Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2024 DIGILAW 448 (KER)

D. Rejeev v. D. Sunil

2024-04-09

C.JAYACHANDRAN

body2024
JUDGMENT : The Order impugned in both the Original Petitions afore referred is the one dated 01.04.2022 rendered in I.A.No.4/2022 in the suit, O.S.No.580/2021 of the Additional Munsiff Court-I, Neyyattinkara, the order being produced as Ext.P10 in both the Original Petitions. The Original Petition first above referred to, is preferred by the plaintiff in the suit and the second, by the 4th defendant, who is the wife of the plaintiff in the suit. O.P.(C) No.756/2022 is taken as the lead case. 2. Brief facts: A suit was filed restraining the defendants from issuing any notice for convening the meeting of Board of Trustees, Annual General Meeting and extra ordinary General Meeting of the fifth defendant Trust, essentially premised on the ground that, the plaintiff - the managing Trustee of the fifth defendant Trust - alone is entitled to call for a meeting as per Ext.P2 bye-laws of the Trust. An interim order of injunction was granted, restraining defendants 1 to 3 from conducting any meeting of the Trust on 16.08.2021 as per the notice issued for the said purpose, and also restraining them from issuing further notice to convene any meeting of the Trust, except by issuing notice to the plaintiff seeking to convene any such meeting. 3. Thereupon, the first defendant D.Sunil filed Ext.P6 application seeking a direction to the plaintiff to issue notice to all the five members of the Board of Trustees of the fifth defendant Trust to convene a meeting of the Board of Trustees immediately, on the agenda detailed in the affidavit attached to Ext.P6; or in the alternative, to permit the Chairman to conduct such meeting with notice to all members as provided in the Trust deed. The plaintiff D.Rejeev filed Ext.P7 counter affidavit seeking to defer the consideration of Ext.P6 interlocutory application till a decision is rendered by the Director of Public Instructions regarding the second defendant’s right to hold the post of Headmistress simultaneous with being a member of the Board of Trustees. The fourth defendant in the suit, who is the wife of the plaintiff, also filed a counter affidavit seeking dismissal of Ext.P6 interim application. By Ext.P10 impugned order, Ext.P6 interlocutory application was allowed, directing the plaintiff to issue notice within fourteen days to convene a meeting of the Board of Trustees. The fourth defendant in the suit, who is the wife of the plaintiff, also filed a counter affidavit seeking dismissal of Ext.P6 interim application. By Ext.P10 impugned order, Ext.P6 interlocutory application was allowed, directing the plaintiff to issue notice within fourteen days to convene a meeting of the Board of Trustees. The order also directed that if the plaintiff fails to issue notice as directed, the first defendant, who is the Chairman of the Trust, is permitted to apply to the Court for fixing a date for the meeting and issue notice to the members of the Trust through the Court. 4. The relative status of the parties in the suit vis-a-vis, their status in the Original Petitions are as follows: The suit was instituted by Sri.D.Rejeev [petitioner in O.P.(C.) No.756/2022 and fourth respondent in O.P.(C.) No.787/2022]. The first defendant in the suit Sri.D.Sunil, is his brother, both of whom, being the children of late Sri.Daivadanam and Smt.Gomathy. The second defendant (second respondent in both the Original Petitions) is the wife of the first defendant. The third defendant, C.T.Sherly, (third respondent in both the Original Petitions) is the wife of the brother of petitioner/plaintiff. The fourth defendant in the suit [fourth defendant in O.P.(C.) No.756/2022 and the petitioner in O.P.(C.) No.787/2022] is the wife of the sole plaintiff, D.Rejeev. The fifth defendant in the suit (fifth respondent in both the Original Petitions) is Lazar Nadar Educational and Research Foundation, a Trust formed as per deed No.97/1998 of the S.R.O., Neyyattinkara, under which Trust, several educational institutions are being run. 5. The gist of the case espoused by the parties are as follows: Plaintiff's case The 5th defendant Trust was founded by the plaintiff, the defendants and their parents, L.Daivadanam and L.Gomathy. L.Daivadanam, was the Chairman of the Trust and he expired on 06.07.2014. L.Gomathy passed away on 21.02.2011. The plaintiff would assert that he is officiating as the Managing Trustee of the Trust, since 1998 and as the Manager of the Schools under the Trust, since 2006. According to the plaintiff, the sole authority competent to issue notice for a meeting of the Board of Trustees is the plaintiff, in his capacity as the Managing Trustee, as per clauses 15 and 23 of Ext.P2 Trust deed. According to the plaintiff, the sole authority competent to issue notice for a meeting of the Board of Trustees is the plaintiff, in his capacity as the Managing Trustee, as per clauses 15 and 23 of Ext.P2 Trust deed. The suit was filed, when