JUDGMENT : SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD, J. 1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 2008) is directed against the order dated 31.05.2023 passed in Anticipatory Bail Petition No. 1072 of 2023 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-II, Dhanbad in connection with Barora P.S. Case No. 10 of 2022 registered for the offence under Sections 25(1-B)(a)/26/35 of the Arms Act and Section 3/4 of the Explosive Substance Act, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for anticipatory bail of the appellant has been rejected. 2. The instant case has been listed under the heading ‘For Orders’ with the office note that the case is barred by limitation since the same has been filed after maximum statutory period of 90 days. 3. The reason for pointing out such defect is that the provision as contained under Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 which provides the period of limitation to prefer an appeal if filed under Section 21(4) of the Act, 2008, as per which, the requirement to file an appeal is the maximum period of 90 days. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contested the said office note. 5. It requires to refer herein that as per the appellant also, Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 is not applicable, rather, Section 5 of the Limitation Act will be applicable. But, even in support of the said contention of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay, no interlocutory application has been filed. 6. Even, no affidavit has been filed contesting the aforesaid office objection. But, since the said office note has been contested, therefore, it is the bounden duty of the Court to decide the said objection. 7. The contention has been raised on behalf of the appellant that Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 cannot be said to be mandatory in nature rather it is directory/obligatory, in view of the fact that in the first proviso of Section 21(5), the word ‘may’ have been inserted which confers power upon the appellate court, i.e., the High Court to condone the delay beyond the period of 90 days. 8. As per his argument also, the requirement to file delay condonation application is there but no interlocutory application has been filed even knowing the fact that the appeal has been filed after delay of 90 days. 9. 8. As per his argument also, the requirement to file delay condonation application is there but no interlocutory application has been filed even knowing the fact that the appeal has been filed after delay of 90 days. 9. Ms. Lily Sahay, learned A.P.P. appearing for the respondent-State has seriously objected the aforesaid submission by taking aid of the 2nd proviso of Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008, which cannot be said to be directory in view of the specific stipulation made therein. 10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and appreciated the argument advanced on their behalf. 11. It is relevant to refer herein that this Court is hearing an appeal filed under Section 21(4) of the Act, 2008 against the order passed by the learned Court rejecting the prayer for anticipatory bail in connection with “scheduled offences.” 12. The question herein as has been pointed out by contesting the office note that the appeal is also to be filed beyond the period of 90 days, since, Section 21(5) cannot be said to be mandatory, rather, it is directory. 13. But the question herein would be that: “whether the appellate court has got power to interpret the statutory mandate as is being sought for on behalf of the appellant.” 14. The law is well settled that the appellate court is having no power to interpret the law, rather, the appellate court is to proceed strictly in adherence to the statutory mandate on the principle that when a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other manner, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Singhara Singh and Others, AIR 1964 SC 358 , wherein at paragraph 8 it has been held as under: “....its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the 14 act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” 15. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted....” 15. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Verghese and Others vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Others, (1999) 3 SCC 422 , at paragraphs 31 & 32 held as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Others, (2002) 1 SCC 633 , at paragraph 27 as under: “.....it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself.” 17. Further, it also needs to be referred herein that each and every word contained in the statutory provision has got its meaning and no word can be said to be meaningless, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (1989) 4 SCC 378 . “39...........No part of a statute is to be taken as superfluous or redundant. Every word in a statute is to be given a meaning. “39...........No part of a statute is to be taken as superfluous or redundant. Every word in a statute is to be given a meaning. A construction which would leave without effect any part of the language of a statute will normally be rejected. Every clause of a statute is to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act so as to make, as far as possible, a consistent enactment of the whole statute.” 18. The reason for referring the aforesaid judgment is that the appellate court since is not exercising the power under Section 226 of the Constitution of India either to read down the statutory provision or declaring the statutory provision to be unconstitutional/invalid since the said power is not available to the appellate court, hence, the appellate court is required to proceed as per the statutory command. 