ORDER : 1. The petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition to quash the order dated 28.12.2018 (Annexure P/1) passed in Case No. BSP-7(03)/2018-RLC by Regional Labour Commissioner (C), Bilaspur (C.G.) by which the respondent No.1 issued direction under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 directing the petitioner to calculate and determine the claim amount and ascertain the “Money Due” as per Bhave Award passed in Reference Case No. 6/89 or in accordance with the settlement dated 22.09.1992 or where it may be worked out without any dispute in respect of Shree Niwas Gurijala & 134 others after identification & verification of the workers within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. The petitioner has also prayed for setting aside the show cause notice dated 15.04.2019 & 22.08.2019 (Annexure P/1) by which the respondent No. 2 has directed the petitioner why suitable legal action shall not be initiated against the petitioner by issuing revenue recovery certificate to the competent authority under Section 33 (C) (1) of the I.D. Act 1947 for recovery of Rs. 55,807,4256.38 of 135 workers mentioned in the list. 2. The brief facts as reflected from the record are that on 23.09.1989 a settlement was arrived at between the SECL, Hasdeo Area and MPKMS(HMS) under Section 10-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 read with Rule 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 to refer a dispute with regard to the regularisation of contractual workers to an Arbitrator appointed by the appropriate Government. Accordingly, the matter was sent to the Arbitrator on the following terms of reference:- “Whether the demand of the Union for departmentalization of contractual work/workers for Tub-Repairing Jobs of Hasdeo Area is justified? If not, to what relief the workers would be entitled to?" 3. The said reference was registered as Reference No. 6/89 and the learned Arbitrator has passed the award on 30.08.1990 by recording its finding in paragraph 6.16 of its award as under:- “on the basis of list of workmen submitted by the union to ALC(C)/CLC(C) to the management an enquiry already caused through SAMs, even before April 1988 now for the management to say that the union’s list may not be given congnizence does not appear to be proper, when the list at W-7 filed in case No. 3/89 was admitted and not denied by SECL. Similarly, the RKKMS(INTUC) have filed list of 26 workmen, 22 from South JKD and 4 from North JKD during Arbitration No. 10/11/89 at W-8 in case No. 4/89. These documents was not denied by the SECL. 6.16.1- The S.K.M.S(AITUC) in case No. 5/89 and NCWF in case No. 6/89 had not filed any such list before Arbitrator. However, in oral evidence the SKMS has produced two witness ww-1 and ww-2 both from Rajnangar Colliery, NCWF had produced two witnesses from Bijuri and one from Rajnagar. WW-1 was ex-workman from Bijuri, WW-2 from Rajnangar Colliery and WW-3 from Bijuri deposed that they were contractual workmen on tub repairing jobs. On minute scruity it reveals that the list filed in case No. 3/89 and 4/89 do not contain names from Rajnagar Colliery where 23 works are reported to be workmen and thereafter passed the final award. In paragraph 6.23(A) which reads as under:- 6,23(A) In my view examined in above finding, there is full justification in the case of the unons(s). In the result, I hold that the demand of the union for departmentalization of contractual work/workers for Tub Repairing jobs in Hasdeo area is justified. (B) As the issue has been alive for years and the unions(s) has been consistently pursuing it, the ends of justice will meet if the departmentalisation is done from 1st December 1988 in which month the conciliation officer (ALC(C) Shahdol draw up a conciliation settlement making the SECLL Hasdeo Area management to agree for Arbitration and resolve the issue once for all. (C) After departmentalizing these workers, from 1.12.88 with all consequential benefits if the management finds subsequently that there is over staffing in this category, it may divert the excess Tub repairing mazdoors in other jobs in any of the Sub Areas of Hadeo, Area ensuring that they continue to get category II wages and all others benefits available to cat. II employees. (D) In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. 4. It has been contended by the petitioner that in compliance of the Arbitration Award, the petitioner gave employment to all those persons whose names were submitted by the Unions before the Arbitrator and thus, the Arbitration Award stood complied with in its letter and spirit. II employees. (D) In the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. 4. It has been contended by the petitioner that in compliance of the Arbitration Award, the petitioner gave employment to all those persons whose names were submitted by the Unions before the Arbitrator and thus, the Arbitration Award stood complied with in its letter and spirit. It is submitted that the Respondent No. 2, which is the successor of NCWF, preferred a Writ Petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh which was registered as M.P. No. 1322/1994 wherein it has been submitted by the Respondent No. 2 that they could not submit the list of workers before the Arbitrator and the said petition was disposed of vide order dated 10.11.2005 (Annexure P/3) by the Hon’ble High Court of M.P. the operative part of the order is as under:- “Counsel for the petitioner per contra has argued that relying on the judgment of this Court regarding identification the respondent No. 1/Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur ought to have verified for the purposes of giving effect to the claims awarded in the award passed by the arbitrator and since no verification has been done by the respondent No.1/Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur considering these arguments and in the interest of justice, the petition can be disposed off with a simple direction to the respondent No.1 Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur to consider the representation of the petitioner/union within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order passed today and pass appropriate order in accordance with the law. In case of rejection, it shall pass a reasoned order assigning reasons”. 5. It has been submitted that in pursuance of direction given by the Hon’ble High Court M.P., the Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC) conducted a meeting between the parties wherein the petitioner had categorically submitted before the RLC that the award has been implemented in toto as admittedly the list which was submitted by the Respondent no.2 was never before the Arbitrator. Without considering the said submission, the respondent No.2 vide its memo dated 22.02.2006 has informed the petitioner that proceedings may be initiated for prosecution by approaching Central Government which is appropriate government for the petitioner. 6. Without considering the said submission, the respondent No.2 vide its memo dated 22.02.2006 has informed the petitioner that proceedings may be initiated for prosecution by approaching Central Government which is appropriate government for the petitioner. 6. The Respondent No. 2/Union again filed a Writ Petition bearing WP No. 5920/2007 before the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Principal Bench at Jabalpur praying for implementation of the proceedings order passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Jabalpur dated 22.02.2006 and for implementation of the award passed by Arbitrator. The Respondent No. 1 to 4 in the said Writ Petition No. 5920/2007 filed their return contending that the list which has been filed by the Respondent No. 2/Union was never submitted before the Arbitrator and only in MP No. 1322/1994 they have filed the list of workers for which they are claiming regularization. It was further submitted by the Respondent No. 1 to 4 that other Unions have never raised any objection with regard to the implementation of the award. Subsequently, Writ Petition No. 5920/2007 was withdrawn unconditionally on 08.03.2017 by the petitioner of that case i.e. presently respondent No.2. 7. It has been further contended that thereafter the respondent No. 2/Union made a representation to the Respondent No. 1 contending that the award has not been complied with, based on such representation, Show Cause Notice dated 20.09.2018 was issued to the petitioner by the Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Bilaspur. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted its reply dated 04.12.2018 to the said Show Cause Notice dated 20.09.2018 rebutting all the claims of respndent No.1 without considering the submissions made by the petitioner in its reply the Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Jabalpur rejected the same vide order dated 28.12.2018 by issuing direction to the petitioner to calculate and determine the claim amount and ascertain the “Money Due” as per Bhave Award passed in Reference Case No. 06/89 or in accordance with the settlement dated 22.09.1992 or where it may be worked out without any dispute in respect of Shree Niwas Gurijala & 134 others after identification & verification of the workers within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. This order was not challenged when the petition was filed and thereafter the petitioner moved an application for amendment before this Court by filing I.A. No. 6 of 2020. The said application was allowed by this Court on 30.11.2023. This order was not challenged when the petition was filed and thereafter the petitioner moved an application for amendment before this Court by filing I.A. No. 6 of 2020. The said application was allowed by this Court on 30.11.2023. This Court has also directed the respondent to file additional return to the amendment made by the petitioner. After the order passed on 28.12.2018, the respondent No.1 has issued show-cause notice to the petitioner dated 15.04.2019 and 22.08.2019 (Annexure P/1) why suitable action be not initiated against the SECL and also directed to submit explanation within 15 days of receipt of the notice, as to why the award has not been implemented, failing which respondent No.1 has no other option but to initiate legal action by way of recovery under the provisions of I.D. Act, 1947. Hence, this petition is filed for quashing of the order dated 28.12.2018 and show cause notices dated 15.04.2019 and 22.08.2019. 8. Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress has moved an application for intervention as well as impleadment as respondent in the writ petition. The said application was allowed by this Court on 14.10.2019 and this Court has granted interim stay in favour of the petitioner by directing to deposit 50% of the amount so demanded by respondent No.1 recovery of remaining amount shall remain stayed until further order. This Court has further directed that the amount so deposited shall be kept in fixed deposit of the bank which shall be subject to the final adjudication of this writ petition. 9. Being aggrieved with this interim order, the petitioner has preferred Writ Appeal No. 528 of 2019 before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. This Court has further directed that the amount so deposited shall be kept in fixed deposit of the bank which shall be subject to the final adjudication of this writ petition. 9. Being aggrieved with this interim order, the petitioner has preferred Writ Appeal No. 528 of 2019 before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. The Hon’ble Division Bench vide its order dated 28.11.2019 has modified the interim order as under:- “Counsel for the petitioner per contra has argued that relying on the judgment of this Court regarding identification the respondent No. 1/Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur ought to have verified for the purposes of giving effect to the claims awarded in the award passed by the arbitrator and since no verification has been done by the respondent No.1/Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur considering these arguments and in the interest of justice, the petition can be disposed off with a simple direction to the respondent No.1 Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Jabalpur to consider the representation of the petitioner/union within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order passed today and pass appropriate order in accordance with the law. In case of rejection, it shall pass a reasoned order assigning reasons. 10. Respondent No. 1 has filed its return mainly contending that Show Cause Notices have been issued to the petitioner on the basis of several complaints received from Shri Deepak Jaiswal, President, Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress (RCMC) and National President, National Federation of Indian Trade Union (NFITU) alleging about the non- implementation of the Arbitration Award pronounced by Shri H.G Bhave in reference No. 06/89 as per the provisions of I.D Act, 1947. It has also been contended that in the Arbitration Award in Reference Case No. 06/89, the South Eastern Coalfields Ltd, Hasdeo Area the Union National Colliery Workers Federation were the parties which has not been renamed as Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress. It is further contended that from bare perusal of the award it is quite vivid, that union had raised demand for departmentalization of the contractual workers engaged in the Tub-repairing job in the Hasdeo Area of SECL. It is further contended that from bare perusal of the award it is quite vivid, that union had raised demand for departmentalization of the contractual workers engaged in the Tub-repairing job in the Hasdeo Area of SECL. The Hon’ble High Court of M.P. in Miscellaneous Petition No. 1322/94 decided on 08.11.2005 has directed the respondents No. 1 to 4 to re-consider the representation of the union and pass appropriate order, in compliance of which the RLC(C), Jabalpur vide his order dated 22.02.2006 had passed the order advising the petitioner to enter into bilateral settlement/tripartite settlement/arbitration agreement with the union on the point in dispute i.e. non implementation of the award. It has also been contended in the return that the dispute of the union before the Arbitrator was for regularization of contractual Tub-repairing workers, but the union could not submit the list before the Arbitrator before passing of Award. But the union subsequently filed the list before the RLC(C), Jabalpur and this has been considered by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur and accordingly directed the RLC(C), Jabalpur to reconsider the demand of the union about regularization of workers and in compliance of which the RLC(C) had advised the management of SECL to implement the Award in reference Case No.06/89 by entering into settlement, failing which prosecution may be filed. Accordingly, it has been found by the RLC (C) Jabalpur that the Award has not been implemented by the SECL management, in its letter and spirit and it is also not correct on the part of the petitioner to say that there is no Award in favour of workmen. The respondent No.1 while passing the order dated 28.12.2018 has considered the contention made by the petitioner and the Union and well reasoned order has been passed, as such there is no illegality in passing the impugned order dated 28.12.2018. Since the order passed by the respondent No.1 was not complied with, therefore, respondent No.1 had issued various notices to the petitioner and subsequently notices dated 15.047.2019 and 22.08.2019 are issued to them. The notices are issued by respondent No.1 to the petitioner is to initiate proceedings for recovery. The impugned order dated 28.12.2018, subsequent notices are legal, justified and do not warrant interference by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the petition. 11. The notices are issued by respondent No.1 to the petitioner is to initiate proceedings for recovery. The impugned order dated 28.12.2018, subsequent notices are legal, justified and do not warrant interference by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the petition. 11. The Respondent No. 3 has filed its return mainly contending that respondent No. 3- Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress (in short RCMC) is a registered trade union which was initially (in the year 1948) named as the M.P. Colliery Workers' Federation Manendragarh and subsequently the name of the respondent No.3/Union was changed from MP Colliery Workers' Federation Manendragarh to Madhya Pradesh Colliery Mazdoor Sangh in the year 1962, from Madhya Pradesh Colliery Mazdoor Sangh to National Colliery Workers Federation in the year 1988, National Colliery Workers Federation to Rashtriya Colliery Workers Federation in the year 1997 and lastly from Rashtriya Colliery Worker Federation to Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Congress in the year 2003. It has been further contended that in the year 1988, a dispute was raised by the respondent No. 3 Union- RCMC (who was then known as NCWF i.e. National Colliery Worker Federation) before the petitioner company regarding regularization/departmentalization of Tub Repair Workers who were engaged through contractors and were working on contractual basis in Hasdev Area. It has been further contended that on 23.09.1989, an agreement was executed between the petitioner company and the respondent No. 3 Union RCMC (then named NCWF) for settlement of dispute through arbitration and Mr. H.G. Bhave was accepted as Arbitrator under Section 10A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. 