defendants 1 to 3 issued notice to the plaintiff, intimating him of a meeting of the Board of Trustees to be convened on 16.08.2021, on a specified agenda, including admission of two members to the Trust and also, to decide whether a new Manager is to be appointed for the educational institutions. Asserting his right as the Managing Trustee under Ext.P2 Trust deed, the suit was filed with the relief indicated in paragraph no.1 of the judgment and an ad interim order of temporary injunction was obtained, vide order dated 16.08.2021 in I.A.No.2/2021 filed along with the suit. 6. The defense contentions, as could be seen from Ext.P6 I.A., are to the following effect: The 5th defendant Trust, a public Trust is running six educational institutions, consisting of three aided schools, governed by the Kerala Education Act and Rules. There were seven members in the Board of Trustees originally, which got reduced to 5, upon the death of their father and mother. The Trust is liable to be governed by the Board of Trustees as per clause 9 of Ext.P2 Trust deed. The 1st defendant is the Chairman and Finance Trustee of the 5th defendant Trust. Plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 are the members of the Board of Trustees of the 5th defendant Trust. The Chairman has all powers of general supervision and control of the affairs of the foundation as per Clause 11. As per Clause 12, the Managing Trustee shall be the Executive Officer of the Trust, who can approve all ordinary payments, except expenditure of an extraordinary nature, which requires the approval of the Board of Trustees. Rule 15 provides for issuance of notice of meetings by the Managing Trustee and Rule 17 provides for the powers and duties of the Board of Trustees. Specific allegations are seen raised from paragraph nos.16 to 22 of Ext.P6 application, as against the plaintiff, especially with respect to the manner in which he was usurping power in the affairs of the Trust. Specific allegations are seen raised from paragraph nos.16 to 22 of Ext.P6 application, as against the plaintiff, especially with respect to the manner in which he was usurping power in the affairs of the Trust. In paragraph no.22, it is specifically contended that the plaintiff has only the duty to issue notice for meetings, which right does not include a right to decide for a meeting, or to fix a day for meeting. The plaintiff as Managing Trustee can only draft a notice with the agenda as suggested by the Chairman. The Chairman alone has got the power to fix a meeting. 7. Heard Sri.V.G.Arun, learned counsel for the petitioner/plaintiff, Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, learned Senior Counsel, instructed by Sri.P.B.Krishnan on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 5 and Sri.G.Sreekmar (Chelur) for the 4th respondent. 8. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred to in their status in O.P.(C.) No.756/2022. 9. Learned counsel for the plaintiff (petitioner in O.P.(C) No.756/2022) would firstly contend that in the absence of a counter-claim, an interim relief, especially in the nature of a mandatory injunction, cannot be granted at all. An interim relief can be granted only 'in aid of' and 'as ancillary to' the main relief and the same cannot be outside the scope of the suit. In this regard, learned counsel relied upon a constitution bench decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [ AIR 1952 SC 12 ] and also a Division Bench judgment of this court in Manjeri Municipality v. Mohammed Ali [ 2015 (1) KLT 612 (DB)]. It was also submitted that the relief for interlocutory mandatory injunction can be granted only to preserve or restore the last non-contested status, going by which yardstick, an order as Ext.P10 could not have been issued at all. Reliance in this regard was placed on Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others [ AIR 1990 SC 864 ] and also on a Single Bench decision of this Court in Anil Kumar v. Rajendran [ 2021 (2) KLT 376 ]. On facts, learned counsel would submit that the challenge is essentially centered around two controversial agenda items, the first pertaining to induction of new members and the second, with respect to appointment of new Manager. On facts, learned counsel would submit that the challenge is essentially centered around two controversial agenda items, the first pertaining to induction of new members and the second, with respect to appointment of new Manager. It was mooted that the above referred agenda items will facilitate change of status quo as on the date of suit, which status was prevailing for the past several years. Another contention raised is that the sole authority to issue notice for a Board meeting as per Rule 15 of Ext.P2 Trust deed is the plaintiff, in his capacity as the Managing Trustee. The same is the situation for convening an extra ordinary general meeting under Rule 23 as well. That being the position, there cannot be an interim judicial intervention to the said right of the Managing Trustee, especially, by dictating agenda for the meeting, which is the prerogative of the plaintiff, as a Managing Trustee under Rule 15. Finally, it was contended that an order like Ext.P10 would torpedo Ext.P1 suit, which is laid to protect the office of the petitioner as the Managing Trustee of the Trust and the Manager of the schools under it. The same cannot be done in a suit for injunction simpliciter preferred by the plaintiff, without there being a counter-claim and without paying court fees. 10. Sri.Sreekumar G.Chelur on behalf of the 4th respondent in O.P.