JUDGMENT : Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer 1. The instant intra-court appeal preferred under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 21.11.2022 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.6243 of 2010, whereby and whereunder, the writ petition filed for seeking direction to set aside the office order contained in memo no.4762 dated 04.09.2010 issued under the signature of the respondent no.2 (District Superintendent of Education, Ranchi) by which the petitioner has been inflicted punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect with further stipulation that he would be entitled only for the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and that on the principle of ‘no work no pay’, he would not get any pay for the period he remained absent without information and with a further direction to pay the consequential benefits including the full salary as also to set aside the enquiry report submitted by the respondent no.3. Facts 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, are as hereunder:- 3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that by office order contained in memo no.145 dated 26.06.2007, the appellant was deputed at Girls Government Middle School, Bero, in view of the fact that the appellant made a complaint with respect to various threats given to him by antisocial elements. The said deputation of the writ petitioner/appellant was extended for further 3 months, as would appear from memo no. 198 dated 12.09.2007, in view of the persistent threats to the writ petitioner which was still continuing. Again, vide office order as contained in memo No. 231 dated 01.12.2007, the deputation of the appellant was extended for 3 months at Government Girls Middle School, Bero in the District of Ranchi. Vide memo No. 15 dated 29.02.2008, the further extension was given to the writ petitioner on the post of his deputation at Bero. 4. Thereafter, vide memo no. 62 dated 01.09.2008, further one month’s extension to the writ petitioner was given at the post of his deputation at Bero, in view of the threats by anti-social elements to the writ petitioner at Akramroma Primary School. 5. In view of the direction contained in memo No. 145 dated 26.06.2007; memo No. 231 dated 01.12.2007; memo no. 15 dated 29.02.2008 and memo no. 5. In view of the direction contained in memo No. 145 dated 26.06.2007; memo No. 231 dated 01.12.2007; memo no. 15 dated 29.02.2008 and memo no. 62 dated 01.09.2008, the writ petitioner submitted his joining and discharged his duty at the place strictly as per the direction of the authorities. The writ petitioner thereafter put under suspension vide office order contained in memo No. 1715 dated 08.06.2009. 6. The memo of charge was framed against the writ petitioner vide memo no. 1717 dated 08.06.2009 for the following charges: (a) To remain absent unauthorisedly from the school without any information for last 4 months; (b) The unauthorized absence amounted to negligence and the same was against the departmental provisions; 7. The writ petitioner has submitted his reply on 10.03.2010 stating inter alia that his life was at stake at the place of posting and the information to this effect was orally given to the concerned officers. 8. The respondent no. 3 submitted its enquiry report vide memo No. 89 dated 11.03.2010 stating inter alia that the action of the writ petitioner was punishable and the explanation of the writ petitioner cannot be accepted so far the charge no.1 was concerned. So far as charge No. 2, it was opined by the Enquiry Officer (respondent No. 3) that the explanation given by the writ petitioner could not be accepted on the ground that he did not give any information either to the concerned Police Station nor his controlling authority. 9. It is the further case that second show cause was asked from the writ petitioner by respondent no. 2 through memo no. 1703 dated 10.04.2010 directing him inter alia to inform the respondent no. 3 as to whether the information relating to the danger of life of the writ petitioner at the school concerned was given to the concerned Police Station and departmental Officer or not. 10. In reply to the second show cause notice dated 10.04.2010, the writ petitioner by his reply dated 31.07.2010 stated inter alia that he did not inform to the concerned Police Station about the aforesaid situation to become worse, but, however, he did inform to the departmental Officers and in support of his contention, he enclosed memo No. 145 dated 26.06.2007 and memo No. 198 dated 12.09.2010; memo No. 231 dated 01.12.2007 and memo no.15 dated 29.02.2008. The writ petitioner, therefore, explained the position with respect to threat of his life which led to his absence from duty at the school concerned. 11. Thereafter, the respondent No. 2 has pass the office order impugned contained in memo No. 4762 dated 04.09.2010. 12. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant/writ petitioner while working as Assistant Teacher was transferred to Govt. Primary School, Akamroma, Lapung. 13. The writ petitioner has made representation raising the issue of life threat requesting therein the stay of the order of transfer. The Regional Education Officer, Bero has considered and accepted the said request by deputing the petitioner in State Middle School, Bero for the period of three months. 