JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Bhup Chandra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Aniruddha Kumar Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate-I for the State. 2. In view of the order proposed to be passed, the notices to opposite party Nos.3 and 4 are hereby dispensed with. 3. By means of this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has prayed for quashing/ setting aside the order dated 11.01.2024 passed in S.T. No.54 of 2021 (State vs. Avdhesh) by the learned Special Judge, POCSO Act, / Additional Sessions Judge, Room No.12, Sultanpur relating to Case Crime No.136 of 2019, under Sections 363 & 366 I.P.C. and Section 16/17 of POCSO Act, Police Station-Kamrauli, District-Amethi, so far as it relates to the present petitioner, as well as the entire criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner may kindly be terminated. 4. Attention has been drawn towards Annexure No.2 of the petition which is F.I.R. registered against the petitioner bearing Case Crime No.136 of 2019, under Sections 363 & 366 I.P.C. and Section 16/17 of POCSO Act, Police Station-Kamrauli, District-Amethi and the petitioner has been granted bail in the aforesaid case crime number. Thereafter, the investigation was completed and the charge-sheet was filed under those sections but during the course of trial, the prosecution has filed an application before the court after examination of the testimony of the prosecutrix to the effect that on the basis of such testimony section 3/4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO) and Section 376 I.P.C. should be added. However, objection has been filed on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that earlier the prosecutrix has not supported the prosecution version while recording her statement under Sections 161 Cr.P.C. & 164 Cr.P.C. and authenticity of those statements may not be ignored. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this court towards the dictum of Apex Court rendered in the case in re: P. Kartikalakshmi vs. Sri Ganesh and another reported in (2017) 3 SCC 347 wherein the Apex Court has observed that the powers of Section 216 Cr.P.C. may not be invoked on the application of the prosecution or the defence but the court while invoking powers under Section 216 Cr.P.C. should apply its judicious mind and must consider the relevant facts, circumstances and evidences available on record. Therefore, the impugned order dated 11.01.2024 whereby the court added Sections 376 I.P.C. and 3/4 of POCSO Act on the application of the prosecution filed under Section 216 Cr.P.C. The Apex Court in the case in re: P. Kartikalakshmi (supra) in paras-6, 7 & 8 held as under:- "6. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, we find force in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 1. Section 216 CrPC empowers the Court to alter or add any charge at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is now well settled that the power vested in the Court is exclusive to the Court and there is no right in any party to seek for such addition or alteration by filing any application as a matter of right. It may be that if there was an omission in the framing of the charge and if it comes to the knowledge of the Court trying the offence, the power is always vested in the Court, as provided under Section 216 CrPC to either alter or add the charge and that such power is available with the Court at any time before the judgment is pronounced. It is an enabling provision for the Court to exercise its power under certain contingencies which comes to its notice or brought to its notice. In such a situation, if it comes to the knowledge of the Court that a necessity has arisen for the charge to be altered or added, it may do so on its own and no order need to be passed for that purpose. After such alteration or addition when the final decision is rendered, it will be open for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law. 7. We were taken through Sections 221 and 222 CrPC in this context. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are only concerned with Section 216 CrPC. We, therefore, do not propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of the facts involved in this case, we are only concerned with Section 216 CrPC. We, therefore, do not propose to examine the implications of the other provisions to the case on hand. We wish to confine ourselves to the invocation of Section 216 and rest with that. In the light of our conclusion that the power of invocation of Section 216 CrPC is exclusively confined with the Court as an enabling provision for the purpose of alteration or addition of any charge at any time before pronouncement of the judgment, we make it clear that no party, neither de facto complainant nor the accused or for that matter the prosecution has any vested right to seek any addition or alteration of charge, because it is not provided under Section 216 CrPC. If such a course to be adopted by the parties is allowed, then it will be well-nigh impossible for the criminal court to conclude its proceedings and the concept of speedy trial will get jeopardised. 8. In such circumstances, when the application preferred by the appellant itself before the trial court was not maintainable, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to pass an order under Section 216 CrPC. Therefore, there was no question of the said order being revisable under Section 397 CrPC. The whole proceeding, initiated at the instance of the appellant, was not maintainable. Inasmuch as the legal issue had to be necessarily set right, we are obliged to clarify the law as is available under Section 216 CrPC. To that extent, having clarified the legal position, we make it clear that the whole proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellant was thoroughly misconceived and vitiated in law and ought not to have been entertained by the trial court. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 1, such a course adopted by the appellant and entertained by the court below has unnecessarily provided scope for protraction of the proceedings which ought not to have been allowed by the court below." (emphasis supplied) 6. Per contra, Sri Aniruddha Kumar Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate-I has submitted that learned counsel for the petitioner has placed appropriate judgment before this Court but the facts and circumstances of the present case are different from the case which was considered by the Apex Court. Per contra, Sri Aniruddha Kumar Singh, learned Additional Government Advocate-I has submitted that learned counsel for the petitioner has placed appropriate judgment before this Court but the facts and circumstances of the present case are different from the case which was considered by the Apex Court. In the present case, the learned trial court has neither considered an application of the prosecution nor objection of the defence but has applied its judicious mind considering the testimony of the prosecutrix indicating her statement in the impugned order dated 11.01.2024, therefore, the benefit of the judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case in re: P. Kartikalakshmi (supra) may not be provided to the petitioner in the present case. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record and having regard to the judgment of Apex Court rendered in the case in re: P. Kartikalakshmi (supra), I find that while passing the impugned order dated 11.01.2024, the learned trial court has rightly considered the testimony of the prosecutrix whereby she has stated on oath before the court during the course of trial that the petitioner has committed offence of rape when she was below eighteen years. 8. In Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2004) 5 SCC 347 , the Apex Court while dealing with scope of Section 216 Cr.P.C, in para-10 has held as under:- "10. Therefore, if during trial the trial court on a consideration of broad probabilities of the case based upon total effect of the evidence and documents produced is satisfied that any addition or alteration of the charge is necessary, it is free to do so, and there can be no legal bar to appropriately act as the exigencies of the case warrant or necessitate." 9. Therefore, in view of what has been considered above, I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order dated 11.01.2024 passed by the learned trial court but it is needless to say that the petitioner after surrendering/ appearing before the court concerned may take all pleas and grounds which are available to him to establish himself as innocent in those sections. He may also apprise the court concerned that in the F.I.R. and the charge-sheet, which has been filed by the Investigating Officer, the petitioner has already been granted bail, therefore, in added sections his bail application may be considered leniently. 10. In view of the above, the instant petition is disposed of finally at the admission stage. Before parting with, I appreciate the efforts and research work done by Mr. Piyush Tripathi, Research Associate, attached with me and Mr. Vaibhav Tyagi, Law Intern in finding out the relevant case laws applicable in the present case.