JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. 1. The instant revision application has been filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure assailing the order dated 15.09.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (ACB), Palamau at Daltonganj in connection with A.C.B. Case No. 09 of 2022 and Vigilance Case No.09 of 2022, whereby and whereunder, the prayer made by the petitioner for his discharge for the offence under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, has been rejected. Factual Matrix of the case: 2. The factual matrix leading to filing of the instant case in brief reads as under: One Niranjan Singh has alleged that on 05.08.2022 he has given two applications before the Circle Officer, Chainpur for uploading Khata no. 24, plot nos. 34, 43, 45, 42, 46, 52 and 40 measuring an area of 3.11/4 Decimals and Khata no. 1, 13, 18, 59, 65, 58, 106, 182, plot nos. 440, 445, 502, 328, 439 on Jharseva site but the same had not been updated online. It is further alleged that when the same had not been updated, then the informant met with one Kanhai Ram, Karmchari of Basaria Kala and asked him as to why his work for updating the same has not been done till date, upon which he asked him to pay an amount of Rs.12,000/- as bribe for his work, but the informant was not ready to pay the bribe amount to him and therefore, he filed a complaint in A.C.B. office. On the complainant made by the informant, the said matter was verified by one Navin Prasad, Police Inspector, ACB, Palamau on 24.08.2022 at the private office of the accused Kanhai Ram running near Forest Department Office, Chainpur where the informant met the accused Kanhai Ram and again, he demanded money for his work. On this, the informant requested to reduce the bribe amount but the accused told him that he has to pay the bribe amount if he wants his work to be completed. Thereafter, the informant told the verifying officer on 12.09.2022 that the bribe amount which was demanded by him has been arranged and accordingly the verifying officer submitted his report on 12.09.2022. Thereafter, the informant told the verifying officer on 12.09.2022 that the bribe amount which was demanded by him has been arranged and accordingly the verifying officer submitted his report on 12.09.2022. Thereafter, the case has been lodged against the accused Kanhai Ram and after following the procedure, the raiding team of A.C.B. caught Kanhai Ram and the present petitioner red handed from Mata Vaishnavi Complex, Chainpur and tainted money of Rs.10,000/- (20 notes of the denomination of Rs.500/-) was recovered from the petitioner as because the co-accused Kanhai Ram has handed over the said bribe amount to the petitioner after counting the same and accordingly the seizure list was prepared. Thereafter the F.I.R. has been lodged. Argument of the learned counsel for the parties 3. Learned senior counsel has submitted that for invoking any provision of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the essential condition is that there has to be "public servant", against whom the Act would be applied. Since the petitioner is neither a public servant nor would fall under any of the category of discharging any functions as public authority, accordingly, under no circumstances, the petitioner can be brought within the ambit of the Act of 1988. 4. He further submits that the respondent by registering the FIR under Section 7(a) of the Act against the private individual (petitioner herein) has therefore, not only abused the process of law but has also resulted in depriving the liberty of the petitioner which otherwise could not have been curtailed except in accordance with law. Thus, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the respondent has misused its authority by registering the impugned FIR and consequently, the arrest of the petitioner is sheer abuse of process of law, whereby the liberty of the petitioner has been deprived. 5. Mr. A.K. Kashyap, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the ground that the cognizance taken under Section 7(a) of the PC Act will not be maintainable since herein the petitioner is not a public servant. It has been submitted that Section 7(a) is only applicable with respect to the commission of crime said to attract Section 7(a) by the public servant. 6. While on the other hand, Mrs. It has been submitted that Section 7(a) is only applicable with respect to the commission of crime said to attract Section 7(a) by the public servant. 6. While on the other hand, Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to take the ground that cognizance has been taken under Section 7(a) although it has been written as 7(a) but the FIR has been instituted under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018. The matter would have been different if the cognizance would have been taken pre-amended act wherein there is no provision of Section 7(A) but the case has been instituted post-amended act, hence, Section 7(a) cannot be of any aid so as to come to the conclusion that the entire prosecution version will be vitiated. 7. It has been submitted that the petitioner has been found prima facie to commit offence under Section 7(A) since the ingredient of Section 7(A) is well available against the petitioner. 8. Further, the second argument has been advanced by the learned senior counsel that there is no acceptance of the bribed money rather only the allegation as per the prosecuting agency is that the petitioner was sitting just adjacent to a person who happens to be a public servant. 9. In response to the aforesaid contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the learned State counsel has submitted by referring to the imputation so made against the petitioner that he all along was sitting adjacent to the public servant and he was also hearing the entire conversation of negotiation of the amount from Rs.12,000/- to Rs.10,000/- or Rs.2,000/- may be exempted and thereafter, the money which was taken over by the public servant, i.e., one Kanhai Ram was handed over to the petitioner who has accepted the same at the time when the team intercepted and even the alleged money was recovered from the hand of the present petitioner. The evidence is there that the hands of both Kanhai Ram and the petitioner became pink, hence, it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to take the ground that there is no prima facie evidence to proceed with the trial. 