ORDER Subba Reddy Satti, J. - The Writ Petition is filed to declare the demand notice dated 10.07.2022 vide Bill No.256 for assessment No.19899 issued by the respondent as illegal and arbitrary and violative of law laid down in V.K. Roy Vs. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and another, 2002 (4) ALD 711 (DB) and consequently direct the respondent not to take any coercive steps. 2. Pending the writ petition, sole petitioner died, and his legal representatives were brought on record, as petitioners 2 and 3, as per order in I.A.No.4 of 2015 dated 05.03.2024. 3. In the affidavit, it was contended, inter alia, that 1st petitioner is the owner of property bearing Door No.27-14-38, Ward No.23, Rajagopalachary Street, Vijayawada. Respondent-authority issued impugned demand notice after 13 years to pay huge amount of Rs.1,48,567.25p within 15 days. In the demand notice, petitioner is directed to pay the amount failing which, articles of the petitioner will be auctioned and essential services like water and drainage connections will be disconnected. Petitioner also reserved the right to challenge fixation of half yearly property tax. 4. Counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent. It was contended, inter alia, that demand notices are being served to petitioner for several half years. Dues were upheld owing to filing of suits from time to time. Tax on the building was enhanced from the existing tax of Rs.1,193.25 to Rs.7,010.50 with effect from 01.04.1986. The petitioner filed revision and the was registered as S.No.77/86 and the revision was disposed of reducing the tax for Rs.5,747.32p. Petitioner filed CMA in Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada and the same was disposed of on 02.12.1991 reducing the M.R.V with N.R. Rs.2,450/- + Rs.400/-. Petitioner filed CMSA No.43632 of 1992. Hence, claiming arrears after lapse of 13 years does not arise. The bill contains the conditions that are commonly mentioned in all demand notices. If the corporation intends to disconnect the essential service, it should give another disconnection notice. No distraint notice was served on the petitioner. The conditions of distraint were commonly noted in all bills and the bill was served on the petitioner in routine and eventually, prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 5. On 09.08.2002, while ordering Notice Before Admission, the Court granted interim stay of recovery of tax, on condition of petitioner depositing one fourth of the demand, within a period of six weeks. 5. On 09.08.2002, while ordering Notice Before Admission, the Court granted interim stay of recovery of tax, on condition of petitioner depositing one fourth of the demand, within a period of six weeks. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that said condition was complied with. 6. When this Court posed a question about the result of CMSA, pleaded in the counter affidavit, both counsels pleaded ignorance. 7. Heard Sri V.Subrahmanyam, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri G.Naresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent-Corporation. 8. Learned counsel for petitioner reiterated the contentions as per averments in the affidavit. Learned standing counsel for respondent reiterated the contentions as per the averments in the counter affidavit. 9. Now, the points for consideration are: 1) Whether the notice impugned in the writ petition, is a notice or demand notice or distraint notice? 2) Whether the respondent-Corporation is entitled to recover the arrears of tax by way of distress after expiry of three years when the tax becomes due? 10. Answer to the 2nd point is no longer res integra. In V.K.Roy's case, the Division Bench of the composite High Court dealt with identical issue and held thus: 14. Thus, the emerging scenario from the above discussion of the Division Bench of this Court, it is clear that though distress proceedings are provided in the Act, but recourse to such proceedings would not be initiated as a matter of routine but can only be resorted to for recovery of taxes for the preceding three years from the date when the tax becomes due and in cases where the period is more than three years, proceedings for recovery of such tax can be initiated in terms of Section 278 of the Act, by filing a suit in a competent Court of law. 11. The Division Bench of the composite placed reliance upon another judgment of Division Bench in The Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad through the Special Officer, Hyderabad Vs. Champalal, 1976 (2) APLJ 41 = 1976 SCC OnLine AP 29, wherein the Division Bench examined Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 qua distraint notice/order and held thus: 'The Municipal Corporation is not given the power to recover taxes by attaching and/or selling the immovable property of the defaulter. Champalal, 1976 (2) APLJ 41 = 1976 SCC OnLine AP 29, wherein the Division Bench examined Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 qua distraint notice/order and held thus: 'The Municipal Corporation is not given the power to recover taxes by attaching and/or selling the immovable property of the defaulter. It has been given the power