(C) No.756/2022 would submit that the relief sought for vide Ext.P6 application is neither traceable to Order XXXIX, Rule 2 or to Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Order XXXIX, Rule 2, the suit should be one preferred against the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind. The application for temporary injunction should be to restrain the defendant from committing such breach of contract or injury complained of, or any breach of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or relating to the same property or right. The above factual parameters are not satisfied in the instant facts. As regards Section 151 of the Code, it was submitted that the same cannot be pressed into service, since the Code provides for a specific remedy under Order XXXIX. It was submitted that Section 151 is procedural in nature and no substantive rights could be decided or created by taking resort to the said provision. 11. As regards Section 151 of the Code, it was submitted that the same cannot be pressed into service, since the Code provides for a specific remedy under Order XXXIX. It was submitted that Section 151 is procedural in nature and no substantive rights could be decided or created by taking resort to the said provision. 11. In answer to the above contentions, Sri.S.V.Balakrishna Iyer, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of respondents 1 to 3 and 5 would submit that, as many as three attempts were made to convene a meeting of the Board of Trustees, all of which were sought to be frustrated by the plaintiff [petitioner in O.P.(C) No.756/2022]. Ext.R1(a) request was objected by the petitioner/plaintiff by issuing Ext.R1(b) reply, asserting his right to issue notice for convening a meeting, but agreeing that the plaintiff is ready to issue notice for convening the meeting of the Board of Trustees, for which a convenient date was sought for. The second request, Ext.R1(e) was opposed by issuing Ext.R1(i) reply stating that conduct of meeting, pending O.P. No.21672/2021, would be illegal. Again, respondents 1 to 3 gave Ext.R1(j) request to convene the meeting of the Board of Trustees, to which there was no reply. It was in such circumstances, Ext.P6 application was filed with the reliefs taken note of earlier, which culminated in Ext.P10 impugned order. 12. As regards the objections to agenda item nos.1 and 4, which pertains to induction of new members and appointment of new Manager, learned Senior Counsel would submit that no such objection was raised in Exts.P7 and P8 counter affidavits and that the same is raised for the first time in the reply affidavit preferred in the above Original Petition. On induction of new members, it was submitted that, the strength of the Board of Trustees got reduced to 5, from 7, pursuant to the death of the parents, Daivadanam and Gomathy, and that the said vacancies are to be filled up, which cannot be objected legally. As regards the appointment of new Manager, learned Senior Counsel would point out that the power to appoint the Manager is upon the Corporate Educational Agency, as per Section 7 of the Kerala Education Act. The petitioner cannot pick up an objection to the said agenda item and cannot seek to stall the very meeting itself, on the strength of such an objection. The petitioner cannot pick up an objection to the said agenda item and cannot seek to stall the very meeting itself, on the strength of such an objection. At best, the petitioner can raise the issue at the meeting and vote against any particular agenda item, in exercise of his power as a member of the Board of Trustees. At any rate, he cannot contend that there cannot be a new Manager for the Institutions and that he should continue to officiate indefinitely. As regards Ext.P11 agreement, produced along with the reply affidavit in O.P.(C) No.756/2022, learned Senior Counsel would point out that the same was not produced before the trial court and hence, there was no occasion for the trial court to address the parties' rights based on the said agreement. On facts, learned Senior Counsel would point out that Ext.P11, in paragraph no.2 refers to another agreement, which is not produced by the petitioners. It was then pointed out that Ext.P11 as produced, has no continuity from page no.1 to page no.2. According to the learned counsel, page no.2 appears to be an extract of some other document, unrelated to the contents of page no.1 of Ext.P11. Even as per the recitals in Ext.P11, the petitioner is to continue as the Manager only until a different decision is taken by the parties, thereby meaning the Trustees. The same is the situation with respect to the post of Manager, as well. Clauses in Ext.P11 dealing with change of Manager in page nos.1 and 2 are mutually contradictory and the interpolations in Ext.P11 shatters the credibility of the document. The petitioner's claim for continuing as the Manager indefinitely cannot therefore be sustained, is the final submission made by the learned Senior Counsel. 