10. The evidence is there that the hands of both Kanhai Ram and the petitioner became pink, hence, it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to take the ground that there is no prima facie evidence to proceed with the trial. 10. It has further been contended by the state counsel that whatever argument is being made, the same cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge rather the matter is to be looked into at the stage of trial. 11. Learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the learned court while rejecting the discharge application cannot be said to suffer from error since prima facie imputation is there against the petitioner to proceed with the trial. Analysis 12. In view of aforesaid submissions of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the contents of the instant revision petition as well as the impugned order. 13. It is evident from the record that the case has been lodged against the accused Kanhai Ram and after following the procedure, the raiding team of A.C.B. caught Kanhai Ram and the present petitioner red handed from Mata Vaishnavi Complex, Chainpur and tainted money of Rs.10,000/- (20 notes of the denomination of Rs.500/-) was recovered from the petitioner as because the co-accused Kanhai Ram has handed over the said bribe amount to the petitioner after counting the same and accordingly the seizure list was prepared. Thereafter the F.I.R. has been lodged. 14. Accordingly, the cognizance of offence has been taken and consequently, a discharge petition was filed by the present petitioner but the same was dismissed vide order dated 15.09.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge (ACB), Palamau at Daltonganj in connection with A.C.B. Case No. 09 of 2022 and Vigilance Case No.09 of 2022 which is the subject matter of the instant revision application. 15. Before adverting into merit of the case this Court thinks it fit to discuss the principle of discharge as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. 16. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner. 17. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation under section 161(3) of the Code, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the police report submitted under section 173(2) of the Code. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed. 18. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. 19. 19. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan and Others, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , wherein at paragraphs no.29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon’ble Apex Court has been observed as under : “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 MLJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification. 33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously. 34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.” 20. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148 , that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no.18 of the said judgment which reads as under : “18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.” 21. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 . For ready reference Paragraph nos.10 to 17 of the said judgment are quoted below : “10. By the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has set aside the order passed by the learned Special Judge framing the charge against the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act and consequently has discharged the accused for the said offence. What has been weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused is stated in paras 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order, which are reproduced hereinabove. 11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. 11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) ‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’ ” 12. We shall now apply the principles enunciated above to the present case in order to find out whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in discharging the accused for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. 13. Having considered the reasoning given by the High Court and the grounds which are weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239 CrPC. While discharging the accused, the High Court has gone into the merits of the case and has considered whether on the basis of the material on record, the accused is likely to be convicted or not. For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in detail the transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused which exercise at this stage to consider the discharge application and/or framing of the charge is not permissible at all. 14. As rightly observed and held by the learned Special Judge at the stage of framing of the charge, it has to be seen whether or not a prima facie case is made out and the defence of the accused is not to be considered. 14. As rightly observed and held by the learned Special Judge at the stage of framing of the charge, it has to be seen whether or not a prima facie case is made out and the defence of the accused is not to be considered. After considering the material on record including the transcript of the conversation between the complainant and the accused, the learned Special Judge having found that there is a prima facie case of the alleged offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, framed the charge against the accused for the said offence. The High Court materially erred in negating the exercise of considering the transcript in detail and in considering whether on the basis of the material on record the accused is likely to be convicted for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act or not. 15. As observed hereinabove, the High Court was required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not. At the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. At this stage, it is to be noted that even as per Section 7 of the PC Act, even an attempt constitutes an offence. Therefore, the High Court has erred and/or exceeded in virtually holding a mini trial at the stage of discharge application. 