14. The aforesaid order of deputation was extended time to time as would be evident from the order dated 12.09.2007 for the period of three months. Again the deputation period was extended vide order dated 01.12.2007 for the period of three months and further vide order dated 29.02.2008, the deputation period was extended for the further period of three months. 15. It appears from the order passed by the Regional Education Officer that in all these orders, the specific stipulation has been made that if after completion of period three months, the writ petitioner will not report to the transfer place of posting then the aforesaid deputation will stand automatically cancelled. 16. The writ petitioner, after completion of the period of three months as per the extension granted vide order dated 29.02.2008, has not joined the post. 17. The authorities have issued an order on 08.06.2009, whereby and whereunder, the petitioner was put under suspension on the ground that he remained absent without any information to the competent authority. His headquarter has been fixed in Block Education Extension Officer holding him entitled to get the subsistence allowance. 18. A departmental proceeding was decided to be initiated against the writ petitioner, in terms thereof, the memorandum of charge was issued on 08.06.2009 leveling therein the two allegations, i.e., (a) To remain absent unauthorisedly from the school without any information for last 4 months; (b) Remaining absent without any information is an example of indiscipline and contrary to the departmental provision. 19. The authorities have appointed the inquiry officer and directed the writ petitioner to submit his reply, in terms thereof, the inquiry officer was directed to submit inquiry report. 19. The authorities have appointed the inquiry officer and directed the writ petitioner to submit his reply, in terms thereof, the inquiry officer was directed to submit inquiry report. The petitioner has submitted its reply and has admitted the fact that he remained absent but along with the reasons that he was threatened by the unsocial elements and hence, having no option he was to remain absent from duty. 20. It has also been replied in the said application that he after giving oral information to the concerned officers, he remained absence and hence, the charge as has been alleged against him, is not worth to be proper. 21. The inquiry officer has submitted report on consideration of the explanation so furnished by the writ petitioner. The charges have been found to be proved. 22. The said inquiry report was forwarded before the disciplinary authority which has been accepted and thereafter, the order of punishment has been passed inflicting the punishment of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect with further stipulation that he would be entitled only for the subsistence allowance during the period of suspension and that on the principle of ‘no work no pay’, he would not get any pay for the period he remained absent without information. 23. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the same, has preferred writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6243 of 2010. 24. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/appellant has taken the ground of violation of principle of natural justice since no witness was ever examined to prove the charge against the petitioner and even the memorandum of charge does not give any list of witnesses. 25. The ground has also been taken that the charge is relating to absenteeism of four months and unless there is a finding that this absenteeism was willful and deliberate, no punishment could have been imposed on the ground of absence from duty. 26. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 27. The learned Single Judge, on appreciating the rival submissions made on behalf of the respondents, has dismissed the writ petition, against which, the present appeal. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 and Krushnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 178 . 27. The learned Single Judge, on appreciating the rival submissions made on behalf of the respondents, has dismissed the writ petition, against which, the present appeal. Arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant 28. Mr. Manoj Tandon, learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner has taken the following grounds:- (i) There is gross violation of principle of natural justice since no evidence has been produced in substance of the charge said to be proved. (ii) The absenteeism cannot be said to be willful in absence of any finding to that effect by the inquiry officer. 29. Learned counsel, in order to strengthen his argument, has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of 30. The ground has also been taken that the charge has been proved without leading any evidence and hence, there is violation of principle of natural justice and in order to strengthen his argument, he has relied upon the judgment of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (supra). 