JUDGMENT : Jay Sengupta, J. 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for direction upon the respondent authorities to pass an order in terms of Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act and for quashing the order dated 16.06.2022 passed by the Assistant Secretary (Labour), Andaman and Nicobar Administration. 2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted as follows. The petitioner was working as a regular mazdoor in the Department of Forest, Andaman and Nicobar Islands. On 08.05.2015, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The order was affirmed by the Appellate Authority on 01.12.2015. Both the orders were challenged before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal which set aside the orders and remanded the matter back vide Order dated 14.06.2019. This Court thereafter affirmed the order of the Tribunal with certain modifications on 24.12.2019. On 17.07.2020, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed the petitioner from service by concluding the disciplinary proceeding. The appeal preferred by the writ petitioner was also dismissed on 19.01.2022 holding that there was no provision for such appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application before the Conciliation Officer, who rejected the application. Upon challenge, this Court set aside the order of the Conciliation Officer and directed the authorities to consider the representation of the petitioner afresh vide order dated 24.03.2022. The Conciliation Officer submitted a failure report before the Government on 27.04.2022. On 16.06.2022, the Assistant Secretary (Labour) refused to refer the matter to the Labour Court on the ground that the Disciplinary Authority followed the principles of natural justice and the punishment so imposed was proportionate. First, the Assistant Labour Commissioner could not refuse to refer the matter to the Labour Court, inter alia, as such authority could not scrutinize the issue judicially. Here, the decision was passed on reasons, which were given after entering into the merits of the case. Reference was made under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and section 11(A) empowers the Labour Court or the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue relating to discharge of dismissal of an employee. Whether opportunity of hearing was given to the employee or not and whether the punishment was proportionate or not, could not be decided by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Whether opportunity of hearing was given to the employee or not and whether the punishment was proportionate or not, could not be decided by the Assistant Labour Commissioner. In the decision reported at AIR 1985 SC 860 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that allowing the Government to adjudicate the issue would render Sections 10 and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act nugatory. A final decision on the demand could not be done by the Government. In the decision reported at 1985 (3) SCC 189 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that if the Government was given the authority to refuse reference in cases of dismissal by holding that the Discipliner Authority had acted in accordance with law, Sections 10 and 11(A) would be meaningless. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported at AIR 1989 SC 1565 , 1991(Suppl) 2 SCC 10, AIR 2002 SC 1724 and 2009 (11) SCC 609 . In the decision reported at 1973(1) SCC 813 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Labour Court or the Tribunal had power under Section 11(A) to reappraise the evidence and examine the correctness of the finding arrive at in domestic enquiry. The decision relied by on behalf of the respondent authorities being the one reported at AIR 1960 SC 1223 was distinguishable in the present facts inasmuch as it did not relate to dismissal of an employee. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities submitted as follows. The petitioner had initially raised an objection as to the competence of the respondent no.2 to issue the impugned order. The respondent no.2 had filed an affidavit in July, 2022 pointing out that the decision of the respondent no.2 was duly ratified by the Labour Commissioner and the Secretary (Labour). The Secretary (Labour) had in turn been authorised by the Lieutenant Governor by a notification dated 04.07.2007. The Lieutenant Governor had in turn been authorised by an notification dated 28.06.1947 issued by the erstwhile Governor General in Council followed by a subsequent notification dated 13.12.1955 issued by the President of India to exercise the powers of the Central Government excluding Section 38 but including Section 39 which deals with delegation of powers. On this reliance was placed at Central Agricultural Research Institute and another vs. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, 1998 SC OnLine Cal 666. On this reliance was placed at Central Agricultural Research Institute and another vs. The Presiding Officer Labour Court, 1998 SC OnLine Cal 666. However, in course of submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner had submitted that she was not pursuing the said objection on the question of competence. O merits, reliance was placed on the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Bombay vs. K.P.Krishnan, (1961) 1 SCR 227 . There the Hon’ble Court held that the discretion was vested in the appropriate Government to decide to make or not make a reference. The question as to whether a case for reference was made out or not, could be answered in the light of all the relevant circumstances which would have bearing on the merits of the case. So far as the scope of judicial review of an order passed under section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act was concerned, a writ of mandamus would lie if no reasons were recorded or it could be shown that the refusal to refer a dispute was not bonafide or was based on consideration of wholly irrelevant facts and circumstances. In the present case, the decisions of the respondent authorities not to make reference as recorded in the letter dated 16.06.2022 contained reasons and was not based on irrelevant and extraneous facts and circumstances and there was no dispute that it was not bonafide. Therefore, the impugned order should not be interfered with. 4. I heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the writ petition, the affidavits and the written notes of submission. 