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2024 DIGILAW 453 (JHR)

State of Jharkhand through the Collector of Palamu v. Kishore Prasad Gupta, S/o. Late Ram Awatar Prasad Gupta

2024-04-26

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2024
JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The petitioners has filed the instant miscellaneous petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order 10.08.2022 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.)-VI, Palamau at Daltonganj in Execution Case No.14 of 2008, whereby and whereunder the petition filed on behalf of the Judgment Debtor (petitioners herein) was rejected wherein a plea was taken that against the decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/-, a cheque of Rs.4,81,519/- has been deposited in the Court and the remaining amount of Rs.82,173/- being under the sales tax, income-tax and royalty head payable by the contractor has been deducted, hence the payment may be considered to be paid in full to the satisfaction of decree and warrant of attachment may be recalled. Facts 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made are as under. 3. The plaintiff to the suit filed a Money Suit for holding him entitled for an amount of the work executed by him. The decree finally was passed by the competent court holding the plaintiff entitled for a decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/-. The decree having not been executed, in consequence thereof, Execution Case has been filed being Execution No.14 of 2008. 4. It is further evident that when Execution proceeding was going on, one petition was filed on behalf of the Judgment Debtor by making objection that the plaintiff (decree holder) is not entitled for the decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/-, rather he is entitled only to get an amount of Rs.4,81,519/-, since, an amount of Rs.82,173/- was already deducted under the Sales Tax, Income-tax and royalty head which was to be paid by the contractor himself. 5. The said objection was dealt with by the Executing Court vide order dated 02.05.2014 by overruling objection of the Judgment Debtor and the petition dated 20th March, 2013 was allowed. 6. It further appears that again after lapse of about eight years, the similar objection was filed. The learned Court by taking note of the order dated 02.05.2014 passed in Execution Case No.14 of 2008 has overruled the said objection vide order dated 10.08.2022, against which the present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner 7. Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Sr. The learned Court by taking note of the order dated 02.05.2014 passed in Execution Case No.14 of 2008 has overruled the said objection vide order dated 10.08.2022, against which the present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner 7. Mr. Ashok Kumar Yadav, learned Sr. S.C.-I appearing for the petitioner-State of Jharkhand has submitted that the learned Court has not appreciated the fact in the right perspective reason being that from the decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/-, a sum of Rs.82,173/-was the statutory deduction to be paid by the contractor and, hence, the decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/- cannot be said to be the entitlement which has been made by the original Trial Court in favour of the contractor leaving apart the statutory deduction under the sales tax, income tax and royalty head which was to be paid by the contractor. 8. It has been contended that the State has already executed the decree so far as the actual entitlement of the contractor is concerned by disbursing an amount of Rs.4,81,519/- and, therefore, the contractor/plaintiff cannot be allowed to take double benefit. 9. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid grounds has submitted that the impugned order suffers from error, hence, this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Analysis 10. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and gone across the finding recorded by the learned executing court while passing the order impugned dated 10.08.2022. 11. This Court from the materials available on record, particularly the decree, has gathered that the plaintiff has been held entitled for disbursement in his favour of the decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/-. The State although has a paid a sum of Rs.4,81,519/- and so far as the remaining amount of Rs.82,173/- is concerned, ground has been taken before the Executing Court that the aforesaid amount of Rs.82,173/- is not the entitlement of the plaintiff, since, the same was deducted under the sales tax, income tax and royalty head as per the liability of the contractor. 12. This Court before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, thinks it fit and proper to deal with the scope and objection of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under : “47. 12. This Court before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, thinks it fit and proper to deal with the scope and objection of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under : “47. Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.-(1) All question arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. ------------- (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court.” 13. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers power upon the Executing court to determine a question if arises between the parties in the suit in which the decree was passed or their representative relating the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Executing court and not by a separate suit. 14. Section 47 has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of decisions, some of the decision is being referred herein for ready reference. 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman reported in (1970) 1 SCC 670 in essence enunciated that only a decree which is nullity can be subject matter of objection under Section 47 of the Code and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision needs to be referred herein : “6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree : between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representative on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record : where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.” 16. In the case of Brakewel Automotive Components (India) (P) Ltd. v. P.R. Selvam Alagappan reported in (2017) 5 SCC 371 wherein their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with Section 47 of the CPC have laid down the proposition at paragraph 21 and 22 which is referred hereinabove : “21. As it is, Section 47 of the Code mandates determination by an executing court, questions arising between the parties or their representatives relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and does not contemplate any adjudication beyond the same. A decree of court of law being sacrosanct in nature, the execution thereof ought not to be thwarted on mere asking and on untenable and purported grounds having no bearing on the validity or the executability thereof. 22. Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are plethoric. 22. Judicial precedents to the effect that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited to objections to its executability on the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness are plethoric. This Court, amongst others in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman in essence enunciated that only a decree which is a nullity can be the subject-matter of objection under Section 47 of the Code and not one which is erroneous either in law or on facts. The following extract from this decision seems apt : (SCC pp. 672-73, paras 6-7) “6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree : between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representative on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make it, objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record : where the objection as to the jurisdiction of the court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the executing court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction.” 17. It is thus evident from the judgment referred hereinabove that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited but objections to its executability on the ground of essential infirmity or voidness and plethoric. It is thus evident from the judgment referred hereinabove that the purview of scrutiny under Section 47 of the Code qua a decree is limited but objections to its executability on the ground of essential infirmity or voidness and plethoric. The Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree until it is set aside in an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be decree or erroneous is still binding upon the parties. 18. It is thus evident that even if the decree said to be wrong but attains its finality, it is not the jurisdiction of the Executing Court not to execute the said decree, rather the Executing Court has to execute the decree as it is, as per the decree passed by the Original Court on adjudication of the suit. The matter would have been different if the decree passed by the concerned court is reversed by the appellate court or modified or partially modified by the superior court. 19. The undisputed fact herein as per the decree passed by the original court is that while decreeing the Money Suit, the decree was passed holding the plaintiff entitled for the decretal amount of Rs.5,63,692/-. For ready reference, the relevant part of the decree is quoted as under:- “The plaintiff is entitle to get a money decree of Rs.3,15,000/-+ Bank’s rate interest + cost of the suit, only. In this way suit is decree in part with contest and with cost of the suit against defendant 2 only. The defendant no.2 is directed to pay the decretal amount within a month from the date of decree to the plaintiff, otherwise valid action will be taken against defendant no.2 with his cost.” 20. The State has not executed the decree said to be in its letter and spirit, rather, the State on its own has paid an amount of Rs.4,81,519/- and rest amount of Rs.82,173/- was not paid on the ground that said amount was deducted under sales tax, income-tax and royalty head. There is no reference in the decree regarding the issue having been raised with respect to the amount which was to be deposited under the sale tax, income-tax and royalty head. 21. There is no reference in the decree regarding the issue having been raised with respect to the amount which was to be deposited under the sale tax, income-tax and royalty head. 21. Even if it is accepted that there is a discussion on the issue, fact remains, the decree has to be executed on the basis of the decree having been passed irrespective of the discussions made. If the discussion has been made and even without consideration of the aforesaid fact the decree has been passed, then the same can be a ground to challenge the decree before the first appellate court, but, here, it is the admitted case that the decree passed by the original court has not been assailed before the higher forum, thus, the decree dated 30.07.2008 passed in Money Suit No.5 of 2004 has attained its finality. 22. It is further admitted fact that objection with respect to non-payment of Rs.82,173/- was also agitated way back in the year 2014 and the Executing Court had rejected the said objection as per the order 02.05.2014 which is appended with the paper book. 23. The State even again after lapse of about eight years has filed a similar objection. The Executing Court has dealt with and passed the impugned order on 10.08.2022 by referring the decision already taken on 02.05.2014 in the Execution Case as also by making reference of the settled position of law that there cannot be a deviation with the decree by the Executing Court. 24. Here, since it is an admitted case that similar objection was dealt with by the Executing Court by passing an order on 02.05.2014, but the same having not been challenged before the higher forum, again, similar objection was filed. The said conduct of the State cannot be appreciated due to the reason that if the State was at all aggrieved, then the order dated 02.05.2014 ought to have been challenged before the higher forum, but after accepting the same, again raising similar question is nothing but a misuse of the judicial proceeding. 25. The said conduct of the State cannot be appreciated due to the reason that if the State was at all aggrieved, then the order dated 02.05.2014 ought to have been challenged before the higher forum, but after accepting the same, again raising similar question is nothing but a misuse of the judicial proceeding. 25. The fact remains herein that since the Executing Court has to strictly go by the decree and if on such ground, the objection so made regarding non-payment of Rs.82,173/- since was already dealt with by an order dated 02.05.2014 and, hence, referring the said order in the subsequent objection as contained in impugned order dated 10.08.2022, according to the considered view of this Court cannot be said to suffering from any error. 26. The law has also been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi, (2021) 6 SCC 418 wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the execution proceeding is to be closed within a period of six months. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under : “21. The High Court has directed the executing court to complete the process within six months. That direction is affirmed. The parties are hereby directed to cooperate with the executing court; in case that court finds any obstruction or non-cooperation it shall proceed to use its powers, including the power to set down and proceed ex parte any party or impose suitably heavy costs. Therefore, in light of the above observations these appeals are liable to be dismissed. 