13. Having referred to the contentions of the respective parties, this Court will address the points raised one after other. The petitioner's claim for continuing as the Manager indefinitely cannot therefore be sustained, is the final submission made by the learned Senior Counsel. 13. Having referred to the contentions of the respective parties, this Court will address the points raised one after other. 14.Contention No.1:- An interim mandatory injunction, as sought for in Ext.P6, cannot be granted, in the absence of a counter-claim:- The relief sought for in Ext.P6 is extracted here below: “For the reasons stated in the accompanying affidavit it is most humbly prayed that this court may be pleased to direct the plaintiff/1st counter petitioner to issue notice to all the five board of trustees for the meeting of the board of trustees of the 5th defendant with the agenda detailed in the affidavit, to be convened immediately, in the room of the chairman of the 5th defendant or permit the chairman to conduct such a meeting of the board of trustees with notice to all the five members as required under rules 15 & 16 of the rules and regulations attached to the trust deed dated 8th July, 1998 bearing No.97/98; within the time frame to be fixed by the court.” It could be seen from the above that what is sought for is a direction to the plaintiff/ petitioner to issue notice for convening a meeting of the Board of Trustees. Alternatively, a permission is also sought for, enabling the Chairman to conduct such a meeting. This Court is of the opinion that the relief sought for vide Ext.P6 extracted above, is not one strictly falling within the contours of an interim mandatory injunction. As rightly contended by the petitioner/plaintiff relying upon The Managing Director, J. and K. Handicrafts v. M/s.Good Luck Carpets [ AIR 1990 SC 864 ], a relief of mandatory injunction is granted generally to restore the status quo ante. The concept inheres with it a wrong done by the adversary party pendente lite, or immediately before the litigation so as to alter the status, wherefore, there exists a compelling necessity to undo the wrong and to restore the status quo ante, thereby meaning the last non-contested status. In the instant case, there is no such factual situation surfacing. 15. This Court will address the factual matrix necessitating a relief like the one contemplated in Ext.P6. In the instant case, there is no such factual situation surfacing. 15. This Court will address the factual matrix necessitating a relief like the one contemplated in Ext.P6. The suit, O.S.No.580/2021, was preferred by the petitioner/plaintiff challenging notice dated 23.07.2021 issued by defendants 1 to 3 to convene a meeting of the Board of Trustees on 16.08.2021. The main bone of contention of the plaintiff is that going by Ext.P2 Trust deed, the authority empowered to issue notice and to call for a meeting of the Board of Trustees is the plaintiff, in his capacity as the Managing Trustee. In I.A.No.2/2021, filed along with the suit, a temporary injunction was granted by the learned Munsiff Court, Neyyattinkara in the following lines: “..respondents 1 to 3 are hereby temporarily restrained by an order of adinterim temporary injunction from conducting meeting of the trust on 16.08.2021 as contemplated in Annexure 6' notice and is also restrained from issuing further notices from convening the meetings of the trust other than issuing notice to the plaintiffs seeking convening of any meeting. It is further ordered that any decision taken on any meeting conducted before the receipt of this order shall not be implemented until further orders.” (Underlined by me for emphasis) 16. It could thus be seen that, what has been restrained is the meeting called for vide notice dated 23.07.2021, scheduled to be held on 16.08.2021 and also, from issuing notice for convening meeting of the Trust, except by issuing notice to the plaintiff for convening such meeting. It is in such circumstances that Ext.P6 application was filed, for a direction to the plaintiff/ petitioner to issue a notice to the members of the Board of Trustees to convene a meeting, with the agenda detailed in the affidavit. The objections to the agenda will be addressed later. As an alternative prayer, permission was sought in favour of the Chairman to conduct the meeting, with notice to all the members of the Board of Trustees. 17. Now, this Court will refer to the reasons espoused for calling a meeting of the Board of Trustees. The allegations in paragraph nos.16 to 22 of the affidavit in support of Ext.P6 application, are specifically referred to in this regard. 