ORDER : 1. In the present bunch of petitions, the scope of the controversy involved, both in law and facts, is identical. Therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for both the sides, the present bunch of petitions are being taken up for final disposal collectively. For the purpose of recording arguments, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19131/2023 titled as Narayan Das vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., is being taken up as the lead file. 2. The present petition is filed with the following prayers:- “i) Issue a writ, order or directions to quash and set aside the impugned order of Revised Pension Authority No. 7479505® Dated: 22.11/2019 under Clause of Para-6 of FD Memorandum No. F.12 (6) FD/Rules/2017 Pt-1 dated:05 Nov 2019 being unfair and inconsistent to the provisions of para-2, 3, 5 of FD Memo No. F. 12 (6) FD/Rules/2017 Pt-1 dated: 12 Jun 2019. ii) issue a writ, order or directions declaring that the pre-01/01/2016 Pensioners, Librarians (Selection Scale) drawing pension in RPB 37400-67000m with AGP 9000/-are eligible for the notional pay fixation in RPB 37400-67000 with AGP 9000/-prescribed for the revision of pension of pre-01/01/2016 pensioner under Clauses of para-2, para-3 and para-5 of the Government of Rajasthan FD (Rules) Division Memorandum No. f.12(6) FD/ Rules/ 2017 Pt-1 dated: 12 Jun 2019 3. Issue a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents for the maintenance of parity in pension revision to all pre-2016 pensioners and to issue a revised pension authority to the petitioner in Level in the Pay Matrix at AL-13A prescribed under Clause of Paras-2, 3, 5 of the Government of Rajasthan FD (Rules) Division Memorandum No. F.12(6) FD/ Rules/2017 Pt-1 dated: 12 Jun 2019 corresponding to RPB 37400-67000 with AGP 9000/- 4. Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which the Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 5. Award costs.” 3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that vide order impugned dated 22.11.2019, grave discrimination has been caused qua the petitioner, which in turn, violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner as enshrined under Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 5. Award costs.” 3. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that vide order impugned dated 22.11.2019, grave discrimination has been caused qua the petitioner, which in turn, violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner as enshrined under Articles 14,16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it is averred that the respondents have issued the revised authority of pension to many pre-2016 pensioners, belonging to the same category as the present petitioner, drawing pension in RPB 37400-67000 with AGP 9000/-in level in the Pay Matrix at AL-13A but denied the same benefit to the petitioner(s) by issuing authority in level in Pay Matrix at AL12(Annexure-6). Therefore, in the foregoing circumstances, the instant petition is filed before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. Vide orders dated 28.02.2024 and 04.03.2024, this Court had raised specific queries before the counsel for the petitioner regarding the maintainability of the instant petition, especially in light of the existence/availability of an alternate and equally efficacious remedy in law before the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal. In response, to draw out a case for the maintainability of the instant petition before this Court, learned counsel contended as under:- 4.1. That writ jurisdiction of the High Court can be evoked when there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. In the facts of the present case, despite raising the grievance(s) by way of representations, the same were not considered by the respondent-authorities. Rather, a deaf ear was turned to the said representations. 4.2. That the petitioner is senior citizen aged 76 years, who retired way back in the Year 2002. Therefore, relegating the petitioner’s grievance to RAT, at this belated stage, shall cause undue hardship to the petitioner. 4.3. That from time to time, memorandum/circulars have been published by the Government of Rajasthan, Finance Department (Rules Division). Relying upon the memorandum dated 05.11.2019, learned counsel submitted that the learned RAT shall not be well suited to address the petitioner’s grievance(s). 4.4. That some of the petitions, from the instant bunch, were filed during the period of Covid-19, wherein pleadings are largely complete. Therefore, relegating the matters at this stage, shall not be in the interest of justice. 5. 4.4. That some of the petitions, from the instant bunch, were filed during the period of Covid-19, wherein pleadings are largely complete. Therefore, relegating the matters at this stage, shall not be in the interest of justice. 5. In support of the arguments advanced above, learned counsel placed reliance upon the dictum of the Hon’ble Apex Court as enunciated in Whirlpool India vs. Registrar of Trade Mark reported in 1998 (8) SCC 1 and State of Rajasthan and Ors. vs. Mahendra Nath Sharma: Civil Appeal No. 1123. Further reliance was also placed upon the dictum of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court as pronounced in Dhani Ram vs. Chief Engineer Raj Ghat Project Betwa River Board, Nandanpura, Jhansi and Ors.: Special Appeal No. 1301/2012. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State, Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, AAG, raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the instant petition, especially in light of the existence of an equally efficacious alternate remedy before the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal. In this regard, it was contended that by-passing the statutory alternate remedy, the petitioners cannot be allowed to knock at the doors of this Court. Furthermore, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that even though the petitioner has retired, the petitioner definitively fell within the ambit of a ‘Government Servant’ as defined under Section 2(c) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 (hereinafter, Act of 1976). Therefore, the services rendered by the petitioner categorically fell under the Section 2(f) of the Act of 1976. Hence, for the redressal of the grievance noted above, the petitioner ought to approach the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal. 7. Heard learned counsel for both the sides, scanned the record of the petition and perused through the judgments cited at Bar. 8. It is a settled position of law that in an eventuality where a preliminary objection is raised against the maintainability of a petition, the said objection ought to be adjudicated upon at the outset, prior to delving into the factual considerations of the dispute at hand. The elementary rationale behind the said prioritized adjudication of the objection, pertains to the simple fact that the outcome on the said preliminary objection regarding the maintainability, shall have a direct nexus on the outcome of the petition before this Court insofar as the petition may not be entertained per se. 9. The elementary rationale behind the said prioritized adjudication of the objection, pertains to the simple fact that the outcome on the said preliminary objection regarding the maintainability, shall have a direct nexus on the outcome of the petition before this Court insofar as the petition may not be entertained per se. 9. Accordingly, on the aspect of maintainability of the instant petition, during the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner could not refute the fact that the petitioner would be covered under the definition of a ‘Government Servant’ as prescribed under Section 2(c) of the Act of 1976 nor could learned counsel for the petitioner refute the fact that the lis before this Court also falls under the definition of ‘Service Matters’ as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act of 1976. In view thereof, since the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious remedy available in law, this Court does not deem it appropriate to entertain the instant petition at the first instance, without the petitioner having exhausted the alternate remedy available in law. 10. In this regard, on the maintainability of disputes before the Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal on the subject matter of ‘pension’, reliance can be also be placed upon the dictum of the Division Bench of this Court as enunciated in Jahangir Ali Khan vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 662/2022 wherein it was held as under:- “6. The first contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute regarding the validity of an order of suspension, cannot be accepted in view of wide definition of expression "Service matter" given under Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1976. 7. Section 2, sub-section (f), being relevant, is extracted hereinbelow:- "(f) "Service matter" means any one or more than one of the following matters relating to a Government Servant:- (i) Seniority; (ii) Promotion; (iii) Confirmation; (iv) Fixation of pay; (v) An order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Government Servant, otherwise than as a penalty; (vi) Cases of reversion while officiating in a higher service, grade or post to lower service, grade or post other-wise than as a penalty; (vii) Withholding the pension or denying the maximum pension other-wise than as the penalty; (viii) Any other matter notified by the Government." 8. Clause (v) of sub-section (f) of Section 2 of the Act of 1976 is very wide. It reads that an order denying or varying pay, allowances, pension and other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Government Servant, other-wise than as a penalty would be covered under the expression "Service matter". The expression "any other service conditions to the disadvantage of a Government Servant" would obviously include the dispute arising on account of an action of suspending an employee under the service Rules. Given the wide definition under sub-section (f) as aforesaid, we have no reason to hold that it excludes suspension issue. Therefore, the contention of Ld. Additional Advocate General with regard to jurisdiction on this aspect cannot be accepted and therefore rejected.” 12. This Court deems it appropriate to note that by way of the preamble of the Act of 1976, it is categorically reflected that the said Act seeks to provide for the constitution of Appellate Tribunals for service matters and the matters which are incidental thereto. In this background, it is noted that when the requisite tribunals are constituted and are functioning smoothly with an expertise in a specific subject-matter of law, then this Court whilst exercising writ jurisdiction, ought to proceed slowly and relegate the matters to the Tribunal, for due adjudication on merits. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court, through a plethora of judicial pronouncements, has time and again held that High Court’s ought not to entertain writ petitions, which are filed bypassing the statutory alternative remedies. In the event where an alternate remedy subsists, judicial prudence demands that the Courts refrain from exercising writ jurisdiction, in the first instance. When a petitioner approaches the Court without exhausting the alternate remedy, the question with which the Court is posed, is not merely limited to the maintainability of the petition itself, but rather, it’s entertainability as well. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. Greatship (India) Limited: Civil Appeal No. 4956/2022, categorically held as under:- “8. When a petitioner approaches the Court without exhausting the alternate remedy, the question with which the Court is posed, is not merely limited to the maintainability of the petition itself, but rather, it’s entertainability as well. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and Ors. vs. Greatship (India) Limited: Civil Appeal No. 4956/2022, categorically held as under:- “8. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this Court by the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, referred to hereinabove, are concerned, the question is not about the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, but the question is about the entertainability of the writ petition against the order of assessment by-passing the statutory remedy of appeal. There are serious disputes on facts as to whether the assessment order was passed on 20.03.2020 or 14.07.2020 (as alleged by the assessee). No valid reasons have been shown by the assessee to by-pass the statutory remedy of appeal. This Court has consistently taken the view that when there is an alternate remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under constitutional provisions. 9. In view of the above and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has seriously erred in entertaining the writ petition against the assessment order. The High Court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner – assessee to avail the statutory remedy of appeal and thereafter to avail other remedies provided under the statute.” 13. Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. The said view was enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in CCE vs. Dunlop India Ltd. reported in (1985) 1 SCC 260 . Similarly, the foregoing rationale has also been propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a variety of subsequent judgments, including Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan reported in (2001) 6 SCC 569 , United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Ors. reported (2010) 8 SCC 110 , M/s. Radha Krishnan Industries vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771 and Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Ors. vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 . Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid, the reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner upon the Circular/Memorandum dated 05.11.2019 regarding the remedy before the Tribunal not being efficacious, is also misconceived. 14. Nothing has been brought on record by the counsel for the petitioners, warranting this Court to entertain the present petition, especially in the presence of an equally efficacious alternate remedy before the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal, which possesses the due expertise to adjudicate upon service disputes and matters which are incidental thereto. Moreover, the Tribunal would also be in a substantially better suited position to determine the disputed factual considerations before the Court. Moreover, the hitch advanced by the counsel for the petitioner in approaching the Tribunal is merely based on presumptions and assumptions as well, which cannot be given precedence over the settled dictum of law. 15. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing observations and considering the fact that an equally efficacious alternate remedy is available before petitioner, this Court deems it appropriate to relegate the present petition to the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal, for adjudication on merits. 16. However, looking to the fact that the petitioner is a senior citizen aged 76 years and the pleadings in the matter are largely complete, this Court directs the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal to pass final order(s) within a period of 3 months from today. 16. However, looking to the fact that the petitioner is a senior citizen aged 76 years and the pleadings in the matter are largely complete, this Court directs the learned Rajasthan Administrative Tribunal to pass final order(s) within a period of 3 months from today. Additional submissions, if any, may be filed by either of the sides before the learned Tribunal within a period of 7 days. It goes without saying that the learned Tribunal shall pass a well-reasoned speaking order, after effectuating due compliance with the principles of natural justice and also, the law applicable. 17. In terms of the above, the instant petitions are disposed of. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. 18. A copy of this order be placed in each file of the present bunch of petitions.