16. We are not further entering into the merits of the case and/or merits of the transcript as the same is required to be considered at the time of trial. Defence on merits is not to be considered at the stage of framing of the charge and/or at the stage of discharge application. 17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court 28 discharging the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is unsustainable in law and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly hereby quashed and set aside and the order passed by the learned Special Judge framing charge against the accused under Section 7 of the PC Act is hereby restored. Now the case is to be tried against the accused by the competent court for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, in accordance with law and its own merits.” 22. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra & Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 ] wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under : “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy [ (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised. 14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [ (2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh & others (2009) 3 SCC(Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time. 24. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715 . 25. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under : “27. 25. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under : “27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.” 26. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely infered that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused. 27. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible. 28. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case is made out or not? 29. This Court deems it fit and proper to scrutinize the evidence available on record. 30. 29. This Court deems it fit and proper to scrutinize the evidence available on record. 30. From the material available on record, it is evident that there is specific accusation against the petitioner that the present petitioner was caught red handed from Mata Vaishnavi Complex, Chainpur and tainted money of Rs.10,000/- (20 notes of the denomination of Rs.500/-) was recovered from the petitioner as because the co-accused Kanhai Ram has handed over the said bribe amount to the petitioner after counting the same and accordingly the seizure list was prepared. Thereafter the F.I.R. has been lodged. 31. The foremost contention of the learned senior counsel for the revisionist is that for invoking said provision of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the essential condition is that there has to be "public servant", against whom the Act would be applied. Since the petitioners are neither the public servant nor would fall under any of the category of discharging any functions as public authority, accordingly, under no circumstances, the petitioner can be brought within the ambit of the Act of 1988 and the respondent by registering the FIR under Section 7(a) of the Act against the private individual (petitioner herein) has therefore, not only abused the process of law but has also resulted in depriving the liberty of the petitioner which otherwise could not have been curtailed except in accordance with law. 32. Per contra, the learned counsel for state has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the petitioner to take the ground that cognizance has been taken under Section 7(a) although it has been written as 7(a) but the FIR has been instituted under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act 2018. The matter would have been different if there is no provision of Section 7(A) but the case has been instituted post-amended act, hence, Section 7(a) cannot be of any aid so as to come to the conclusion that the entire prosecution version will be vitiated. 33. In the backdrop of the aforesaid contentions of the parties, at this juncture, this Court thinks fit to discuss the evolution and object of the Prevention of Corruption Act along with the relevant provisions to reach out the conclusion that whether the case of discharge of petitioner is made out or not. 34. 33. In the backdrop of the aforesaid contentions of the parties, at this juncture, this Court thinks fit to discuss the evolution and object of the Prevention of Corruption Act along with the relevant provisions to reach out the conclusion that whether the case of discharge of petitioner is made out or not. 34. At the outset, it may be noted that the PC Act, 1988 sets the framework for prosecuting individuals involved in corrupt activities and provides measures to prevent corruption in various spheres of the society. By emphasizing accountability, transparency and strict legal consequences, the PC Act stands to combat corruption and to foster and uphold the culture of ethical conduct. The very objectives of the Act are to prevent corruption, to promote transparency and accountability in the public administration, to deter individuals from engaging in corrupt practices by imposing strict penalties, protects whistleblowers etc. It also provides for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, outlining the procedure for gathering evidence, conducting trials and ensuring a fair and expeditious legal process. 35. By the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act, 2018), the PC Act, 1988 was further amended, to fill in the gaps in the description and coverage of the offence of bribery so as to bring it in line with the current international practices and also to meet more effectively the country's obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 36. The Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section (1) of the Amendment Act, 2018, had vide the Notification dated 26.07.2018 appointed the 26th July 2018 as the date on which the provisions of the said Amendment shall come into force. Accordingly, the said provisions of the Amendment Act, 2018 came into force on 26.07.2018. 