17. Now, this Court will refer to the reasons espoused for calling a meeting of the Board of Trustees. The allegations in paragraph nos.16 to 22 of the affidavit in support of Ext.P6 application, are specifically referred to in this regard. Thereafter, the contention in paragraph no.22 is that the plaintiff has the duty to issue notice for conducting the meeting of the Board of Trustees with the permission of the Chairman of the Trust and that he has no right, whatsoever, to decide for a meeting or to fix a day for meeting, which are powers falling within the domain of the Chairman. The Managing Trustee can only draft a notice with the agenda as suggested by the Chairman. The fact that the respondents 1 to 3 received an injunction order is referred to in paragraph no.23 of Ext.P6 application. On the basis of the facts pleaded in the preceding paragraphs, respondents 1 to 3 in paragraph no.23 would state that the order of injunction has to be modified. The relevant pleadings are extracted here below: “He cannot take shelter under the order obtained from this court on the basis of false pleadings. So the order of injunction has to be modified to be effective on the basis of the willingness submitted by us in this counter affidavit giving one more opportunity to him to convene the meeting lest we have no other option than to take appropriate legal proceedings for the conduct of the meeting which cannot be avoided and cannot be postponed even for one more day. In his letter dated 11/08/2021, he unconditionally stated that he had no objection in convening the meeting of the trust members.” (Underlined by me for emphasis) 18. The admission made by the petitioner/ plaintiff that he is willing to call for the meeting was also relied upon. In this regard, it is profitable to note that in paragraph nos.24, 26 etc. of the Ext.P1 plaint, the plaintiff had categorically admitted that he is ready and willing to convene the meeting of the Board of Trustees. The various steps allegedly resorted to by the plaintiff/ petitioner to avoid a meeting contrary to the stipulations in Ext.P2 Trust deed is also narrated in Ext.P6 application. It is on the strength of the above narrated averments and allegations that the relief afore extracted was sought for, vide Ext.P6. 19. The various steps allegedly resorted to by the plaintiff/ petitioner to avoid a meeting contrary to the stipulations in Ext.P2 Trust deed is also narrated in Ext.P6 application. It is on the strength of the above narrated averments and allegations that the relief afore extracted was sought for, vide Ext.P6. 19. In the above backdrop, the legal nature of the relief sought for in Ext.P6 has to be ascertained. In the given facts, this Court is only persuaded to hold that Ext.P6 merely seeks modification of the interim order dated 16.08.2021 in I.A.No.2/2021 in the suit. Such modification is sought for inter alia on the basis of the following factual premise, as decipherable from Ext.P6 application: a) The plaintiff's admission that he is ready and willing to call for the meeting of the Board of Trustees. b) Clause 15 of Ext.P2 trust deed only empowers the plaintiff to issue notice of the proposed meeting to the trustees, which clause does not clothe him with the authority to decide for a meeting, or to fix the date or agenda for the meeting. c) The interim order 16.08.2021 in I.A.No.2/2021 itself contemplates that meeting can be convened by issuing notice to the plaintiff requiring of him to issue notice for convening such meeting. 20. This Court is therefore of the definite opinion that Ext.P6 application, which only sought for a direction to the plaintiff/petitioner to convene a meeting - in accord with his own assertion that he is the sole depository to issue notice for convening the meeting – with an alternative prayer to permit a Chairman to conduct the meeting - which situation obviously arise when the petitioner/ plaintiff fails to comply with the direction to issue notice as sought for - cannot be caught and wrapped within the fetters of an interim mandatory injunction, the factual requirements of which are not at all triggered in the given case. Any and every relief which seeks a direction cannot be construed and characterised as a command, so as to treat it as mandatory injunction, interim or otherwise. The legal nature and character of a relief has to be adjudged in the setting in which it is sought for. The first contention is therefore repelled. 21. Any and every relief which seeks a direction cannot be construed and characterised as a command, so as to treat it as mandatory injunction, interim or otherwise. The legal nature and character of a relief has to be adjudged in the setting in which it is sought for. The first contention is therefore repelled. 