5. First, one thing is absolutely certain that the question of the government making a reference to the Labour Court surely precedes an action to be taken in terms of section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, ratio of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.P.Krishnan (supra) squarely applies regardless of what happens subsequently, in terms of section 11A of the said Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the discretion was vested in the appropriate Government to decide to make or not make a reference. Moreover, the question as to whether a case for reference was made out or not could be answered in the light of all the relevant circumstance, which would have a bearing on the merits of the case. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that the discretion was vested in the appropriate Government to decide to make or not make a reference. Moreover, the question as to whether a case for reference was made out or not could be answered in the light of all the relevant circumstance, which would have a bearing on the merits of the case. It was further held that so far as the scope of judicial review of an order passed under section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was concerned, a writ of mandamus would lie if no reasons were accorded or if it could be shown that the refusal to refer a dispute was not bonafide or was based on wholly irrelevant facts and circumstances. 6. Therefore, it will not be correct to hold that an order of reference should not be a speaking one or should not touch upon the merits of the case. 7. It may be germane to mention that in the instant case not only have reasons been recorded, but no case of malafide is also made out on behalf of the petitioner. So, it has to be seen whether the refusal to refer the dispute was based on wholly irrelevant facts and circumstances. 8. The cases relied upon by the petitioner dealing with section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act do mention about the expansive scope of the provisions introduced subsequently to the Act. However, they cannot have any bearing, far less render nugatory, the provisions empowering the State Government to make or not to make a reference to a dispute to the Labour Court. The decisions do not strike down any provisions of law in this regard. 9. In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K.P.Krishnan (supra), it is impossible to postulate that appropriate Government would be denied of any discretion whether to refer or not a dispute to the Labour Court and in all cases be compelled to make a reference. 10. However, the decision in Ram Avtar (supra) renders similar reasons cited for refusing reference, as in the instant case, as insufficient. It also held that an adjudication in this regard on merits by the Government was also quite impermissible as that is to be done by the Labour Court, if referred to. 11. 10. However, the decision in Ram Avtar (supra) renders similar reasons cited for refusing reference, as in the instant case, as insufficient. It also held that an adjudication in this regard on merits by the Government was also quite impermissible as that is to be done by the Labour Court, if referred to. 11. From a harmonious reading of the ratios laid down in K.P. Krishnan (supra), by a Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and in Ram Avtar (supra), a decision passed after introduction of section 11A to the Industrial Disputes Act, the following propositions emerge. - (a) Although, Ram Avtar (supra) deals with the expansive scope of section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the power of the appropriate Government to make a reference in terms of section 10 read with section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act has neither been struck down nor been rendered nugatory. (b) The appropriate Government is vested with the power to make a reference or not and such question would be answered in the light of relevant circumstances, which could have bearing on the merits of the case. (c) However, the appropriate Government ought not indulge in making an adjudication on merits as the same would render a possible exercise in terms of section 11A of the Act redundant. (d) For the judicial review of an order based under section 12(5) of the Act, a writ of mandamus would lie, if no reasons are recorded or the refusal could be shown to be attended with malafide or is based on consideration of wholly irrelevant facts and circumstances. 12. In view of the above, the mere recording of purported reasons in the impugned order that the domestic enquiry was in conformity with the principles of natural justice and that the punishment imposed on the workman was proportionate as per the Industrial Standing Order in force cannot be accepted as sufficient for not making reference to the Labour Court. 13. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded back for fresh consideration and disposal upon hearing the concerned parties, in the light of the decisions rendered in K.P.Krishnan (supra) and Ram Avtar (supra). 14. The entire exercise shall be concluded within six weeks from the date of communication of this order and the decision shall be communicated to the petitioner within a week therefrom. 15. 14. The entire exercise shall be concluded within six weeks from the date of communication of this order and the decision shall be communicated to the petitioner within a week therefrom. 15. With these observations, the writ petition is disposed of. 16. Urgent certified photostat copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, upon compliance of usual formalities.