JUDGMENT : (Sanjay S. Agrawal J.) : 1. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 2(1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench) Act, 2006, questioning, the legality and propriety of the order dated 22/11/2019 passed by learned Single Judge in WP No.4835 of 1997, whereby, the order dated 13/12/1996 passed by the appellate authority affirming the order of his termination from service passed by the disciplinary authority on 23/09/1994 has been upheld while dismissing the petition. Parties shall be referred hereinafter as per their descriptions before the learned Single Judge. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner-Sunil Sharma, who was appointed as Lower Division Clerk and was performing his duty as a Deposition Writer in the Court of Second Civil Judge, Class-II at Mahasamund, was placed under suspension vide order dated 01/10/1992 and thereupon, a chargesheet was served upon him on 14/11/1992. In the said chargesheet, as many as 08 charges were framed against him by the respondent no.2-District and Sessions Judge, Raipur and vide order dated 16/11/1992 (Annexure P-3), he was directed to submit his reply within a period of 15 days. The petitioner has submitted his reply (Annexure P-4) on 23/11/1992, but it was not found to be satisfactory by the disciplinary authority, who has, therefore, appointed the Fourth Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Raipur as an Enquiry Officer vide order dated 25/11/1992 while the Second Deputy Clerk of Court, Raipur as a presenting officer. During enquiry, the petitioner has moved an application on 08/01/1993 praying for the engagement of a defence lawyer which was rejected by the Enquiry Officer on 06/02/1993. During enquiry, the petitioner has moved an application on 08/01/1993 praying for the engagement of a defence lawyer which was rejected by the Enquiry Officer on 06/02/1993. After the rejection of his application, the Enquiry Officer proceeded with the enquiry and recorded the statements of prosecution as well as the defence witnesses, wherein all the charges were found to be proved, except charges no.3 and 8, and accordingly, the enquiry report (Annexure P-7) was submitted on 18/11/1993 before the disciplinary authority, who, however, though concurred with the said report, but has shown his disagreement with regard to the finding in relation to charge no.8 and thereby, issued a show cause notice (Annexure P-6) vide its order dated 01/09/1994 as to why he should not be removed from his service and, the petitioner was accordingly called upon to submit his reply, who in turn, has submitted his reply (Annexure P-8) on 19/09/1994 denying all the charges as framed while detailing the circumstances how the case has been cooked up by Shri A.P. Shrivastava, the in-charge Additional District Judge, in order to victimize him. After considering the said reply, the disciplinary authority vide its order dated 23/09/1994 (Annexure P-9) has dismissed him from service without disqualification from future government employment which has been affirmed further by the appellate authority vide its order dated 13/12/1996 (Annexure P-11) in appeal preferred by him. 3. It was the contention of the petitioner that since the aforesaid orders have been passed without specifying any reasons in arriving to such a conclusion, in as much as, in violation of the principles of natural justice as the charge no.8 was found to be proved by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer without providing any opportunity of hearing in violation of the Rule 15(2) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1966”). Further contention of the petitioner is that during enquiry he had requested to engage a defence counsel but was refused, therefore, he has been denied the right of fair defence as after the refusal of his said request another application made for appointment of a co-worker was also rejected. It is alleged further that since none of the charges so framed were serious in nature, therefore, the capital punishment as awarded to him is liable to be set aside. 4. It is alleged further that since none of the charges so framed were serious in nature, therefore, the capital punishment as awarded to him is liable to be set aside. 4. While contesting the aforesaid contention of the petitioner, it is pleaded by the respondents that during the enquiry, the petitioner has not only cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, but has led the defence evidence as well, therefore, the order passed by the disciplinary authority on 23/09/1994 removing the petitioner from his service after holding the charges to be proved, in accordance with the provisions prescribed under Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966, affirmed in appeal by the appellate authority vide its order dated 13/12/1996, cannot be said to be passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is contended further that since the order as passed by the disciplinary authority on 23/09/1994 removing the petitioner from his service was found to be affirmed by the appellate authority in appeal preferred by him, therefore, the finding of fact as arrived therein is not liable to be interfered under writ jurisdiction as the judicial review is not an