12. He would submit that at the time of agreement, as many as 135 Tub Repair Workers (Satish Chandra & 134 others) working in Hasdev Area were being represented by the respondent no.3 Union (then named NCWF) and the said agreement was executed by the respondent no.3 Union (then named NCWF) on behalf of the said 135 persons which is well mentioned in the agreement itself. On 05.10.1989, the arbitration agreement was published in Gazette Notification and then the case of the respondent No.3 Union RCMC (then named NCWF) was registered as Reference Case No. 06/1989. The case of the respondent No.3 Union -RCMC (then named NCWF) was heard together with three other cases raised by three other unions namely M.P.R.M.S. R.K.K.M.S. and SKMS. On 05.10.1989, the arbitration agreement was published in Gazette Notification and then the case of the respondent No.3 Union RCMC (then named NCWF) was registered as Reference Case No. 06/1989. The case of the respondent No.3 Union -RCMC (then named NCWF) was heard together with three other cases raised by three other unions namely M.P.R.M.S. R.K.K.M.S. and SKMS. In so far as the case of the respondent no.3 Union RCMC (then name NCWF) is concerned, the same was registered as Reference Case No. 06/89. He would further submit that on 30.08.1990, the award dated 30.08.1990 (Annexure P/2) was passed by the Arbitrator. Shri G.P. Sharma the then General Secretary of the respondent No.3 Union -RCMC (then named NCWF) made an approach for compliance of the arbitration award passed in Reference Case No. 06/89 on 04.10.1990 and made prayer for departmentalization of 135 Tub Repair Workers who were represented by the respondent No.3 Union- RCMC (then named NCWF) by signing arbitration agreement on their behalf. On 04.02.1992, an application was filed by the respondent no.3 Union- RCMC (then named NCWF) for implementation of Bhave Award before the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Jabalpur. On 01.04.1993, the order dated 01.04.1993 was passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Jabalpur and the matter was closed by giving information to the effect that no further action is required. 13. It has been further contended that in the year 1994, a writ petition bearing M.P. No. 1322/1994 was filed by the respondent no.3 Union- RCMC (then named NCWF), challenging the order dated 01.04.1993 passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Jabalpur and on 10.11.2005, the writ petition bearing M.P. No. 1322/1994 was disposed of by directing the Regional Labour Commissioner (C)Jabalpur to consider the representation of the respondent No.3 Union- RCMC (NCWF) within a period of three months and to pass appropriate order in accordance with law. It has been further contended that on 22.02.2006, the order dated 22.02.2006 was passed by the Regional Labour Commissioner Jabalpur and the management of SECL was advised to enter into a bilateral settlement/tripartite settlement/arbitration agreement with the respondent No.3 Union on the point in-dispute (i.e. non implementation of the arbitration award passed in Reference Case No. 06/89) to avoid prosecution proceeding by holding that the award is still having binding force. It has been also contended that in the year 2007, a writ petition bearing W.P. No. 5920/2007 was filed by the respondent No.3 Union RCMC for issuance of direction Labour Authorities to implement the order dated 22.02.2006 and for other ancillary reliefs. 14. On 18.01.2014 a representation was made by the respondent No. 3 Union- RCMC before the Secretary, Labour & Employment, Government of India, New Delhi for settlement of dispute out of the Court and on 19.02.2014, a hearing was held and the respondent no.3 Union -RCMC was heard by the Secretary, Labour & Employment, Government of India, New Delhi in presence of the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) New Delhi. The Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) New Delhi wrote a letter dated 24.02.2014 to the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) Jabalpur requesting to take necessary action in case the arbitration award is still enforceable and the concerned management is not implementing the award with further request to deal with the matter on priority basis. Since the matter was within jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) Raipur, the matter was sent by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) Jabalpur to the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) Raipur. The matter was referred to by the Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) Raipur to the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bilaspur for suitable action. Thereafter, discussions were held between the respondent no.3 Union -RCMC and the management of the petitioner company in presence of the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bilaspur. During course of discussions, the workers whose names were mentioned in the list had marked their attendance for identification before the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bilaspur on 13.10.2015 with all their documents and they were identified by the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bilaspur and by the management of the petitioner company. Thereafter, as per demand of the petitioner company, a list was submitted with supporting affidavit and documentary proof before the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bilaspur and thereafter the list along with documentary proofs was forwarded by the Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bilaspur to the management of the petitioner company on 29.07.2016. He would further submit that during discussions, the management of the petitioner company never disputed the list submitted by the respondent no.3 Union RCMC and furthermore, the list sent by RLC Bilaspur on 29.07.2016 was also not disputed by the management of the petitioner company. He would further submit that during discussions, the management of the petitioner company never disputed the list submitted by the respondent no.3 Union RCMC and furthermore, the list sent by RLC Bilaspur on 29.07.2016 was also not disputed by the management of the petitioner company. On 19.10.2016 the Government of India, Ministry of Coal issued a letter dated 19.10.2016 to the Chairman -cum- Managing Director, SECL Bilaspur to show cause as to why the Bhave Award has not been implemented in respect of Reference Case No. 06/89 whereas the same has been implemented in respect of Case No. 04/89 and 05/89. A Show-Cause Notice was issued by the respondent no.1 on 26.10.2016 to the General Manager of the petitioner company to show-cause as to why legal action should not be initiated against the management of SECL. 15. He would further submit that since legal action was started to be taken against the appellant company and since the grievance of the petitioner was in substance redressed, an application was filed by the respondent no.3 Union-RCMC on 25.02.2017, seeking permission for withdrawal of W.P. No. 5920/2007 with liberty to approach the Hon'ble Court if the grievance of the respondent no.3 Union is not readdressed. Subsequently on 08.03.2017, W.P. No. 5920/2007 was dismissed as withdrawn. 16. It has been further contended that on 15.08.2018, an application under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 was filed by the respondent No.3- Union- RCMC. The respondent no.1 issued a Show Cause Notice dated 20.09.2018 to the General Manager Hasdev Area of the petitioner company. The petitioner company filed its reply on 04.12.2018 to the Show Cause Notice and on 20.12.2018, the respondent No. 3 Union submitted written argument before the respondent no.1 who by well reasoned and merit order dated 28.12.2018 allowed the application filed by the respondent No.3 Union RCMC under section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. Thereafter, Show Cause Notice dated 15.04.2019 and 22.08.2019 were issued by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner company which was replied by them. The respondent No.1 issued a letter dated 09.09.2019 along with Revenue Recovery Certificate against the petitioner company and at present, recovery proceeding is pending before the Tahsildar Bilaspur (C.G.). 17. Thereafter, Show Cause Notice dated 15.04.2019 and 22.08.2019 were issued by the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner company which was replied by them. The respondent No.1 issued a letter dated 09.09.2019 along with Revenue Recovery Certificate against the petitioner company and at present, recovery proceeding is pending before the Tahsildar Bilaspur (C.G.). 17. It has been further contended that the petitioner company has always misled by making submission that the arbitration award has been fully implemented by granting employment to those workers whose names were in the lists submitted before the Arbitrator. It has been further contended that member of respondent No.3 Union is subject to hostile discrimination by the management as members of other Union have already been regularized expect the member of the respondent No.3 Union. 18. This Court vide order dated 08.02.2024 has passed the following order which is as under:- ‘The hole controversy moves around the arbitration award which was referred on 05.10.1989 before Arbitrator Shri H.G. Bhave thereafter the award was passed on 30th August, 1990 and the same was published on 07.09.1990 by the Central Government in the Government Gazette. The issue involved in this case whether respondent No. 3 submitted lists of workers claiming their regularization as it has been granted to the members of other Unions. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondent No.3 has not sent any list of workers as observed by the Arbitrator in its award, this is the factual matrix which can be determined only on the basis of original record pertains to H.G. Bhave award. As such, respondent No.1 is directed to call the original records with complete order sheets of the arbitration award on the next date of hearing. 