JUDGMENT : 1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the judgment dated 15.12.1998 passed by the Special Judge, C.B.I., Jabalpur in Special Case No.44 of 1997, whereby the Appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under: Conviction Sentence Under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs.8,000 in default of payment of which to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 6 months Under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Rigorous Imprisonment for 3 years and fine of Rs.8,000 in default of payment of which to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 6 months The jail sentences are directed to run concurrently 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that in January-February, 1997 the Appellant was posted as a Branch Manager in Dena Bank, Branch Damakheda, District Durg. He was entrusted besides other duties to disburse loan/subsidy under Pradhan Mantri Yojna. Complainant Tejender Dev Chavre (PW4) had submitted an application for sanction of a loan through District Industries Centre for the purpose of electronic and watch parts. His case for loan was sent to Damakheda Branch of Dena Bank where the Appellant was the Branch Manager. The Complainant had gone to the Appellant in the Bank on 29.1.1997 for getting information about his loan. He came to know that his loan of Rs.95,000 was sanctioned under the Pradhan Mantri Rojgar Yogna, but, the Appellant demanded a bribe of Rs.7,000 from the Complainant for disbursement of the said loan and asked him to pay that amount of Rs.7,000 on 20.2.1997. On 14.2.1997 the Complainant lodged a written complaint (Ex.P2) before the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Jabalpur regarding the demand of the bribe by the Appellant. First Information Report (Ex.P28) was registered on 14.2.1997 and CBI Inspector Dhirendra Kumar (PW6) was directed for investigation into the matter. The Complainant was called to the S.E.C.L. Guest House, Bilaspur on 20.2.1997 where panch witnesses Sahwal Chandra (PW5) and Rajeshwar Singh (PW2) were also called for the purpose of giving them a demonstration of trap proceedings. The panch witnesses were introduced with the Complainant and his complaint (Ex.P2) was given to them for perusal. They verified the complaint from the Complainant. A demonstration of phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate solution was given there. The panch witnesses were introduced with the Complainant and his complaint (Ex.P2) was given to them for perusal. They verified the complaint from the Complainant. A demonstration of phenolphthalein powder and sodium carbonate solution was given there. Numbers of the currency notes submitted by the Complainant were noted. Those currency notes were smeared with phenolphthalein powder and thereafter given to the Complainant for giving them as bribe. The Complainant was inculcated to give a signal after giving the bribe. All these proceedings were recorded as a memorandum (Ex.P3). The trap party proceeded towards Damakheda Branch of Dena Bank and reached there at about 1:30 p.m. The Complainant and Rajeshwar Singh (PW2) entered the Bank. On being demanded, the Complainant gave the tainted money of Rs.7,000 to the Appellant to which after counting the Appellant kept in the drawer. On receiving a signal from the Complainant, the trap party entered the Bank, caught the Appellant and got his right hand washed in a solution of sodium carbonate and thereafter his left hand was also got washed in a different solution of sodium carbonate. Colour of both the solutions turned into pink. Both the pink solutions were sealed in bottles. Hands of the Complainant were also got washed in a solution of sodium carbonate on which colour of the solution turned into pink. That solution was also sealed. Numbers of the recovered tainted currency notes were noted and sealed in an envelope. A memorandum of all the proceedings was prepared. The amount which was received by the Appellant from Devendra Kosle was also seized vide Ex.P8. Loan case files of Complainant Tejender Dev Chavre and Devendra Kosle were seized vide Ex.P5. The seized articles were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) for chemical examination. FSL report is Ex.P30. Sanction for prosecution of the Appellant (Ex.P1) was obtained from the competent authority. On completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed against the Appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (henceforth ‘the Act of 1988’). Charges were framed against the Appellant for the said offences. 3. To bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 6 witnesses. Statement of the Appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which he pleaded false implication. 4. Charges were framed against the Appellant for the said offences. 3. To bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 6 witnesses. Statement of the Appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in which he pleaded false implication. 4. It was the defence of the Appellant that he had told the Complainant that charges of margin money, insurance, documentation and processing fees are payable before sanction of the loan and these charges are to be deposited in Savings Bank Account. It was the stand of the Complainant that no margin money is not payable in any government scheme and, therefore, his loan may be sanctioned without the said charges. Since without payment of the margin money he was not authorised to sanction the loan, on 21.1.1997 he had told the Complainant that only after payment of the margin money, which is of about Rs.7,000, loan sanction letter could be sent to the District Industries Centre. After sending loan sanction letter, a training is given by the District Industries Centre to the person seeking loan and thereafter only the loan is disbursed. On 20.2.1997 the Complainant came to him and said that he was ready to deposit the amount then he told him to deposit Rs.7,000 in the Savings Bank Account. On this, the Complainant said that he had not brought photograph and he asked the Appellant to keep the money with him. A fair was running and he will come back within half an hour with his photograph and he will give photograph within half an hour. The Complainant said that if he goes with the money to the fair there could be a chance of his pocket