19. The question which has been raised that the aforesaid provision if not mandatory rather it is directory, therefore, the same is required to be answered by this Court since the office has given the note the appeal to be not maintainable in view of the fact that the appeal has been filed beyond the period of 90 days, as such, the issue which requires consideration as to whether the provision as contained under Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 is mandatory or directory. 20. This Court, in order to answer the aforesaid issue needs to refer the provision of Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 which reads as under: “(5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days.” 21. The law is well settled that any statutory provision if legislates the same in the background of its object and intent so as to the very purpose of the Act be achieved, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 wherein at paragraph 32 it has been held as under: “32. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly.” 22. This Court in the light of the aforesaid proposition of law is now proceeding to refer the basic object and reason upon which the Act, 2008 has been enacted. 23. The basic object and reason of this Act is that the country has been the victim of large-scale terrorism sponsored from across the borders. There have been innumerable incidents of terrorist attacks, not only in the militancy and insurgency affected areas and areas affected by Extremism, but also in the form of terrorist attacks and bomb blasts, etc., in various parts of the country and major cities. 24. The Government after due consideration and to deal with such situation proposes to enact a legislation to make provisions for establishment of a National Investigation Agency in a concurrent jurisdiction framework, with provisions for taking up specific cases under specific Acts for investigation, provisions for setting up of Special Courts and or other related matters. 25. Therefore, the National Investigation Agency Bill, 2008 has been placed before the parliament. 26. The bill has been concurred by the majority of the parliamentarians was taken shape of the enactment known as “National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. 27. 25. Therefore, the National Investigation Agency Bill, 2008 has been placed before the parliament. 26. The bill has been concurred by the majority of the parliamentarians was taken shape of the enactment known as “National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. 27. Further, the purpose of legislating this Act is to facilitate the speedy investigation and prosecution of Scheduled Offences, including those committed outside India against the Indian citizens or affecting the interest of India and to insert certain new offences in the schedule to the Act as Scheduled Offences which adversely affect the national security, it has become necessary to amend certain provisions of the Act therefore, certain amendment has been carved out by way of National Investigation Agency (Amendment) Act, 2019. 28. The aforesaid Act has been acted upon by the constitution of National Investigation Agency. 29. The power has been conferred to the Central Government vis-à-vis the State Government to investigate the Scheduled Offence, as would appear from the provision so made under Chapter-III of the Act, 2008. 30. The trial is mandated to be conducted by the Special Courts as per the provision contained under Chapter-IV thereof. 31. The purpose of constituting the Special Courts is to have the speedy trial without any hindrance, so that, the very object and intent of the Act, 2008, be given full enforceability in order to maintain the integrity of the country. 32. The National Investigation Agency Act has also contains a Schedule as referred under Section 2(1)(f), by which, certain offence has been brought under the purview of the Scheduled Offence, which is being referred as under: “2(1)(f) “Schedule” means the Schedule to this Act” 33. Section 2(1)(f) deals with the definition of ‘Schedule’ which means the Schedule to this Act and all the scheduled offences as provided under Section 2(1)(g) is to be tried by the Special Court and is to be investigated by the National Investigating Agency as per the provision made under Section 6 thereof, which provides provision conferring power upon the Central Government to take up the investigation to be conducted by the National Investigating Agency on the report if furnished by the State Government, or the Central Government has also got suo motu power to take over the investigation but simultaneous to the aforesaid provision, Section 10 is also there which confers power upon the State Government to investigate Scheduled Offences also. 34. 34. Thus, it is evident that the very purpose of constituting National Investigating Agency, 2008 is to deal primarily the Scheduled Offences which has got gravity so far as the nature of allegation is concerned including the U.A.(P) Act, Explosive Substance Act etc. 35. The Act, 2008 has been made to be the self-contained act also provided for the forum of appeal as under Section 21 thereof, the said provision starts with the non-obstante clause that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. 36. Sub-Section (2) of Section 21 provides that every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal. 37. Sub-Section (3) of Section 21 provides that no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. 38. Sub-Section (4) of Section 21 provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. 39. But the rider has been put for filing such appeal either as per the provision as referred under Section 21(1) or Section 21(4) within the period of 30 days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order. 