19. On 01.03.2024 Learned Dy. S.G. for the Union of India has prayed for a week’s time to produce the record. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned for 13.03.2024. On 13.03.2024 Dy. Dy. S.G. stated that the record is not available with the Department as the record is 35 years old, as such it cannot be produced, therefore, this Court has directed to file an affidavit of Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India on or before 08.04.2024 explaining whether records are available or not available with them. Dy. S.G. stated that the record is not available with the Department as the record is 35 years old, as such it cannot be produced, therefore, this Court has directed to file an affidavit of Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India on or before 08.04.2024 explaining whether records are available or not available with them. In pursuance of direction Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India has filed the affidavit stating that since the matter is too old and pertains to the year 1990 the records as desired could not be found/traced out in the Ministry. 20. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Respondent No. 1/Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Bilaspur failed to see that no award was passed in favour of the workers represented by the Respondent No. 2/Union as their names were never placed before the Arbitrator as admittedly no list was ever submitted by the Respondent No. 2/Union. He would further submit that the Respondent No. 1/Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Bilaspur failed to see that admittedly for the first time the name of workers was filed in MP No. 1332/1994. The Respondent No. 1/Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Bilaspur failed to see that there is no award in favour of the workmen represented by Respondent No. 2/Union. He would further submit that Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in the Writ Petition No. 5920/2007 have stated before the Hon'ble High Court that the Respondent No. 2/Union had neither submitted any list of contract worker before the Arbitrator, nor the Respondent No. 2/Union was able to prove that the contractual labourers ever worked in Hasdeo Area of SECL in the work/capacity of Tub Repairers and therefore, the Respondent Authority i.e. Regional Labour Commissioner (RLC), Bilaspur cannot take a contrary stand. He would further submit that once respondent No.2/Union had withdrawn the Writ Petition no. 5920/2007 which was filed for implementation of award, unconditionally and therefore, the relief claimed for implementation of the Arbitration Award would be barred by the applicability of the principle of res-judicata. 21. He would further submit that Section 33-C(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947 does not apply under the facts and circumstances of the case in absence of any amount due from the Employer without there being determination to that effect u/s 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947. 21. He would further submit that Section 33-C(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947 does not apply under the facts and circumstances of the case in absence of any amount due from the Employer without there being determination to that effect u/s 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act, 1947. He would further submit that the Respondent No. 1 derives its jurisdiction for making recovery of money due from the Employer only after determination of the amount due for payment is awarded by the Labour Court. He would further submit that the Respondent No. 1 in its order dated 28.12.2018 has grossly erred in directing the Writ Petitioner-Employer to calculate and determine the claimed amount and ascertain the money due as per the Bhave Award in Reference Case No. 6/89 or in accordance with the Settlement dated 22.9.1992. He would further submit that the Employer is not competent to determine the claimed amount and ascertain the "money due" as it is only the Labour Court which has jurisdiction and authority, only if an application is submitted for computation of wages u/s 33-C(2) of the I.D. Act. The Respondent No. 1 has grossly erred in having failed to take into consideration that the Labour Court under Sub-Section (3) of Section 33-C of the I.D. Act for the purpose of computing the "money due", it is only the Labour Court which can appoint a Commissioner, who after taking evidence as may be necessary submit a report to the Labour Court who would determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case. 22. He would further submit that the order passed by the Respondent No. 1 under no circumstances is justified in directing the Employer to calculate and determine the amount after due and proper verification of the records and identification of the workers engaged in Tub Repairing Work through contractors. In absence of any pre-existing right to receive any amount due from an award or a settlement from a Labour Court, the Respondent No. 1, namely the appropriate government, does not acquire any jurisdiction u/s 33-C(1) of the I.D. Act. In absence of any pre-existing right to receive any amount due from an award or a settlement from a Labour Court, the Respondent No. 1, namely the appropriate government, does not acquire any jurisdiction u/s 33-C(1) of the I.D. Act. He would further submit that the Agreement dated 23.9.1989 entered between the Employer and the Vice President, NCWF Union u/s 10A(3) of the I.D. Act, 1947 does not contain the list of 135 persons and if any such list has been produced by the Respondent No. 3 at a belated stage, the same is manufactured, fabricated and has been introduced to derive undue gain for the first time after almost 25 years since the date of the agreement dated 23.9.1989. He would further submit that the Award dated 30.8.1990 passed by Shri H.G. Bhave, the Learned Arbitrator, in Ref. No. 6 of 1989, has held in his Award that assessed a list of 175 workers as regards Ref. No. 3/89 (vide Ext. W-7). Further there is a list of 26 workers (Ext. W-8) at page 35 of the Award. 23. The learned Arbitrator Shree Bhave thereafter proceeds to hold that SKMS (AITUC) in Ref. No. 5/89 and NCWF in Ref. No. 6/89 has not filed any such list before the Arbitrator and therefore, the so called list of 135 persons alleged to be dated 20.9.1989 is false and fabricated to derive undue advantage. Thus he would submit that the order dated 28.12.2018, impugned Show Cause Notice dated 15.04.2019, 22.08.2019 deserves to be quashed and set aside. To substantiate his submission, he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of AIR 1963 SC 487 Punjab National Bank Vs. K.L. Kharbanda, AIR 1964 SC 743 Central Bank of India vs. P.S. Rajgopalan, 1997 (3) SCC 150 Fabril Gasosa and Ors, vs. Labour Commissioner and Ors., Siemens Limited v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2006(12) SCC 33 and in the matter of "Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 2010(13) S.C.C. 427 . 2022 (5) SCC Bombay Chemical Industries vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner and others, 2007(5) SCC 281 Handard(Wakf) Laboratories vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner, 2005(8) SCC 58 State of U.P. vs. Brijpal Singh, 1995(1) SCC 235 Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Rajak, 2004(1) SCC 68 Pandichari Khadi VIII Ind. 2022 (5) SCC Bombay Chemical Industries vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner and others, 2007(5) SCC 281 Handard(Wakf) Laboratories vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner, 2005(8) SCC 58 State of U.P. vs. Brijpal Singh, 1995(1) SCC 235 Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ganesh Rajak, 2004(1) SCC 68 Pandichari Khadi VIII Ind. vs. P. Kulath, 2023 SCC on line Sc 852 State of Odisha vs. Laxmi Narayan and WPS No. 377 of 2023 decided on 22.02.2023 in the case of Tulsi Ram Drow vs. State of Chhattisgarh. 