31. The learned counsel for the appellant has further agitated the ground that the reason is there in the explanation furnished based upon which, the appellant was deputed in particular school, namely, Girls Government Middle School, Bero which was time to time extended, since, he has received the threat of life, hence, he was not in a position to resume his duty and in that view of the matter, on oral communication of that fact to the immediate controlling authority, he remained absent. Hence, the reason of absenteeism has clearly been explained to the immediate authority which since was beyond the control of the petitioner and as such, it cannot be said that the absenteeism is wilful. 32. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact in right perspective and even the judgments upon which the reliance has been placed, have also not properly been considered, hence, the impugned order suffers from an error and as such, not sustainable in the eye of law. 33. None appears on behalf of the State. Analysis 34. 33. None appears on behalf of the State. Analysis 34. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order as also considered the material available on record. 35. The undisputed fact in this case is that the appellant was deputed at Girls Government Middle School, Bero, in view of the fact that the appellant made a complaint with respect to various threats given to him by anti-social elements. The concerned authority has considered the said complaint/request and passed the order allowing his deputation. The said deputation of the writ petitioner/appellant was extended for further 3 months, as would appear from memo no. 198 dated 12.09.2007. Again, vide office order as contained in memo No. 231 dated 01.12.2007, the deputation of the appellant was extended for 3 months at Government Girls Middle School, Bero in the District of Ranchi. Vide memo No. 15 dated 29.02.2008, the further extension was given to the writ petitioner on the post of his deputation at Bero. 36. Thereafter, vide memo no. 62 dated 01.09.2008, further one month’s extension to the writ petitioner was given at the post of his deputation at Bero, in view of the threats by anti-social elements to the writ petitioner at Akramroma Primary School. Thus, the deputation period of the writ petitioner was extended four times. 37. The deputation period was not extended, the petitioner on its own has not joined the transfer place of posting and remained absent unauthorisedly for the period of four months. 38. The writ petitioner was put under suspension as also the departmental proceeding was initiated. The petitioner has submitted its reply on 10.03.2010 stating therein that his life was at stake at the place of posting and the information to this effect was orally given to the concerned officers. 39. The inquiry officer has prepared the inquiry report. The inquiry officer has found the charge proved taking into consideration the fact that the appellant has admitted his allegation of unauthorized absence due to life threat. 40. 39. The inquiry officer has prepared the inquiry report. The inquiry officer has found the charge proved taking into consideration the fact that the appellant has admitted his allegation of unauthorized absence due to life threat. 40. The said inquiry report has been accepted by the disciplinary authority, in terms thereof, the punishments have been imposed of stoppage of increments for two years with cumulative effect and the petitioner will not be entitled for any wages for the period he did not work and subsistence allowance will be paid for the period of suspension as the said period was to be counted towards the period of pensionable service. The same is under challenge by way of instant appeal. 41. This Court, after taking into consideration the ground taken more particularly the ground has been taken that the unauthorized absence cannot be said to be wilful and to strengthen his argument, the reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra) has been taken aid of. 42. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the factual aspect of the judgment rendered in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra) needs to be referred herein:- Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra). “21. In the present case, the disciplinary authority failed to prove that the absence from duty was wilful, no such finding has been given by the inquiry officer or the appellate authority. Though the appellant had taken a specific defence that he was prevented from attending duty by Shri P. Venkateswarlu, DCIO, Palanpur who prevented him to sign the attendance register and also brought on record 11 defence exhibits in support of his defence that he was prevented to sign the attendance register, this includes his letter dated 3-10-1995 addressed to Shri K.P. Jain, JD, SIB, Ahmedabad, receipts from STD/PCO office of telephone calls dated 29-9-1995, etc. but such defence and evidence were ignored and on the basis of irrelevant fact and surmises the inquiry officer held the appellant guilty.” 43. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the factual aspect leads to the said case was that the concerned appellant of the said appeal was prevented from attending duty and was not allowed to sign attendance register. 44. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that the factual aspect leads to the said case was that the concerned appellant of the said appeal was prevented from attending duty and was not allowed to sign attendance register. 