JUDGMENT : Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. This writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the order dated 17.11.2022 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Circuit Bench, Ranchi in Original Appeal No.051/00124/2022, whereby and whereunder, the order of compulsory retirement passed by the respondent under Fundamental Rule 56(J) vide order dated 28.04.2021, has been refused to be interfered with. Facts 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition based upon the pleading of the original application filed on behalf of the applicant, the writ petitioner herein, needs to be referred which reads as under:- 3. It is the case of the writ petitioner/applicant that the petitioner joined the Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) on 24/02/1992 as stenographer and promoted as Personal Assistant (PA) on 02/05/2008 retrospectively w.e.f. 14/07/1997. The petitioner was disciplined and dedicated employee of the Organization, worked with sincerity and devotion to duty. The petitioner, while in service, was never communicated any adverse remarks recorded in the Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR). 4. Thereafter, one Smt. Dashma Bobonga filed an FIR No.0073 on 23/06/2017 with Sadar Police Station, Chaibasa alleging false allegation that the petitioner, her sister's son 'Sanjat Alda' and one Ram Chandra Mukhi have fraudulently withdrawn Rs.1,91,000/-(Rupees One Lakh Ninety One Thousand Only) from her and her son and daughter's savings bank account. In consonance to the aforesaid FIR, the petitioner was arrested on 23/06/2017 and Rs.22,000/-(Rupees Twenty Two Thousand Only) was seized from him. The petitioner was released on bail on 04/09/2017. The petitioner was placed under deemed suspension w.e.f. 23/06/2017 vide order no. JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/08 dated 27/06/2017. 5. The Head Quarter of the petitioner during suspension was changed to District Office, Giridih as per order no. 12 dated 08/08/2017. However, the suspension of the petitioner was revoked vide order no.JH/RO/JSR/Vig./M.A./2017/61 dated 29/11/2017. 6. The Ld. Magistrate West Singhbhum at Chaibasa acquitted the petitioner vide order dated 18.09.2017. 7. Upon acquittal by the Ld. Court on 18/09/2017, the petitioner received the Charge Memorandum dated 20/12/2018 under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CC & A) Rules, 1971 for the same allegations of which the Judicial Magistrate acquitted the petitioner, issued by the Addl. Central Provident Fund Commissioner (ACC), Bihar and Jharkhand for which departmental proceeding against the petitioner is still continuing. 8. Court on 18/09/2017, the petitioner received the Charge Memorandum dated 20/12/2018 under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CC & A) Rules, 1971 for the same allegations of which the Judicial Magistrate acquitted the petitioner, issued by the Addl. Central Provident Fund Commissioner (ACC), Bihar and Jharkhand for which departmental proceeding against the petitioner is still continuing. 8. The petitioner under the Conduct Rules applied for permission to purchase a flat in the name of his wife on 11/12/2018. The petitioner, while submitting the aforesaid request, submitted that he shall finance the consideration money from (i) Personal savings Rs. 10,00,000/-(Rupees Ten Lakhs (ii) Withdrawal); from SPF Rs. 25,00,000/-(Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs Only) and (iii) Personal loan Rs. 15,00,000/-(Rupees Fifteen Lakhs Only). Upon which, the Competent Authority granted permission vide letter no.JH/RO/RNCAdm-I/immovable property/2018/9731 dated 01/01/2019. In consonance to aforesaid approval; the petitioner paid an amount of Rs. 27,00,000/-(Twenty Seven Lakhs Only) to the seller of the flat by withdrawing Rs.23,92,611/-(Rupees Twenty Three Lakhs Ninety Two Thousand Six Hundred Eleven Only) from his PF Account and the balance from his Personal Savings. Subsequent to the transaction, the respondent no. 4 started putting queries through various letters regarding personal savings of Rs. 10,00,000/-(Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) proposed to be saved in the next two years. 9. The DOPT issued Office Memorandum dated 11/03/2016 bearing no.25013/1/2016-Estt.-A-IV that "where autonomous institutions have adopted the provisions of Ministry may ensure 56(J), FR Administrative that they are strictly followed in letter and spirit. 10. Thereafter, the Respondent no. 3 in pursuance of DOPT OM dated 11/09/2015 issued circular no.HR/AVS/NZ/193/56J/2015/589 dated 14/06/2017 relating to periodical review under Rule 56(J) of Fundamental Rules and Rule 48 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and in pursuance thereto, respondent no.3 with the approval of respondent no.2 constituted the Screening Committee and Review Committee to consider the case of the officials of the Organization under Fundamental Rule 56 (J) of and Rule 48 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 11. The respondents issued another circular no.HR/AVS/NZ/193/56-J/2015/3959 dated 05/08/2019 wherein the participation of the vigilance representative in the Screening Committee was dispensed. 12. The Regional PF Commissioner, Ranchi forwarded assessment sheet of the petitioner for consideration of the Screening Committee as per letter no.JH/RO/RNC/Adm-I/FR 56J/2018/795/16748 dated 22/01/2020. The Assessment Report do not depict the correct information. The RPFC has expressed the opinion on presumption that due to their inquiry about savings of Rs. 12. The Regional PF Commissioner, Ranchi forwarded assessment sheet of the petitioner for consideration of the Screening Committee as per letter no.JH/RO/RNC/Adm-I/FR 56J/2018/795/16748 dated 22/01/2020. The Assessment Report do not depict the correct information. The RPFC has expressed the opinion on presumption that due to their inquiry about savings of Rs. 10,00,000/-(Rupees Ten Lakhs Only) in next two years, the petitioner cancelled the transaction. In fact, totally ignored the factual aspect that seller/builder defrauded and cheated the petitioner. 