24. Mr. Ramakant Mishra, Dy. Solicitor General for Union of India reiterating the stand taken in the return filed on behalf of Union of India would submit that on 23.09.1989 an agreement was executed under Section 10-A "Voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration" of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 between the SECL Management and the Union RCMC erstwhile National Colliery Workers Federation (NCWF) to refer an Industrial Dispute through arbitration with regard to the regularization of contractual workers to an Arbitrator. Mr. H G Bhave was appointed as the arbitrator by the Govt. The said agreement and terms of reference was also published on 05.10.1989 clearly mentioning the total number of workmen employed in the undertaking affected as 135 and estimated number of workmen affected as 135. The above agreement has not been set aside or challenged by the Petitioner. Accordingly, the arbitrator Mr. H G Bhave passed an arbitration award 30.08.1990 in arbitration Reference Case No. 06/89, as per agreement executed between the SECL Management and the Union RCMC erstwhile National Colliery Workers Federation (NCWF), directing the departmentalization of tub repair workmen w.e.f. 01.12.1988 with all consequential benefits. The said Bhave Award was published in the gazette notification on 07.09.1990 as per Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 25. He would further submit that the agreement dated 23.09.1989 and the subsequent awards were neither challenged nor set aside and attained finality after the expiry of thirty days of its publication. Therefore, the instant petition filed by the Petitioner with subsequent application for quashing the Show Cause Notices dated 15.04.2019 & 22.08.2019 issued by the Respondent No. 01 with the subsequent proceedings including the certificate of Recovery dated 09.09.2019 and the directions dated 28.12.2018 are liable to be dismissed as it is devoid of merits. Therefore, the instant petition filed by the Petitioner with subsequent application for quashing the Show Cause Notices dated 15.04.2019 & 22.08.2019 issued by the Respondent No. 01 with the subsequent proceedings including the certificate of Recovery dated 09.09.2019 and the directions dated 28.12.2018 are liable to be dismissed as it is devoid of merits. He would further submit that the identity of the 135 workmen was never a subject matter of the dispute and, therefore, the implementation of the said award cannot be disputed by the petitioner that too at this stage. In fact, the Management has failed to establish that they had even raised any objection regarding the list of workmen during the arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Reference Case No. 06/89. Thus, the Petitioner has utterly failed to establish any violation of the statutory provisions while issuance of certificate of recovery under section 33 C (1) of the I.D. Act or any procedural lapses. There is no violation of principle of natural justice demonstrated by the Petitioner in the present case. Award once published cannot be called in question by any Court of law u/s 17 of the I.D. Act. In such circumstance, it is not a fit case to be entertained by the Hon’ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He would further submit that principle of res judicata as alleged by the petitioner is not applicable to the facts and circumstance of the case and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition with cost. 26. Mr. Prafull N. Bharat, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni and Mr. Sanjay Patel counsel for the respondent No.3 reiterating the stand taken by them in the return would submit that the petitioner company or the General Manager Hasdeo Area has filed the instant writ petition, challenging the Show Cause Notices dated 15.04.2019 22.08.2019 issued by the Respondent No.1- the Regional Labour Commissioner Bilaspur (C.G.) who is not the authorized person to file the writ petition as such writ petition is not maintainable. He would further submit that no authorization by the Board of Director of the Company to authorize the General Manager Hasdeo Area has been filed as such the writ petition has been filed by an unauthorized person, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. He would further submit that no authorization by the Board of Director of the Company to authorize the General Manager Hasdeo Area has been filed as such the writ petition has been filed by an unauthorized person, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. To substantiate his submission he has referred to judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers Private Limited (2011) 11 SCC 524 . 27. He would further submit that the arbitration award passed in Reference Case No. 06/89 has not been complied with by the petitioner company. In fact, the petitioner company has made deliberate attempt to mislead the Hon'ble Court by showing compliance of the award passed in Reference Case No. 3/89 and 4/89 whereas the same has no relevance with the present case arising out of Reference Case No. 6/89. So far as the point raised by the petitioner company with respect to non-submission of workers' list is concerned. It would not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner company has never produced the above mentioned registers (statutory records) either before the Arbitrator or before any other authority till date. It is crystal clear that the petitioner company has not implemented the award passed by the Arbitrator Shri H.G. Bhave in Reference No. 06/89 and in case of otherwise the petitioner company would be in a position to produce document to substantiate the result/outcome of implementation of the arbitration award passed in Reference No. 06/89. 28. He would further submit that the matter regarding non-compliance of Bhave Award has not only been examined by Ministry of Labour & Employment but by the Coal Ministry and after examination it was found that the arbitration award passed in Reference No. 6/89 has not been implemented and thereafter the proceedings under section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 have been taken against the petitioner company. 29. It has been further submitted that in so far as withdrawal of W.P. No. 5920/2007 is concerned, the same does not create any right in favour of the petitioner company. 29. It has been further submitted that in so far as withdrawal of W.P. No. 5920/2007 is concerned, the same does not create any right in favour of the petitioner company. The writ petition W.P. No. 5920/2007 was filed by the respondent no.3 union -RCMC substantially to direct the Central Labour Authorities to make implementation of the order dated 22.02.2006 but subsequently when legal action was started to be taken against the petition company and the grievance of the respondent No. 3 union was in substance redressed, the respondent no.3 union RCMC filed an application for withdrawal of writ petition with liberty to approach the Hon'ble Court if grievance is not readdressed and on 08.03.2017 W.P. No.5920/2007 was dismissed as withdrawn. In view of the above situation, the withdrawal of W.P. No.5920/2007 does not create any right in favour of the petitioner company for the reason that the said writ petition was withdrawn due to new developed situation i.e. issuance of notice for prosecution against the management of SECL. Even otherwise, since the said writ petition has not been decided on merits, the order dated 08.03.2017 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya in W.P. No. 5920 does not operate as Res-Judicata. To substantiate his submission he would refer tothe judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Services vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and Others 1987(1) SCC 5 and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 30. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 31. From the above stated factual position, the points to be determined by this Court are:- (I) Whether the Writ petition is not maintainable in view of the objection raised by the respondent No.3 ?. (II) Whether subsequent withdrawal of the Writ petition bearing WPL No. 5920 of 2007 creates bar over the petitioner agitating the claim before the respondent No.1. (III) whether application under Section 33(C)(1) of the I.D. Act, 1947 is maintainable before the respondent No.1 or not ? Point No.1. 32. Learned Sr. Counsel for respondent No.3 would submit that the writ petition filed in the name and style of South Eastern Coalfields Limited through its General Manager, SECL, Hasdeo Area and the affidavit has been filed by Mr. R.R.R. Lakra Sr. Manager, Personnel, SECL, Hasdeo Area but no authorization authorizing Mr. Point No.1. 32. Learned Sr. Counsel for respondent No.3 would submit that the writ petition filed in the name and style of South Eastern Coalfields Limited through its General Manager, SECL, Hasdeo Area and the affidavit has been filed by Mr. R.R.R. Lakra Sr. Manager, Personnel, SECL, Hasdeo Area but no authorization authorizing Mr. R.R.R. Lakra to file affidavit has been filed and Vakalatnama has been signed by General Manager of SECL, therefore, the writ petition has been verified by unauthorized person, as such the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. To substantiate, his submission, he has referred to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the Case of State Bank (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K.Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the appellant and authorised Shri Ashok K.Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K.Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K.Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company. 33. This submission was vehemently objected by the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the writ petition is very much maintainable as the SECL being company, registered under the Companies Act 1956 or under Companies Act, 2013. The provisions of Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC. Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC provide that in suit by or against a corporation any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the Secretary or by any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation, who is able to dispose of the facts of the case. The affidavit has been filed by Mr. R.R.R. Lakra, Sr. Manager Personnel who in his affidavit has categorically stated that he has been authorized by the SECL to swear and executed the affidavit. This fact has not been denied by the respondent No.3 or no material has been placed on record to demonstrate that Mr. The affidavit has been filed by Mr. R.R.R. Lakra, Sr. Manager Personnel who in his affidavit has categorically stated that he has been authorized by the SECL to swear and executed the affidavit. This fact has not been denied by the respondent No.3 or no material has been placed on record to demonstrate that Mr. R.R.R. Lakra is not authorized by the SECL. Even Mr. R.R.R. Lakra, Sr. Personnel Manager, who deals with the affairs of labour employed in the company is well conversant with the material facts of the case than the person working as General Manager or Director, as such the objection raised by respondent No.3 deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. Even otherwise, it is well settled legal position of law that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is different from a suit, therefore, the provisions of CPC 1908 have no application whereas the High Court exercised extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with its aim at securing a very speedy efficacious remedy to a person whose legal and constitution right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules laid down in the code are to be applied to the writ proceeding the very object and purpose likely to be defeated. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Puran Singh and others vs. State of Punjab reported in 1996(2) SCC 205 has examined this issue with regard to strict application of CPC and in paragraph, 5 and 10 has held as under:- 5. The question with which we are concerned is as to whether the aforesaid provisions made under Order 22 of the code are applicable to proceedings under Article 226 and 227 of the constitution. Prior to the introduction of an explanation by Civil Procedure code (Amendment) Act 1976, Section 141 of the Code was as follows: "141. The question with which we are concerned is as to whether the aforesaid provisions made under Order 22 of the code are applicable to proceedings under Article 226 and 227 of the constitution. Prior to the introduction of an explanation by Civil Procedure code (Amendment) Act 1976, Section 141 of the Code was as follows: "141. Miscellaneous proceedings - The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction." The explanation which was added by the aforesaid Amending Act said: "Explanation - In this section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution." There was controversy between different courts as to whether the different provisions of the Code shall be applicable even to writ proceedings under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Some High Courts held that writ proceedings before the High Court shall be deemed to be proceedings "in any court of civil jurisdiction" within the meaning of Section 141 of the Code. (Ibrahimbhai vs. State, AIR 1968 Gujarat 202;Panchayat Officer vs. Jain Narain, AIR 1967 All. 334 ; Krishnlal Sadhu vs. State, AIR 1967 Cal. 275 ; Sona Ram Ranga Ram vs. Central Government, AIR 1963 Punjab 510; A. Adinarayana vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 16). However, in another set of cases, it was held that writ proceeding being a proceeding of a special nature and not one being in a court of civil jurisdiction Section 141 of the Code was not applicable. (Bhagwan Singh vs. Additional Director Consolidation, AIR 1968 Punjab 360; Chandmal v. State, AIR 1968 Rajasthan 20;K.B. Mfg. Co. vs. Sales Tax Commissioner, AIR 1965 All. 517 ; Ramchand vs. Anandlal, AIR 1962 Gujarat 21; Messers Bharat Board Mills v. Regional Fund Commissioner and Others, AIR 1957 Cal. 702 ). 10. On a plain reading, Section 141 of the Code provides that the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings". In other words, it is open to make the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits applicable to any other proceeding in any court of civil jurisdiction. In other words, it is open to make the procedure provided in the said Code in regard to suits applicable to any other proceeding in any court of civil jurisdiction. The explanation which was added is more or less in the nature of proviso, saying that the expression "proceedings" shall not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The necessary corollary thereof shall be that it shall be open to make applicable the procedure provided in the Code to any proceeding in any court of civil jurisdiction except to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Once the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution has been excluded from the expression "proceedings" occurring in Section 141 of the Code by the explanation, how on basis of Section 141 of the Code any procedure provided in the Code can be made applicable to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution? In this background, how merely on basis of Writ Rule 32 the provisions of the Code shall be applicable to writ proceedings? Apart from that, Section 141 of the Code even in respect of other proceedings contemplates that the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable". Rule 32 of Writ Rules does not specifically make provisions of Code applicable to petitions under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It simply says that in matters for which no provision has been made by those rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply mutatis mutandis in so far as they are not inconsistent with those rules. In the case of Rokyaybi v. Ismail Khan, AIR 1984 Karnataka 234 in view of Rule 39 of the Writ Proceedings Rules as framed by the Karnataka High Court making the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to writ proceedings and writ appeals, it was held that the provisions of the Code were applicable to writ proceedings and writ appeals. 34. The judgment referred by the learned Sr. 34. The judgment referred by the learned Sr. Counsel for respondent No. 3 in case of State Bank (supra) is not applicable to the present facts of the case, as in that case dispute arose from the order passed by the High Court of Delhi in Civil Suit while exercising its original jurisdiction where the provisions of Civil Procedure Code is strictly applicable, as such in view of the above stated factual position and considering the law laid by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Puran Singh (supra), the objection raised by the respondent No.3 regarding maintainability of the writ petition deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. Thus, point No. 1 is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent No.3. Point No. 2. 35. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner would submit that WPL No. 5920 of 2007 filed by the respondent No.3 Union has unconditionally without leave of the Court has been withdrawn, therefore, subsequent proceeding initiated by the respondent No.3 before respondent No.1 is hit by res- judicata and would submit that the subsequent orders and proceedings deserve to be quashed on the principle of res judicata. To substantiate his submission, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner has referred to judgment of Hon’ble Suprme Court in the case of State of Orissa and anther vs. Laxmi Narayan Das(died) through Lrs reported in 2023 SCC on line 825 and would refer to paragraphs 37 as under:- 36. 37. On the question, as to whether after the withdrawal of a suit claiming the same relief without having permission to institute fresh one for the same relief, a writ petition will be maintainable before the Court, the guidance is available from the judgment of this Court in M.J. Exporters Private Limited v. Union of India and others (2021) 13 SCC 543 , wherein the principle of constructive res judicata was applied. The case concerns a litigant who sought to file a fresh writ petition after withdrawal of the earlier writ petition filed for the same relief without permission to file fresh one. The Court held that the principles contained in Order 23, Rule 1 CPC are applicable even in writ proceedings. Para 15 thereof is extracted below: “15. The case concerns a litigant who sought to file a fresh writ petition after withdrawal of the earlier writ petition filed for the same relief without permission to file fresh one. The Court held that the principles contained in Order 23, Rule 1 CPC are applicable even in writ proceedings. Para 15 thereof is extracted below: “15. In these circumstances, we feel that when this issue was raised and abandoned in the first writ petition which was dismissed as withdrawn, the principles of constructive res judicata which are laid down under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and which principles are extendable to writ proceedings as well as held by this in Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT, (1987) 1 SCC 5 .” 