44. Neither inquiry officer nor appellate authority has found absence of appellant willful, despite his specific defence that he was prevented from attending duty and was not allowed to sign attendance register. 45. The Hon’ble Apex Court considering the aforesaid aspect of the matter and taking into consideration the fact, has directed the reinstatement of the appellant with 50 per cent back wages. 46. It has further been held therein that in absence of any such finding of wilful absence, the order of punishment based upon the ground of unauthorized absence, cannot be said to be proper, the relevant part of the said judgment needs to be referred hereinbelow:- “17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be willful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean willful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalization, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty.” 20. The question relating to jurisdiction of the court in judicial review in a departmental proceeding fell for consideration before this Court in M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [ (2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919] wherein this Court held: (SCC p. 95, para 25) “25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.” 47. Learned counsel for the appellant by referring paragraph-17 to 20 of the aforesaid judgment has submitted that the word “etc.” will include in the factual aspect of the present case. 48. In this context, it requires to refer herein the applicability of the judgment which depends upon the applicability based upon the facts of the individual case, since, the judgment is not having the universal applicability, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Subramanian Swamy Vrs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75 , wherein, at paragraph-47, it has been held as under:- “47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is 21 only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 49. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 49. Now coming to the facts of the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, has laid down the proposition that if the document has been produced showing the reason of absence which is beyond the control of concerned public servant then it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to give finding with respect to the fact that the absence is wilful or intentional. 50. But so far as the argument that the word “etc.” is there then the defiance of the valid order of transfer on the ground of threat perception will also come under the fold of the said judgment. 51. But, this Court is not in agreement with such interpretation of the said judgment and merely because the word “etc.” is there, the ratio laid down in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra) will not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case, reason being that the ailment or the accident pertains to individual grievance of the public servant and if such employee has become ill seriously or meted with the accident having been advised not to move or remain confined with the bed, then in such circumstances, it is impossible for such public servant to attend the office. 52. But, so far as the issue herein which is the life threat of the petitioner on the ground that the place where the petitioner posted was the MCC affected area/, the same cannot be a ground to defy the order passed by the competent authority of the State Government. If the petitioner would be allowed to defy such valid order of transfer then the question will be that how the administration will function. 53. “Whether such defiance will be said to be proper on the part of one or the other public servant?” 54. Further, as to whether merely by saying that there is life threat perception, can it be said to be a ground for defying the order of transfer. 55. Admittedly herein, the petitioner has taken the ground of life threat perception but there is no FIR on the record. 56. Further, as to whether merely by saying that there is life threat perception, can it be said to be a ground for defying the order of transfer. 55. Admittedly herein, the petitioner has taken the ground of life threat perception but there is no FIR on the record. 56. Further, the life threat perception by taking as a general ground, cannot be a ground to defy the order of transfer, otherwise, the entire administration will fail. 57. Further, non-compliance of the order of transfer is merely on the ground of threat perception, cannot be said to be justified also on the ground that if such ground will be said to be justified then the question would be that everybody will come and will take the ground that there is life threat perception and in that circumstances, the entire administrative machinery will fail. 58. But herein, the petitioner/appellant in his reply has accepted the fact that he remained on unauthorized absence but due to life threat perception, he has not joined his duty. 59. What is the nature of life threat perception or whether any complaint has been made to that effect before any competent authority or the Police, is lacking in the present case. 60. Hence, in absence of the aforesaid material, it is not available for the petitioner that he was having the life threat perception which led him not to resume the duty. 61. Therefore, this Court is of the view that on the basis of the fact governing the present case, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra), is not applicable. 