13. The Screening Committee comprising (i) Additional Central PF Commissioner who is the Appointing Authority, (ii) RPFC-I of the Region who sent assessment report for placing before the Screening Committee and (iii) Assistant Director Vigilance who was not to be member of the Committee was constituted of the Screening Committee is per se illegal for two reasons viz; (i) senior most member being the appointing authority and the (ii) RPFC who sent adverse assessing report being member of the committee and associating Assistant Director Vigilance as a member in contravention of the circular dated 05/08/2019. 14. The Screening Committee considered the case of the petitioner in their meeting held on 23/12/2020. The function assigned to the Screening Committee was to collate the service records of the petitioner and place the same before the Review Committee to consider the case of the petitioner under Rule 56 (J) of the Fundamental Rules. But the Screening Committee dehors the jurisdiction and the function assigned to it as assumed the role of the Review Committee by recommending in conclusion "Based on above facts, the members of the Screening Committee are of unanimous opinion that Md. Mobin Alam, PA, is a fit case for compulsory retirement under Fundamental Rule 56 (J). The official has outlived his utility to the organization and has actually never been useful to the organization even in the past." The findings of the committee are totally contrary to the factual position on record. The minutes of the Screening Committee is only copying the Assessment Report sent by the RPFC. 15. The Review Committee in their meeting held on 03/09/2021 considered the recommendation of the Screening Committee. The Review Committee considered the Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR) of the applicant. 16. The Review Committee is also influenced by the Charge memorandum no.118/ZO (BR&JH)/Vig./Mobin Alam (PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20/12/2018 which is issued for the same charges of which the Trial Court acquitted the appellant. The Review Committee considered the Annual Performance Assessment Report (APAR) of the applicant. 16. The Review Committee is also influenced by the Charge memorandum no.118/ZO (BR&JH)/Vig./Mobin Alam (PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20/12/2018 which is issued for the same charges of which the Trial Court acquitted the appellant. Moreover, they failed to consider that the inquiry proceedings in respect of the charge memorandum was continuing to ascertain the truth of imputations and they cannot resort to action under Rule 56 (J) as a short cut to the inquiry and proving of the charges alleged against the applicant. 17. The Review Committee while recommending the petitioner for pre-mature retirement is influenced by the recommendation of Screening Committee and the remarks of the Screening Committee that the general reputation and trustworthiness of the petitioner has been so dismissal that despite holding the post of PA his services have rarely been used by any officer. The finding of the Review Committee is contrary to the factual position as the petitioner has been attached with different officers. The Review Committee recommended the applicant for pre-mature retirement under FR 56 (J) on the ground that the petitioner has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful which is contrary to the factual position as explained. 18. Being aggrieved by the acts, actions and inactions of respondents against and illegal, arbitrary orders, the petitioner approached Ld. Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench by filing Original Appeal No. 050/00270/2021. The Ld. Tribunal, while disposing off the aforesaid Original Appeal vide order dated 07/05/2021 directed the respondents to consider and pass order on the representation of the applicant (petitioner herein) within time as per spirit of the DOPT OM on the subject dated 28/08/2020. 19. It is the further case of the writ petitioner/applicant that in pursuance to the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted representations dated 24/05/2021 & 24/06/2021 before the respondent to decide the same in time and as per direction of the tribunal, instead of deciding the representation within the time as directed by the Ld. Tribunal, sought extension of time by filing application before Ld. Tribunal. Extension of time was granted by Ld. Tribunal subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/-(Ten Thousand Only). Upon extension of time, the respondents rejected the representation of the petitioner on the recommendation of the Representation Committee vide order dated 23.12.2021. 20. Tribunal, sought extension of time by filing application before Ld. Tribunal. Extension of time was granted by Ld. Tribunal subject to payment of cost of Rs. 10,000/-(Ten Thousand Only). Upon extension of time, the respondents rejected the representation of the petitioner on the recommendation of the Representation Committee vide order dated 23.12.2021. 20. It is evident from the factual aspect as referred hereinabove based upon the pleading that the writ petitioner/applicant was appointed as Stenographer in the Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO) on 24.02.1992 and promoted to the post of Personal Assistant on 14.07.1997. 21. The Screening Committee of the EPFO was constituted as per the circular dated 14.06.2017 for the purpose of scrutinizing the service records of the applicant. The meeting of the said Committee was conveyed on 23.12.2020 and found his case fit for retirement under Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental Rule. The decision so taken for compulsory retirement was passed on 28.04.2021. 22. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated 28.04.2021, had approached the tribunal by filing original application which was disposed of on 07.05.2021 with a direction upon the respondents to consider and pass order on the representation of the applicant within the stipulated period. 23. The respondents had considered and rejected the said representation vide order dated 23.12.2021, aggrieved thereof, the original application being Original Appeal No.051/00124/2022 has been filed. 24. The learned Tribunal, after calling upon the respondents, who had filed the written statement and on consideration of the rival submissions made on behalf of both the parties, the original application was dismissed declining to interfere with the impugned order taking into consideration the discussion made in the recommendation of the review committee, which according to the tribunal, cannot be called arbitrary or without any material, rather, the committee has considered the said report which shows the consideration of the service records of the applicant including the APARs, memorandums and warnings issued in past for dereliction of punctuality, diligence and absenteeism, applicant’s general conduct reflected through registration of FIR, his arrest and subsequent acquittal by the trial court on the basis of compromise and his evasive conduct about his savings, the same is the subject matter of the present writ petition. Arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner 25. Mr. Arguments advanced on behalf of the writ petitioner 25. Mr. Jorong Jedan Sanga, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:- (i) The learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the factual aspect particularly the fact that if the entire service career of the applicant will be taken into consideration, the same cannot be said to be adverse so as to reach to the conclusion of compulsory retirement under the weeding out principle, as per the provision of Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental Rules. (ii) The ground has been taken that as per the settled position of law, the entire service career of the public servant is required to be considered and only then, a conclusion is to be arrived at for the purpose of taking decision on the basis of the weeding out principle, but herein, if the entire service career of the applicant will be taken into consideration, it will transpire that the service career cannot be said to be adverse so as to take decision for compulsory retirement under the weeding out principle but the aforesaid aspect has not been taken into consideration. (iii) The ground has been taken that the case of the writ petitioner was also placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee for consideration of his promotion. The Departmental Promotion Committee has recommended the case of the writ petitioner for promotion which also suggests that the service career of the writ petitioner/applicant was not said to be there so as to take decision under the weeding out principle. 26. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal, therefore, suffers from illegality and hence, not sustainable in the eye of law. Arguments advanced on behalf of the Respondent 27. Mr. Parth S. A. Swaroop Pati, learned counsel for the respondent nos.2 to 4 has defended the impugned order by taking the following grounds:- (i) It is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner to take the ground that entire service career has not been taken into consideration, rather, if the decision of the Screening Committee will be taken into consideration, the service career of the writ petitioner has been taken in entirety which is explanatory. (ii) The service career of the writ petitioner has found to be not good, therefore, the decision has been taken for compulsory retirement under the weeding out principle as per the provision as contained under Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental Rule. (iii) The ground so taken that the case of the writ petitioner was placed before the Departmental Promotion Committee for promotion to the Higher post but the fact is that the recommendation although was made finding the writ petitioner fit to be promoted but due to pendency of the departmental proceeding, the said recommendation was kept in sealed cover. The said departmental proceeding has finally been culminated into the order of punishment and therefore, the writ petitioner has never been granted promotion, hence, the aforesaid ground is not sustainable in the eye of law. (iv) The learned tribunal has taken into consideration the entire report of the Screening Committee as would appear from paragraph-12 of the impugned order and based upon the same, if the learned tribunal has not found any material to interfere with the impugned decision of the authority, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error. 28. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.2 to 4 based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the order passed by the learned tribunal suffers from no error, hence, the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. Analysis 29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned tribunal in the impugned order. 30. This Court, at the outset, needs to refer herein that since the issue has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner that the service career of the writ petitioner is not adverse so as to take decision of compulsory retirement under weeding out the principle, therefore, deems it fit and proper to call for the service record, as would appear from the order dated 07.02.2024 so as to come to the appropriate conclusion. 