ORDER : 1. This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed seeking the following relief: “........issue a Wirt or order preferably in the nature of Writ of Mandamus and after calling for records pertaining to the impugned Proceedings/Order Order No. NITW/BOG/59/2023/155 dated 17-4-23 passed by 1st Respondent declare the same as illegal, arbitrary, contrary to law and without power or jurisdiction and unconstitutional and consequently quash the same as such and consequently declare the very Charge Memo No NITW/DIR/GBS/2020/79/306 dated 24-6-20 issued by the 2nd Respondent as illegal, without power or jurisdiction, and contrary to Sec.17 sub Section 17 of the First Statutes of the National Institutions of Technology Act as till date no disciplinary powers as contemplated above was decided by the Board of the governors of the NIT Warangal and consequently quash the same as such and consequently quash the illegal punishment orders of Compulsory Retirement imposed by the 2nd Respondent vide Memorandum No NITW/DIR/GBS/2735 dated 13-10-2022, as contrary to law and unconstitutional and wholly without power or jurisdiction, and consequently quash the same as such and consequently quash all the impugned orders issued by 1st and 2nd Respondents as illegal, arbitrary, contrary to law and unconstitutional and consequently quash the same as such and consequently declare that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated into service with all consequential benefits like, continuity of service, arrears of pay and salary, seniority and promotion and to pass......” 2. Heard Dr. K. Lakshmi Narasimha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri T. Mahender Rao, learned Standing Counsel for National Institute of Technology, appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, appearing for respondent No. 3. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that while the petitioner was working as a Senior Assistant in the respondent Institution, a charge memo was issued to him on 24.06.2020, containing certain allegations against the petitioner. As per Section 17(4) of the National Institutes of Technology Act, 2012, the power to handle such matters is vested on the Board of Governors. Therefore, respondent No. 2 lacks the jurisdiction to initiate any disciplinary action, much less, to impose any punishments. Further, according to the petitioner’s knowledge, respondent No. 2 was not empowered with such authority, and no notification to that effect was ever issued or published. Therefore, respondent No. 2 lacks the jurisdiction to initiate any disciplinary action, much less, to impose any punishments. Further, according to the petitioner’s knowledge, respondent No. 2 was not empowered with such authority, and no notification to that effect was ever issued or published. As a result, the very issuance of the charge memo itself is deemed illegal as respondent No. 2 acted beyond his power or jurisdiction. 4. He further submits that the petitioner submitted his explanation to the charge memo, denying all the charges. However, without examining the said explanation, respondent No. 2 promptly ordered an enquiry, indicating the biased behavior of the Management and inimical attitude of the Director as well as the Registrar toward the petitioner, who is a whistleblower. Further, only two out of the six charges framed against the petitioner, namely Articles I and III, were held proved by the Enquiry Officer and the said charges were not based on any complaint but solely on a fictitious confidential report submitted by one Mr. Neelakanteswar Rao. The witnesses examined by the NIT also contradicted the allegations, claiming that the confidential report of Mr. Neelakanteswar Rao’s imagination. Thus, the entire enquiry is deemed as a sham process, instigated due to the biased attitudes of the respondents and the Registrar concerned. Further, based on the enquiry report dated 12.08.2022, respondent No. 2 imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement from service vide proceedings No. NITW/Viz./GBS/2020/2 dated 13.10.2022, and the same is contrary to the NIT Rules and also in violation of the principles of natural justice. Moreover, the imposition of the said punishment is deemed disproportionate to the proven charges, as they are not so grave to attract the major punishment of compulsory retirement from service. Hence, the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority did not apply their minds while imposing or composing the punishment. 5. He further contends that aggrieved by the punishment order dated 13.10.2023, the petitioner preferred an appeal before respondent No. 1 i.e. the Board of Governors. Further, the term of the Director ended on 27.10.2022, and the Director’s appointment is governed by the Act and Statute. According to Statute 17(1) of the First Statue of NITs, the Director of an Institute must be appointed by the Visitor based on the recommendations of a Selection Committee constituted by Him and in accordance with the prescribed terms and conditions of service. According to Statute 17(1) of the First Statue of NITs, the Director of an Institute must be appointed by the Visitor based on the recommendations of a Selection Committee constituted by Him and in accordance with the prescribed terms and conditions of service. Further, as per Statute 17(2) of the First Statute, the term of a Director is limited to five years, with no provision in the Act and Statute for extension of his tenure. The appointment of a Director is outlined in Schedule A of the Statute, and there is no provision for extending the Director’s term. Thus, the so-called order of extension of the term of the Director, dated 27.10.2022, is not valid as it goes against the Act and Statute. Consequently, respondent No. 2 cannot assume the role of the Director of the Institution based on that order as the same was only an officiating arrangement. He further contends that respondent No. 2, who passed the original order of compulsory retirement, has also participated as an appellate authority in the petitioner's appeal, essentially acting as a judge over his own orders and dismissed the appeal without providing any reasons. Therefore, the entire action is vitiated by pure malafides, lack of application of mind, bias, and the same is also in violation of principles of natural justice. 