62. The learned Single Judge, has also appreciated the aforesaid fact as would appear from paragraph-18 and based upon the discussion made on the basis of the factual aspect in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra) and comparing the same with the fact of the present case, the learned Single Judge has disagreed with the argument made on behalf of the petitioner that the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (Supra), is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 63. This Court, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that while doing so, the learned Single Judge has committed no error. 64. 63. This Court, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that while doing so, the learned Single Judge has committed no error. 64. The other ground that there is violation of principle of natural justice, since, the evidence was led by the disciplinary authority, as would appear from the inquiry report itself. 65. 63. This Court, in view of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that while doing so, the learned Single Judge has committed no error. 64. The other ground that there is violation of principle of natural justice, since, the evidence was led by the disciplinary authority, as would appear from the inquiry report itself. 65. This Court in order to consider the said argument, deems it fit and proper to refer the entire inquiry report, which is being quoted as under:- ^^ftyk f'k{kk v/kh{kd] jkaph ds Kkikad 1715 fnukad 08-06-09 ds vkns'kkuqlkj f'k{kd dks fuyafcr fd;k x;k gS rFkk mUgha ds Kkikad 1717 fnukad 08-06-09 ds }kjk vkjksi i= izi= ^^d** fuxZr gqvk gSA fuyacu vof/k esa f'k{kd dk eq[;ky; iz[k.M f'k{kk izlkj inkf/kdkjh] rekM+ dk dk;kZy; fu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gSA xfBr vkjksi rFkk ml lanHkZ esa f'k{kd dk Li"Vhdj.k rFkk foHkkxh; inkf/kdkjh ds dFku dk C;kSjk fuEuor~ gS%& vkjksi vkjksih f'k{kd dk Li"Vhdj.k foHkkxh; i{k tkap inkf/kdkjh dk earO; 1- fcuk lwpuk ds vuf/kd`r :i ls fo|ky; ls pkj ekg ls vuqifLFkr jgukA vkjksih f'k{kd vDVwcj 08 ls 8 twu 09 ¼fuyacu frfFk½ rd fcuk lwpuk vuf/kd`r :i ls vuqifLFkr Fks ftls Lo;a f'k{kd us vius Li"Vhdj.k esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA iwNs tkus ij muds }kjk crk;k x;k fd muds tku dks [krjk gks x;k FkkA mUgksaus bldh lwpuk ekSf[kd :i ls vius fudklh ,oa O;;u fo|ky; ds iz/kkuk/;kid dks fn;k FkkA foHkkxh; inkf/kdkjh dk dFku gS fd izkFkfed fo|ky;ksa ds fu;a=h inkf/kdkjh lacaf/kr iz[k.M ds iz[k.M f'k{kk izlkj inkf/kdkjh gksrs gSaA vxj okLro esa muds tku dks [krjk Fkk rks bl vk'k; dh lwpuk fudklh ,oa O;;u fo|ky; ds iz-v- dks u nsdj vius iz[k.M f'k{kk izlkj inkf/kdkjh dks nsuk pkfg, FkkA ;fn O;fDrxr rkSj ij mifLFkr gksdj lwpuk nsus esa dfBukbZ Fkh rks fucaf/kr Mkd ls Hkh bl vk'k; dh lwpuk nsuk pkfg, FkkA vkjksih f'k{kd ds }kjk ,slk ugha fd;k x;k gS tks bl ckr dk Li"V izek.k gS fd tku ds [krjs dh dksbZ ckr ugha FkhA cfYd f'k{kd LosPNkpkjh gSA lsok lafgrk ds vuqlkj fcuk lwpuk vuf/kd`r :i ls fo|ky; ls yEch vof/k rd xk;c jguk n.Muh; vijk/k gSA f'k{kd ds Li"Vhdj.k dks foHkkxh; inkf/kdkjh ds fVIi.kh ds vkyksd esa Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk ldrkA 2- fcuk lwpuk vuqifLFkr LosPNkpkfjrk dk |ksrd gS ,oa foHkkxh; izko/kku ds izfrdwy gSA vkjksih f'k{kd ds vuqlkj tku dks [krjs esa ikdj rFkk vius fudklh ,oa O;;u fo|ky; ds iz/kkuk/;kid dks ekSf[kd lwpuk nsdj os fo|ky; ls xk;c FksA bls LosPNkpkfjrk ,oa foHkkxh; izko/kkuksa dk mYya?ku f'k{kd ugha ekurs gSaA foHkkxh; inkf/kdkjh ds vuqlkj dksbZ Hkh ljdkjh lsod l{ke inkf/kdkjh dks lwpuk fn;s fcuk ;fn vius dÙkZO; ls vuqifLFkr jgrk gS rks ,slh ljdkjh lsok ds ,slh d`r dks foHkkxh; izko/kku ds izfrdwy ekuk tkrk gS vkSj ;g ljdkjh lsod ds LosPNkpkfjrk dk |ksrd gSA vkjksih f'k{kd ds }kjk Lo;a O;fDrxr :i ls mifLFkr gksdj ;k fucaf/kr Mkd ds ek/;e ls bl vk'k; dh dksbZ lwpuk vius l{ke inkf/kdkjh dks ugha nh xbZ gSA foHkkxh; inkf/kdkjh dh mijksDr fVIi.kh ds vkyksd esa vkjksih f'k{kd ds dFku dks Lohdkj ugha fd;k Tkk ldrk gSA tku dk [krjk dh fLFkfr lacaf/kr Fkkuk ds lkFk&lkFk vius fu;a=h inkf/kdkjh dks lwpuk u nsuk Li"V :i ls foHkkxh; izko/kku dk mYya?ku gS rFkk f'k{kd ds LosPNkpkfjrk dk ifj;k;d gSA mij vafdr nksuksa vkjksi izekf.kr gSaA foHkkxh; izko/kku ds vuqlkj f'k{kd dM+s n.M ds Hkkxhnkj gSaA^^ 66. It is evident from the inquiry report that the petitioner remained absent unauthorisedly assigning the reason that there was life threat perception. 67. The question of leading evidence in the circumstances of guilt having been admitted by the petitioner, has been taken as a ground by the inquiry officer and further, no justifiable reason has been placed said to not attend the office that too without giving any due information. 