31. The photo-copy of the entire service record has been produced before this Court for its perusal. 32. This Court has perused the entire service record. 33. 31. The photo-copy of the entire service record has been produced before this Court for its perusal. 32. This Court has perused the entire service record. 33. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer the provision of Rule 56(J) of the Fundamental Rule, which reads as under:- “Fundamental Rule 56(J)-Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Appropriate Authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest SO to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice not less than three months in writing three months' or pay and allowances in lieu of such notice: (i) if he is in Group A or Group B service or post in a substantive, quasi-permanent or temporary capacity and had entered Government Service before the age of 35 years after he has attained the age 50 years. (ii) in any other case after he has attained the age of fifty five years” 34. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the service of one or the other employee is to be dispensed with by passing the order of compulsory retirement if the service of such public servant is found not to be proper/satisfactory. 35. The pre-condition is that the service period before the age of 35 years after he has attained the age 50 years is to be considered before taking such decision. 36. This Court further deems it fit and proper to refer the judicial pronouncements in this regard. 37. The law is well settled with respect to the issue of premature retirement rendered by the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das & Anr. Vrs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada & Anr., reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299 . For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being referred as under - “32. We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the rules/orders in that behalf. We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the rules/orders in that behalf. Any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56(j) (or the rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation or representations, as the case may be. In some cases, it may happen that some adverse remarks of the recent years are not communicated or if communicated, the representation received in that behalf are pending consideration. On this account alone, the action under F.R. 56(j) need not be held back. There is no reason to presume that the Review Committee or the government, if it chooses to take into consideration such uncommunicated remarks, would not be conscious or cognizant of the fact that they are not communicated to the government servant and that he was not given an opportunity to explain or rebut the same. Similarly, if any representation made by the government servant is there, it shall also be taken into consideration. We may reiterate that not only the Review Committee is generally composed of high and responsible officers, the power is vested in government alone and not in a minor official. It is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed present, may be indicative of malice in law. We may mention in this connection that the remedy provided by Article 226 of the Constitution is no less an important safeguard. Even with its well known constraints, the remedy is an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action. 33. At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks — not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. Even with its well known constraints, the remedy is an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action. 33. At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks — not every remark, comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. There may be any number of remarks, observations and comments, which do not constitute adverse remarks, but are yet relevant for the purpose of F.R. 56(j) or a rule corresponding to it. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well stated in J.N. Sinha [ (1970) 2 SCC 458 : (1971) 1 SCR 791 ] and other decisions referred supra. 34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary — in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter — of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.” 38. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S. Ramachandra Raju Vrs. State of Orissa, reported in (1994) Suppl. 3 SCC 424 has been pleased to hold at paragraph-10, as under:- “10. Keeping these principles in mind and on considering the facts extracted hereinbefore we find that the exercise of power by the Government falls in the category of arbitrary exercise of power or failure to take the total record of service into consideration objectively. It has taken only the solitary adverse report for the year 1987-88 as a foundation to compulsorily retire the appellant from service. The Review Committee as well considered only that report, neither earlier reports nor subsequent reports were considered. It is seen that admittedly the appellant was promoted as a Reader after the adverse report and the adverse comments were communicated to him and in a mechanical way they rejected the report (sic representation) to expunge the adverse remarks, even without going into the contention of the appellant that the then Principal was actuated with mala fides by submitting wrongly or falsely in confidential reports which appear to have some foundation or suspicion for such a contention. Consistent record earlier and later periods would establish that the appellant has meritorious record of service as a teacher and that his devotion to the service is good and fair and that he maintains discipline, good relations with the students and imparts teaching to the students fairly with good knowledge as a teacher. Therefore, in that background the exercise of the power is illegal.” 