only to proceed against the movables found in the premises in respect of which taxes are due, or of the defaulter, wherever they are found. The said remedy is in the nature of a summary remedy for prompt collection of taxes. It may be that, in some cases, the said remedy may not be effective, or it may not be practicable to adopt that method, and in such a case, the corporation can adopt the normal and ordinary channel of a suit in a civil Court. In such a suit it can seek to enforce the statutory charge against the immovable property in which case, the period of limitation would be twelve years; while, if it chooses to file a suit merely for recovery of taxes, it would be bound by the three years rule contained in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. If the contention of the Municipal Corporation that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to destraint proceedings is accepted, a situation would arise where the Corporation would be entitled to recover taxes under Section 269 and Section 270 of the Act without any period of limitation, while in case it approaches the civil Court it would be bound by the periods of limitation, referred to above. Even after, say 20 years or even 30 years, the Corporation would be entitled to recover taxes under Section 269 and Section 270 of the Act, while its remedies by way of suit are barred by law. It cannot be gainsaid that the remedy of suit provided by Section 278 of the Act is substantive remedy while the mode of recovery provided in Sections 269 and 270 is summary in nature. The substantive and summary remedy should be read consistent with each other, and if so read, it becomes clear that the said summary remedy is available only for recovery of taxes for three years from the date when the tax becomes due.' 12. Case at hand, notice impugned was issued under Section 266(1) of the Act. The substantive and summary remedy should be read consistent with each other, and if so read, it becomes clear that the said summary remedy is available only for recovery of taxes for three years from the date when the tax becomes due.' 12. Case at hand, notice impugned was issued under Section 266(1) of the Act. Section 266 of the Act deals with service of bills for certain taxes i.e. property tax, tax on vehicle and animals etc. The Commissioner with least practicable delay shall serve notice. If the amount of tax for which bill is served is not paid within 15 days the Commissioner shall cause notice of demand of demand in the form of Schedule K. If any person fails to pay tax upon receipt of demand notice within 15 days and if no appeal is preferred against the said demand notice, such sum with all costs of recovery may be levied under a warrant in form of Schedule L or to the like effect by distress and sale of goods and chattels of the defaulter etc. 13. Thus, the scheme under the Act primarily provides three types of notices i.e. (1) service of bill Sec 266(1), (2) demand notice Sec 268 and (3) distress warrant Sec 269(1) in respect of payment tax apart from other notices/warrants. 14. Case at hand, the notice was issued under Section 266(1) of the Act. Even forms appended to the Schedule i.e. Schedule-K and Schedule-L are different from the notice impugned in the writ petition. Thus, the notice impugned, cannot be termed as distress notice under Schedule K. Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the notice impugned is not a distress notice, the judgments referred to supra, have no application to the facts of the case. 15. In the notice impugned, it was scribed, on the reverse of the notice, that if the amount is not paid within 15 days, articles of petitioner will be auctioned and essential services like water and drainage connections will be disconnected. Notice intimating the petitioner to pay tax was issued from 01.04.1989 to 01.04.2002. However, in the counter affidavit it was clarified that the writing is in routine, and the Corporation is not taking any coercive action. Apart from as discussed supra, notice of distress should be in the form of Schedule L. 16. Notice intimating the petitioner to pay tax was issued from 01.04.1989 to 01.04.2002. However, in the counter affidavit it was clarified that the writing is in routine, and the Corporation is not taking any coercive action. Apart from as discussed supra, notice of distress should be in the form of Schedule L. 16. In fact, it was contended in the counter affidavit that notice issued is not a distress notice and it is only a notice traceable to Section 266(1) of the Act. In fact, the notice was issued after dismissal of CMA filed by the petitioner pending CMSA. As stated supra, none of the learned could be in a position to inform the Court as to result of CMSA. Petitioners are bound to pay property tax. Since the notice impugned is not distress notice, the judgments relied upon by the petitioner would not apply to this case. 17. In view of the discussion supra, this Court does not find any merit in the writ petition and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 18. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is Dismissed. No costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.