JUDGMENT : Venuthurumalli Gopala Krishna Rao, J. This Appeal, under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short 'the C.P.C.'], is filed by the Appellants/defendants challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 30.06.2005, in O.S.No.148 of 2002 passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati [for short 'the trial Court']. The Respondent herein is the plaintiff in the said Suit. 2. The Plaintiff filed the above said suit against the defendants to direct the defendants to execute a registered sale deed in respect of plaint schedule property at the expenses of plaintiff in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 04.06.1999, in case of default, the Court may be pleased to execute a regular registered sale deed on behalf of plaintiff through process of Court and for costs. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.148 of 2002, are as under: The deceased first defendant is the absolute owner of items 1 and 2 of the plaint schedule property, having been acquired the same under registered sale deeds dated 21.10.1994 and 01.03.1995 from the lawful owners thereof for a valuable consideration. The deceased first defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff on 04.06.1999 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,000/- and received an advance sale consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/- from the plaintiff on the same day and executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff by undertaking to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff in respect of plaint schedule property as and when plaintiff pays the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- and demanded to execute a regular registered sale deed at his expenses. Plaintiff approached the deceased first defendant several times and offered to pay him the remaining balance of sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- and requested the deceased first defendant to execute regular registered sale deed in his favour at his expenses, but inspite of repeated demands and notice dated 21.02.2002, the deceased first defendant failed to comply with the terms of agreement of sale. First defendant died on 12.06.2002, leaving behind him, defendants 2 to 5 as his only legal heirs, who succeed to his entire estate including the suit schedule property. First defendant died on 12.06.2002, leaving behind him, defendants 2 to 5 as his only legal heirs, who succeed to his entire estate including the suit schedule property. Hence, the defendants 2 to 5 are liable to execute a regular registered sale deed on behalf of deceased first defendant in favour of plaintiff after receipt of balance sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- at the expenses of the plaintiff. 5. The third defendant filed a written statement, which was adopted by the defendants 2, 4 and 5, by denying the averments mentioned in the plaint and further contended as under: - The agreement of sale is not genuine and it is a forged document. Plaint schedule properties are not the absolute properties of deceased first defendant. The deceased from out of ancestral property, as manager of joint family, purchased the suit schedule property. Plaintiff and first defendant are closely moving with each other and plaintiff might have obtained the signature of late first defendant while he was under the influence of alcohol, there was no contract between the plaintiff and the deceased first defendant to sell the plaint schedule property and the defendants 2 to 5 have given reply notice dated 19.09.2002 to the notice of the plaintiff and prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. 6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of contract in pursuance of agreement of sale dated 04.06.1999? (ii) Whether the agreement of sale dated 04.06.1999 is true, valid and binding on defendants? (iii) To what relief? 7. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW1 to PW3 were examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A6 were marked. On behalf of the Defendants DW1 was examined and Ex.B1 and Ex.X1 were marked. 8. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 30.06.2005, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendants in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 9. Heard Sri. T.D.Phani Kumar, learned counsel, representing Sri. Harinath Reddy Soma, learned counsel for appellants and Sri. L.R.Jaya Prakash, learned counsel, representing Sri. Rajendra Bussa, learned counsel for respondent. 10. 9. Heard Sri. T.D.Phani Kumar, learned counsel, representing Sri. Harinath Reddy Soma, learned counsel for appellants and Sri. L.R.Jaya Prakash, learned counsel, representing Sri. Rajendra Bussa, learned counsel for respondent. 10. The learned counsel for appellants would contend that Ex.A5 agreement of sale is a fabricated document. He would further contend that even though the plaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness, the trial Court came to wrong conclusion and decreed the suit. He would further contend that the decree and the judgment passed by the trial Court may be set aside and the appeal may be allowed. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that on appreciation of entire evidence on record, the trial Court rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the Trial Court and the appeal may be dismissed. 12. Having regard to the pleadings in the Suit and the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this court, the following points would arise for determination: I. Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for granting relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 04.06.1999? II. Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial court needs any interference, if so, to what extent? 13. Point Nos.1 and 2: The case of the plaintiff is that the deceased first defendant is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property, having been acquired the same under registered sale deeds dated 21.10.1994 and 01.03.1995 from the lawful owners thereof, for a valuable consideration. The plaintiff further pleaded that the deceased first defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff on 04.06.1999 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 4,95,000/- and received an advance sale consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/- from the plaintiff on the same day and executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff undertaking to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property as and when the plaintiff pays the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- and demanded to execute a regular registered sale deed at his expenses among other terms of the agreement of sale dated 04.06.1999. 