40. Section 21(5) contains two provisos: “the first proviso confers power upon the High Court with the word that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within the period of thirty days.” The second proviso is very specific which provides “that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of 90 days.” 41. The very purpose of the enactment of the Act, 2008 as referred hereinabove is to provide a forum of trial as also the forum of appeal to conclude the trial of the Scheduled offences, as referred under Section 2(1)(g) of the Act, 2008. 42. The very purpose of the enactment of the Act, 2008 as referred hereinabove is to provide a forum of trial as also the forum of appeal to conclude the trial of the Scheduled offences, as referred under Section 2(1)(g) of the Act, 2008. 42. The very purpose of constituting the Special Court is to expedite the trial and further the legislation has been made as the provision of Section 21(1) and 21(3) as also the Section 21(4) by which the forum has been provided. 43. The very purpose of carving out the forum which is to be heard by the Division Bench of the High Court which impliedly means that the Scheduled Offence being grave in nature and the Act is recourse, therefore, the same is to be heard by the Division Bench of the High Court. 44. Further, in some of the Scheduled Offences for example, the U.A.(P) Act, 1967, there is no provision of pre-arrest bail in view of the specific embargo put under Section 43(D)(5) of the U.A.(P) Act, 1967. Therefore, the legislature has brought some of the Scheduled Offences from the purview of the privilege of pre-arrest bail and hence, in order to consider the propriety of the order passed by the Special Court which pertains to Article 21 of the Constitution of India of a person concerned, who has been taken into custody but such arrayed accused person cannot be in a position to file pre-arrest bail in the circumstances if he has been taken into custody for custodial interrogation and when the prayer for regular bail if being rejected, then the same is to be heard by the Division Bench. 45. While, carving out such mechanism, the principle as laid down under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has also been taken into consideration. But the law is also settled merely on the ground of Article 21 of the Constitution of India if a person has committed offence which is coming under the fold of the Scheduled Offences, then, the personal liberty will not be allowed to prevail upon the commission of crime in order to maintain the balance and the enforcement of Rule of law in the country. 46. 46. Admittedly, Article 21 of the Constitution of India being the fundamental right is to be preserved of an individual but such preservation depends upon facts to each case and if a person has been found to have committed serious offences like Scheduled Offences, then the question of maintaining Rule of law will be said to be prevailed upon the right to liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 47. The question of declaring the provision of Section 21(5) to be directory and not mandatory is the basic question herein. 48. It is not in dispute that the Section 21(5) contains two provisions, the first proviso which reads hereunder as: “Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days.” 49. In the first proviso, the word ‘may’ is there, which according to the appellant, is considered to be directory and not mandatory as per which, the appeal is to be filed within the period of 30 days and if the sufficient cause will be shown then, the appellate court will have the power to condone the delay. 50. The second proviso is also there which reads as under: “Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days.” 51. The second proviso stipulates that the appellate court shall not entertain an appeal beyond the period of 90 days. 52. The matter would have been different if Section 21(5) will have with only one proviso, i.e., the first proviso but the same has been added with the second proviso, wherein, the specific provision has been made by putting embargo of not entertaining an appeal beyond the period of 90 days by using the word ‘shall’. 53. The aforesaid two proviso, if read together, then according to the considered view of this Court, Section 21(5), providing the period of limitation to file an appeal within the period of 90 days will be said to be mandatory. 54. 53. The aforesaid two proviso, if read together, then according to the considered view of this Court, Section 21(5), providing the period of limitation to file an appeal within the period of 90 days will be said to be mandatory. 54. Further, the conclusion to hold the said provision mandatory is in order to achieve the object and intent of the Act as per the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd. (2022) 10 SCC 1 , wherein, it has dealt with the meaning of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ i.e., in which circumstances the word ‘may’ will be directory and mandatory. The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted herein under: “32. A Bench of five learned Judges in the judgment reported in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , considered the question as to whether Para 486 of the Police Regulations framed under Section 7 of the Police Act, was mandatory or not. In substance, the said paragraph purported to taboo the Magisterial inquiry under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, when the offence alleged against the police officer was only one under Section 7 of the Police Act. 33. In the opinion written for the majority in State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , K. Subba Rao, J. proceeded to sum-up the relevant rules relating to interpretation, when the statute uses the word “shall:” (AIR p. 765, Para 29) “29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus - When a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus - When a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.” 