appeal from a decision taken by the authorities based upon the material available before it. It is contended further that a strict rule of Evidence Act is not applicable to the disciplinary proceedings and when the authority accepted the evidence led by both the parties then the Court/Tribunal is not empowered to act as an appellate authority while exercising its judicial review. Therefore, the alleged orders are not required to be interfered in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Insofar as the refusal of petitioner’s request to engage a legal practitioner is concerned, it is stated that since the presenting officer was not the legal practitioner, therefore, the alleged application of the petitioner has rightly been refused by the Enquiry Officer in view of the provisions prescribed under Rule14(8) of the Rules, 1966. 5. After considering the aforesaid contention of the parties and that by considering the charges framed, vis-à-vis, considering the active participation of the petitioner to the alleged enquiry proceedings, it was observed by the learned Single Judge that it cannot be said that the order of his termination has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, so as to hold to be a perverse one. The learned Single Judge held further that refusal of his request to engage a defence practitioner would not be sufficient to hold that the entire proceedings is vitiated particularly when he fully participated the same while examining the prosecution witnesses as well as by producing defence witnesses. In consequence, the order dated 23/09/1994 (Annexure P-9) passed by the disciplinary authority terminating him from the service, affirmed further by the appellate authority vide its order dated 13/12/1996 (Annexure P- 11) in appeal preferred by him do not call for any interference under the writ jurisdiction. The petition is accordingly dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 22/11/2019 which has been assailed by way of preferring this appeal. 6. Shri H.C. Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/appellant submits that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge holding that the order of petitioner’s termination has been passed while providing him sufficient and reasonable opportunity of hearing is apparently contrary to law. It is contended further that the petitioner has moved an application seeking to engage a defence counsel, but the same has been refused without taking into consideration the provisions prescribed under Rule 14(8) of the Rules, 1966 in its proper manner and, moreover, the Enquiry Officer was not the competent authority as per the said provision to entertain the said application, therefore, the refusal of his said application without placing the same before the disciplinary authority vitiates the entire proceedings and consequent upon its findings. It is contended further that since the original record of the enquiry proceeding was not available with the respondent authorities during the course of hearing, therefore, the alleged termination of the petitioner’s services as passed in absence thereof deserves to be quashed. Further contention of him is that the disciplinary authority has reversed the finding of the Enquiry Officer in relation to charge no.8 without following the procedure prescribed under Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966, therefore, the order as passed by the disciplinary authority on 23/09/1994 terminating the petitioner’s services, affirmed by the appellate authority vide its order dated 13/12/1996, is non est in the eye of law and deserves to be quashed. In support, he placed his reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab National Bank And Others Vs. In support, he placed his reliance upon the decisions rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab National Bank And Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 and also placed his reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of The Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay vs Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni & Others, reported in AIR 1983 S.C. 109 . 7. Shri Amrito Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondents while opposing the aforesaid contention submits that the alleged termination order has been passed strictly in accordance with the law as during enquiry, the petitioner has not only examined the respondents’ witnesses, but has led the evidence in defence as well, therefore, after providing sufficient and reasonable opportunity of hearing, the same has been passed, as such, it cannot be said to be passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. While inviting attention to the charges framed, which duly found to be proved, except the charge no.3, upon due and proper appreciation of the evidence led by both the parties, submitted that since the same are serious in nature, therefore, the petitioner has rightly been removed from the service upon following the due procedure of law as prescribed under the Rules, 1966. It is contended further that since the presenting officer was not the legal practitioner, therefore, there is no infirmity in the order dated 06/03/1993 passed by the Enquiry Officer rejecting his request to engage a defence