6. Learned counsel further contends that Charges I and III do not amount to misconduct, as there are no allegations of corruption against the petitioner. Even assuming these charges to be true, they do not constitute misconduct. Further, warning the contractors not to indulge in any illegal activities like bribery, cannot be construed as misconduct under the CCA Rules or NIT Regulations. Therefore, learned counsel prays this Court to pass appropriate orders in the present writ petition. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied on the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan, (1989) 3 SCC 132 , V.C. Banaras Hindu University v. Shrikant, (2006) 11 SCC 42 and Sayunkta Sangarsh Samiti v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC Online SC 1684. 7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that respondent No. 2, being the appointing authority, has got the inherent powers of the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss/remove/reduce the rank of the petitioner herein. 7. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submits that respondent No. 2, being the appointing authority, has got the inherent powers of the Disciplinary Authority to dismiss/remove/reduce the rank of the petitioner herein. For Group A employees of the Institution, the Board of Governors i.e. respondent No. 1 herein, serves as the Appointing Authority. Since the Board of Governors, being a collective body, cannot conduct disciplinary action, Statue No. 17(17) enables the Board to delegate its disciplinary powers for institution of disciplinary action against the employees for whom the Board is the appointing authority, i.e. Group A Employees. Therefore, the Director i.e. respondent No. 2, being the appointing authority in the case of the petitioner, has the inherent powers of the Disciplinary Authority by virtue of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965. Hence, no separate decision of the Board is required for taking action against the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner had accepted the Charge Sheet issued by respondent No. 2 and after conducting an enquiry, the punishment of compulsory retirement from service was imposed upon him. However, the petitioner raised the issue of competency of the Director i.e. respondent No. 2, in imposing the penalty only after his appeal was rejected by the Board of Governors i.e. respondent No. 1, which is not based on any logic or reasoning. 8. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965. Hence, the same is a valid one, whereby, two charges leveled against the petitioner i.e. Charges I and III, were held proved, while Charge II was not proven. Charges IV, V and VI were not enquired into by the enquiry officer on the ground that the documentary evidence No. 11 i.e. Video message of the Charged Officer on WhatsApp stored in the USB drive was not available. Further, respondent No. 2, vide letter dated 25.08.2022, has forwarded the enquiry report to the petitioner granting the petitioner 15 days to submit his representation, if any, on the enquiry report, and the petitioner has also availed this opportunity and submitted a representation on 09.09.2022. Further, the disciplinary authority has considered this representation before imposing the penalty as stipulated under the CCS (CC&A) Rules. Further, the disciplinary authority has considered this representation before imposing the penalty as stipulated under the CCS (CC&A) Rules. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that concurring with the enquiry report before communication to the petitioner is biased is deemed incorrect and incomprehensible. 9. He further submits that the since the position of Chairperson of the Board of Governors is vacant, respondent No. 2 carried out the functions of the Chairperson. The Board of Governors i.e. respondent No. 1, in its 59th meeting held on 24.02.2023, had considered the appeal of the petitioner. During the meeting, six members were present, including two representatives from the Ministry of Education, Government of India; one member from the IIT, Hyderabad; two members from the Institute; and the Director (respondent No. 2). The Board collectively considered the appeal of the petitioner and has unanimously decided to reject it, providing detailed reasons. Therefore, the decision of the Board is valid. 10. Learned Standing Counsel further contends that the petitioner himself admitted the fact that Professor N.V. Ramana Rao was appointed as the Director of NIT Warangal for a period of five years after obtaining the approval of the Hon’ble President of India, in his capacity as the Visitor of NITs. The appointment was preceded by due process of selection. Consequent upon completion of the five-year term, with the approval of the competent authority i.e. the Ministry of Education, Government of India, respondent No. 3, vide his Order No. 35-2/2021-TS.III dated 27.10.2022, has assigned the temporary charge of the post of Director for six months beyond the term or until appointment of regular Director, whichever is earlier. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the Director was terminated and the extension of the tenure of respondent No. 2 as the Director, is contrary to the Act and Statutes, is irrelevant to the matter under question. Furthermore, the contention of the petitioner that the Director acted as a judge of his own order is incorrect, as the Board of Governors, i.e. respondent No. 1 herein, unanimously decided to reject the appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 17.04.2023 by giving cogent and valid reasons. Hence, the action of respondent No. 2 in imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement vide order dated 13.10.2022, and also confirming the same in the appeal, are proportionate to the proven charges and are highly justified. Hence, the action of respondent No. 2 in imposing the punishment of compulsory retirement vide order dated 13.10.2022, and also confirming the same in the appeal, are proportionate to the proven charges and are highly justified. Therefore, learned Standing Counsel prays this Court to dismiss the present writ petition. In support of his contentions, learned Standing Counsel relied on a decision of the full Bench of this Court in K. Swarna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 (2) ALD 585 . 11. This Court has taken note of the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties. 12. A perusal of the record discloses that while the petitioner was working as a Senior Assistant in the respondent Institution, respondent No. 2 has issued a Charge Sheet to the petitioner on 24.06.2020, outlining six Articles of Charges against him. In response to the same, the petitioner has submitted his explanations on 29.06.2020 and 23.07.2020, denying the said charges and requested for documents. As respondent No. 2 was not convinced by the explanations submitted by the petitioner, an enquiry officer was appointed vide order dated 17.11.2020, to enquire the charges leveled against the petitioner. After conducting the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted the enquiry report vide letter dated 12.08.2022, holding that two charges, i.e. Charges I and III, as proven, while Charge II was held not proven. Further, the remaining charges, i.e. Charges IV, V and VI were dropped. For better appreciation of the case on hand, it is relevant to refer the Charges I and III, which were held proved in the enquiry, and the same are extracted hereunder: “Article I: Shri G. Balasubramanyam, Assistant (SG-I), Department of Biotechnology has interfered in the working of the Engineering & Maintenance Unit and thereby behaved in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant. By the aforesaid act, Shri G. Balasubramanyam has violated Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Article III: That the aforesaid Shri Balasubramanyam made baseless allegations against the Executive Engineer (Civil), Engineering & Maintenance Unit that he demanded Rs.50,000/- as bribe from the friend of Shri Balasubramanyam. By the aforesaid act, Shri Balasubramanyam has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby violated Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” 13. By the aforesaid act, Shri Balasubramanyam has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby violated Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” 13. A bare reading of the above two charges would indicate that though they had been held proved in the enquiry, the same are no so grave to attract a major punishment of compulsory retirement from service. It is incumbent on the disciplinary authority to apply its mind while deciding the quantum of punishment, as there are two layers of punishment under the Rules that may be imposed on a charged officer depending on the seriousness of the charges. 14. The main contention of the petitioner is that the Direction who has issued the charge sheet dated 24.06.2020, is not competent or authorized to take any disciplinary action. Here, it is appropriate to refer to Section 17 of the National Institutes of Technology Act, 2012, which is extracted hereunder: “17. Director and Deputy Director: (1) The Director of an Institute shall be appointed by the Visitor, on such terms and conditions of service and on the recommendations of a Selection Committee constituted by him in such manner, as may be prescribed by the Statutes. (2) The Director shall be the principal academic and executive officer of the Institute and shall be responsible for the proper administration of the Institute and for the imparting of instruction and maintenance of discipline therein. (3) The Director shall submit annual reports and accounts to the Board. (4) The Director shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by this Act or the Statutes or Ordinances.” According to Section 17(4), the Director of the Institute has to carry out all the responsibilities given to him by the Act, Statutes, or Ordinances. However, this Section did not give the Director the authority to act as a disciplinary authority. 15. Further, it is also refer to Section 24 of the National Institutes of Technology Act, 2012, which is extracted hereunder: “24. However, this Section did not give the Director the authority to act as a disciplinary authority. 