ORDER : NUPUR BHATI, J. 1. The present writ petition has been preferred with the following prayers:- (a) your lordships may be pleased to admit and allow the present petition. (b) your lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent HFC to grant the benefit of restructuring of the loan accounts as per the directions and guidelines issued by the RBI. (c) your lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent HFC to withdraw the notices dated 21.04.2022 (Annexure-4) and drop the proceedings initiated against the petitioner for recovery of illegal demand. (d) your lordships may be pleased to quash the order dated 20.12.2022 (Annexure-8) rejecting the representation of the petitioners. (e) your lordships may be pleased to grant any other and further relief/s as may be deemed just and proper in the interest of justice and fitness of things. (f) the writ petition of the petitioners may kindly be allowed throughout with costs. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners took a home loan facility from the respondent-SRG Finance Limited, (for short, hereinafter referred to as “SRGFL”), against the assets creating security interest in favour of the respondent-SRGFL. The petitioners were granted home loan facility of Rs. 14 lacs in two installments. The petitioners deposited regular EMIs against the loan of Rs.14 lacs and a sum of Rs.10,76,067/-was deposited by the petitioners upto 30.11.2022 and a sum of Rs.5 lacs and odd was due in principal and interest thereon. 3. As per the terms and conditions of the loan agreement as well as Loan Sanction Letter, the loan amount was required to be deposited in 120 installments of EMIs of Rs.30867/-per month including the interest. The respondent in point No.6 of the sanction letter (Annex-1) excluded the moratorium period thereby, breaching the terms of Home Loan Agreement. 4. The petitioners received a notice dated 21.08.2020 from the respondent under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 (for short, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The petitioners approached the respondent authority and filed a complaint before him. The earlier notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was dropped and the account was regularized by withdrawing the NPA account remarks from petitioners’ loan account. The petitioners approached the respondent authority and filed a complaint before him. The earlier notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was dropped and the account was regularized by withdrawing the NPA account remarks from petitioners’ loan account. Due to the pandemic COVID-19, there was a complete lockdown and all business sectors and industries were also very adversely affected due to COVID-19 pandemic. 5. The respondent charged an in-exorbitant rate of interest while calculating the due amount and the respondent-SRGFL also ignored the RBI guidelines. The petitioners received a notice dated 12.02.2021 for payment of a certain amount and initiated the proceedings for recovery under the provisions as mentioned therein. The petitioners after one year and two months again received a notice dated 21.04.2022 on 06.05.2022 with threats that the respondent would be initiated proceedings under the provisions of Section 14 of the Act, if the petitioners do not deposit the loan amount. 6. The petitioners submitted a detailed representation dated 20.05.2022 to the District Collector, Pali. 7. The petitioners being aggrieved by the notices issued by the respondent preferred writ petition being SBCWP No.15393/2022 before this Court and the aforesaid writ petition was disposed of by this court vide order dated 14.10.2022 (Annex-6) while directing the petitioners to file the representation before the respondent. The petitioners submitted a detailed representation dated 21.10.2022 (Annex-7) and the said representation was rejected vide order dated 20.12.2022 (Annex-8). 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the present writ petition has been filed for seeking compliance of the statement dated 27.03.2020 and Circular dated 22.05.2020 issued by Reserve Bank of India and thus, the petitioners have rightly invoked the writ jurisdiction while filing the present writ petition. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners while placing reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Velankani Information systems Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors : (2020) 5 KantLJ 375 submits that in the said case the Hon’ble Court had granted indulgence, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned notices 21.04.2022 (Annex.4) and order impugned dated 20.12.2022 (Annex.8) deserve to be quashed and set aside. 10. Union of India & Ors : (2020) 5 KantLJ 375 submits that in the said case the Hon’ble Court had granted indulgence, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and the impugned notices 21.04.2022 (Annex.4) and order impugned dated 20.12.2022 (Annex.8) deserve to be quashed and set aside. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent raises a preliminary objection that the present writ petition is not maintainable before this Court as the petitioners have an alternative and efficacious remedy available under the Act of 2002 to first approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 12. This Court finds that the petitioners in the prayer have specifically sought quashing of the notice dated 21.04.2022 (Annex-4) and also for dropping the proceedings initiated against the petitioners for recovery of illegal demand and further a prayer has been made for quashing of the order dated 20.12.2022 (Annex-8) whereby the representation filed by the petitioners was rejected. 13. From petitioners’ own pleadings, it is clearly discernible that the petitioners have not paid the loan amount. It is writ large that the respondent has initiated proceedings against the petitioners in light of the provisions of the Act. This Court is also conscious of the fact that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s South Indian Bank Vs. Naveen Mathew Philip : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435 has specifically observed that the High Court erred in ignoring the existence of alternate remedies under the Act and wrongly exercised its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to resolve commercial disputes between a lender and a borrower. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 16 of the said judgment, took note of the dictum of Apex Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks : (1998) 8 SCC 1 and in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. : (2003) 2 SCC 107 , took note paragraphs 26 and 27, which read as under: “26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 , In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 , this Court noted that: “7. Ltd. : (2003) 2 SCC 107 , took note paragraphs 26 and 27, which read as under: “26. Following the dictum of this Court in Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 , In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 , this Court noted that: “7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. 