counsel. Further of his contention is that after the refusal of his request as such, he actively participated the proceedings without being aggrieved with the same, therefore, he is not entitled to question the same after the conclusion of the entire proceedings as he is estopped from the principles of estoppel. Further of his contention is that after the refusal of his request as such, he actively participated the proceedings without being aggrieved with the same, therefore, he is not entitled to question the same after the conclusion of the entire proceedings as he is estopped from the principles of estoppel. It is contended further that although the original records were not available during the course of arguments, but merely on its non-production would not be sufficient to hold the entire proceedings as null and void as the petitioner has never questioned the same either in his reply to the alleged show cause notice, issued on 01/09/1994 (Annexure P-6), or in appeal (Annexure P-10) preferred against his termination order dated 23/09/1994 (Annexure P-9), or even at the time of filing of the writ petition, therefore, the ground as raised herein for the first time and that too at this appellate stage is nothing but the afterthought of the petitioner in order to get rid of the alleged charges somehow or the other. The appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed. In support, he placed his reliance upon the decisions, rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Chairman, State Bank of India and another Versus. M.J. James, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 301 . 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the entire record carefully. 9. The main questions which arise for determination in this appeal are :- (A) Whether rejection of his application, dated 08/01/1993 seeking to engage a defence lawyer vitiates the entire proceedings ? (B) Whether finding of the disciplinary authority holding the charge no.8 to be “proved” while disagreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer in this regard, has been arrived at in violation of Rule 15(2) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 ? (C) Whether order impugned could be held to be vitiated on nonproduction of record of enquiry proceedings during the course of arguments particularly when it was inspected by the counsel for the petitioner on 17/11/2011 ? 10. (C) Whether order impugned could be held to be vitiated on nonproduction of record of enquiry proceedings during the course of arguments particularly when it was inspected by the counsel for the petitioner on 17/11/2011 ? 10. Reference to Question A :- Before considering this question, it is necessary to re-produce the charges which read as under:- “Charge No.1 While you were posted as a document writer in the Court of 2nd Civil Judge Class-II, Mahasamund and on 11.12.1991 the Presiding Officer was on leave, you were called upon by 1st Civil Judge Class-II Shri N.S. Usendi for discharging some official work in his Court and you disobeying the command of Shri Usendi left the Court stating that you were proceeding on leave. But till 1 O'clock of 11.12.1991 your application for leave did not reach the office. Thus, you have willfully disobeyed the command of a Judicial Officer and have shown disrespect, lack of responsibility and also dereliction of duty which amounts to a misconduct under Rule 3 of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1965 (hereinunder referred as “the Rules of 1965”). Charge No.2 Presiding Officer, Najarat (Junior) Shri R.C.S. Samant, Civil Judge Class-I, Mahasamund, on 20.12.1991 at the request of Shri N. S.Usendi, 1st Civil Judge, Class-II, Mahasamund, sent you by an order in writing for recording evidence in his Court as Shri S.V.Verma, 2nd Civil Judge, Class-II, Mahasamund was on leave. The said written order was handed over to you on 20.12.1991 at 1.05 hours by Shri Basant Kumar, Process Server. But after reading the written order you crushed it with your hand and threw it on floor and told the Process Server to tell Mr. Usendi that you would not go. That immediately at 1.04 hour, on the false ground of being unwell, without proper sanction, you remained absent from duty. In this way also you have disobeyed the order of Judicial Officer and have shown lack of responsibility and dereliction of duty which amounts to violation of Rule-3 & 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. Charge No.3 Shri A. P. Shrivastava, Additional Judge to District Judge and Presiding Officer Najarat (Senior) Mahasamund sought explanation for remaining out of headquarter from 4 O'clock in the evening of 25.12.1991 without any permission of which the reply was to be given by 30.12.1991 but you till date have not given the reply. Charge No.3 Shri A. P. Shrivastava, Additional Judge to District Judge and Presiding Officer Najarat (Senior) Mahasamund sought explanation for remaining out of headquarter from 4 O'clock in the evening of 25.12.1991 without any permission of which the reply was to be given by 30.12.1991 but you till date have not given the reply. Thus, you have disobeyed the duties of a Judicial Officer as well as that of the Administrative Officer and the said act amounts to violation of Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965. Charge No.4 That on 01.04.1992, you had entrusted the work of copying to one Shri Jitendra Soni, a typist in the Bar, whereas the government work in different sections cannot be got done from outside persons. In this way you have done an act which is unbecoming of a government servant which amounts to misconduct under Rule 3 of the Rules of 1965. Charge No.5 That on 22.05.1992, you were handed over the Dak Book No.319 from the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund for releasing the copies free of charge on the copying application Nos.528/92, 529/92 & 530/92. You had initially put your signature on the said Dak Book and after receiving copying application No.528, 529 & 530 and the concerned copies, you tampered the signature by crossing the same and returned the Dak Book to the concerned Court. This act of yours again in one which is unbecoming of government employees. Thus, the same is violative of Rule-3 of the Rules of 1965. Charge No.6 That in the preliminary enquiry in respect of tampering of the signature by crossing the same in the Dak Book No.319 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund, you had misplaced the Dak Book from the Court of the Enquiry Officer. When the Enquiry Officer made certain oral enquiry in respect of your taking away the Dak Book from the Dais of the Enquiry Officer, you specifically denied of taking the same away. Thereafter, the Officer-in-charge, Copying Section, Mahasamund got the Almirah which was in your possession inspected and during the course of inspection, the Dak Book was recovered from the said Almirah. Thus, you had without any permission from the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund removed the Dak Book bearing No.319 with an intention of hiding the evidence and kept it in the Almirah under your possession. Thus, you had without any permission from the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund removed the Dak Book bearing No.319 with an intention of hiding the evidence and kept it in the Almirah under your possession. Thus, this act of your is again violative of Rule-3 of the Rules of 1965. Charge No.7 That on 29.05.1992 at around 10.15 a.m. you had misbehaved kicking the door of Najarat Section, Mahasamund without any reason. Charge No.8 That you had told Shri U. D. Lohani, Advocate Mahasamund that only on payment of Rs.10 per page he would give the copies to Shri Lohani. In the way, he tried to earn extra from the two copying applications and only receiving extra money you had released the copy to Shri Lohani and on other copying applications, on account of not getting extra money, you did not release the same.” 11. After framing of the aforesaid charges, the petitioner was asked to submit his reply vide order dated 16/11/1992 (Annexure P-3), who in turn, has submitted his reply (Annexure P-4) on 23/11/1992. Since, the said reply was not found to be satisfactory, the respondent authorities have decided to constitute a departmental enquiry and accordingly, Fourth Additional District Judge, Raipur was appointed as Enquiry Officer vide order dated 25/11/1992, while Second Deputy Clerk of Court, Raipur as a presenting officer. 12. During enquiry, the petitioner had moved an application on 08/01/1993 seeking to engage a defence lawyer and since the presenting officer was not a legal practitioner, therefore, his request was turned down vide order dated 06/02/1993 in view of the provisions prescribed under Rule 14(8) of the Rules, 1966. While questioning the same, the counsel for the petitioner has placed his reliance upon the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of The Board of Trustees (supra). We have gone through the said case law, but the principles laid down therein is, however, based upon different footing as in the said matter, the legal advisor and junior assistant legal advisor was appointed as presenting-cum-prosecuting officers and in that factual scenario, the entire proceedings, where the delinquent employee was refused to engage a defence lawyer, was held to be vitiated on account of violation of the principles of natural justice. No reliance, therefore, could be placed upon it, as in the instant matter, the petitioner after refusal of his said request, kept silent and instead of questioning the same has participated the enquiry proceedings thoroughly while examining the witnesses of the respondents and that by producing his own witnesses in defence, namely, Reshamlal Patel, Ramesh Dewangan and Thanuram on 07/07/1993 and, that apart, it appears further that after the completion of enquiry, he submitted his reply (Annexure P-5) before the Enquiry Officer on 15/07/1993 and, a bare perusal of it would show that he had not shown his dissatisfaction with regard to the refusal of his alleged request to engage a defence counsel, else it would have certainly been questioned by him immediately after the rejection of his said request. The petitioner has, thus, been estopped in questioning the same at such a later stage in view of the principles laid down recently by the Supreme Court in the matter of Chairman, State Bank Of India (supra), wherein it has been held at para 40 which reads as under :- “40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” 13. Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” 13. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case in hand, and that by considering the conduct of the petitioner, who having failed to assail the same at the relevant point of time and instead has questioned the same only when the alleged termination order (Annexure P-9) was passed by the disciplinary authority while preferring an appeal (Annexure P-10), therefore, it cannot be said that refusal of his alleged request was wrongly made so as to call for any interference in this appeal. The ground raised in this regard is, therefore, liable to be and is hereby rejected. 14. Reference to Question B :- Insofar as the disagreement of the disciplinary authority in relation to the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer vide its report (Annexure P-7) dated 18/11/1993 with regard to the charge no.8, which was found to be “not proved”, is concerned, we find force in the contention of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, as the same was found to be deferred without providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioner as required under sub-rule(2) of Rule 15 of the Rules, 1966. The Enquiry Officer after considering the evidence led by the parties has found all the alleged charges to be proved, except charges no.3 and 8 vide its report (Annexure P-7) dated 18/11/1993. The disciplinary authority, however, after considering the said report (Annexure P-7) has shown his disagreement with regard to the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer in relation to the charge no.8 while holding it to be “proved” and thereby, issued a show cause notice dated 01/09/1994 (Annexure P-6) to the petitioner in exercise of the powers provided under Rule 10(8) of the Rules, 1966 and, after considering the reply of the petitioner, filed on 19/09/1994 (Annexure P-8), the disciplinary authority has passed the order dated 23/09/1994 (Annexure P-9) directing for his removal from the service. 15. 15. What is, therefore, reflected that after the submission of the enquiry report, dated 18/11/1993, the disciplinary authority vide its alleged notice dated 01/09/1994 (Annexure P-6) has shown his disagreement with regard to the finding of the Enquiry Officer in relation to charge no.8 while holding it to be “proved” and thereby after considering the reply dated 19/09/1994 (Annexure P-8), submitted by the petitioner, with regard to the alleged show cause notice (Annexure P-6), has passed the order dated 23/09/1994 directing for his removal from the service. 16. It is, however, to be seen that the aforesaid disagreement of the disciplinary authority pertaining to the charge no.8 appears to have been made in violation of the provisions prescribed under sub-rule(2) of Rule 15 of the Rules, 1966. The said provision is relevant for the purpose which provides as under :- “15. Action on the inquiry report – (1) ……xxxx…. (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, records its reasons for such disagreement and record its own findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) ……xxxx ……” 17. From perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that if the disciplinary authority is disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer on any article of charge, he then, in such an eventuality, has to record its own reasonings and findings on such charge and before recording its findings of such disagreement, an opportunity was required to be given to the delinquent officer. The said observation is fortified by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Punjab National Bank (supra), wherein the pari materia provision prescribed under Rule 7(2) of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1977 was fell into consideration and it was observed at paragraphs 18 and 19 as under :- “18. ……….. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer's report and, while recording of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar's case (supra). 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 18. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer.” 18. In the light of the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the above referred matter, it is, thus, clear that an opportunity of hearing is required to be given to the delinquent employee, if the disciplinary authority is not satisfied with the finding of the Enquiry Officer which is recorded in his favour on any article of charge, before recording its own reasonings and findings. The finding of the disciplinary authority with regard to charge no.8 while disagreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, therefore, cannot be held to be sustainable in the eye of law. Consequently, the finding of the disciplinary authority in relation to charge no.8 is hereby set aside. Although, the finding of the disciplinary authority pertaining to charge no.8 has not been upheld, but, we are not inclined to remand the matter for its fresh decision on the said charge as other charges (except charges no.3 and 8), which are serious in nature, have duly been found to be proved by the disciplinary authority based upon the due enquiry which are, therefore, not required to be interferred in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. Reference