JUDGMENT : Two questions surface for consideration in this Original Petition. The first question -in the context of Section 25 of the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 ('Act 12 of 1955', for short) – is whether it is permissible to seek a relief, which is not specifically recognised in Section 25 of the Act? The second issue is whether an amendment to incorporate subsequent events, as also, to seek a relief on that basis, can be allowed or not. 2. The factual backdrop is as follows: Sree Narayana Health Care Society is one registered under Act 12 of 1955, having 241 members. As many as 33 out of them preferred Ext.P1 Original Petition, O.P.(Society) No.122/2021, under Act 12 of 1955, for framing a scheme for the better and efficient management of the 1st respondent Society and also for a direction to conduct election to the fresh Governing body of the 1st respondent Society, in accordance with the scheme so framed, through the process of court. Along with the Original Petition, I.A.No.1/2021 was filed seeking a temporary injunction restraining the respondents in the Original Petition, inter alia from inducting new members of the Society. An ex-parte ad interim order of injunction was granted as sought for. The same was, however, modified by Ext.P3 order, as per which, the 1st respondent Society was allowed to admit provisionally ordinary members, however, subject to the condition that such members will not have any right to participate in the election and that they will not have any vested right to continue as members, if the Original Petition is ultimately allowed. I.A.No.1/2021 was finally heard and Ext.P4 order was passed dismissing the same, holding that a restraint on admitting new members would affect the income of the Society and thereby, the proper functioning of its institutions. 3. Ext.P4 was subjected to challenge before this Court in F.A.O No.112/2022, wherein Ext.P4 was set aside, vide Ext.P5 judgment. An undertaking given by the contesting respondents that the 1st respondent will not admit any new member in future till the disposal of the suit was recorded and F.A.O was accordingly disposed of. However, during the interregnum between the date of Ext.P4 order (vacating the interim order and dismissing I.A. No.1/2021) and the date of Ext.P5 order, as many as, 51 new members were inducted. However, during the interregnum between the date of Ext.P4 order (vacating the interim order and dismissing I.A. No.1/2021) and the date of Ext.P5 order, as many as, 51 new members were inducted. Seeking clarification of their status, a review petition was filed in Ext.P5 judgment vide R.P.No.1264/2022. The same was, however, disposed of stating that Ext.P3 modified order of the Additional District Court got merged with Ext.P4 order and, therefore, the status of the said 51 persons is not required to be clarified. In such circumstances, the petitioners herein preferred Ext.P7 application for amendment of the plaint to incorporate pleadings to the effect that the persons, who were inducted as ordinary members of the 1st respondent Society, provisionally, during the pendency of the Original Petition, are not validly inducted members and that they are not conferred with any vested right or privilege as members of the Society. A relief to that effect was also sought for in the plaint. A further declaration was also sought for that the election to the Governing body of the 1st respondent Society held on 12.01.2020 is not lawful and that executive committee and the office bearers thus elected, are not empowered to govern and administer the affairs of the respondent Society. Exts.P8 to P13 are the counter affidavits preferred by the various respondents to Ext.P7 amendment application. 4. By Ext.P14 order dated 04.03.2023, the amendment sought for vide Ext.P7 was dismissed, on the solitary ground that the reliefs sought to be incorporated are outside the purview of Section 25 of Act 12 of 1955 and that the court has no jurisdiction or power to grant any relief, other than those specified/enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) to Section 25(1). The learned District Judge also found that the petitioners have every right to institute an ordinary civil suit seeking the reliefs sought for by virtue of Ext.P7 amendment. Ext.P14 order is under challenge before this Court. 5. Heard Sri.P.B.Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri.S.Sreekumar, learned Senior Counsel -duly instructed by Adv.P.Martin Jose -on behalf of respondents 61 to 81 and Sri.A.Sudhi Vasudevan, learned Senior Counsel -duly instructed by Adv.Shilpa Sathish -on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, 15, 16 and 18 to 29. 6. Ext.P14 order is under challenge before this Court. 5. Heard Sri.P.B.Krishnan, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri.S.Sreekumar, learned Senior Counsel -duly instructed by Adv.P.Martin Jose -on behalf of respondents 61 to 81 and Sri.A.Sudhi Vasudevan, learned Senior Counsel -duly instructed by Adv.Shilpa Sathish -on behalf of respondents 1 to 3, 15, 16 and 18 to 29. 6. This Court will address the first question as to whether the relief sought for by virtue of Ext.P7 amendment application is outside the purview of the reliefs specifically enumerated under Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 25(1) of Act 12 of 1955. If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, then Ext.P14 order is liable to be confirmed, and if not, the same cannot be. 7. Section 25(1) is extracted here below: “25. Application to Court for dissolution, framing a scheme, etc.