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2024 DIGILAW 471 (MP)

Padam Singh v. State of M. P.

2024-07-01

PRANAY VERMA

body2024
ORDER 1. By this petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 14.5.2019 by which respondent No.2/Director General of Home Guards has dismissed the representation preferred by him for taking him back in service. The petitioner has also challenged the order dated 9.8.2004 passed by the respondents whereby he had been terminated from services. 2. As per the petitioner, he was initially appointed on the post of Constable [Sainik] in the Home Guard Department on 1.10.1988. On 15.4.2004 he was arrested in a criminal case after which his services were terminated on the ground that he was absent in election duty. In the criminal case registered against him, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore convicted him which order was affirmed by the Appellate Court by order dated 16.4.2004. Being aggrieved by the said order, petitioner preferred Criminal Revision before this Court which was allowed by order dated 2.8.2006 and his order of jail sentence passed under section 325 of the IPC was set aside. It was stated therein that conviction of the petitioner will not be treated to be a disqualification as provided under section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 for his services. 3. After the order passed in the criminal case, the petitioner filed applications before the respondents on 30.8.2006 and 5.1.2009 for taking him back in services but no action thereupon was taken and he did not receive any response. Petitioner hence preferred W.P. No.3675 of 2008 before this Court which was disposed of by order dated 5.12.2008 with a direction to the petitioner to submit a fresh representation and the respondents were directed to pass a detailed and speaking order within six months. Thereafter, the Divisional Commandant, Home Guard, Indore recommended and forwarded the case of the petitioner to Director General, Home Guard, Jabalpur vide letter dated 24.12.2009 but thereafter no action was taken. Petitioner hence again preferred W.P. No.2189 of 2012(S) before this Court in which reply was filed by the respondents along with which they filed a copy of order dated 9.8.2004 by which the services of the petitioner had been terminated. By order dated 9.3.2019 the petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner in light of the law laid down by this Court in R.P. Dwivedi v. SECL 2011(4) MPLT 483. By order dated 9.3.2019 the petition was disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner in light of the law laid down by this Court in R.P. Dwivedi v. SECL 2011(4) MPLT 483. Thereafter, by order dated 14.5.2019, the representation made by the petitioner in light of the aforesaid order has been rejected by the respondents by observing that fifteen years have already elapsed since the time when the petitioner was relieved from services hence now he cannot be taken back. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that termination order of the petitioner as well as rejection of his representation made pursuant to order passed by this Court is illegal. The impugned order has been passed without complying with the order of this Court only on the ground of delay which was already in the knowledge of this Court at the time of passing of its order in the Writ Petition. The first Writ Petition was preferred by the petitioner in the year 2008 and the second one in February, 2012. The matter was pending before this Court hence there was no delay on part of the petitioner. The services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground of absence from election duty without considering the fact that he was behind bars during that period hence was unable to join duty. The petitioner had given reasonable explanation about his absence which was not willful but the same has been turned down without duly appreciating the same. The termination order has been passed without following the process of law, without issuing any show cause notice to the petitioner and without conducting regular enquiry which hence deserves to be quashed. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the apex Court in Krishkant B Parmar v. Union of India, 2012(3) SCC 178 and of this Court in Sanjay Jain v. State of M.P. and another 2021 (4) MPLJ 182 , W.P. No.10887/2006 (S. Ramsiya Tiwari v. State of M.P. and another) decided on 16.07.2012 and Second Appeal No.349 of 2005 [State of M.P. and another v. Kishansingh] decided on 4.11.2006. 5. 5. Reply has been filed by the respondents and it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that petitioner was not terminated on account of his involvement in criminal case but was terminated on account of his absence from duty at the time of Lok Sabha Elections in the year 2004. Petitioner was not only absent at the time of election duty but was continuously absent since 1.6.2003 without any intimation. The petitioner never apprised the department that he has been involved in a criminal case. Pursuant to order passed in W.P. No.3675 of 2018 the representation of the petitioner was decided by order dated 4.3.2010 giving reasons for him being relieved from service and as to why his representation cannot be accepted. The termination order was duly communicated to the petitioner on 4.3.2010 itself. On another representation having been made by the petitioner he was again intimated of the order on 6.9.2011. Moreover in W.P. No.2189 of 2012 reply was filed by the respondents in April, 2012 itself along with which copy of termination order of petitioner was also filed. The petitioner however did not challenge his termination order even then in his pending writ petition and instead continued with the same which was eventually disposed of with a direction to respondents to consider his case in the light of the judgment in the case of R.P. Dwivedi (supra). His case has been considered and duly rejected in which there is no infirmity in view of which petition deserves to be dismissed. 6. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. From the facts which are not disputed between the parties, it is apparent that petitioner was terminated by order dated 9.8.2004 passed by the respondents. His termination was not oral as was earlier contended by him. The question which arises is as to when petitioner acquired knowledge of passing of the said order. Along with the reply respondents have filed an order dated 4.3.2010 [Annexure R/1] which was passed pursuant to order passed in W.P. No.3675 of 2018. Therein it has been specifically stated that petitioner was terminated from service by order dated 9.8.2004 on account of him being absent from election duties in the year 2004 and for various other reasons. Along with the reply respondents have filed an order dated 4.3.2010 [Annexure R/1] which was passed pursuant to order passed in W.P. No.3675 of 2018. Therein it has been specifically stated that petitioner was terminated from service by order dated 9.8.2004 on account of him being absent from election duties in the year 2004 and for various other reasons. Thus, the petitioner was communicated as regards passing of his termination order at least on 4.3.2010. Annexure R/2 has also been filed by the respondents which is a receipt as regards communication of order dated 4.3.2010 to the petitioner. Therein it is stated that the said order was received by the petitioner on 4.3.2010. There is no rebuttal on part of the petitioner by filling any rejoinder to controvert the fact of communication of the aforesaid documents [Annexure R/1 and R/2] to him on 4.3.2010. The petitioner hence specifically acquired knowledge of his order of termination on 4.3.2010. 8. Despite becoming aware of his order of termination in the year 2010 itself the petitioner chose to prefer W.P. No.2189 of 2012(S) in the year 2012 but did not challenge his termination order therein. In that petition reply was filed by the respondents in April, 2012 along with which they filed copy of termination order dated 9.8.2004 of the petitioner. The order specifically recited that petitioner has been terminated from services on account of being absent from election duties. Thus, even if Annexure R/1 & R/2, for sake of arguments are ignored, then also apparently in April, 2012 itself the petitioner became aware of his termination order but did not challenge the same either in the already pending Writ Petition or by preferring a fresh Writ Petition. The pending Writ Petition eventually came to be disposed of by order dated 9.3.2019 with a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner in light of law laid down by this Court in the case of R.P. Dwivedi (supra). 9. The said order also does not come to the aid of the petitioner since the order in the case of R.P. Dwivedi (supra) was in respect of termination of an employee on the ground of his conviction in a criminal offence involving moral turpitude. 9. The said order also does not come to the aid of the petitioner since the order in the case of R.P. Dwivedi (supra) was in respect of termination of an employee on the ground of his conviction in a criminal offence involving moral turpitude. In the present case, as per the petitioner himself, he has not been terminated on account of any conviction in a criminal case but has been terminating on account of being absent from election duties. As per the law laid down by this Court in Sanjay Jain (supra), the reasons given by the respondents in the return for terminating the services of the petitioner are to be wholly ignored and only the termination order has to be read. When the same is done it is absolutely clear that termination of the petitioner is solely on the ground of him being absent from election duties and not on account of being involved in a criminal case. Thus, the order passed on 9.3.2019 in W.P. No.2189 of 2022 (S) does not help the petitioner in any manner. 10. From the above, it is apparent that petitioner became aware of his termination order dated 9.8.2004 at least on 4.3.2010 and in any case in April, 2012. However, he did not challenge the same upon acquiring its knowledge but has challenged the same in this petition preferred in the year 2019 i.e. after a period of 7 to 9 years from acquiring such knowledge. There has hence been unexplained lapse on part of the petitioner in challenging his termination order and the petition suffers from delay and latches. No explanation whatsoever has been given by the petitioner for the delay in challenging his termination order. Merely because he was pursuing his Writ Petition preferred in the year 2012, it would not help him in any manner. Despite becoming aware of his termination order at least in the year 2012 the petitioner did not take any steps for challenging the same. The petition was disposed of with a direction to consider petitioner’s case in light of the case of R.P Dwivedi (supra) which is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case of the petitioner. Despite becoming aware of his termination order at least in the year 2012 the petitioner did not take any steps for challenging the same. The petition was disposed of with a direction to consider petitioner’s case in light of the case of R.P Dwivedi (supra) which is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case of the petitioner. Since petitioner has challenged his termination order in the year 2019 after acquiring its knowledge in the year 2010-2012, the petition is not liable to be entertained in view of unexplained delay and latches in preferring the same. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are hence not required to be gone into in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. As a result, I do not find any ground to interfere in the matter. The petition deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.