2,95,000/- and demanded to execute a regular registered sale deed at his expenses among other terms of the agreement of sale dated 04.06.1999. The plaintiff further pleaded that he approached the deceased first defendant several times and offered to pay him the remaining balance of sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- and requested the deceased first defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in his favour, but he failed to do so. The plaintiff further pleaded that inspite of issuance of legal notice dated 21.02.2002 and even though the first defendant received legal notice, he failed to perform his obligation to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 14. The suit is based on Ex.A5 agreement of sale said to have been executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The undisputed facts are the suit is filed against the first defendant only, during the pendency of the suit the first defendant died and his legal representatives are brought on record as defendants 2 to 5. Defendant No.3 filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the other defendants. Ex.A5 recitals goes to show that the first defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for Rs. 4,95,000/- and the plaintiff paid advance sale consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/- on the date of agreement of sale itself and the first defendant executed an agreement of sale in favour of plaintiff and it was recited in Ex.A5 that the first defendant will execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on payment of remaining balance sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/-, inspite of repeated demands, the first defendant failed to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has approached the trial Court by filing the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale. 15. The legal position, in this regard is no more res integra, the law is well settled that to grant of decree of specific performance of agreement of sale is not an automatic and it is discretionary relief, the same is required to be exercised judiciously sound and reasonably. 16. 15. The legal position, in this regard is no more res integra, the law is well settled that to grant of decree of specific performance of agreement of sale is not an automatic and it is discretionary relief, the same is required to be exercised judiciously sound and reasonably. 16. In the case of Gaddipati Divija and another v. Pathuri Samrajyam and others 2023 SCC Online SC 442, the Apex Court held as follows: "Before parting with the judgment, we would like to clarify another aspect, i.e., with regard to whether time is of the essence in the sale agreement in the present case or not. In Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., this Court was dealing with a similar question with respect to a sale agreement for an immovable property, while referring to an earlier judgment in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, it was reiterated that in sale of immovable property there is no presumption that time is the essence of the contract, however, the court may infer performance in a reasonable time if the conditions are evident from the express terms of the contract, from the nature of the property, and from the surrounding circumstances". It is also well settled that generally speaking, time is not of the essence of agreement for the sale of immovable property. In deciding whether to grant the remedy of specific performance of agreement of sale, specifically in a suits relating to sale of immovable property, the Courts must be cognizant of the conduct of the parties. The remedy provided must not cause injustice to the parties specifically when they are not at fault. In the case on hand, no specific time is fixed for performance of the part of the contract. The case of the plaintiff is that even though he is ready and willing to pay the remaining balance sale consideration, inspite of issuance of Ex.A3 legal notice and after receipt of legal notice the defendant No.1 failed to discharge his obligation. It was also pleaded in the plaint itself that even though the plaintiff approached the first defendant for several times and offered to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- and requested the deceased first defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in his favour, but inspite of repeated demands, he failed to do so. It was also pleaded in the plaint itself that even though the plaintiff approached the first defendant for several times and offered to pay the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs. 2,95,000/- and requested the deceased first defendant to execute a regular registered sale deed in his favour, but inspite of repeated demands, he failed to do so. The plaintiff further pleaded in the plaint itself that inspite of receipt of legal notice under Ex.A3 from the plaintiff, the defendant No.1 failed to perform his part of the obligation. Ex.A4 shows that the first defendant himself received Ex.A3 legal notice. The fact remains that after receipt of legal notice, the first defendant did not issue any reply, which leads to institute the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale by the plaintiff. To deny the contents in Ex.A3 legal notice, no reply notice was given by the first defendant. The defense put forth by the defendants 2 to 5 is Ex.A5 is a fabricated document. Ex.A1, Ex.A2 coupled with Ex.A5 goes to show the first defendant handed over his original title deeds of his vendor i.e., Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 to the plaintiff. No explanation is offered by the appellants, on this aspect, about the possession of original title deeds of the first defendant by the plaintiff, which is also one of the circumstance to believe that the first defendant executed Ex.A5 agreement of sale after receipt of advance sale consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/-. Furthermore, after receipt of legal notice, the first defendant kept quiet, if the first defendant did not execute Ex.A5 agreement of sale, what prevented him to issue reply notice to deny the contents of Ex.A3 legal notice. The learned counsel for appellants would contend that the first defendant is bedridden by the date of receipt of legal notice issued by the plaintiff. There is no whisper in the evidence of DW1 that the first defendant was bedridden by the time of receipt of legal notice. It was not suggested to PW1 in cross examination by the learned counsel for defendants before the trial Court that by the date of receipt of Ex.A3 notice, the first defendant was bedridden. DW1 also did not depose that Ex.A3 legal notice was not received by the first defendant. It was not suggested to PW1 in cross examination by the learned counsel for defendants before the trial Court that by the date of receipt of Ex.A3 notice, the first defendant was bedridden. DW1 also did not depose that Ex.A3 legal notice was not received by the first defendant. The appellants raised the plea of bedridden of first defendant by the date of receipt of Ex.A3 notice for the first time before this appellate Court, the same is not permissible under law. 17. The another defense put forth by the appellants is that the plaint schedule property is the ancestral property of first defendant and it is not the self acquired property of first defendant. Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 goes to show that the plaint schedule property is self acquired property of first defendant. The 3rd defendant i.e., DW1 admitted in cross examination that he did not file any document to show that the suit schedule property is ancestral property of first defendant. He further admits that the first defendant purchased the suit schedule property in the year 1994. The above admissions of DW1 coupled with Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 falsifies the statement of defendants that the suit schedule property is ancestral property. 18. The another defense put forth by the defendants is that Ex.A5 is a fabricated document. As stated supra, on the date of execution of Ex.A5 agreement of sale by the first defendant, he handed-over his original title deeds Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 to the plaintiff. No explanation is offered by the appellants, on this aspect, about the possession of original title deeds of the first defendant by the plaintiff which is also one of the circumstance to believe that the first defendant executed Ex.A5 agreement of sale after receipt of advance amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. Another important circumstance to disbelieve the case of the defendants is that after receipt of legal notice, the first defendant kept quiet and did not issue any reply notice to deny the contents of Ex.A3 legal notice. If the first defendant did not execute Ex.A5 agreement of sale, what prevented him to issue reply notice denying the contents of Ex.A3 legal notice. As stated supra, the first defendant, who executed Ex.A5 agreement of sale did not issue any reply notice denying the contents in Ex.A3 legal notice. If the first defendant did not execute Ex.A5 agreement of sale, what prevented him to issue reply notice denying the contents of Ex.A3 legal notice. As stated supra, the first defendant, who executed Ex.A5 agreement of sale did not issue any reply notice denying the contents in Ex.A3 legal notice. The defendants 2 to 5 have no knowledge about Ex.A5 agreement of sale and so also Ex.A3 legal notice. Furthermore, the plaintiff examined one of the attestor in Ex.A5 agreement of sale as PW2. His evidence goes to show that the deceased first defendant agreed to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for Rs. 4,95,000/- and executed Ex.A5 agreement of sale on 04.06.1999 and he attested the said Ex.A5 agreement of sale and the Ex.A5 was scribed by document writer M.Subbarao and the entire transaction was happened in his presence. Even though he was cross examined by the learned counsel for defendants before the trial Court, nothing was elicited from PW2 to discredit the testimony of PW2. 19. To prove the Ex.A5 agreement of sale and to discharge his burden to prove that the Ex.A5 contains the signature of first defendant, the plaintiff relied on the evidence of PW3. As per the evidence of PW3, he purchased the vacant house site from the first defendant under a registered sale deed and Ex.X1 is the registered sale deed dated 08.11.1994. PW3 identified the signature of first defendant in Ex.X1, he further deposed that the said Muneendra Reddy signed in Ex.X1 in his presence. The trial Court compared the signatures of first defendant in Ex.A5 agreement of sale with the signatures in Ex.X1 registered sale deed said to have been executed by first defendant in favour of PW3. Appellants did not take any steps to send Ex.A5 agreement of sale to the hand writing expert for the reasons best known to the appellants. 20. Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act expressly enables the Court to compare the disputed signatures with admitted signatures to ascertain whether the signatures are that of the person, by whom it purports to have been signed. Both the parties have not opted for comparison of the signature of the hand writing expert. 20. Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act expressly enables the Court to compare the disputed signatures with admitted signatures to ascertain whether the signatures are that of the person, by whom it purports to have been signed. Both the parties have not opted for comparison of the signature of the hand writing expert. The Apex Court in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1980 SC 531 observed that "the duty of the Court to compare the signatures and come to its own conclusion cannot be avoided by recourse to the statement that the court is not an expert". It is thus clear from the above observation of the Apex Court that under Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act, the Court can compare the disputed signatures and admitted signatures to come to its own conclusion. However, the provisions of Section 73 of Indian Evidence Act have been interpreted by various courts as to how the signatures are to be compared when there is no assistance from the expert. The trial Court has taken pains to compare the signatures of first defendant on Ex.A5 agreement of sale with the admitted signatures of first defendant on Ex.X1 and came to conclusion that the signatures on Ex.A5 are genuine one. The defendants did not choose to cross examine the PW3. The evidence on record clearly proves that the first defendant agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for Rs. 4,95,000/- and executed Ex.A5 agreement of sale on 04.06.1999 after receipt of advance sale consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/- and inspite of repeated demands made by the plaintiff, the first defendant failed to discharge his obligation to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 21. The learned counsel for appellants placed a reliance in U.N.Krishnamurthy v. A.M.Krishnamurthy 2022 SCC Online SC 840, in that case, the Apex court held as follows: In D.L.F. Housing and Construction (Pvt.) Ltd., in the absence of an averment on the part of the Plaintiff in the plaint, that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, it was held that the Plaintiff had no cause of action so far as the relief for Specific Performance was concerned. In this case, of course, there is an averment in the plaint that the Respondent Plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract. In this case, of course, there is an averment in the plaint that the Respondent Plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract. The question is whether the Respondent Plaintiff had proved his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R.Jagan Mohan Rao, this Court reiterated that section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 envisages that the Plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which were to be performed by him other than those terms, the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the Defendant. In N.P. Thirugnanam, this Court said that the continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Plaintiff was a condition precedent for grant of the relief of Specific Performance. 22. In the case of K.S.Vidyanadam v. Vairavan (1997) 3 SCC 1 , the Apex Court held as follows: It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. The period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing a suit is three years. From these two circumstances, it does not follow that any and every suit for specific performance of the agreement (which does not provide specifically that time is of the essence of the contract) should be decreed provided it is filed within the period of limitation notwithstanding the time limits stipulated in the agreement for doing one or the other thing by one or the other party. That would amount to saying that the time-limits prescribed by the parties in the agreement have no significance or value and that they mean nothing. Would it be reasonable to say that because time is not made the essence of the contract, the time-limit(s) specified in the agreement have no relevance and can be ignored with impunity? It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani. It would also mean denying the discretion vested in the court by both Sections 10 and 20. As held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani. "it is clear that in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract, the court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are (evident') : (1) from the express terms of the contract; (2) from the nature of the property; and (3) from the surrounding circumstances, for example, the object of making the contract". In other words, the court should look at all the relevant circumstances including the time-limit(s) specified in the agreement and determine whether its discretion to grant specific performance should be exercised. In the case on hand, the time is not an essence of contract, no specific time limit is fixed for performance of contract of both the parties. The case of the plaintiff is that even though the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to pay the remaining balance sale consideration, the deceased first defendant failed to come forward to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The date of specific performance of agreement of sale is 04.06.1999. The plaintiff issued a legal notice on 21.05.2002 prior to 3 years from the date of execution of Ex.A5 agreement of sale, the suit is filed on 03.06.2002 within a period of 3 years from the date of agreement of sale. Furthermore, as stated supra, the material on record clearly reveals that no time limit is fixed in between the first defendant and plaintiff for performance of contract. The material on record reveals that even though the plaintiff is ready to perform his part of contract to pay the balance sale consideration, the first defendant did not come forward to perform his part of contract to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of plaintiff. 23. The evidence on record clearly proves that there is no negligence on the part of the plaintiff to obtain the regular registered sale deed from the first defendant. 23. The evidence on record clearly proves that there is no negligence on the part of the plaintiff to obtain the regular registered sale deed from the first defendant. The first defendant died during the pendency of the suit, his legal representatives are brought on record as defendants 2 to 5 and they also filed a written statement before the trial Court and therefore, the defendants 2 to 5 being the legal representatives of the first defendant have to execute a regular registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff after receipt of remaining balance sale consideration from the plaintiff. The trial Court on appreciation of entire evidence on record, rightly came to conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale, accordingly, the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court is perfectly sustainable under law and it requires no interference. Accordingly, the points 1 and 2 are answered. 24. In the result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming the decree and Judgment dated 30.06.2005 in O.S.No.148 of 2002 passed by the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Tirupati. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.