21. The Second contention:- The interim relief sought for in Ext.P6 application is neither traceable to Order XXXIX, Rule 2, nor Section 151 of the Code:- It is true that the relief for conducting meeting of the Board of Trustees is not one falling within the ambit of Order XXXIX, Rule 1 or 2. However, it is pertinent to notice that, Ext.P6 cites Section 151 of the Code as the source of power for issuance of the direction sought for. Therefore, the question which surface is, whether a direction in the form of an injunction can be sought for under Section 151, if such relief is not one falling within the scope of Order XXXIX. The legal position in this regard is not res integra; the same stands settled way back from 1962 onwards, when a four judges bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the legal position in the affirmative in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 (SC) 567 ). The relevant findings are extracted: “18. There is difference of opinion between the High Courts on this point. One view is that a Court cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if the circumstances do not fall within the provisions of Order 39 of the Code: Varadacharlu v. Narsimha Charlu; Govindarajulu v Imperial Bank of India Karuppayya v. Ponnuswami; Murugesa Mudali v. Angamuthu Mudalie and Subramanian v. Seetarama. The other view is that a Court can issue an interim injunction under circumstances which are not covered by Order 39 of the Code, if the Court is of opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction: Dhaneshwar Nath v. Ghanshyam Dhar; Firm Bichchha Ram v. Firm Baldeo Sahai; Bhagat Singh v. Jagbir Sawhney and Chinese Tannery Owners' Association v Makhan Lal. We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC. We are of opinion that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 CPC. There is no such expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any rules made under the Code. It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. The effect of the expression “if it is so prescribed” is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power. 19. There is nothing in Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 which provide specifically that a temporary injunction is not to be issued in cases which are not mentioned in those rules. The rules only provide that in circumstances mentioned in them the Court may grant a temporary injunction. 20. Further the provisions of Section 151 of the Code make it clear that the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code. The rules only provide that in circumstances mentioned in them the Court may grant a temporary injunction. 20. Further the provisions of Section 151 of the Code make it clear that the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code. Section 151 reads: "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." 22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold in paragraph no.23 that, the non-obstante clause with which Section 151 of the Code starts, would leave no room for any doubt, as regards the inherent powers of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. It was held that, the inherent power is not the creation of Code, but a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties. Although, one among the Hon'ble judges (J.C. Shah, J.) had dissented in the above view, the same will not affect the proposition of law as held by the majority judgment. 23. The legal position in this regard was reiterated by S.B. Sinha, J., speaking for the Bench, in Tanusree Basu and Other v. Inshani Prasad Basu and Others [ 2008 (4) SCC 791 ] (See in this regard paragraph no. 16 of the judgment). The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon Manohar Lal Chopra (supra) and also in India Household and Healthcare Limited v. LG Household and Healthcare L imited [ AIR 2007 (SC) 1376 ], to hold that Section 151 confers powers on the Court to grant injunction, if the matter is not covered by Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX. In the light of the above discussion, the second contention is also untenable. 24. In the light of the above discussion, the second contention is also untenable. 24. The third contention:- The relief sought for in Ext.P6 cannot be granted i n the plaintiff's suit for injunction simpliciter, in the absence of a counter-claim and that the same is outside the scope of the suit:- As regards this point, this Court should notice that the question as to whether a counter-claim has to be sought for or not is a matter wholly within the domain of the defendants and it cannot be said that in the absence of such a counter-claim, the defendants cannot seek an interim injunction or for that matter, a direction in the nature of an injunction. This Court also frowns upon the contention that the relief sought for in Ext.P6 is outside the scope of the suit. As already indicated, the suit was essentially to prevent a meeting of the Board of Trustees being convened by the defendants, without the junction of the plaintiff, who going by Rule 15 of Ext.P2 Trust deed, is the sole authority to issue notice. It is in prima facie recognition of that contention