37. This was vehemently objected by the Sr. counsel for respondent No.3 and would submit that the subsequent proceedings initiated by them are not hit by res judicata as in the earlier writ petition High Court of Madhaya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition No. 1332 of 1994 decided on 10.11.2005, has directed the Respondent No.1 to reconsider the representation of the Respondent No.3 and this order has attained finality as it was not subjected to challenge by the petitioner before any forum. Even withdrawal of WPL No. 5920 of 2007 unconditionally does not create bar for respondent No.1 to comply with the order passed by the Hon’ble High Court and would submit that the objection raised by the petitioner deserves to be rejected. 38. The application of principle of res judicata has very recently come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of NCT of Delhi and Anr. vs. M/s. BSK Real Tors LLP and Anr. decided on 17th May, 2024 in SLP(C) D. No. 32072 of 2022 and other connected SLP(C)s, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court has held as under:- 21. vs. M/s. BSK Real Tors LLP and Anr. decided on 17th May, 2024 in SLP(C) D. No. 32072 of 2022 and other connected SLP(C)s, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court has held as under:- 21. Nearly a century ago, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of the Privy Council in Munni Bibi (since deceased) and another v. Tirloki Nath and others AIR 1931 PC 114 laid down the following three conditions for the application of res judicata between codefendants: “(1.) There, must be a conflict of interest between the defendants concerned; (2.) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims; and (3.) the question between the defendants must have been finally decided.” 22. In State of Gujarat and others v. M.P. Shah Charitable Trust and others (1994) 3 SCC 552 , a Bench comprising two Hon’ble Judges ruled that the principle of res judicata applies only when there has been a directly and substantially disputed issue between the parties, which the court has heard and conclusively resolved. The relevant extract of the decision is extracted hereunder: “17. […] For attracting the rule of res judicata between codefendants — according to the terms in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which provision of course is not, in terms, applicable to proceedings in a writ petition — it is necessary that there should have been some issue directly and substantially in controversy between them which has been heard and finally decided by the court. Same would be the position, where a plea of res judicata is sought to be raised between co-respondents in a writ petition, on the general principles of res judicata. Since the said basic requirement is not satisfied, the said judgment cannot be treated as res judicata between the trust and the Government. (underlining ours, for emphasis) 23. In the lead matter before us or for that matter the other appeals, the co-respondents before the High Court, namely, GNCTD and DDA did not have conflicting interests. Inter se them, neither was there any disputed issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated on any such issue. Before this Court too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD and DDA were at loggerheads. Inter se them, neither was there any disputed issue, nor could have the High Court possibly adjudicated on any such issue. Before this Court too, in the first round, there was no issue on which GNCTD and DDA were at loggerheads. In the light of this, in accordance with the aforementioned legal principle, the applicability of res judicata is negated. 24. A brief review of the ruling in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and others v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 will also guide us to the resolution of the second issue on the applicability of res judicata. In the said decision, the first instance court and the High Court rejected an application seeking fixation of standard rent, holding that the provisions of the Rent Act did not extend to open land, relying upon an earlier decision. However, this Court later overturned the said decision, affirming the applicability of the Rent Act to open land as well. When A filed a fresh application, B opposed it, claiming it was barred by res judicata. Dismissing this argument and affirming the application's viability, a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court observed thus: 5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the ‘matter in issue’ may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent Court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent Court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be reopened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata. A matter in issue between the parties is the right claimed by one party and denied by the other, and the claim of right from its very nature depends upon proof of facts and application of the relevant law thereto. A pure question of law unrelated to facts which give rise to a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. When it is said that a previous decision is res judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same parties. A previous decision of a competent Court on facts which are the foundation of the right and the relevant law applicable to the determination of the transaction which is the source of the right is res judicata. A previous decision on a matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision on law cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be as res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding be the same as in the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is prohibited by law. […….] 10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. […….] 10. A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly, by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. 11. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression ‘the matter in issue’ in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.” (underlining ours, for emphasis). 39. In view of above stated legal position of law it is quite vivid that Res-Judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same parteis from relitigating the same issue that have already been conclusively determined by the Court. 39. In view of above stated legal position of law it is quite vivid that Res-Judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same parteis from relitigating the same issue that have already been conclusively determined by the Court. In view of above factual and legal position and in view of the order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in M.P. No. 1322/1994 the subsequent withdrawal of the writ petition wherein the petitioner has prayed for grant of benefits of award cannot be held to be hit by res judicata, thus the objection raised by the petitioner that subsequent proceedings and order passed by respondent No.1 is hit by res judicata deserves to be rejected. Accordingly it is rejected and the point No.2 is answered in favour of respondents. Point No.3. 40. To determine the point No.3 it is expedient for this Court to extract Section 33(C) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 which reads as under:- Section 33 (C) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.—(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of 6[Chapter VA or Chapter VB], the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue: Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer: Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government; [within a period not exceeding three months:] Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he maythink fit. 3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case. (4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub-section (1). (5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen. Explanation.—In this section “Labour Court” includes any court constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.]. 41. Learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner would submit that for initiating the proceeding under Section 33(C)(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 it is incumbent upon the respondent No.3 to produce the material to establish that there was prior adjudication of the claim put forwarded by the respondent No. 3 and in absence of any pre adjudication of the claim. Respondent No.1 has committed illegality in passing the impugned order. Respondent No.1 has committed illegality in passing the impugned order. He would further submit that respondent No.3 has not been able to establish that the alleged 135 members have worked with the petitioner and accrued right to be departmentalized to get arrears of salary. In absence of any such material the proceedings are without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed. He would further submit that in absence of prior adjudication on the issue the respondent No.1 should not have passed the order dated 28.12.2018 and subsequent show cause notice and it is beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33C(2) of the I.D.Act and would pray for allowing the petition. 