15. Further, it is also refer to Section 24 of the National Institutes of Technology Act, 2012, which is extracted hereunder: “24. Appointments - All appointments of the staff of every Institute, except that of the Director, shall be made in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Statutes, by: (a) the Board, if the appointment is made on the academic staff in the post of Lecturer or above or if the appointment is made on the non-academic staff in any cadre the maximum of the pay scale for which exceeds rupees ten thousand five hundred. (b) the Director, in any other case.” It is evident from Section 24(b) that the Director is the authority person to appoint the petitioner in the respondent University. It is important to note that the appointing authority typically has the authority to take any disciplinary action. However, since the respondent Institute is governed by the NIT Act, which is a special Act, it is exempt from the general Rules. Moreover, the NIT Act is vague about who was granted the authority to initiate disciplinary action. 16. It is also relevant to refer to Statute 17 of the First Statute (Amended) of NITs, which deals with the powers of a Director, and Statute 17(17) is extracted hereunder: “(17) The disciplinary powers for Director of the Institute shall be decided by the Board of Governors of the respective National Institute of Technology from time to time.” A close reading of the above Statute reveals that respondent No. 2 cannot initiate any disciplinary action, much less impose any punishments, unless and until the Board of Governors decides on his disciplinary powers. In this regard, the petitioner has unequivocally asserted that respondent No. 2 was not granted any disciplinary powers and that the Board of Governors never issued any notification to that effect. Admittedly, the counter affidavit filed by the respondents is also silent regarding delegation of any disciplinary powers to respondent No. 2 by way of a notification. The respondents contended that Article 311 of the Indian Constitution gives the appointing authority the inherent jurisdiction to act as a disciplinary authority, and they can accordingly dismiss, remove, or lower the rank of the petitioner without the need for a separate decision of the Board. The respondents contended that Article 311 of the Indian Constitution gives the appointing authority the inherent jurisdiction to act as a disciplinary authority, and they can accordingly dismiss, remove, or lower the rank of the petitioner without the need for a separate decision of the Board. However, in view of Statute 17(17) of the First Statute (Amended) of NITs, the aforementioned contention of the respondents cannot be accepted in the absence of any notification delegating such disciplinary powers to respondent No. 2. Therefore, since the charge memo was issued by respondent No. 2 without authority or jurisdiction, the very issuance of the same is illegal. 17. In Marathwada University’s case (referred supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the power to regulate the work and conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal, and that when the Act mandates a specific body to exercise a particular power, it must be fulfilled by that body only, and the said power cannot be exercised by others, unless specifically delegated. Additionally, it is held that any action taken without authority has no legal validity, and that the statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred on it. The relevant portion of the said decision is extracted hereunder: “20. Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power of the Vice-Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of officers of the University implies as well, the power to take disciplinary action against officers. We are unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate the work and conduct of officers cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly, the Act confers power to appoint officers on the Executive Council and it generally includes the power to remove. This power is located under Section 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the Vice-Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive Council. It is a settled principle that when the Act prescribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only by that body. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegation. ............. 27. These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegation. ............. 27. These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.” 18. In V.C. Banaras Hindu University’s case (referred supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows: “21. The Executive Council, the Vice-Chancellor or any other authority, who are creatures of the Statutes, must act within the four corners thereof. They were also required to follow the procedure laid down for initiation of a disciplinary proceeding against an employee. 