27. The principles of law which emerge are that: 27.1 The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well. 27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person 27.3 Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged. 27.4 An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.4 An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law. 27.5 When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is discretion 27.6 In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with.” The Hon’ble Apex Court while reiterating the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act in the case of M/s South Indian Bank (supra) and while considering the decision in the case of Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thoms : (2003) 10 SCC 733 has deprecated the invoking of writ jurisdiction and observed as under: “17. We shall reiterate the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting a few of the earlier decisions of this Court wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. “27. Such private companies would normally not be amenable to the writ j urisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. But in certain circumstances a writ may issue to such private bodies or persons as there may be statutes which need to be complied with by all concerned including the private companies. For example, there are certain legislations like the Industrial Disputes Act, the Minimum Wages Act, the Factories Act or for maintaining proper environment, say the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 or the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 etc. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance with those provisions. or statutes of the like nature which fasten certain duties and responsibilities statutorily upon such private bodies which they are bound to comply with. If they violate such a statutory provision a writ would certainly be issued for compliance with those provisions. For instance, if a private employer dispenses with the service of its employee in violation of the provisions contained under the Industrial Disputes Act, in innumerable cases the High Court interfered and has issued the writ to the private bodies and the companies in that regard. But the difficulty in issuing a writ may arise where there may not be any non-compliance with or violation of any statutory provision by the private body. In that event a writ may not be issued at all. Other remedies, as may be available, may have to be resorted to.” United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17 (1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13 (4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” [emphasis applied] Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s South Indian Bank (supra) while relying on decision rendered i n Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir : (2022) 5 SCC 345 , took note paragraphs 18 and 21 of the said judgment, which paragraphs inter-alia reads thus: - “18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution — ARC — the appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ petition against the private financial institution — ARC — the appellant herein under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the proposed action/actions under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under the SARFAESI Act to recover the borrowed amount as a secured creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing public functions which are normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. During the course of a commercial transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function which is normally expected to be performed by the State authorities. If proceedings are initiated under the SARFAESI Act and/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC, borrower has to avail the remedy under the SARFAESI Act and no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court in Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, [ (1969) 1 SCC 585 ] and Ramesh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, [(2012) 12 SCC 331 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 45 : 4 SCEC 715] relied upon by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not of any assistance to the borrowers. xxx 21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., [ (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41] to the facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ petitions by the borrowers before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the court. The writ petitions have been filed against the proposed action to be taken under Section 13(4). As observed hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 13-8-2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. As observed hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated 13-8-2015 was a notice under Section 13(4), in that case also, in view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. Even the impugned orders passed by the High Court directing to maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the secured properties on payment of Rs 1 crore only (in all Rs 3 crores) is absolutely unjustifiable. The dues are to the extent of approximately Rs 117 crores. The ad interim relief has been continued since 2015 and the secured creditor is deprived of proceeding further with the action under the SARFAESI Act. Filing of the writ petition by the borrowers before the High Court is nothing but an abuse of process of court. It appears that the High Court has initially granted an ex parte ad interim order mechanically and without assigning any reasons. The High Court ought to have appreciated that by passing such an interim order, the rights of the secured creditor to recover the amount due and payable have been seriously prejudiced. The secured creditor and/or its assignor have a right to recover the amount due and payable to it from the borrowers. The stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of the secured creditor/assignor. Therefore, the High Court should have been extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion while granting stay in such matters. In these circumstances, the proceedings before the High Court deserve to be dismissed.” Lastly, in paragraph 18 of the said judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s South Indian Bank (supra) concluded and held as under: “18. While doing so, we are conscious of the fact that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.” 14. Further, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition against a private finance company and the private finance company is not amenable to writ jurisdiction as the petitioner has failed to demonstrate the statutory alternative remedy under the Act of 2002 is not an efficacious remedy. Thus, the present writ petition is not maintainable against a private housing finance company. The petitioners have also failed to demonstrate before the Court exception to rule of alternative remedy that the writ petition has been filed for enforcement of fundamental right, there has been violation of principles of natural justice, and the order impugned/proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction. 15. So far as judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Velankani Information systems Limited (supra) is concerned, the same is of no avail to the petitioners, inasmuch as the petitioners in the instant writ petition have questioned the legality of the notice dated 21.04.2022 (Annex.4) and the order dated 20.12.2022 (Annex.8), whereby their representation has been rejected. In the opinion of this Court, the challenge laid to said notice and the order, cannot be countenanced in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, more so when there is alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners. 16. In view of above discussion, this Court finds no force in the instant writ petition and the same is therefore dismissed. Stay Petition also stand dismissed.