picking and, therefore, he asked the Appellant to keep the money with him. On the request of the Complainant, he counted the money and kept the same in the drawer. The money could not be deposited in the account without photograph. In the meantime, some people entered the Bank and told him that he had received a bribe. He had told those persons about the fact, but, they said that whatever was needed to be told the same should be told before the Court. Whosoever deposits money, they are bound to receive the same. On the same day, Devendra Kumar Kosle had deposited a sum of Rs.7,000 towards bank charges. He had told those persons about the fact, but, they said that whatever was needed to be told the same should be told before the Court. Whosoever deposits money, they are bound to receive the same. On the same day, Devendra Kumar Kosle had deposited a sum of Rs.7,000 towards bank charges. The Appellant claimed that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated. In his defence, the Appellant examined two witnesses, namely, P.R. Yadu (DW1), who was an Assistant Development Officer in Block Development Simga, Damakheda and Ambikachand Shukla (DW2), who was a Clerk-cum-Cashier in Damakheda Branch of Dena Bank. 5. On completion of the trial, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellant as mentioned in first paragraph of this judgment. Hence, the instant appeal. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that the Trial Court has wrongly convicted the Appellant without there being sufficient evidence against him on record. It was argued that the Trial Court has arrived at a conclusion that the recovery of tainted money is proved, but, the Appellant had accepted that tainted money as an illegal gratification, no sufficient evidence is available on record in this regard and, therefore, the conviction is not sustainable. There are material contradictions and omissions in the statements of the witnesses and, therefore, their statements are not reliable. Hence, the Appellant deserves acquittal. 7. Per contra, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/State supported the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence and submitted that the Trial Court has rightly convicted the Appellant. 8. No one appeared on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation. 9. I have heard the contentions put-forth on behalf of the parties and perused the entire material available including the statements of the witnesses with due care. 10. Present is a case of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification other than legal remuneration by misusing the office by a public servant/Appellant. A heinous offence relating to a public servant is sufficient for termination of his services. Degree/standard of proof of ingredients of the offence is high and the prosecution is required to prove the offence by adducing cogent evidence without leaving any room for doubt or ambiguity. 11. In case of an illegal gratification, there are three essential ingredients to constitute the offence. They are (i) demand, (ii) acceptance and (iii) recovery. 12. Degree/standard of proof of ingredients of the offence is high and the prosecution is required to prove the offence by adducing cogent evidence without leaving any room for doubt or ambiguity. 11. In case of an illegal gratification, there are three essential ingredients to constitute the offence. They are (i) demand, (ii) acceptance and (iii) recovery. 12. In (2009) 3 SCC 779 (C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala), the Supreme Court held thus: “18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 4 SCC 725 , this Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727, para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe.” 13. Further, in (2014) 13 SCC 55 (B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh), it was held by the Supreme Court as under: “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 . 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” 14. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” 14. Further, in (2015) 10 SCC 152 (P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh), the Supreme Court held as follows: “22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 , in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” 15. In (2015) 11 SCC 314 (C. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala), it was held by the Supreme Court as under: “13. With reference to the abovementioned rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties and the evidence on record, we have examined the concurrent finding of the fact on the charge made against the appellant. It has been continuously held by this Court in a catena of cases after interpretation of the provisions of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act that the demand of illegal gratification by the accused is the sine qua non for constituting an offence under the provisions of the Act. Thus, the burden to prove the accusation against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act with regard to the acceptance of illegal gratification from the complainant PW2, lies on the prosecution.” 16. Reiterating the judgment of B. Jayaraj case (supra) and P. Satyanarayana Murthy case (supra), again, in (2016) 3 SCC 108 (Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi), it was held by the Supreme Court thus: “35. It is well-settled position of law that the demand for the bribe money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The same legal principle has been held by this Court in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 , A. Subair v. State of Kerala, (2009) 6 SCC 587 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 upon which reliance is rightly placed by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant.” In paragraph 39, it was further held by the Supreme Court thus: “39. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the trial court and the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the courts have relied upon the evidence of the prosecution on the aspect of demand of illegal gratification from the complainant Jai Bhagwan (PW2) by the appellant though there is no substantive evidence in this regard and the appellant was erroneously convicted for the charges framed against him. The prosecution has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made by the appellant from the complainant Jai Bhagwan (PW2), which is the sine qua non for convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and order [Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2312] of the High Court is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside.” 17. Recently, in (2021) 3 SCC 687 (N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu), reiterating the judgment of C.M. Girish Babu case (supra) and B. Jayaraj case (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court as follows: “26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 . In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. 27. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. 27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 read as under: (SCC pp. 58-59) “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 . 8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext.P-11) before LW9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record.” 18. In the light of above view taken by the Supreme Court, I shall examine the facts and statements of the witnesses of the present case. 19. In the instant case, Madhukar Umarji (PW1), who, at the relevant time, was General Manager of Dena Bank at its headquarter Mumbai and was the prosecution sanctioning authority of the Appellant, has deposed in paragraph 4 that for the loan in question an account of the applicant must be opened in the bank and an approximate amount of Rs.6,900 is payable towards margin money, insurance, processing fees, stamp duty etc. He has also deposed that photograph is necessary for opening an account in the bank. In paragraph 8, he has further deposed that amount of Rs.6,900 is payable for fulfillment of formalities towards the loan, but, he explained that the said formalities are fulfilled after sanction of the loan. He has also deposed that if the amount of Rs.7,000 in round figure is demanded, that would be illegal. 20. S.R. Ingle (PW3), who, at the relevant time, was a Manager in Regional Office of Dena Bank at Raipur, has deposed that for opening an account in the bank, photograph is necessary. For loan under the Pradhan Mantri Yojna, deposit of 5% margin money is essential. Amount for insurance is not necessary. For opening Savings Bank Account, money is required to be deposited. If any applicant does not give his photograph, his loan cannot be sanctioned. For loan of Rs.1,00,000, if the Branch Manager of the Bank demands margin money of Rs.5,000 and Rs.500 for opening Savings Bank Account, that is essential. But, Rs.200 for processing fees is not necessary. If the demand of Rs.50 per document is made towards adhesive stamps, that is legal. For loan of Rs.1,00,000, if the Branch Manager of the Bank demands margin money of Rs.5,000 and Rs.500 for opening Savings Bank Account, that is essential. But, Rs.200 for processing fees is not necessary. If the demand of Rs.50 per document is made towards adhesive stamps, that is legal. Total of all the payable charges comes to Rs.6,900 and if the Branch Manager had demanded round figure of Rs.7,000, that is not illegal. 21. Tejender Dev Chavre (PW4), who is the Complainant, has deposed in paragraph 3 that the Appellant had demanded bribe of Rs.7,000 and since he did not want to give the bribe he made written complaint dated 14.2.1997 (Ex.P2) in the office of Central Bureau of Investigation at Jabalpur. The Appellant had asked this witness to bring the amount of Rs.7,000 on 20.2.1997. The Appellant had told this witness if he wanted to take the loan he will bring Rs.7,000. In paragraph 4, this witness has stated that he went to the Appellant in his Bank and said him that he had brought the money of Rs.7,000 which he had asked for. On being asked for by the Appellant, this witness took out the tainted money from right pocket of his kurta and gave the same to the Appellant. The Appellant received the money in his right hand and after counting the same by his both hands kept the same in the drawer. Thereafter, the Appellant had prepared and given him a letter in the name of the D.I.C. (District Industries Centre) Raipur and said him that he will get the loan disbursed to him. In paragraph 18, this witness has deposed that the Appellant had demanded a sum of Rs.10,000 from him for deposit of F.D.R. and a sum of Rs7,000 for bribe. Other than these, he had not made any demand for Bank or for himself. This witness has not stated anywhere in his deposition that he had made payment of required money towards margin, insurance, Savings Bank Account opening, process fees, stamp duty etc. separately other than the said amount of Rs.7,000. The deposit made of F.D.R. of Rs.10,000 was of father of this witness, but, no seizure of any F.D.R. is made by the prosecution. 22. On a minute examination of the statements of the above witnesses, I find that initial demand is not established. separately other than the said amount of Rs.7,000. The deposit made of F.D.R. of Rs.10,000 was of father of this witness, but, no seizure of any F.D.R. is made by the prosecution. 22. On a minute examination of the statements of the above witnesses, I find that initial demand is not established. The defence taken by the Appellant finds support from the deposition of Madhukar Umarji (PW1), General Manager of Dena Bank at headquarter Mumbai and S.R. Ingle (PW3), Manager in Regional Office of Dena Bank at Raipur. Thus, it is clear that Complainant Tejender Dev Chave (PW4) is not a credible witness. The evidence on record does not inspire confidence of the Court to hold the Appellant guilty. From the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution, demand of bribe, in any way, is not established. Though recovery of money is proved, the Appellant had accepted that money as a bribe or as an illegal gratification is not established. 23. As an outcome of the discussion made above, the instant appeal is allowed. The judgment under challenge is set aside. The Appellant is acquitted of the charges framed against him. 24. The Appellant is reported to be on bail. His bail bonds shall continue for a further period of 6 months under Section 437A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter, the said bonds shall stand discharged. 25. Records of the Trial Court be sent back along with a copy of this judgment forthwith for necessary compliance.