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in yet another case, as has been held in the case of State of Punjab Vrs. Therefore, in that background the exercise of the power is illegal.” 39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in yet another case, as has been held in the case of State of Punjab Vrs. Gurdas Singh, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 92 , for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being referred as under:- “10. In Union of India v. V.P. Seth [1994 SCC (L&S) 1052 : (1994) 27 ATC 851 : AIR 1994 SC 1261 ] a decision to retire the respondent was taken on his completing fifty years of age and after perusing his record of service. He challenged this order under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur Bench. The Tribunal set aside the order of premature retirement on the sole ground that certain adverse remarks made in the confidential report of the respondent had not been conveyed to him and yet they were taken into consideration in passing the impugned order. The stand of the Union of India was that the entire record of service of the respondent had been taken into consideration and it was realised that his integrity was suspect and, therefore, decision was taken to compulsorily retire him from service. This Court noticed that it would be clear that on overall assessment of the officer his integrity was found to be suspect and, therefore, it was decided to exercise the power of compulsory retirement. The Tribunal, however, came to the conclusion that as the adverse remarks of 1985-86 and 1986-87 had not been communicated and as the earlier adverse remarks in connection with the integrity of the respondent stood eclipsed by his subsequent promotions, the authorities were not justified in terminating his services by way of compulsory retirement. Relying on two decisions of this Court in Baikuntha Nath Das [ (1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 521 : (1992) 21 ATC 649] and C.S.N. Murthy [ (1992) 2 SCC 317 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 710 : (1992) 21 ATC 664] this Court observed that the position of law has been settled and the order of the Tribunal could not be sustained as the same runs counter to the principles laid down in the said two decisions. 11. 11. The facts in the present case are quite similar to that in Union of India v. V.P. Seth [1994 SCC (L&S) 1052 : (1994) 27 ATC 851 : AIR 1994 SC 1261 ]. Here also the only ground on which the order prematurely retiring Gurdas Singh was set aside was that two adverse entries after his promotion from the rank of Assistant Sub-Inspector to Sub-Inspector were not communicated to him and earlier adverse entries could not be taken into account because even when those existed Gurdas Singh had earned his promotion. It is not necessary for us to again reiterate the principles where the Court will interfere in the order of premature retirement of an employee as these have been accurately set down by various pronouncements of this Court and particularly in Baikuntha Nath Das case [ (1992) 2 SCC 299 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 521 : (1992) 21 ATC 649]. Before the decision to retire a government servant prematurely is taken the authorities are required to consider the whole record of service. Any adverse entry prior to earning of promotion or crossing of efficiency bar or picking up higher rank is not wiped out and can be taken into consideration while considering the overall performance of the employee during whole of his tenure of service whether it is in public interest to retain him in the service. The whole record of service of the employee will include any uncommunicated adverse entries as well.” 40. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the principle has been laid down before taking decision of compulsory retirement under the weeding out principle. 41. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition of law that the entire service record is to be seen for compulsory retirement in public interest and only on sole incident, it cannot be. 42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab State Power Corporation Limited and Ors. Vrs. Hari Krishan Verma (Civil Appeal No.4784 of 2007) reported in (2015) 13 SCC 156 , has laid down the proposition at paragraph-12, as under:- “12. Coming to the case at hand, as we find from the order it has reflected on the order passed in the past, taken note of the ACRs and opined that the respondent was unfit and accordingly the order of compulsory retirement came to be issued. Coming to the case at hand, as we find from the order it has reflected on the order passed in the past, taken note of the ACRs and opined that the respondent was unfit and accordingly the order of compulsory retirement came to be issued. In this backdrop the question that has emerged for consideration is whether such an order can be treated as stigmatic? It is well settled in law that the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It also does not cast a stigma. But when by any incorporation or some reference or otherwise some stigma is attached to the order of compulsory retirement, it would be treated as an order of punishment, falling in a different compartment altogether losing its features of order of compulsory retirement under the Rules or Regulations under which he is not allowed to continue after attaining a particular age.” 43. It is evident from the aforesaid proposition of law as has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court that while taking decision of compulsory retirement, the entire service record of one or the other public servant is required to be considered and not only on the sole ground, such decision is to be taken. 