55. In the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition that the Act is to be held to be mandatory on the basis of enactment based upon its object and intent. 56. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. v. Axis Bank Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352 had observed that ordinarily the word “may” is directory. The expression “may admit” confers discretion to admit. In contrast, the use of the word “shall” postulates a mandatory requirement, wherein, at paragraph-64, it has been laid down that: “64. Ordinarily the word “may” is directory. The expression “may admit” confers discretion to admit. In contrast, the use of the word “shall” postulates a mandatory requirement. The use of the word “shall” raises a presumption that a provision is imperative. However, it is well settled that the prima facie presumption about the provision being imperative may be rebutted by other considerations such as the scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from the construction.” 57. It is also a well settled principle of interpretation that the expression “may” if circumstances so demand can be construed as “shall.” Reference in this regard may be taken from State Tax Officer v. Rainbow Papers Limited, 2022 Live Law (SC) 743. 58. It is also a well settled principle of interpretation that the expression “may” if circumstances so demand can be construed as “shall.” Reference in this regard may be taken from State Tax Officer v. Rainbow Papers Limited, 2022 Live Law (SC) 743. 58. Herein, the object and intent of the Act is to put a deterrent and to give a message to the illegal doers who have found to have committed the offence coming under the fold of Scheduled Offences touching the issue of integrity of the country. Hence, the provision has been under Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 and as per second proviso it is stipulated that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry period of ninety days. 59. The question is that if 2nd proviso of Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 will be said to be directory then whether the very object and intent of the Act can be achieved. In such circumstances, if the appeal will be allowed to be filed even beyond the period of 90 days, then, it can be even beyond the period of 1 year/2 years/3 years/5 years or at any time. 60. The principle to condone the delay under Section 21(5) is based upon the sufficient cause, then in such circumstances, if a person has been convicted under the Scheduled Offence, then he will file an appeal even after inordinate delay by giving justification of sufficient cause for condoning the delay, then what will happen to the very object and intent for the purpose for which, the Act has been enacted i.e., to give message to the society if the Scheduled Offence will be committed then the person concerned will be punished with punishment as enshrined therein. 61. This can also be considered from another angle that if a person has been convicted and if he found that there is patent illegality in the order passed by the Special Courts then the legislature has commanded by filing an appeal within the stipulated period so that it be assessed by the appellate court in order to correct the illegality if committed by the Special Courts so as to achieve the very object and intent of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 62. 62. It also needs to be referred herein that the individual claiming the fundamental right of liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, if not filed an appeal, within the maximum period of 90 days then in such circumstance to such individual cannot be allowed to take plea of the violation of the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution, for the reason that when the statute itself taken into consideration the fact that the appeal is to be filed within the period of 90 days so that the issue be decided by the appellate court, will be said to be consideration of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and if the appeal will be filed beyond the period of 90 days, how can such individual be allowed to take the plea of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 63. Further, conferring the fundamental right in the Constitution of India as under Part-III which also contains Article 21 if it is availed by an individual or any other fundamental right, such individual is to be vigilant about the statutory remedy. 64. It is, thus, evident that the twin test in order to achieve the object of the Act on the one hand and to secure the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, will be said to be fulfilled only when the act will be read in entirety and the same will be said to be achieved its intent, if the due adherence is to be given to the statutory provision. 65. The period of 90 days which has been provided to file an appeal is for the purpose of providing an opportunity to the aggrieved to prefer an appeal so that an opportunity be available at an early date to look into the perversity if available in the impugned order or judgment or sentence or the order rejecting the prayer for bail. 66. It is only on the basis of the aforesaid finding which is to be considered by the appellate court will be said to be in the way to achieve the purport of the Act so as to give a message to the society in the case of judgment or sentence or the order rejecting bail if has been approved by the appellate court. 67. 67. While, on the other hand, if the appellate court finds the infirmity in the order passed by the special court, then the same will be reversed and in that view of the matter, the person concerned who had adversely been affected by improper order, will be allowed to come to the judicial custody and in that way, the principle of Article 21 will be preserved. 