37. By the Amendment Act, 2018, several provisions more particularly the offences described under Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13 in the PC Act, 1988 were substituted with the new provisions; and several new provisions like Section 7A, 17A, 18A, 29A etc. were inserted. Certain provisions pertaining to the punishments of the offences under the Act were also amended. 38. By the Amendment Act, 2018, several provisions more particularly the offences described under Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 13 in the PC Act, 1988 were substituted with the new provisions; and several new provisions like Section 7A, 17A, 18A, 29A etc. were inserted. Certain provisions pertaining to the punishments of the offences under the Act were also amended. 38. Since the main issue involved in the present Appeal is in respect of the implication of the newly inserted provision Section 7 and 7-A, hence this Court thinks fit to discuss the core and scope of aforesaid sections particularly amended section 7-A. 39. For the facility of reference, Section 7 and 7-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 is reproduced hereunder:- "7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. -- Any public servant who, -- (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; (b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.--For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Explanation 1.--For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Explanation 2.--For the purpose of this section,-- (i) the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party. 7-A. Taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence.--Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person any undue advantage as a motive or reward to induce a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence to perform or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to forbear such public duty by such public servant or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 40. Before entering into interpretation of the aforesaid sections it will be purposeful to regurgitate the basic principles of Statutory interpretation as propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time. It is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the courts must look to the object which the Statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. The purport and object of the Act must be given its full effect and the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in the Statue. 41. Further, it is settled proposition of law that if two views are possible, the view which most accords the object of the Act, and which makes the Act workable must necessarily be the controlling view. 41. Further, it is settled proposition of law that if two views are possible, the view which most accords the object of the Act, and which makes the Act workable must necessarily be the controlling view. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012) 3 SCC 64 , has categorically observed that in case of two possible constructions of a provision in the PC Act, it would be the duty of the court to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it. 42. Further, even penal Statutes are governed not only by their literal language, but also by the object sought to be achieved by Parliament. Even if the words occurring in the Statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner which would fit in the context of the other provisions of the Statutes and bring about the real intention of the legislature. 43. Thus, whereas the prospective statute operates from the date of its enactments conferring new rights, the retrospective statute operates backwards and takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under the existing laws. A retroactive statute is one that does not operate retrospectively, however depending upon the status and nature of the events or transactions, the operation of the statute is extended or given effect from the date prior to its enactment. So far as the Amendment Act, 2018 is concerned, it has been made applicable specifically from the date of its notification i.e. 26.07.2018. 44. So far as the Amendment Act, 2018 is concerned, it has been made applicable specifically from the date of its notification i.e. 26.07.2018. 44. Similarly, from a bare reading of Section 7 of PC Act 1988, the same can be extended to any public servant who obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 45. The explanation- I further amplifies the scope of Section 7 which provides that for the purpose of this Section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant is not or has not been improper. Explanation- II further provides that for the purpose of this section, the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means, and it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party. 46. From a bare perusal of Explanation I and II, it is emphatically clear that accepting, or attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence. 46. From a bare perusal of Explanation I and II, it is emphatically clear that accepting, or attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence. Further, the expression "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means, and it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party. 47. Thus, it may safely be concluded that while Section 7 and 7A are independent to each other but Section 7A has been inserted with sole object to reach aiders and abettors of the offence. It, therefore, extends all the persons whether they are or are not public servant. However, where a person accepting bribe is a public servant, the Section for charging him is Section 7 of PC Act 1988, and for a private person, Section 7A would be applicable. Therefore, Section 7A gives wider power to the authorities to initiate action against a private individual, which means involvement of public servant is not a condition precedent for registering of FIR. 48. Further Section 3 of the Act empowers the Central or the State Government to appoint Special Judges, by notification in the Official Gazette, to try cases, as may be specified therein, namely : (a) any offence punishable under the Act; and (b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of the offences specified in clause (a). 