JUDGMENT : Goutam Bhaduri, J. Heard. 1. This appeal under Section 374(2) has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.12.2019 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Korba, District2 Korba (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 114/2018 whereby the appellant stands convicted and sentenced as under:- Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code Life Imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/-. in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 3 months. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 07.07.2018 at about 4:30-5:30 P.M., the accused/appellant was abusing the deceased- Seema Yadav and she resisted the same and in retaliation to such resistance, the accused/appellant took out the kerosene can from his house and poured it on the deceased- Seema Yadav and set her ablaze. She was severely burnt and the fire was extinguished by the neighbours. The daughter of the deceased- Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14) informed her father- Lakhan Yadav (P.W.-1) about the incident. Lakhan Yadav (P.W.-1) immediately reached the spot and thereafter, the deceased- Seema Yadav was taken to Korba hospital. Subsequently, on reference being made, she was shifted to CIMS, Bilaspur where during her treatment, she died on 12.07.2018. While she was admitted in hospital at Korba, her dying declaration was recorded by Naib Tehsildar – Gurudatt Panchbhaye (P.W.-6) where she was declared to be in a fit state of mind to make statement. In her statement, the accusation was made against the present appellant. Daughter and husband of the deceased too made the similar statements. The dead body was subjected to postmortem and in the postmortem report, the death was shown to be cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of extensive burn injury [70 to 75%] resulting in septicaemia and its complications. The accused/appellant was arrested and after recording statement of witnesses, the charge-sheet was filed. 3. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 23 documents. The accused/appellant did not accept the allegations and claimed to be tried. In his defence, the appellant examined 3 witnesses as D.W.-1- Smt. Santoshi Das Manikpuri, D.W.-2- Smt. Kumari Naydu & D.W.-3- Smt. Sunita Singh. 4. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence of the witnesses convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. In his defence, the appellant examined 3 witnesses as D.W.-1- Smt. Santoshi Das Manikpuri, D.W.-2- Smt. Kumari Naydu & D.W.-3- Smt. Sunita Singh. 4. Learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence of the witnesses convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned in para 1 of the judgment. Hence, this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the evidence of the defence witnesses i.e. D.W.-1- Smt. Santoshi Das Manikpuri, D.W.-2- Smt. Kumari Naydu & D.W.-3- Smt. Sunita Singh would clearly show that the present appellant was actually trying to save the deceased. He would submit that because of some earlier dispute existing between the parties, threat was always extended that the appellant would be inculpated in a false case and she herself poured kerosene on her and set herself ablaze. Therefore, the false allegations are to be separated from truth. The Court though relied on the child witness- Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14) but her statement is contradictory and she was tutored and even she is not the eye-witness to the incident. He further submits that the statements of the neighbours as also the family members would show that they have not supported the case of the prosecution. Consequently, the conviction in this case needs interference by this Court. 6. Per contra, the learned State counsel would submit that unequivocal dying declaration exists and the same was proved by Naib Tehsildar-Gurudatt Panchbhaye (P.W.-6) and state of mind of the deceased has also been proved correct by Dr. R.P.S. Paikra (P.W.-5). He further submits that in the statement of husband of the deceased- Lakhan Yadav (P.W.-1), it is also admitted that the deceased disclosed that she was set on fire by the present appellant which is corroborated by her daughter- Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14) & both the statements of Lakhan Yadav (P.W.-1) and Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14) along with the dying declaration proved that the appellant was the author of crime. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence available on record. 8. Therefore, the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge is well merited and does not call for any interference by this Court. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence available on record. 8. According to the prosecution, on 07.07.2018 in between 4:30 PM to 5:30 PM because of certain dispute as appellant was abusing the deceased- Seema Yadav and she resisted such abuse, in retaliation, he took out the kerosene jerrycan from his house and poured it on her and set her ablaze. The first witness was Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14), the daughter of the deceased, who was playing nearby. 9. We went through the statement of Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14) who is aged about 14 years. In examination-in-chief, she states that after hearing the noise that her mother suffered the burn injury, she went there and saw that her mother Seema Yadav was sitting outside her house. Having asked, how it happened, she said that the present appellant- Sonu Mahant has burnt her. Thereafter, this was informed to her father and when her sister came, the deceased was taken to district hospital, Korba and from there she was taken to CIMS, Bilaspur where during treatment, she died. She was cross-examined and was declared hostile, however, this part of the statement that when she immediately reached the spot, the deceased disclosed that she was burnt by the present appellant, remains unrebutted. Though she was not an eye-witness but immediate disclosure of the incident was made to this witness by the deceased and we do not find any reason to disbelieve it. 10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Shivasharanappa Versus State of Karnataka, reported in (2013) 5 SCC 705 , held that the testimony of a child witness can be relied when such testimony forms the basis of conviction. It further lays down that even if the corroboration is not required but as a rule of prudence, the Court can deem it desirable to get the statement corroborated and the solitary statement can also be relied on. Para 17 of the said decision is relevant and quoted below:- “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Para 17 of the said decision is relevant and quoted below:- “17. Thus, it is well settled in law that the court can rely upon the testimony of a child witness and it can form the basis of conviction if the same is credible, truthful and is corroborated by other evidence brought on record. Needless to say, the corroboration is not a must to ‘record a conviction, but as a rule of prudence, the court thinks it desirable to see the corroboration from other reliable evidence placed on record. The principles that apply for placing reliance on the solitary statement of the witness, namely, that the statement is true and correct and is of quality and cannot be discarded solely on the ground of lack of corroboration, apply to a child witness who is competent and whose version is reliable.” 