68. Herein, the maximum period of 90 days has been provided to file an appeal and as such, the concerned accused person if implicated in the case pertaining to Scheduled Offence, then it requires to such individual to prefer an appeal within the stipulated period as enshrined under the statutory provision so as to achieve the object of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 69. Further, the settled position of law is that the provision contained in the Act is to be read out in its entirety and not by figure out the specific provision leaving apart the other provisions as contained in the said Act. 70. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 at page 1245, emphasized the importance of construing the statute as a whole, the relevant paragraph is being referred hereunder as: “The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire Statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.” 71. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of N.K. Jain v. C.K. Shah, (1991) 2 SCC 495 has decided that for construing the provision of an Act the legislative purpose must be noted and the statute must be read as a whole, in the aforesaid judgment, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph 13 thereof has been pleased to lay down: “The legislative purpose must be noted and the statute must be read as a whole. In our view taking into consideration the object underlying the Act and on reading Sections 14 and 17 in full, it becomes clear that cancellation of the exemption granted does not amount to a penalty within the meaning of Section 14(2-A).” 72. In our view taking into consideration the object underlying the Act and on reading Sections 14 and 17 in full, it becomes clear that cancellation of the exemption granted does not amount to a penalty within the meaning of Section 14(2-A).” 72. This Court, taking into consideration the very object and intent of the Act and reading it together with both the proviso of Section 21(5), is of the view that the aforesaid provision of filing an appeal with the maximum period of 90 days, according to our considered view, is mandatory. 73. This Court has considered the judgments passed by the different High Courts on the issue, i.e., passed by the Kerala High Court in the case of Nasir Ahammed vs. National Investigation Agency, 2015 SCC Online Ker 39625, wherein, the issue involved in the appeal was that Section 21 of the Act, 2008, the appeal can be filed after expiry of the period of 90 days from the date of judgment, sentence or order and whether the High Court can condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 74. The Kerala High Court has answered the said issue by taking into consideration the very object of the Act, as would appear from paragraph-22 thereof and has been pleased to come to the conclusion that Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable holding the period of limitation of 90 days as provided under Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 is mandatory, for ready reference, paragraph-22 of the said judgment is being referred as under: “22. The N.I.A. Act is an Act to constitute an investigation agency at the national level to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the United Nations, its agencies and other international organisations and formatters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The superintendence of the N.I.A. shall vest in the Central Government, as provided in S. 4 of the N.I.A. Act. S. 6 provides for investigation of Scheduled offences. S. 7 provides that the N.I.A. may request the State Government to associate itself with the investigation. S. 9 mandates that the State Government shall extend all assistance and co-operation to the Agency for investigation of the Scheduled offences. S. 6 provides for investigation of Scheduled offences. S. 7 provides that the N.I.A. may request the State Government to associate itself with the investigation. S. 9 mandates that the State Government shall extend all assistance and co-operation to the Agency for investigation of the Scheduled offences. Special courts are constituted under S. 11 for the trial of Scheduled offences. S. 15 of the N.I.A. Act provides for appointment of Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors. S. 16 provides for the procedure and powers of Special Courts. S. 19 of the N.I.A. Act states that the trial under the Act of any offence by a Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and have precedence oyer the trial of any other case against the accused in any other Court (not being a Special Court) and shall be concluded in preference to the trial of such other case and accordingly the trial of such other case shall, if necessary, remain in abeyance. Sub-section (2) of S. 21 states that every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal. The scope of the provisos to subsection (5) of S. 21 of the N.I.A. Act has to be considered in the light of the other provisions in the Act. The period of limitation provided under sub section (5) of S. 21 is thirty days. The first proviso to sub-section (5) empowers the High Court to entertain an appeal after the expiry of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. The second proviso provides that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days. The first proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 21 itself deals with condonation of delay in filing appeal and the delay up to sixty days (ninety days from the date of order) can be condoned by the High Court. By making a restriction that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days, the application of S. 