44. This Court, after considering the aforesaid judgments and adverting to the facts of the case, it is evident from the pleading that the Screening Committee was constituted for the purpose of scrutinizing the entire service record of the writ petitioner which has been taken note by the learned tribunal, as would appear from paragraph-19 of the impugned order dated 17.11.2022. 45. The learned tribunal has considered the reference made in the recommendation of the aforesaid review committee with respect to the applicant’s service records including the APARs, memorandums and warnings issued in past for dereliction of punctuality, diligence and absenteeism, applicant’s general conduct reflected through registration of FIR, his arrest and subsequent acquittal by the trial court on the basis of compromise and his evasive conduct about his savings. 46. 46. This Court, in order to scrutinize the aforesaid finding since has called for the entire records for its perusal so as to come to the conclusion with respect to the legality and propriety of the impugned order passed by the learned tribunal, wherefrom, it is evident that the Screening Committee report is also part of the said document and the meeting of which was held on 23.12.2020, wherefrom it is evident that the Screening Committee has considered the work performing assessment based upon the APARs of the writ petitioner right from the year 1997-1998. 47. The Vigilance Profile has also been taken into consideration, wherein, the case being G.R. No.318/2017/TR No.461/2017, was filed against the writ petitioner in the Court of Additional C.J.M. West Singhbhum, Chaibasa for the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471 & 120B of the IPC. 48. The consideration has been made of the closure of the said case based upon the compromise entered in between the petitioner and the beneficiary. 49. The reference of one Charge memorandum dated 20.12.2018 which has been issued under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CC&A) Rules, 1971 has also been taken note thereof. 50. The details of the communicated entries in the service book has been taken into consideration along with the failure on the part of the writ petitioner for giving intimation of property transaction made by the officials, for ready reference, the details as referred in paragraph-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 of the consideration made by the Screening Committee are being referred as under:- “4.2 Vigilance Profile- 4.2.1 A case No. G.R. Case No. 318/2017/TR No. 461/17 was filed against Sh. Mobin Alam, PA in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Singhbhum at Chaibasa for offences punishable under Section 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Sh. Mobin Alam PA was acquitted by the District and Session Judge-I Chaibasa vide order dated 18.07.2017 but the acquittal was on the basis of compromise between the accused and the complainant. The facts of the case are as follow:- i. Shri Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridhi while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedput cheated and withdrew Rs. 1,91,000/-from pension accounts of Smt. Dashma Bobonga W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa, East Singhbum and her two children in collusion with two other accomplices. The facts of the case are as follow:- i. Shri Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridhi while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedput cheated and withdrew Rs. 1,91,000/-from pension accounts of Smt. Dashma Bobonga W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa, East Singhbum and her two children in collusion with two other accomplices. A FIR was filed against them in Sadar Thana, Chaibasa and the Police authority taking immediate action arrested him along with cash amount Rs. 22,000/- ii. The trial court in its order dated 18.09.2017 pronounced the order as –“After going through the evidence of the prosecution witness, it is clear that during illegal transaction all accused persons have not prepared any forged document to withdraw the amount from the A/c of informant, her son and daughter. Hence, no case is made out for the offences u/s 467, 468, 471, 120(B) IPC rest section 420 IPC is compoundable in nature with permission of the court. The informant and her son and daughter have deposed that they have received all amount from the accused person and they do not want to proceed in this case. They agreed to settled their dispute happily. Informant, PW2 and PW3 have stated that on the po8int of compromise that accused was returned all amount and both parties have settled their dispute and not they do not want to proceed further in this case. On joint compromise petition dated 01.07.2017 both parties have signed which are duly identified by their respective lawyer. There is no public policy involved. The compromise petition is in order. Under such circumstances, compromise petition is hereby accepted. Hence, the accused persons namely 1. Mobin Alam 2. Ram Chandra Mukhi and 3. Sanjay Alda are hereby acquitted from all the charges of this case on compromise basis. They are also discharged from the liabilities of their respective bail bond. 4.2.2 One Charge Memorandum No. 118/Zo(BR&JH)/Vig./Mobin Alam (PA)/JSR/1473 dated 20.12.2018 has been issued under Rule 10 of the EPF Staff (CCA) Rules, 1971 which is pending at the inquiry stage. The charges against the official in the said charge memorandum are- (a) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur willfully committed grave misconduct by cheating and resoring to withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 1,91,000/-from the saving Bank Account of Smt. Dashma Bobonga, W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa. The charges