ORDER : 1. The contempt petitioner herein has filed this contempt case under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 alleging willful disobedience of the order passed by this Court dated 28-8-2018 in FAM No.191/2018 (Sheetal Patil v. Sandeep Patil) by which the effect and operation of the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court in favour of the contemnor herein dated 16-7-2018, was stayed. 2. The case of the contempt petitioner is that the contemnor herein has willfully disobeyed the order dated 28-8-2018 passed by this Court and performed second marriage on 25-4-2019 for which he deserves to be punished under the aforesaid constructional provision read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 3. The contemnor has refuted the allegation of willful disobedience of the order of this Court and took a defence that though the order was passed on 28-8-2018, but it was only up-till the next date of hearing and on the next date of hearing i.e. 25-9-2018, this Court did not continue the stay order dated 28-8-2018 and in fact, the interim order was in existence from 28-8-2018 and from 25-9-2018, it is not in existence, whereas the second marriage has been performed on 25-4-2019 and therefore there is no willful disobedience of the order of the Court and the contemnor deserves to be discharged. 4. The petitioner and the respondents have lead evidence in support of their respective cases. 5. Mr. Parag Kotecha, learned counsel appearing for the contempt petitioner, would submit that the respondent has willfully disobeyed the order of this Court dated 28-8-2018 and performed second marriage on 25-4-2019, which amounts to willful disobedience and disregard of the order of this Court and which constitutes civil contempt under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and therefore he deserves to be punished. 6. Mr. C.R. Sahu, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, would submit that the interim order dated 28-8-2018 was not continued on the next of hearing and therefore there is no willful disobedience of the order of the Court and as such, the rule issued deserves to be discharged and the contempt case deserves to be closed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival contentions cautiously and perused the records thoroughly. 8. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival contentions cautiously and perused the records thoroughly. 8. The Court after hearing the parties framed following charge on 18-7- 2023: - CHARGE You Mr. Sandeep Patil, S/o Chandralal Patil, R/o Ramnagar, Motipur, Ward No.8, Tahsil & Dist. Rajnandgaon are charged as below: - “This Court passed order on 28-8-2018 in FAM No.191 of 2018 staying the effect and operation of the impugned decree of divorce. Thereafter, the counsel marked appearance on your behalf on 25.09.2018 and subsequently, the interim order was continued on 22.02.2019 and it is still in operation. However, without leave of the court, you have performed second marriage on 25-4-2019, which amounts to willful disobedience and disregard of the order passed by this Court, thereby committed contempt punishable under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 and the Court proposes to try you for the same.” 9. It is not in dispute that the Family Court, Rajnandgaon in Civil Suit No.71A/17 (Sandeep Patil v. Sheetal Patil) granted decree of divorce in favour of the respondent herein – Sandeep Patil and against the contempt petitioner herein – Sheetal Patil dissolving the marriage by judgment and decree dated 16-7-2018 against which the contempt petitioner filed FAM No.191/2018 in which a Division Bench of this Court passed order on 28-8-2018 directing that till the next date of hearing, there shall be stay of the effect and operation of the impugned judgment and decree. The matter came up for hearing on 25-9-2018, but the interim order was not continued, however, thereafter, on 22-2-2019, it was directed that till final hearing, interim order passed earlier shall continue. 10. It is well settled that before a proceeding for contempt can succeed, it is of paramount importance to establish first, the service of the order of the Court said to have been disobeyed upon the person alleged to have committed contempt thereof, secondly the precise act of contempt, thirdly the precise responsibility of the contemnor in the act of contempt and fourthly the date of the alleged contempt being subsequent to the service of the order said to have been disobeyed. These are the four indispensable requisites and failure to establish any one of them must mean dismissal of the petition for contempt. 11. These are the four indispensable requisites and failure to establish any one of them must mean dismissal of the petition for contempt. 11. In the matter of Hoshiar Singh and another v. Gurbachan Singh and others : AIR 1962 SC 1089 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have authoritatively held that judgment or order should be served on the party against whom the order is granted and person cannot be held guilty of the contempt, if the order is not served to him and he had no knowledge about the order, it said to have been disobeyed and summarized the legal position as under: “The judgment or order should be served on the party personally, except in the following cases: (1) prohibitive orders, the drawing up of which is not completed; (2) orders embodying an undertaking to do an act by a named day; (3) orders to answer interrogatories or for discovery or inspection of documents; (4) where an order for substituted service has been made; (5) where the respondent has evaded service of the order ……….. In order to justify committal for breach of a prohibitive order it is not necessary that the order should have been served upon the party against whom it has been granted, if it be proved that he had notice of the order aliunde, as by telegram, or newspaper, report, or otherwise, and knew that it was intended to be enforced, or if he consented to the order, or if he was present in Court when the order was pronounced, or when the motion was made, although he left before the order was pronounced. The question of obedience or disobedience arises only after the party knows of the order and if the party does not know of the order and if the party does not know the order, no such question can arise.” 