11. In order to find out the corroboration whether exists, we further ventured into the facts and evidence. The husband was examined as P.W.-1. In para 4 of his statement, he states that when he reached immediately and asked her wife as to how the incident happened, it was disclosed that she was set ablaze by the present appellant. Though the presence of other witnesses is eliminated but the case of the prosecution is not on the fact that there was eye7 witness. Though, Arti Yadav (P.W.-3) one of the daughters, who was called, stated that her mother did not disclose as to how it was happened and they comfortably went along with her mother to the hospital, would show that Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/01) was lodged by the father at 10:00 P.M. on the same day and the incident was in between 4:30 P.M. to 5:30 P.M. 12. The MLC which is on record shows that the victim was severely burnt and was admitted to the hospital and was subjected to MLC. In view of MLC report (Ex.P/14) mentioning the degree of burn injury about 70%-75%, we readily infer that the victim was not in a state of comfort as has been stated by one of the witnesses. Be that as it may, when she was admitted to the hospital, dying declaration was recorded. Before such dying declaration was recorded, Dr. R.P.S. Painkra (P.W.-5) examined the victim. According to him, she was in a fit state of mind to depose and was able to understand the facts. Be that as it may, when she was admitted to the hospital, dying declaration was recorded. Before such dying declaration was recorded, Dr. R.P.S. Painkra (P.W.-5) examined the victim. According to him, she was in a fit state of mind to depose and was able to understand the facts. This certification was given by him on Ex.P/8 with dying declaration. Perusal of dying declaration (Ex.P/8) further corroborates the fact that endorsement was made by the doctor at about 9:40 P.M. on 07.07.2018 that she is able to depose. Subsequently, her statement was recorded by Naib Tehsildar- Gurudatt Panchbhaye (P.W.-6) who deposed that on 07.07.2018, he received phone call from his Tehsildar that dying declaration is to be recorded and he went to the hospital and after reaching the hospital, he obtained the opinion of the doctor about state of mind of the deceased. Having obtained the positive opinion that the victim is able to depose, her statement was recorded. In crossexamination of this witness, nothing has been elicited to doubt such statement which brings us to the statement made in the dying declaration (Ex.P/8). Perusal of the dying declaration (Ex.P/8) shows that she deposed that at 4:30 P.M. to 5:00 P.M. while she was sitting in her house, at that time, Sonu Mehant, the neighbour in intoxicated state started abusing her. Thereafter, kerosene oil was poured on her and she was set ablaze. She further stated that at the time of incident, the neighbour did not come for help and closed the doors. The said statement is also signed by the deceased. 13. The Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Vs State of Haryana (2008) 11 SCC 425 , a two Judge Bench reproduced Para 51 from Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 81 wherein it was observed that (Dalbir Singh Case, SCC pp 429-30 Para 13) "13….’51..... The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (False in one thing, false in every thing) has not received general acceptance. ..…. nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of the rules of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded.” 14. ..…. nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of the rules of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded.” 14. This Court in the matter of Goje @ Dalpratap Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Chhattisgarh in CRA No. 1643 of 2021 vide judgment dated 21.06.2023 held in para 14 as under:- “14. In the facts of the case the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in every thing) cannot be made applicable since a person who is on death bed is considered to be very solemn and serene. This proposition was laid down by the Supreme Court in Laxman Versus State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 wherein it was observed that the situation in which a man is on the deathbed is very solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his/her statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. The Court further held that since the accused has no power of cross examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness The Court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or promoting or a product of imagination. The Court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit statement of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant(s). Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate, there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore voluntary and truthful nature of declaration can be established otherwise.” 15. Thus, in the dying declaration, the accusation has directly been made against the appellant without any iota of doubt. The said statement is further corroborated by Bharti Yadav (P.W.-14) who immediately reached the spot. Therefore, the incident happened because of the fact that appellant poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze, was successfully established by the prosecution. 16. Now coming to the question about the death, it is not disputed that the deceased- Seema Yadav died on 12.07.2018 and thereafter she was subjected to postmortem. The postmortem report is Ex.P/11 and the Dr. N. Varun (P.W.-8) conducted the postmortem of the dead body. According to him, the following burn injuries were found:- 1. Head & Neck: 09% 2. Chest: 08% 3. Abdomen: 08% 4. Both upper limbs: 15% 5. Both lower limbs: 22% 6. Back: 10% 7. Genital region: 0% 17. The cause of death is cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of extensive burn injury [70 to 75%] followed by septicaemia and its complications. Head & Neck: 09% 2. Chest: 08% 3. Abdomen: 08% 4. Both upper limbs: 15% 5. Both lower limbs: 22% 6. Back: 10% 7. Genital region: 0% 17. The cause of death is cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of extensive burn injury [70 to 75%] followed by septicaemia and its complications. Three defence witnesses were examined as D.W.-1, D.W.-2 & D.W.-3 and they stated that the deceased went inside the house, poured kerosene on her and came out with a matchbox and set herself on fire and the present appellant has been inculpated for the reason that the threat was extended that she would inculpate him. The map of the crime scene is Ex. P/17. Perusal of map (Ex.P/17) proved by Chandrashekhar Barik (P.W.-13) would show that the house of the deceased which is marked as B is at a distance whereas the house of the accused/appellant which is marked as C is in front of the place of the incident which happened on the road. The seizure of kerosene was also made and the plastic jerrycan of kerosene was seized vide Ex. P/18 from the road. Therefore, the statements of D.W.-1, D.W.-2 & D.W.-3 that the deceased went inside the house, then came out and poured kerosene on herself and set herself on fire, appears to be wrong as the crime scene map reflects otherwise. 18. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the oral and documentary evidence including the medical evidence, we are of the opinion that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court. Thus, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court. 19. In the result, the appeal being sans merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.