against the official in the said charge memorandum are- (a) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedpur willfully committed grave misconduct by cheating and resoring to withdrawal of a sum of Rs. 1,91,000/-from the saving Bank Account of Smt. Dashma Bobonga, W/o Late Rasai Bobonga resident of Chaibasa. East Singbum and also from the Savings bank Accounts of her two children in collusion with other accomplices namesly Shri Ram Chandra Mukhi s/o Shri Bogeswar Mukhi Medical Basti Dhatkidih, Bistupur and Shri Sanjay Alda, S/o Shri Jam Rai Alda, vill-Harilatola, Basti Dhatkidih, Bistupur and Shri Sanjay Alda S/o Shri Jam Rai Alda, Vill Harilatola, Thana Mufsil Chaibasa in a fraudulent manner. (b) Md. Mobin Alam, PA, District Office, Giridih while functioning as Personal Assistant at Regional Office, Jamshedput was reportedly found at Punjab National Bank, Chaibasa on 23.06.2017 without getting headquarters leaving permission. He had taken Restricted Holiday Leave for 23.06.2017 but did noit apply for headquarters leaving permission. Without headquarters leave permission, he left the headquarter. The matter of not taking headquarters leave permission has been confirmed by Regional Office, Jamshedpur vide letter No. JH/RO/JSR/Adm/Pers/528/03/409 dated 02.11.2018. It is violation of Provision FR-11 which provides that permission for leaving headquarter is essential for government servant before leaving the headquarter. 4.3 Details of communicated entries in Service Book- i. Memorandum dated 22.01.2003 – for deserting his seat and leaving office during the office hour on regular basis without any permission. ii. Memorandum dated 18.02.2003 – for deserting his seat and leaving the office without prior permission of or intimation to the competent authority. iii. Memorandum dated 01.02.2005 -for failure to dispose the work assigned to him. iv. Memorandum dated 06.07.2005 – from absence fro office without permission and to submit daily work report. v. Memorandum dated 05.08.2005 – to be punctual and disposal of work assigned to him. vi. Memorandum dated 25.11.2005 – for not coming to office in time. vii. Office noted dated 20.04.2006 – not allowing Shri Mobin Alam to makr his attendance on 20.04.2006 as he did not attend office in time and treating his absence as leave without pay till it is regularized by the competent authority. viii. Memorandum dated 18.05.2012 – for absence from office on 18.05.2012 2.00 PM ix. vii. Office noted dated 20.04.2006 – not allowing Shri Mobin Alam to makr his attendance on 20.04.2006 as he did not attend office in time and treating his absence as leave without pay till it is regularized by the competent authority. viii. Memorandum dated 18.05.2012 – for absence from office on 18.05.2012 2.00 PM ix. Memorandum dated 28.08.2012 – for absence from office on 28.08.2012 at 3.00 PM x. Office Noted dated 25.09.2012 – for absence from office on 28.08.2012. Note given by APFC (Cash) on 27.09.2012 with reference to office note dated 25.09.2012 – stating that the submission of Shri Mobin Alam is absolutely false and baseless. xi. Warning dated 20.11.2012 – for absence from office without intimation. xii. Memorandum dated 06.02.2014-for not disposing a grievance case within due date. xiii. Memorandum dated 27.03.2014 – for absence without any permission on 27.03.2014 at 12.45 P.M. xiv. Memorandum dated 05.12.2014 – from absconding from duty without any information/prior permission. xv. Memorandum dated 18.02.2015 – for late coming to office as well as non-appearance in the office as and when he calls upon. xvi. Memorandum dated 13.05.2016 – absence from duty on 12.05.2016 without any information. xvii. Recordable Warning dated 14.06.2016 – for unauthorized absence. xviii. Memorandum dated 30.03.2017 – for absence from office on 30.03.2017 xix. Warning dated 13.04.2017 – for unauthorized absence from office.” 4.4 Regarding intimation of property transactions made by the official- On 11.12.2018, he had given an application in APPENDIX-V seeking prior intimation or previous sanction under rule 18(2) of CCS conduct rule, 1964 regarding purchase of flat worth Rs, 50,00,000 (Fifty lakhs) wherein source of funding was reported as Rs, 10,00,000/-from personal saving, Rs. 15,00,000/-from personal Loan and Rs. 25,00,00/-from SPF. In reply to further query, he replied that he intends to save the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/-within a period of 2 years at the time of taking delivery of flat. When further query was raised about near impossibility of such high saving within two years, he changed his stance and stated that "I have made conversation with the members of family and friend circle who have promised to provide loan but they refused to give prior approval. When further query was raised about near impossibility of such high saving within two years, he changed his stance and stated that "I have made conversation with the members of family and friend circle who have promised to provide loan but they refused to give prior approval. He further made an excuse that "the sentence used by me for taking financial supports from my family and friends was under personal savings and not under personal loan." Subsequently, when he was asked to submit all the saving details, he informed the office that he has cancelled the transaction ostensibly citing that the builder has sold out the flat to other person after taking amount from him and thereafter he has moved the Civil Court, Jamshedpur against the builder.” 51. The Screening Committee, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has come to the conclusion that the services of the writ petitioner have rarely been utilized by any Officers. 