22. Where a matter is covered by one or other clauses contained in Section 17 or 18 of the Act any modification/amendment/substitution thereof was required to be carried out strictly in the manner laid down thereunder. We have noticed hereinbefore that the Statue and the Ordinance not only deal with the manner in which the recruitment of a faculty member is to be carried out, but also lay down the terms and conditions of services, the manner in which the proceeding for commission of misconduct by a delinquent officer was to be initiated and the punishments imposed. It was, therefore, improper on the part of the authorities including the Executive Council to create a new punishment or create a new exit door for the employees to throw them out of the services of the University. It is in that sense that the purported circulars issued by the Registrar in terms of the purported resolutions adopted in the meetings of the Executive Council or otherwise must be held to be ultra vires. It will bear repetition to state what can be the subject-matters of the executive instructions issued under Section 10 of the Act must be those in respect whereof no specific provision exists in the Act e.g. Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. ............. 41. Although, laying down a provision providing for deemed abandonment from service may be permissible in law, it is not disputed that an action taken thereunder must be fair and reasonable so as to satisfy the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ............. 41. Although, laying down a provision providing for deemed abandonment from service may be permissible in law, it is not disputed that an action taken thereunder must be fair and reasonable so as to satisfy the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. If the action taken by the authority is found to be illogical in nature and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, the same cannot be sustained. Statutory authority may pass an order which may otherwise be bona fide, but the same cannot be exercised in an unfair or unreasonable manner. The respondent has shown before use that his leave had been sanctioned by the Director being the Head of the Department in terms of the Leave Rules. It was the Director/Head of the Department who could sanction the leave. Even the matter relating to grant of permission for his going abroad had been recommended by the Director. The respondent states, and if had not been controverter, that some other doctor was given the charge of his duties. We have indicated sufficiently that the Vice-Chancellor posed unto himself a wrong question. A wrong question leads to a wrong answer. When the statutory authority exercises its statutory powers either in ignorance of the procedure prescribed in law or while deciding the matter takes into consideration irrelevant or extraneous matters not germane therefor, he misdirects himself in law. In such an event, an order of the statutory authority must be held to be vitiated in law. It suffers from an error or law. 42. Such an error of law is capable of being rectified by judicial review. Reasonableness in the order and/or fairness in the procedure indisputably can also be gone into by the writ court.” 19. In view of the above made discussion, this Court is of the opinion that respondent No. 2 lacks the authority and jurisdiction to take any disciplinary action against the petitioner in the absence of an order issued by respondent No. 1 delegating the disciplinary authority to respondent No. 2 in accordance with the provisions of the NIT Act, 2012. Therefore, both the impugned charge sheet dated 24.06.2020, and the punishment order dated 13.10.2022 suffer from lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, the citation relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for respondents, is of no avail to him. 20. Therefore, both the impugned charge sheet dated 24.06.2020, and the punishment order dated 13.10.2022 suffer from lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, the citation relied on by the learned Standing Counsel for respondents, is of no avail to him. 20. The record further discloses that the petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No. 1 i.e. Board of Governors, on being aggrieved by the original punishment order dated 13.10.2022. Admittedly, the Director i.e. respondent No. 2, who issued the original punishment order, himself acted as the In-charge Chairman of the Board, participated in the deliberations, and passed the ratification order in the appeal. It is pertinent to mention that respondent No. 2 was appointed as the Director of NIT Warangal for a period of five years, and his tenure as the Director concluded on 27.10.2022. According to the respondents, the tenure of respondent No. 2 as the Director was extended for a period of six months. However, neither the NIT Act nor the NIT Statutes provide for the extension of the Director’s tenure. Therefore, it can be assumed that the alleged extension of his tenure is merely an officiating arrangement rather than a true extension. As such, respondent No. 2 is not authorized to preside over the proceedings of the petitioner’s appeal. Furthermore, even though the respondents specifically contended that the decision of the Board was unanimous, it is a well-settled law that an individual cannot preside as a judge over his own orders. As such, this Court is of the view that the order of the appellate authority is utterly in violation of principles of natural justice, and the same is per se illegal. Therefore, this Court deems it fit and proper to set aside the same. 21. In the light of the above made discussion, the impugned punishment order vide proceedings No. NITW/Vig/GBS-2020/2735 dated 13.10.2022 passed by respondent No. 2, and its subsequent ratification order vide proceedings No. NITW/BoG/59/2023/155 dated 17.04.2023 passed by respondent No. 1, are hereby set aside. 22. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits. 23. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed. No costs.