68. It needs to refer herein that the transfer is the incidence of service and the moment the competent authority has issued the order of transfer, it is bounden duty of the concerned public servant to give effect to the said order of transfer issued by the competent authority. If such order of transfer is being defied, the same is gross misconduct of the concerned employee and for which, such employees are liable to be proceeded departmentally so that a message may not go to the public servant in general that the order of transfer even if will be defied, the concerned public servant will be exercised by the appointing authority. 69. The petitioner/appellant has admitted the fact that he remained absent from his duty and that was taken as a ground to prove the charge. 70. Learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner, in that pretext, has submitted that no oral evidence has been led and in order to buttress his argument, he has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra). 71. This Court has gone through the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra), wherein, the factual aspect also needs to be referred herein which led the Hon’ble Apex Court to laid down the proposition of the basing of the punishment, as would appear from paragraph-15, which reads as under:- “15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed by the enquiry officer was the purported confession made by the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured in the police station. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. The appellant being an employee of the Bank, the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence should have been brought on record to show that he had indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the report demonstrates that the enquiry officer had made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in such a manner that no evidence was left.” 72. It appears from the aforesaid judgment that the punishment since was based upon the solitary evidence against the delinquent was his confessional statement recorded in the criminal proceedings. In that pretext, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that although, the departmental proceeding is based upon the preponderance of probability but even for coming to the rightful conclusion, some direct or indirect evidence is required to prove the charge. There is no dispute about the aforesaid proposition of law. 73. But, the question herein is that the petitioner himself has admitted that he remained absent unauthorisedly and there is no denial/dispute about the aforesaid fact, then the question is that “when the admission is on the part of the appellant/writ petitioner”, then what evidence is required him to led? 74. There is no explanation to that effect by the petitioner. The law is already settled that in the departmental proceeding if the charge is admitted then there is no need for the departmental proceeding. 75. But herein, the disciplinary authority has initiated the departmental proceeding, it is for the reason that the department wants to know the reason as to why the petitioner has remained absent unauthorisedly. 76. The reason has been assigned about the issue of life threat perception but without any valid document or without making any complaint before any competent authority or any police official. 77. The appellant/writ petitioner has produced no document to that effect for the purpose of taking the ground that there is no consideration of the said document by the inquiry officer. There is no complaint made by the petitioner/appellant that he has not given any opportunity of hearing in course of departmental proceeding. 78. 77. The appellant/writ petitioner has produced no document to that effect for the purpose of taking the ground that there is no consideration of the said document by the inquiry officer. There is no complaint made by the petitioner/appellant that he has not given any opportunity of hearing in course of departmental proceeding. 78. The matter would have been different that if any complaint would have been made before any police official regarding the life threat perception and it has been given before the inquiry officer and if there is no consideration of the same then the ground could have been taken that there is no consideration of the valid document, hence, the inquiry report suffers from perversity. 79. But, that is not the factual aspect herein, rather, merely by giving an explanation that there is life threat perception without making any complaint before any authority or the police, the said ground of not joining the duty without any due permission from the authority, cannot be said to be justified. 80. This Court, in view of the aforesaid fact and coming to the facts of the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra), is of the view that the factual aspect involved in the aforesaid case, is quite different to that of the present case, hence, the ratio of the said judgment, is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 81. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and coming back to the order passed by the learned Single Judge and as per the discussion made hereinabove based upon the factual aspect vis-à-vis the legal issue, is of the view that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the entire aspects of the matter, hence, the order impugned suffers from no error. 82. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 83. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.