that a temporary injunction was granted by the court, which order itself carves out an exception that notice can be given to the plaintiff to convene any such meeting. In such circumstances, Ext.P6 application was filed seeking modification of the interim order directing the plaintiff himself to issue notice for conducting the meeting of the Board of Trustees. The main relief sought for in the suit; the interim injunction sought for by the plaintiff; and the direction sought for vide Ext.P6 are all inextricably interwoven and the last of which, cannot be said to be outside the purview of the first two. This Court is of the opinion that the times have gone, where we have stuck to the technical rigmarole of looking into the scope of the plaintiff's suit in an air-tight compartment; and frowning upon an interim relief sought for by the defendant in a plaintiff's suit, analysing the relative scope and merit of the claims espoused by both parties. This Court is of the opinion that the times have gone, where we have stuck to the technical rigmarole of looking into the scope of the plaintiff's suit in an air-tight compartment; and frowning upon an interim relief sought for by the defendant in a plaintiff's suit, analysing the relative scope and merit of the claims espoused by both parties. At a time when all the courts are clogged with huge pendency, it is no more desirable to refuse relief, especially of an interim nature, on considerations of a jejune and technical nature, thereby relegating the defendant to file a fresh suit on the same subject matter in prosecution of an interim relief he seeks. Of course, in the context of a main relief, the same cannot be thought of in the absence of a counter-claim. However, the situation will be different, when a modification of the injunction order or a counter injunction is sought for by the defendant as against the plaintiff, especially when the same is indivisibly intertwined to and within the ambit of the subject matter of the suit, as also, the interim injunction, already granted. This Court therefore, repels the third contention as well. 25. Contentions on facts:- The specific objection raised before this Court by the petitioners, is as against the agenda nos.1 and 4, which pertains to injunction of new members and appointment of new Manager. In this regard, this Court takes into account the arguments addressed in detail by the learned Senior counsel for respondents 1 to 3 and 5, as taken note of in paragraph nos.11 and 12 above. 26. Although, this Court was elaborately taken to the various provisions in the Ext.P2 Trust deed and arguments were addressed based on the same, this Court is of the opinion that, the respective contentions of the parties should receive consideration at the hands of the learned Munsiff first. It is relevant to note that, Exts.P7 and P8 objections to Ext.P6 application, only seeks to defer the meeting sought to be called for. Having considered the reasons stated in Exts.P7 and P8, this Court is of the opinion that, the same are not sufficient to defer the proposed meeting. The question as to whether the second respondent holds dual posts as alleged and the hearing contemplated by the DPI are not recognizable reasons for not holding the meeting. Having considered the reasons stated in Exts.P7 and P8, this Court is of the opinion that, the same are not sufficient to defer the proposed meeting. The question as to whether the second respondent holds dual posts as alleged and the hearing contemplated by the DPI are not recognizable reasons for not holding the meeting. At best, the petitioners can espouse the same in the proposed meeting, in the context of the propriety, if any, in dealing with the particular agenda item. 27. Apart from the request for deferring the meeting, the contentions raised in Ext.P6 are not seen met on merits in Ext.P7 and P8 counter affidavits. In the circumstances, the interest of justice demands to afford one more opportunity to the petitioners herein to file a counter affidavit to Ext.P6 application on merits and to re-hear the parties on the basis of the respective contentions. The trial court will essentially focus on the question as to, whether there exists any embargo or legally recognisable contention, so as to stall the very meeting sought to be convened, as distinguished from a contention on the impropriety, if any, as regards the decision to be taken in the meeting. 28. In the circumstances, Ext.P10 order will stand set aside. Ext.6 application will stand remitted to the trial Court for fresh consideration. The petitioners herein shall file their counter affidavits within a period of 20 days from the date of re-opening (20.05.2024). Thereafter, the learned Munsiff will take Ext.P6 application for consideration, hear the parties and shall pass orders expeditiously within a period of one month from the date of commencement of hearing. It is clarified that, it will not be open for the parties to re-agitate the contentions which have been urged and dealt with in this judgment.