JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Learned counsel for the respective respondents waive service. Considering the controversy involved in the matter, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matters are taken up for final hearing today. 2. In these two applications, the applicants have invoked the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) seeking quash the orders dated 15.10.2018 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad in taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 494 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and issuing summons to them for their appearance and to set aside the said orders. 3. In total, there are 15 accused against whom cognizance of offence was taken by the impugned orders and summons were issued. All of them have filed these two applications seeking similar relief of quashing the said orders. Therefore, these two applications are heard together and they are being decided by this common order. 4. The second respondent is the de facto complainant. She has filed a complaint under Section 190 of CrPC before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad alleging that the offence punishable under Sections 494 and 114 IPC was committed by the applicants. The inquiry, as contemplated under Section 202 of CrPC, was conducted by the learned Magistrate. Eventually, as he found from the material available on record before him that a prima facie case is made out against the applicants for the offence punishable under Sections 494 and 114 IPC, the learned Magistrate, by the impugned orders, has taken cognizance of the offence against the applicants and ordered to issue summons to the applicants under Section 204(4) of CrPC. 5. Assailing the said impugned orders of taking cognizance of offence against the applicants and issuing summons to them, the present applications under Section 482 of CrPC are filed to quash the said orders and to set aside the same on various grounds that are urged in the applications. 6. Having regard to the nature of the orders that are being challenged in these two applications, this Court is of the considered view that these applications can be disposed of on the ground of their maintainability, without touching the merits of the case. 6. Having regard to the nature of the orders that are being challenged in these two applications, this Court is of the considered view that these applications can be disposed of on the ground of their maintainability, without touching the merits of the case. 6.1 It is now well settled law that an order taking cognizance of a case instituted upon a complaint or an order refusing to take cognizance of the offence, are construed as intermediate orders or a quasi final orders, which is amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) of CrPC. The said order is not an interlocutory order so as to attract the bar contained under clause (2) of Section 397 of CrPC. A revision against a final order against which no appeal lies and a revision against an intermediate order or a quasi final order against which no appeal lies, is clearly maintainable under Section 397(1) of CrPC. In fact, way back, in the year 1977 itself, the Apex Court in the case of Amar Nath and Others v. State of Haryana and Another, (1977) 4 SCC 137 , has clearly and authoritatively, in no uncertain terms, held that, an order taking cognizance of an offence against the accused is to be construed as an intermediate order or a quasi final order against which, revision under Section 397(1) of CrPC is maintainable. It is clarified by the Apex Court in the said judgment that such an order is not an interlocutory order attracting the express bar engrafted under Sub-clause (2) of Section 397 of CrPC. 6.2 The said law has been consistently followed by various High Courts including this High Court. It is clarified by the Apex Court in the said judgment that such an order is not an interlocutory order attracting the express bar engrafted under Sub-clause (2) of Section 397 of CrPC. 6.2 The said law has been consistently followed by various High Courts including this High Court. When the similar order of taking cognizance of an offence by a Magistrate is challenged before this Court, this Court in the case of Shiv Shakti Industries through Rajkumar Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. State of Gujarat, 2023 LawSuit (Guj) 836, while relying on the aforesaid decision in Amar Nath’s case of the Apex Court and the subsequent judgment rendered by a Three Judge Bench in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 , it is held that the orders like taking cognizance of offence or refusing to take cognizance of offence and the orders like discharging the accused from the case in the trial Court and refusing to discharge the accused where discharge petitions are filed, are all intermediate orders or quasi final orders, which are amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) of CrPC. Further, while reiterating the said law, recently, this Court again, in the case of Chen Zhisin v. Newton Engineering and Chemicals Ltd., 2024 (0) AIJEL-HC 247911, held that when the orders under challenge are amenable to revisional jurisdiction under Section 397(1) of CrPC, that the petitioners cannot invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of CrPC to challenge the said order without preferring revision under Section 397(1) of CrPC. It is also further held that in both, Amar Nath’s Case and Madhu Limaye’s Case, which is rendered by a Three Judge Bench, it is clarified that Section 482 of CrPC cannot be invoked to challenge such orders. Ultimately, the Court has, in the said order, dismissed the application as not maintainable with liberty to the petitioners to challenge the said order by preferring revision if they intend to challenge the same. The Court also ordered that the time spent by the petitioners in this Court in pursuing the said petition shall be excluded from consideration while computing the period of limitation in filing the revision application. The Court also ordered that the time spent by the petitioners in this Court in pursuing the said petition shall be excluded from consideration while computing the period of limitation in filing the revision application. 6.3 Now, the learned counsel for the applicants has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh, (2013) 15 SCC 624 , wherein, it is held that such an order of Magistrate deciding to issue process or summons to accused in exercise of his powers under Sections 200 to 204 of CrPC can always be a subject matter of challenge under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC. Placing reliance on the said judgment, it is sought to be contended that the present applications are maintainable. But, the facts of the said case are different and are distinguishable when compared to the present facts of the case. There, in the said case, it is held that when the Court found that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to pass any such order then on that ground, the same can be challenged under Section 482 of CrPC. Further, in the same judgment, the Apex Court at paragraph 23 clearly held as follows: “Therefore, the position has now come to rest to the effect that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC is available to the aggrieved party in challenging the order of the Magistrate, directing issuance of summons.” 6.4 The Three Judge Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Madhu Limaye’s case has already held that Section 482 of CrPC cannot be invoked when revision under Section 397(1) lies. Further, as observed supra, the said law has consistently been followed by various High Courts including this High Court and this Court is not entertaining an application under Section 482 of CrPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the said order when revision lies against that order. 7. Therefore, the applications is dismissed as not maintainable. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated forthwith. 7.1 However, it is made clear that these applications are dismissed only on the ground of their maintainability and this Court has not decided anything on merits of the case. The applicants are at liberty to challenge the impugned orders by way of preferring revision, if they so intend. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, shall stand vacated forthwith. 7.1 However, it is made clear that these applications are dismissed only on the ground of their maintainability and this Court has not decided anything on merits of the case. The applicants are at liberty to challenge the impugned orders by way of preferring revision, if they so intend. The time spent by the applicants in this Court in pursuing these applications, shall be excluded from consideration while computing the period of limitation in filing the revision. 7.2 Connected applications shall stand disposed of, accordingly.