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded. By making a restriction that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days, the application of S. 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded. The High Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal. But that power is restricted under the first proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 21. A further restriction in the second proviso is a clear indication that the High Court cannot exercise the power under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. To that extent, it amounts to an express exclusion of S. 5 of the Limitation Act as contemplated under S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the application for condonation of delay is not maintainable. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay as well as the Criminal, Appeal are dismissed as not maintainable.” 75. The Calcutta High Court has also considered the same issue in the case of Sheikh Rahamtulla and Others vs. National Investigation Agency, 2023 SCC Online Cal 493, wherein, also the issue of filing an appeal under Section 21 of the N.I.A. Act, 2008 beyond 90 days can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 76. We, after going through the said judgment has found that the Act, 2008 has been considered to be a special law governing proceedings relating to offences which Special Courts recognised under the Act of 2008 and further, by making reference of the settled position of law that the statute is an edict of the legislature and that the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Where the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences, for ready reference paragraphs-67 and 69 of the said judgment are being referred as under: “67. As has been discussed above, the Act of 2008 is a special law governing proceedings relating to offences which Special Courts recognised under the Act of 2008 are entrusted to decide in relation to offences enumerate it in the Scheduledd to the Act of 2008. 69. As has been discussed above, the Act of 2008 is a special law governing proceedings relating to offences which Special Courts recognised under the Act of 2008 are entrusted to decide in relation to offences enumerate it in the Scheduledd to the Act of 2008. 69. It is trite law that, the statute is an edict of the legislature and that the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Where the words of the statute are clear, plain or unambiguous the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences. It is wrong and dangerous to substitute some other words for the words of the statute. The rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to add words unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning.” 77. The Bombay High Court has also delved upon the same issue as to whether, the appellate court has the power to entertain an appeal filed beyond the period of 90 days in view of the second proviso of Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008. 78. The said issue has been answered by taking into consideration the very spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and came to the conclusion that Section 21(5) cannot be held to be mandatory otherwise the same will lead to travesty of justice. Such conclusion has been arrived at that if the provision of Section 21(5) will be said to be mandatory, the same will lead to travesty of justice. 79. The Delhi has taken the same view as has been taken by the Bombay High court in the case of Farhan Shaikh vs. State (National Investigation Agency), 2019 SCC Online Del 9158. 80. 79. The Delhi has taken the same view as has been taken by the Bombay High court in the case of Farhan Shaikh vs. State (National Investigation Agency), 2019 SCC Online Del 9158. 80. At this juncture it will profitable to discuss the settled connotation of law that the judgment passed by the different High Courts is not having binding effect rather it is persuasive in nature and it is also settled position of law that if a High Court is not concurring with the view of the different High Courts or another High Court, then a reason is required to be assigned by the concerned High Court as to why the judgment rendered by the another High Court is not having the persuasive value, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pradip J. Mehta vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad, (2008) 14 SCC 283 , wherein, at paragraph-23, it has been held which reads as under: “23. Although, the judgments referred to above were cited at the Bar in the High Court, which were taken note of by the learned Judges of the Bench of the High Court, but without either recording its agreement or dissent, it answered the two questions referred to it in favour of the Revenue. Judicial decorum, propriety and discipline required that the High Court should, especially in the event of its contra view or dissent, have discussed the aforesaid judgments of the different High Courts and recorded its own reasons for its contra view. We quite see the fact that the judgments given by a High Court are not binding on the other High Court(s), but all the same, they have persuasive value. Another High Court would be within its right to differ with the view taken by the other High Courts but, in all fairness, the High Court should record its dissent with reasons therefor. The judgment of the other High Courts, though not binding, have persuasive value which should be taken note of and dissented from by recording its own reasons.” 81. We are now proceeding to examine the judgment rendered by the different Courts, i.e., the Bombay High Court, Kerala High Court, Calcutta High Court and Delhi High Court, as to whether which judgment has got persuasive value for the purpose of issue involved herein. 