42. This was vehemently objected by counsel for the respondents and would submit that since Bhave award was in favour of the workmen and no material was placed on record by the petitioner that the award has been fully complied with, as such pre existing right was available in favour of member of respondent No.3, therefore, the respondent No.1 has rightly passed the order which does not warrant interference by this court. 43. From perusal of Section 33C of the I.D. Act, it is quite vivid that it is in nature of execution proceedings designed to recover the dues to the workmen. Vide Section 33C (1) and (2), the legislature has provided a speedy remedy to the workmen to have the benefits of a settlement or award which are due to them and are capable of being computed in terms of money, be recovered through the proceedings under those sub-sections. The distinction between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 33C lies mainly in the procedural aspect and not with any substantive rights of workmen as conferred by these two sub- sections. Sub-section (1) comes into play when on the application of a workman himself or any other person assignee or heirs in case of his death, the appropriate Government is satisfied that the amounts so claimed are due and payable to that workman. On that satisfaction being arrived at, the Government can initiate action under this sub-section for recovery of the amount provided the amount is a determined one and requires no adjudication'. On that satisfaction being arrived at, the Government can initiate action under this sub-section for recovery of the amount provided the amount is a determined one and requires no adjudication'. The appropriate Government does not have the power to determine the amount due to any workman under sub-section (1) and that determination can only be done by the Labour Court under sub-section (2) or in a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. Even after the determination is made by the Labour Court under sub-Section (2) the amount so determined by the Labour Court, can be recovered through the summary and speedy procedure provided by subsection (1). Sub-section (1) does not control or affect the ambit and operation of sub-section (2) which is wider in scope than sub-section (1). Besides the rights conferred under Section 33C (2) exist in addition to any other mode of recovery which the workman has under the law. An analysis of the scheme of Sections 33C (1) and 33C(2) shows that the difference between the two sub-sections is quite obvious. While the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or V-B, sub-section (2) deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. 44. Thus, where the amount due to the workmen, flowing from the obligations under a settlement, is per-determined and ascertained or can be arrived at by any arithmetical calculation or simplicitor verification and the only inquiry that is required to be made is whether it is due to the workman or not, recourse to the summary proceedings under Section 33C(1) of the Act is not only appropriate but also desirable to prevent harassment to the workmen. Sub-section (1) of Section 33C entitles the workmen to apply to the appropriate Government for issuance of a certificate of recovery for any money due to them under an award or a settlement or under the provisions of chapter-VA and the Government. If satisfied, that a specific sum is due to the workmen, is obliged to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due. If satisfied, that a specific sum is due to the workmen, is obliged to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount due. After the requisite certificate is issued by the Government to the collector, the collector is under a statutory duty to recover the amounts due under the certificate issued to him. The procedure is aimed at providing a speedy, cheap and summary manner of recovery of the amount due, which the employer has wrongfully withheld. It, therefore, follows that where money due is on the basis of some amount predetermined like the VDA, the rate of which stands determined in terms of the settlement an award stands determined in terms of the settlement an award or under Chapter V-A or V-B, and the period for which the arrears are claimed is also known, the case would be covered by sub- section (1) as only a calculation of the amount is required to be made. 45. The petitioner has taken specific stand in their writ petition that when arbitration proceedings were initiated for departmentalization of contract workers the Union representing their members has not submitted any list of the workers which has also been reflected when the award was passed. Even the labour department who was respondent No. 1 to 4 in the earlier writ petition WPL No. 5920 of 2007 in their return have specifically stated that the respondent No.2 and 3 have not submitted the list of 135 workers but they have submitted the list in Writ Petition No. 1322 of 1994 for the first time, as such the entitlement of 135 workmen for departmentalization itself becomes disputed facts which cannot be adjudicated and decided by the respondent No.1 while deciding the application under Section 33C(1) of the I.D. Act as in their favour no per-exisitng right has been accrued. 46. The issue with regard to power and jurisdiction of the appropriate government under Section 33C is no more res-integra and has come up for consideration before Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decisions, some of the decisions are Punjab National Bank (supra), Central Bank of India (supra) and Fabril Gasosa (supra) and Hamdard(Wakf) supra. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industrial vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner and others has considered all the judgments and has held as under:- 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Chemical Industrial vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner and others has considered all the judgments and has held as under:- 8. As per the settled proposition of law, in an application under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh Razak and Anr. (supra), the labour court’s jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of law without prior adjudication or recognition of the disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr. (1995) 1 SCC 235 ). 9. In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33 C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily a pre-existing benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not. 10. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C (2) of the ID Act while the latter does not. 10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 33 (C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. 11. Therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court was beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above the present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court as well as that of the order passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 are hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent No.2 is relegated to avail any other remedy which may be available under the Industrial Dispute Act, including that of reference to adjudicate his right as an employee of the appellant as claimed by him. Case No.26 of 2012 are hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent No.2 is relegated to avail any other remedy which may be available under the Industrial Dispute Act, including that of reference to adjudicate his right as an employee of the appellant as claimed by him. As and when such proceedings are initiated the same to be considered in accordance with law and on its own merits and without in anyway being influenced by the present order, as this Court has not expressed anything in favour of either of the parties on the aspect of employer-employee relationship between the appellant and respondent No.2. The present appeal is allowed with the above observations and to the aforesaid extent. No costs. 47. In view of the above stated legal position and considering the fact that when the award was passed the list of 135 members could not be submitted by respondent No. 2/3, as such entitlement of member of the Union particularly 135 labours are disputed facts which cannot be adjudicated while deciding the application under Section 33C(1) of the I.D.Act, in absence of any pre-existing right. Therefore, the proceeding drawn by respondent No.1, impugned order dated 28.12.2018, show-cause notice dated 15.04.2019 & 22.08.2019 (Annexure P/1) deserves to be quashed. Accordingly, it is quashed. 48. Considering the fact that in view of Bhave award the respondents have made departmentalized the contractual employee, the respondent No. 2 and 3 are at liberty to raise industrial dispute before the appropriate government which will decide the same in accordance with law and if the dispute is not settled the matter be referred to the Labour Court which has jurisdiction to decide the dispute pertaining to the claim of departmentalization of the contractual employee. 49. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition is allowed.