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2024 DIGILAW 447 (MP)

Veer Singh Prajapati v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2024-05-27

MANINDER S.BHATTI

body2024
ORDER : Maninder S. Bhatti, J. This petition has been filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of the FIR, dated 4-9-2022 in connection with Crime No. 427/2022 registered at the Police Station, Bilkhiriya District Bhopal and consequential proceedings thereto pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal in RCT No. 14258/2022. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant contends that the respondent No. 2 lodged an FIR against the present applicant while stating inter alia, that her marriage with the present applicant was solemnised on 25-2-2008. Thereafter they started living in Gurgaon (Haryana) from 2012 onwards. They also constructed a house at Shyamkunj, Gurgaon. Till 2018 there were instances of torture and thereafter from 2019 onwards, there was physical and mental torture to the respondent No. 2. In the FIR it was further mentioned that just before three months from the date of lodging of the FIR the present applicant left his job and came to Bhopal and started residing there. During that period the respondent No. 2 was residing in Gurgaon. On 26-8-2022 again, the applicant came to Gurgaon and then on 27-8-2022 the applicant manhandled and abused the respondent No. 2. 3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that the entire FIR as well as the statements of witnesses reveal that none of the offence was committed within the territory of Bhopal. Hence, the FIR at Bhopal was not maintainable, nor any cognizance on the charge-sheet on the basis of the said FIR could have been taken. 4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that as no cause of action accrued within the territorial limits of Bhopal, entire proceedings deserve to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel for the State as well counsel for the respondent No. 2 have submitted that the present application filed under section 482 of Cr.P.C. deserves to be dismissed. It is contended by the learned counsel that there are specific allegations in the FIR and considering the said allegations, no case for interference is made out. It is further contended by the counsel that when the respondent No. 2 was subjected to manhandling, she came back to Bhopal and she was treated by doctors at Bhopal. Therefore, it is contended by the counsel that no case for interference is made out. 6. It is further contended by the counsel that when the respondent No. 2 was subjected to manhandling, she came back to Bhopal and she was treated by doctors at Bhopal. Therefore, it is contended by the counsel that no case for interference is made out. 6. To buttress his submission, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court rendered in the cases of Veena Mittal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 110 and Rupali Devi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, LAWS (SC) 2019-4-41, decided on 9-4-2019. It is contended by the counsel that trial at Bhopal is also permissible, inasmuch as respondent No. 2 had taken shelter after being thrown out of the house from Gurgaon (Haryana). 7. Heard the submissions and perused the records. 8. A perusal of the record reflects that in the present case the following FIR was lodged by the respondent No. 2 at Bhopal in the Police Station, Bilkhiriya vide Crime No. 427/2022 under sections 498-A, 294, 323 and 506 of IPC : 9. A perusal of the FIR reflects that in the entire FIR, there is no mentioning of any of the instances of cruelty at Bhopal. The FIR nowhere discloses that any offence was committed in Bhopal. The statements of witnesses which are available on record further reflect that none of the witnesses has stated that there was cruelty with the respondent No. 2 at Bhopal. Apparently, in the present case, no offence has been committed within the territory of Bhopal. 10. The Apex Court in the case of Y. Abraham Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, (2004) 8 SCC 100 has held in paragraph 13 as under : “While in civil cases, normally the expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where the offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make the position different. The expression “cause of action” is, therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Manish Ratan vs. State of M. P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 has held in paragraph 16 as under :— “Yet again in Ramesh vs. State of T. N., (2005) 3 SCC 507 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 735, Abraham Ajith. The expression “cause of action” is, therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases. 11. The Apex Court in the case of Manish Ratan vs. State of M. P., (2007) 1 SCC 262 has held in paragraph 16 as under :— “Yet again in Ramesh vs. State of T. N., (2005) 3 SCC 507 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 735, Abraham Ajith. (2004) 8 SCC 100 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2134 was followed by this Court stating : (SCC pp. 512-13, paras 11-12) “11. In the view we are taking, it is not necessary for us to delve into the question of territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Trichy in detail. Suffice it to say that on looking at the complaint at its face value, the offences alleged cannot be said to have been committed wholly or partly within the local jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court at Trichy. Prima facie, none of the ingredients constituting the offence can be said to have occurred within the local jurisdiction of that Court. Almost all the allegations pertain to acts of cruelty for the purpose of extracting additional property as dowry while she was in the matrimonial home at Mumbai and the alleged acts of misappropriation of her movable property at Mumbai. However, there is one allegation relevant to section 498-A from which it could be inferred that one of the acts giving rise to the offence under the said section had taken place in Chennai. It is alleged that when the relations of the informant met her in-laws at a hotel in Chennai where they were staying on 13-10-1998, there was again a demand for dowry and a threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without the money and articles demanded. 12. Thus the alleged acts which according to the petitioner constitute the offences under sections 498-A and 406 were done by the accused mostly in Mumbai and partly in Chennai. Prima facie, there is nothing in the entire complaint which goes to show that any acts constituting the alleged offences were at all committed at Trichy.” The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 12. Thus, considering the aforesaid, as no offence has been committed within the territory of Bhopal, proceedings at Bhopal are unsustainable, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases. 13. 12. Thus, considering the aforesaid, as no offence has been committed within the territory of Bhopal, proceedings at Bhopal are unsustainable, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases. 13. So far as the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Rupali Devi (supra) is concerned, a perusal of para 16 of the judgment reflects that the Apex Court held that the Courts at the place where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would, dependent on the factual situation while ascertaining the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section 498-A of IPC. The said judgment has no applicability in the present case, inasmuch as in the FIR lodged on 4-9-2022 it was stated by the complainant that the present applicant resigned from the job and came to Bhopal and started living there. It was further stated that the complainant remained at Gurgaon only. The allegation is that the applicant came to Gurgaon on 26-8-2022 and on 27-8-2022, the applicant abused and also manhandled the respondent No. 2 and also her parents. After the incident they were at hospital in Gurgaon for three days. After that they came to Bhopal where the mother of the complainant was admitted in the hospital for treatment. The FIR nowhere suggests that the complainant was thrown out of the house or she, after being discharged from the hospital at Gurgaon, made any efforts to reside in the house at Gurgaon. None of the consequences of cruelty at parental house have been spelt out in the FIR nor in the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C. Hence, the judgments relied upon by the respondent No. 2, being factually distinguishable, have no applicability in the case in hand. 14. Accordingly, entire proceedings pending against the applicant in connection with Crime No. 427/2022 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhopal vide RCT No. 14258/2022 (State vs. Veer Singh Prajapati) for the offence under sections 498-A, 294, 323 and 506 of the IPC stand quashed. However, this order shall not preclude the respondent No. 2 from lodging an FIR with the Police Station of the place, within the territory of which the offence in question was committed. 15. Ex-consequenti, this present petition stands allowed. However, this order shall not preclude the respondent No. 2 from lodging an FIR with the Police Station of the place, within the territory of which the offence in question was committed. 15. Ex-consequenti, this present petition stands allowed. The applicant is discharged from the alleged charges. Bail bond, if any, furnished by the applicant, stands discharged.