626/2019 has been quashed by the High Court and the Investigating Agency has submitted Negative Final Report in connection with the allegations in FIR No.0117/2019. 26. In view of the discussions made above, the writ petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be allowed. 27. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 28. The impugned order dated 14.01.2020 passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e. Dy. Inspector General of Police, Sub-District Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur (Office of District Superintendent of Police, Bharatpur) and also the impugned order dated 16.12.2020 passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Inspector General of Police, Bharatpur Range, Bharatpur, are quashed and set aside with all consequential benefits as if the impugned orders have not been passed against the petitioner as he is in service. 29. The respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to join the duty without any delay. 30. In view of the order passed in the main petition, the stay application and pending application/s, if any, also stand disposed of.