52. Thus, from the conspectus of above, it can be summarized that the expression “dead wood” as referred by the Hon’ble Supreme Court aptly describes this official as he has been ineffective and his integrity is doubtful and hence, the Review Committee after going through the relevant documents and applying its mind and other facts as available in the records, has opined that it is a case for invocation of the provisions under Fundamental Rule 56(J). 53. The authorities have considered the said recommendation of the Committee and based upon the same, the order was issued. However, the said decision was challenged by the writ petitioner by filing original application before the learned tribunal. 54. The learned tribunal has directed to make representation to the writ petitioner which has been made but however, the same was rejected, vide order dated 23.12.2021 taking into consideration the opinion given by the Screening Committee. 55. The law has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court as has been referred hereinabove reflects that the entire service career of the public servant is to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion as to whether the service of such public servant can be categorized as a “dead wood” or not. 56. 55. The law has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court as has been referred hereinabove reflects that the entire service career of the public servant is to be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion as to whether the service of such public servant can be categorized as a “dead wood” or not. 56. It appears from the opinion given by the Screening Committee as referred hereinabove that it is not that on a single instance, such decision has been taken, rather, on the basis of the scrutiny of the entire service record, the consideration has been given by reaching to the conclusion that the service of the writ petitioner has been found to be categorized under the dead wood. 57. It has also been considered about the issue of integrity and moral turpitude and not only that, the amount which was to be given in favour of the beneficiary under the EPF has not been given and subsequently, on the basis of the compromise when the criminal case was instituted, the said criminal case was ended. 58. Further, the declaration which is required to be given by the public servant under Rule 18(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, has also not been furnished by the writ petitioner. But, in addition to that service record of the writ petitioner as per the reference made by the Screening Committee as under paragraph-4.2 as referred hereinabove coupled with paragraph-4.3, the service record of the writ petitioner has been taken into consideration in entirety. 59. Hence, it is not the case where on the sole ground, the decision declaring the writ petitioner by categorizing under the “dead wood”, has been taken. 60. The ground which has been taken that the Departmental Promotion Committee has recommended the case of the writ petitioner for promotion but it is evident that although, the recommendation for promotion was there by the Departmental Promotion Committee but due to pendency of the departmental proceeding, his case for promotion was kept in sealed cover, awaiting for the outcome of the pending departmental proceeding. The said departmental proceeding was culminated into the punishment of withholding 50 per cent of pension, hence, the recommendation so made by the Departmental Promotion Committee has not been given effect to, as such, it is not a case where the writ petitioner has ever been granted promotion. 61. The said departmental proceeding was culminated into the punishment of withholding 50 per cent of pension, hence, the recommendation so made by the Departmental Promotion Committee has not been given effect to, as such, it is not a case where the writ petitioner has ever been granted promotion. 61. This Court, after having discussed the legal and the factual aspects in entirety, as hereinabove and coming back to the order passed by the learned tribunal, has found that the learned tribunal has considered the opinion given by the Screening Committee and based upon the same, the impugned decision taken by the authority, has been declined to be interfered with. 62. The law is well settled, so far as the power which is to be exercised under the power of judicial review, in view of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 , whereby and whereunder, the High Court has been conferred with the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to exercise the power of judicial review. The reference of the relevant paragraph needs to be referred herein which reads hereunder as :- “99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 63. The law is well settled that the power of judicial review is to be exercised if there is any error apparent on the face of the order so assailed suffers from vice of the violation of statutory provision, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Ors Vrs. Abdul Halim & Ors., reported in (2019) 18 SCC 39 , wherein, at paragraph-30 it has been held as under:- “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 64. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.C. Basappa Versus T. Nagappa, reported in (1955) 1 SCR 250 , wherein, it has been held as under:- “An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e. g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.” 65. It is evident from the aforesaid judgments that the power of judicial review is to be exercised if the error apparent on the face of such order. 66. This Court, considering the scope of judicial review, as referred hereinabove, is of the view that the order passed by the learned tribunal is not such an order wherein the power of judicial review is to be exercised by showing interference. 67. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is dismissed. 68. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.