12. In the matter of The Aligarh Municipal Board and others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and others : AIR 1970 SC 1767 , the Supreme Court has categorically held that in order to bring home a charge of contempt of Court for disobeying its order, the complainant must prove that contemnors had knowledge of the order complained of beyond reasonable doubt. Paragraph eight of the report states as under:- “8. Paragraph eight of the report states as under:- “8. … In order to bring home a charge of contempt of court for disobeying orders of Courts those who assert that the alleged contemnors had knowledge of the order must prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. As observed earlier it is of course not necessary to prove formal service of the order by official routine and knowledge of the exact order aliunde would suffice. In case of doubt, however, benefit ought to go to the person charged.” 13. Thus, in light of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that proceedings in the contempt are nature of quasi judicial proceeding, it must be proved beyond doubt that the contemnors had knowledge of order passed by the Court to bring home the charge of contempt under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 14. Now, in light of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Hoshiar Singh (supra), it is quite vivid that the contempt petitioner has to establish that the respondent contemnor herein had knowledge of the order and this fact has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. A careful perusal of the order dated 28-8-2018, which is said to have been willfully disobeyed by the contemnor herein, would reveal that it is an ex parte order in which the contemnor was not present as it was the first date of hearing after preferring appeal by the contempt petitioner herein and in the meanwhile, he was noticed and thereafter, on 25-9-2018, learned counsel for the contemnor appeared and sought time in appeal. As such, it is the case of the contempt petitioner that since learned counsel for the respondent/contemnor sought time to file reply, the order dated 28-8-2018 was in the knowledge of the respondent herein/contemnor personally and thus, by performing second marriage on 25-4-2019, the respondent herein/contemnor has willfully disobeyed the order of this Court. 15. The issue is no longer res integra. 15. The issue is no longer res integra. In the matter of Suresh and others v. Imran Khan and others : 1995 Supp (3) SCC 306, the case before the Supreme Court was, injunction order was not served on the litigant but served on his lawyer, no evidence was produced showing that the lawyer had communicated the order to the litigant and in absence of evidence showing that litigant was aware of the prohibitory order, their Lordships concluded that it cannot be held that that the litigant had committed willful breach of the order or acted contrary to or showed disrespect to the order. Their Lordships in paragraph 2 of the report answered the issue as under: - “2. The proceedings in contempt are in the nature of quasi-criminal proceedings and it must be shown that the litigant in defiance or disobedience of the court's order proceeded to do any act which was in violation thereof. Unless the litigant is aware of a prohibitory order made against him by the court there can be no desire or intention on his part to flout the court's order. Therefore, unless it is shown that the litigant was made aware of the order served on his lawyer it may not be possible to hold that despite the knowledge of the order he wilfully decided to commit a breach of the order by acting contrary thereto. Proceedings in the nature of contempt being quasi-criminal it must be shown that the litigant was aware of the prohibitory order issued by the court and notwithstanding the same in breach thereof or in total disregard thereof he proceeded to continue with the construction. It being not disputed that there was no evidence to show that the lawyer to whom the prohibitory order was given had communicated that order in any manner whatsoever to the litigant, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that by continuing with the construction the litigant intended to commit a breach of the order or showed disrespect for the order. In that view of the matter if the High Court was disinclined to punish the litigant for contempt, be that under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, we see no reason why we should interfere with the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. In that view of the matter if the High Court was disinclined to punish the litigant for contempt, be that under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, we see no reason why we should interfere with the impugned order in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed. No order on the application for impleadment.” 16. Reverting to the facts of the case in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Suresh (supra), it is quite vivid that it is not the case of the contempt petitioner that either the contemnor was served or the contemnor’s lawyer was served, what the contempt petitioner is alleging is, since counsel for the respondent/contemnor herein has sought time to file reply on 25-9-2018 in appeal, he is deemed to have knowledge about the order dated 28-8-2018 and even it is not the case of the contempt petitioner that along with the copy of the notice issued to the contemnor herein in FAM No.191/2018, copy of the order dated 28-8-2018 was served and therefore the order of this Court dated 28-8-2018 must have been respected by the contemnor. Since proceedings in the nature of contempt is quasi-criminal, the contempt petitioner has failed to establish that the contemnor was personally aware of the restraint order passed by this Court and notwithstanding the same in breach thereof or in total disregard thereof, he has performed second marriage. As such, in absence of evidence of service of order in question to the contemnor personally, it cannot be held that the contemnor herein has willfully disregarded or disrespected the order of this Court dated 28-8-2018. In that view of the matter, no civil contempt is constituted under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 warranting imposition of punishment to the contemnor herein and consequently, the rule issued on 29-8-2019 is hereby discharged and the contempt case is closed. No order to cost(s).