—(1) When an application is made by the [State Government] or ten per cent of the members on the rolls of a society to the District Court within the jurisdiction of which the society is registered, the court may, after enquiry and on being satisfied that it is just and equitable, pass any of the following orders:- (a) removing the existing governing body and appointing a fresh governing body; or (b) framing a scheme for the better and efficient management of the society; or (c) dissolving the society.” It is true that Section 25 carves out a specific remedy to be invoked by the State Government or by 10 percent of the members on the roles of the Society in respect of specific reliefs enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c). It is equally true that there is no bar of jurisdiction of the civil court on account of the jurisdiction conferred on the District Court by virtue of Section 25 of Act 12 of 1955, wherefore, there is no legal embargo in a party approaching a civil court in respect of a relief, which does not squarely fall within the ambit of the enumerated reliefs under Clauses (a) to (c) to Section 25(1). The legal position is seen laid down in i)Parayakkattu Nalukulangara Devaswom v. Padmanabhan Harshas and Others [ 1983 KLT 803 ] and ii)Ezhuthachan National Academy and Others v. R.Gopinathan Nair and Others (DB) [ 2019 (2) KLT 1073 ]. The legal position is seen laid down in i)Parayakkattu Nalukulangara Devaswom v. Padmanabhan Harshas and Others [ 1983 KLT 803 ] and ii)Ezhuthachan National Academy and Others v. R.Gopinathan Nair and Others (DB) [ 2019 (2) KLT 1073 ]. As a corollary, it could be held that a relief, independent and separate from the reliefs enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) to Section 25(1), cannot be sought for before the District Court under Section 25 of Act 12 of 1955 and in respect of such reliefs, the party can always approach a Civil Court, whose jurisdiction is not barred. However, the difficulty arise when a relief, which is so inextricably interwoven with one among the reliefs enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) is sought for, especially when the resolution of the dispute involved and the grant of such relief is quite necessary for grant of one among the reliefs enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c). In such circumstances, is it wise and desirable to relegate the parties to the civil court to file a separate suit seeking such relief, is the larger question involved. The answer which occurs to the mind of this Court is an emphatic 'No'. For, such a course may lead to conflict of decisions by two competent courts, more or less on the same subject and in respect of reliefs, which can be termed as the main relief and incidental reliefs, on the same dispute. Besides, the valuable time of two different courts on more or less the same issue/dispute, cannot be contemplated to be spent, at a time when all courts are clogged with huge pendency of litigations. 8. This Court is fortified in adopting the above view by invoking the doctrine of incidental and ancillary powers. It is too well settled a principle that when a statute bestows a power upon court/authority to do a particular act, all necessary and ancillary powers for the effective performance of the Act directed to be done by the statute has to be read into it. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes recognises this principle, thus (11th Edition at page no.350) “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoqe concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit.” 9. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes recognises this principle, thus (11th Edition at page no.350) “where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictio data est, ea quoqe concessa esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictio explicari non potuit.” 9. In Ex parte Martin [(1879) 4 QBD 212, 491], it was held that “where an inferior court is empowered to grant an injunction, the power of punishing disobedience to it by commitment is impliedly conveyed by the enactment, for the power would be useless if it could not be enforced.” 10. Applying the above principles, the Honourable Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K.Mohammed Kunji [ AIR 1969 SC 430 ] held that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal must be held to have the power to grant stay of recovery of the penalty during the pendency of an appeal, as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. The principle was applied by the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Paras Laminates Pvt. Ltd. [ 1990 (4) SCC 453 ]. The following observations in paragraph no.8 of the judgment are relevant and extracted here below: “8. There is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction. It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised, the powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited. Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective.” 11. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective.” 11. Coming to the facts at hand, the issue pertains to induction of new ordinary members to the Society pendente lite. As already indicated, there was an absolute interdiction of such induction by virtue of an ex parte order of injunction, which was later modified by virtue of Ext.P3 order permitting induction, but restraining their rights to participate in the elections and also clarifying that such members will not have any right to continue as members, once the Original Petition is allowed. This was interfered with by virtue of Ext.P4 judgment, whereby the injunction was vacated in toto. In F.A.O, this Court set aside Ext.P4 order and disposed of the F.A.O by recording the undertaking that no new members will be inducted, until disposal of the Original Petition by the District Court. It is in such circumstances that, the status as regards 51 members, who were inducted in the interregnum pending the Original Petition, becomes relevant. 12. This Court cannot appreciate the argument of the learned Senior Counsel Sri.Sudhi Vasudevan that the status of the newly inducted members have no bearing, whatsoever, upon the ultimate reliefs sought for in the Original Petition. As already held, the first relief in the Original Petition is to frame a scheme and the second, for a direction to conduct elections to the Governing body of the 1st respondent Society, in accordance with the scheme, so framed. Needless to say that, the voting powers will be exercised by the members in the elections to the executive committee, if the Original Petition is ultimately allowed and the scheme is framed. Such voting powers are conferred on the members of the Society, as per the existing bye laws, as well. Therefore, the status of the above referred 51 persons, who were inducted pendente lite, subject to Ext.P3 order of the District Court, which was subsequently modified by Exts.P4 and P5 orders, certainly assumes significance, especially when the number of persons so inducted is sizeable to the extent of 51 numbers. Therefore, the status of the above referred 51 persons, who were inducted pendente lite, subject to Ext.P3 order of the District Court, which was subsequently modified by Exts.P4 and P5 orders, certainly assumes significance, especially when the number of persons so inducted is sizeable to the extent of 51 numbers. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the total number of persons so inducted in two phases is 81, so that they can substantially influence the ultimate outcome of the elections, so as to tilt the balance in favour of one faction, wherefore, the contention that their status is completely unconnected with and have no bearing with the relief sought for, can hardly be countenanced. 13. Once it is held so, the question is whether the amendment sought for as regards their status, especially their rights and privileges as members is something, which is incidental and ancillary to the second relief sought for in the Original Petition. This Court may observe in this regard that the second relief for a direction to conduct elections to the Governing body of the 1st respondent Society is very much a relief, which falls within the ambit of Clause (a) to Section 25(1) of Act 12 of 1955. If the District Court is inclined to allow that relief, this Court is of the opinion that the status of the said persons, who were inducted as ordinary members pendente lite, is also required to be adjudicated for the effective grant of relief no. B. The petitioners are seeking assistance of the Court in appointing a fresh Governing body by conducting elections in accord with the scheme to be framed, wherefore, the right to franchise of the newly inducted members is certainly relevant. This Court may also notice in this regard that the present situation is something, which is created pending the litigation, but for which, the amendment of the relief would not have been necessitated. For that reason also, this Court is of the opinion that the amendment sought for to incorporate the relief cannot be refused on the premise that the same is outside the scope of reliefs (a) to (c) contemplated in Section 25(1). 14. For that reason also, this Court is of the opinion that the amendment sought for to incorporate the relief cannot be refused on the premise that the same is outside the scope of reliefs (a) to (c) contemplated in Section 25(1). 14. Now, coming to the 2nd amended relief, which is for a declaration that the elections to the Governing body of the Society held on 12.01.2020 was not lawful and the committee and office bearers so elected, are not empowered to govern and administer the affairs of the Society, this Court notice that the said declaration is quite necessary for granting relief under B. Section 25(1)(a) contemplates a relief for removing the existing Governing body and appointing a fresh Governing body. It is in tune with Clause (a) to Section 25(1) that relief B is seen couched, whereby directions are sought for to appoint a fresh Governing body by conducting elections to the 1st respondent Society in accordance with the scheme to be framed, as sought for in relief A. Though the removal of the existing Governing body is not specifically sought for, the same is an inevitable step to appoint a fresh Governing body, as per a new scheme sought to be framed. That being so, a declaration to the effect that the elections to the Governing body of the 1st respondent Society held on 12.01.2020 is not lawful, is very much necessary. There is no quarrel that the present executive committee and the office bearers were so elected in such election, which is sought to be challenged by virtue of the amendment. In other words, the relief with respect to a declaration that the elections already held are bad in law, is something which is inextricably interwoven with the main relief sought for vide relief no.B. The same is the case with respect to the proposed amended relief with respect to the status of newly inducted members, which is also, inseparably linked with the grant of relief no.B. 15. For reasons already adverted to, it is neither conducive, nor proper to relegate the parties to approach the civil court, by filing a separate suit in respect of the above two reliefs, which are so in indivisibly inter-twined with the main relief sought for in the instant Original Petition. For reasons already adverted to, it is neither conducive, nor proper to relegate the parties to approach the civil court, by filing a separate suit in respect of the above two reliefs, which are so in indivisibly inter-twined with the main relief sought for in the instant Original Petition. No contention, whatsoever, was raised before this Court, as regards the maintainability of the main relief sought for in the Original Petition, as one falling outside the scope of Clauses (a) to (c) to Section 25(1). That being so, the present reliefs, which are inseparably interwoven with such main reliefs also has to be decided by the same court for comity of conclusion and certainty, as well. This Court, therefore, concludes that the finding of the learned District Judge that the amended reliefs are falling outside the purview of enumerated reliefs vide clauses (a) to (c) to Section 25(1), cannot be sustained. 16. Coming to the second question as to whether an amendment to incorporate events subsequent to the filing of the litigation can be allowed or not, the question is no more res integra. The question has been answered by a catena of decisions including i) Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another [ (2002) 7 SCC 559 ]; ii) Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B.Goyal [ (2002) 2 SCC 256 ] and iii) Ram Nibas Gagar (Dead) by Lrs. v. Debojyothi Das and Others [ (2003) 1 SCC 472 ]. 17. In the light of the above referred authoritative judgments, the second question is also resolved, holding that the amendment to incorporate subsequent events is liable to be allowed, provided the same is required for determining the real controversy in issue. 18. In the light of the above discussion, as also, to save the time of the parties -especially when a time bound disposal of Original Petition has already been directed to by this Court vide Ext.P5 order - Ext.P7 amendment application is allowed. The trial court will carry out the amendment and shall proceed with the Original Petition, in accordance with law, expeditiously. This Original Petition is disposed of, as above.