to Question C :- Now, insofar as the contention of learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that non-availability of original record during the course of hearing would vitiate the entire proceedings, is concerned, we, however, do not find any force to it. It is to be seen at this juncture the averments made in the petition. According to which, it appears that the petitioner was not only aware regarding the entire enquiry proceedings, but has actively participated the same, while examining the prosecution witnesses as well as by producing the defence witnesses. It is to be seen at this juncture the averments made in the petition. According to which, it appears that the petitioner was not only aware regarding the entire enquiry proceedings, but has actively participated the same, while examining the prosecution witnesses as well as by producing the defence witnesses. It is to be seen further that vide letter dated 16/11/1992 (Annexure P-3), the petitioner was served with the copy of charge-sheet dated 14/11/1992, alongwith the list of all the documents and also the list of witnesses, and, the petitioner after examining the same, has submitted his reply (Annexure P-4) on 23/11/1992, while denying the charges framed against him and, it appears further that after holding an enquiry, the Enquiry Officer has submitted its report (Annexure P-7) on 18/11/1993 and a show cause notice (Annexure P-6) was thereafter issued to him on 01/09/1994 while supplying the copy of the said enquiry report (Annexure P-7) and was directed to furnish his reply within a period of 15 days and in pursuance thereof, reply (Annexure P-8) was submitted by him on 19/09/1994. It is to be noted at this stage that a bare perusal of the said reply would show that after referring to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, the same was given. Meaning thereby, the petitioner was acquainted with the evidence of all the witnesses and that was the reason why he has submitted his reply without raising the objection that all the materials are not available with him. The petitioner has, thus, possessed all the materials with him, including the deposition sheets of all the witnesses. Therefore, merely on non-production of the original record during the course of arguments would not be sufficient to hold that the entire proceedings would get vitiated as the petitioner has failed to prove that it has caused prejudice to him in any manner. 20. Therefore, merely on non-production of the original record during the course of arguments would not be sufficient to hold that the entire proceedings would get vitiated as the petitioner has failed to prove that it has caused prejudice to him in any manner. 20. Pertinently to be noted here further that during the pendency of the Writ Petition, an application, marked as I.A. No.4, was made by the counsel for the petitioner seeking for the inspection of the record of the departmental enquiry, as reflected from the order sheet dated 21/07/2011 and counsel for the respondents had raised no objection for inspection of the same as evident by the order sheet dated 14/11/2011 and, it appears further that the counsel for the petitioner was permitted to inspect the same on 17/11/2011 in the office of Additional Registrar (D.E.) during office hours. The order sheet, dated 14/11/2011 passed in the Writ Petition is relevant for the purpose which reads as under :- “Shri Agrawal submits that the respondents have no objection permitting the Petitioner to inspect the record, in the office of Additional Registrar (D.E.) on 17.11.2011 during office hours.” 21. In pursuance to the aforesaid order, the counsel for the petitioner, Shri H.C. Shukla had inspected the same on 17/11/2011. Relevant note sheet made on 17/11/2011 by the Additional Registrar (D.E.) which is relevant for the purpose reads as under :- “In compliance of order dated 14.11.2011 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh in Writ Petition No. 4835/1997, the records forwarded by the District & Sessions Judge, Raipur, vide their memo no. 3086/II-5-3/92 dated 12.09.2006, memo no. 822/II-5-3/92 dated 19.07.2011, and memo no. 838/II-5-3/92 dated 20.07.2011 and the file forwarded by High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, vide their memo no. A/1890/III-18- 223/94 (Raipur) dated 20.07.2011 were got perused to Shri H.C. Shukla, Counsel for the petitioner on 17.11.2011 from 12.00 P.M. to 2.30 P.M.” 22. From perusal of the aforesaid order sheet, vis-a-vis, the note sheet dated 17/11/2011, it is evident that the concerned record of the enquiry proceedings was inspected by the counsel for the petitioner on 17/11/2011, yet he is harping that the entire enquiry proceeding would get vitiated for its non-production without disclosing the aforesaid material facts. The order impugned upholding the enquiry proceedings, therefore, cannot be held to be doubtful, as alleged herein by the counsel for the appellant. 23. The order impugned upholding the enquiry proceedings, therefore, cannot be held to be doubtful, as alleged herein by the counsel for the appellant. 23. In view of the aforesaid background, the appeal being devoid of merits is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to cost(s).