49. Under Section 4 (3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, when trying a case, a special Judge may also try any offence, other than the offence specified under Section 3 of the P.C. Act with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, be charged at the same trial. 50. A combined reading of both the provision will make it abundantly clear that the legislature has cast the net wide enough to bring it within its fold not only the principal actors, but also the conspirators, abettors and collaborators with the aid of Section as stipulated in Indian Penal Code. 50. A combined reading of both the provision will make it abundantly clear that the legislature has cast the net wide enough to bring it within its fold not only the principal actors, but also the conspirators, abettors and collaborators with the aid of Section as stipulated in Indian Penal Code. Even a person who is not a public servant will come within its fold if by direct or circumstantial evidence his complicity in the offence comes into picture as an abettor. 51. Now adverting into the fact of the instant case it is evident from the prosecution case as unfolded in the FIR, the role attributed to this petitioner is that he had received the bribed amount which was handed over to him by Kanhai Ram (Revenue Karamchari of the concerned block) who is the main accused. There may be chances that this petitioner, under conspiracy with the public servant, received the amount. It is also on record that the petitioner has been arrested by police trap on the spot after completing all the formalities. 52. Here in the present case, from the record, it is apparently clear that initially as per the stand of respondent, a complaint was made against the Revenue Karamchari namely Kanhai Ram and by taking aid of Section 7 the FIR was instituted. Since as per the materials on record the petitioner is a private person who has been depicted as associate of the main accused who accepted the amount of bribe from the main accused thus, there are sufficient materials to make out a prima facie case that the petitioner engaged and aided the principal accused in facilitating the commission of the criminal act. 53. Further it is apparent from the record that alleged offence was committed on 12.09.2022 that is much after the insertion of new provision 7-A which is effective from 26.07.2018. 54. However, the facts of the instant case reveal that exchange of money has taken place. This prima facie gives the impression that the demand of money by the main accused namely Kanhai Ram at the time of occurrence from the complainant, could have been done under a well-knit conspiracy hatched with the present petitioner, in order to obtain undue advantage for themselves, which also falls within the ambit of Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 55. 55. This Court is of the firm view that a zero tolerance towards corruption should be the top-notch priority for ensuring system based and policy driven, transparent and responsive governance. Corruption cannot be annihilated but strategically be dwindled by reducing monopoly and enabling transparency in decision making. However, fortification of social and moral fabric must be an integral component of long-term policy for nation building to accomplish corruption free society. 56. In furtherance of the fight against corruption, a broad interpretation to the provisions of this statute is required to be given and the arms of this Act are required to be extended to the maximum. The offences under the P.C. Act can be invoked not only against a public servant but also against a private person. 57. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Manusukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 412, has been pleased to observe which reads as under: - "...Today, corruption in our country not only poses a grave danger to the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with the concept of a socialist, secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in our preambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the Court is that any anti-corruption law has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to strengthen the fight against corruption. That is to say in a situation where two constructions are eminently reasonable, the Court has to accept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to the one which seeks to perpetuate it." 58. Be that as it may, on the basis of discussion made herein above, it is to be noted that at this stage scope of adjudication while hearing a discharge petition is a limited one and cannot become a mini trial while considering the material on the basis of which the charge is to be framed. No detailed evaluation of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this stage. 59. No detailed evaluation of the materials or meticulous consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this stage. 59. Further this Court is of the considered view that the points that have been raised in the instant revision petition are part of the defence of the accused/petitioner which can be considered during trial and not at this stage. Prima-facie there are sufficient materials for framing of charge and this Court does not find any illegality or impropriety in the impugned order dated 15.09.2023. 60. In consequence thereof and based upon the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the ground so agitated for interfering with the order passed by the learned trial Court refusing to discharge the petitioner is having no substance and accordingly the same is hereby dismissed. 61. Resultantly, the instant criminal revision application stands dismissed. 62. In consequence of dismissal of the criminal revision, pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. 63. Before parting with the order, it is made clear that the findings so recorded at by this Court are restricted only for the purpose of dealing with the matter of discharge, and as such, the trial Court will not be prejudiced by any of the findings so recorded by this Court or observations made by this Court, during trial.