42. All courts dealing with suits and execution proceedings shall mandatorily follow the below mentioned directions: 42.1. In suits relating to delivery of possession, the court must examine the parties to the suit under Order 10 in relation to third-party interest and further exercise the power under Order 11 Rule 14 asking parties to disclose and produce documents, upon oath, which are in possession of the parties including declaration pertaining to third-party interest in such properties. 42.2. In appropriate cases, where the possession is not in dispute and not a question of fact for adjudication before the court, the court may appoint Commissioner to assess the accurate description and status of the property. 42.3. 42.2. In appropriate cases, where the possession is not in dispute and not a question of fact for adjudication before the court, the court may appoint Commissioner to assess the accurate description and status of the property. 42.3. After examination of parties under Order 10 or production of documents under Order 11 or receipt of Commission report, the court must add all necessary or proper parties to the suit, so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also make such joinder of cause of action in the same suit. 42.4. Under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC, a Court Receiver can be appointed to monitor the status of the property in question as custodia legis for proper adjudication of the matter. 42.5. The court must, before passing the decree, pertaining to delivery of possession of a property ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to not only contain clear description of the property but also having regard to the status of the property. 42.6. In a money suit, the court must invariably resort to Order 21 Rule 11, ensuring immediate execution of decree for payment of money on oral application. 42.7. In a suit for payment of money, before settlement of issues, the defendant may be required to disclose his assets on oath, to the extent that he is being made liable in a suit. The court may further, at any stage, in appropriate cases during the pendency of suit, using powers under Section 151 CPC, demand security to ensure satisfaction of any decree. 42.8. The court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47 or under Order 21 CPC, must not issue notice on an application of third party claiming rights in a mechanical manner. Further, the court should refrain from entertaining any such application(s) that has already been considered by the court while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such issue which otherwise could have been raised and determined during adjudication of suit if due diligence was exercised by the applicant. 42.9. The court should allow taking of evidence during the execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare cases where the question of fact could not be decided by resorting to any other expeditious method like appointment of Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including photographs or video with affidavits. 42.10. 42.9. The court should allow taking of evidence during the execution proceedings only in exceptional and rare cases where the question of fact could not be decided by resorting to any other expeditious method like appointment of Commissioner or calling for electronic materials including photographs or video with affidavits. 42.10. The court must in appropriate cases where it finds the objection or resistance or claim to be frivolous or mala fide, resort to sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of Order 21 as well as grant compensatory costs in accordance with Section 35-A. 42.11. Under Section 60 CPC the term “… in name of the judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for him or on his behalf” should be read liberally to incorporate any other person from whom he may have the ability to derive share, profit or property. 42.12. The executing court must dispose of the execution proceedings within six months from the date of filing, which may be extended only by recording reasons in writing for such delay.” 27. In the instant case it is evident that this Execution proceeding is continuing since last 16 years, that too, in a case where an objection having been raised has already been dealt with, but still the subsequent objection on the same ground is being made. 28. This Court also needs to refer herein that the Executing Court is duty-bound to execute the decree, but it is a case where the Executing Court is also not strictly discharging its duty by closing the Execution proceeding by executing the decree in letter and spirit. 29. This Court is exercising the jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India where the law is well settled that the legality of the order, which is to be looked into by the Court exercising power under Article 227, need not be interfered with unless the error appears on the face of the record said to be manifest in the nature or the order passed by the concerned court is without jurisdiction. 30. It is the settled position of law that the jurisdiction of the court exercising the revisionary jurisdiction, as conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is very least and the same can only be exercised if there is manifest error or the jurisdictional error. 31. 30. It is the settled position of law that the jurisdiction of the court exercising the revisionary jurisdiction, as conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is very least and the same can only be exercised if there is manifest error or the jurisdictional error. 31. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein, it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limit less power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. i. The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. ii. Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 , wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. iii. iii. The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. iv. Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. v. It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normal annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. vi. It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. vii. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. vii. In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 32. This Court, after taking into consideration the aforesaid ratio and after coming back to the impugned order, is of the view, for the reasons referred hereinabove, that the petitioners have failed to show any error apparent on the face of order, hence, it is not a case where power conferred to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India under its supervisory jurisdiction is fit to be exercised. 33. This Court in the entirety of the facts and circumstances is of the considered view that the impugned order 10.08.2022 does not suffer from any error. This petition is accordingly dismissed. 34. The Executing Court is directed to expedite the execution proceeding without any further delay. 35. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this Civil Misc. Petition stands disposed of.