82. We are now proceeding to examine the judgment rendered by the different Courts, i.e., the Bombay High Court, Kerala High Court, Calcutta High Court and Delhi High Court, as to whether which judgment has got persuasive value for the purpose of issue involved herein. 82. We, after going through the judgments passed by the Kerala High Court, Calcutta High Court, Bombay High Court and Delhi High Court, have found that the Bombay High Court and Delhi High Court had considered that if the appeal will not be allowed to file beyond the period of 90 days, it will lead to travesty of justice and ultimately, it will be in the teeth of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 83. But, we are in respectful disagreement with the said view on the basis of the reason that if the statutory mandate has provided a provision to file an appeal within the maximum period of 90 days, then the appeal is to be filed within the maximum period of 90 days and in these circumstances, if a person is in custody in course of investigation or in custody after the judgment of conviction, then the appeal if required to be filed within the maximum period 90 days that will lead to achieve the very object and intent of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is for the reason that if there is any perversity in the judgment of conviction or any order which is adversely affecting the individual concerned, then the same is to be filed immediately within the specific period. 84. If Section 5 of the Limitation Act which has been held to be applicable by the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court and Delhi High Court, will be allowed to prevail then the appeal can be filed even beyond the period of inordinate delay by showing sufficient cause to condone the delay by applying the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which will eventually lead to violation of core of Article 21 of the constitution of India. 85. 85. The judgment rendered by the Kerala High Court, according to our considered view, will have the persuasive value due to the following reasons: (i) If The principle to condone the delay under Section 21(5) is based upon the sufficient cause, then in such circumstances, if a person has been convicted under the Scheduled Offence, then he will file an appeal even after inordinate delay by giving justification of sufficient cause for condoning the delay, then what will happen to the very object and intent for the purpose for which, the Act has been enacted. (ii) Further, when the individual claiming the fundamental right of liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, if not filed an appeal, within the maximum period of 90 days then in such circumstance the said individual cannot be allowed to take plea of the violation of the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution, for the reason that when the statute itself taken into consideration the fact that the appeal is to be filed within the maximum period of 90 days so that the issue be decided by the appellate court, will be said to be consideration of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and if the appeal will be filed beyond the period of 90 days, how can such individual be allowed to take the plea of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (iii) It is, thus, evident that the twin test in order to achieve the object of the Act on the one hand and to secure the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, will be said to be fulfilled only when the act will be read in entirety and the same will be said to be achieved its intent, if the due adherence is to be given to the statutory provision. (iv) The period of 90 days which has been provided to file an appeal is for the purpose of providing an opportunity to the aggrieved to prefer an appeal so that an opportunity be available at an early date to look into the perversity if available in the impugned order or judgment or sentence or the order rejecting the prayer for bail, so as to achieve. 86. 86. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the provision as contained under Section 21(5) of the Act, 2008 mandating to file an appeal within the maximum period of 90 days, will be said to achieve the very purpose of Article 21 of the Constitution of India for the sufferers. 87. This Court, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is in due agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court and the Calcutta High Court. 88. Further, the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court and Delhi High Court, is according to the considered view of this Court and with all due respects to the concerned High Courts, is of the view that the aforesaid judgments are not being considered to have the persuasive value due to the reason, upon which, the judgments passed by the Kerala High Court and Calcutta High Court have been accepted to have the persuasive value as per the reason referred hereinabove. 89. It also requires to refer herein that in course of hearing, it has been informed at Bar that the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court has been kept in abeyance by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 90. We, on scrutiny of the same, have found that the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court has been kept in abeyance by the Hon’ble Apex Court vide order dated 02-12-2019 passed in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No. 41439/2019. 91. Accordingly, and based upon the discussion made hereinabove, this Court is of the view that office note raising the objection of maintainability of the instant appeal in view of the fact that the appeal has been filed after expiry of maximum statutory period of 90 days, is hereby sustained. 92. In the result, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed on the ground of maintainability.