JUDGMENT : V. Gopala Krishna Rao, J. 1. This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short 'the C.P.C.'], is filed by the Appellant/plaintiff challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 21.02.2004, in O.S. No.22 of 1997 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Gudur [for short 'the trial Court']. The Respondents herein are the defendants in the said Suit. 2. The Appellant/Plaintiff filed the above said suit praying the Court to set aside the Court sale dated 12.03.1996 conducted by the I Additional District Judge, Nellore in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 on the ground of fraud played by the defendants and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the 5th defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff to the plaint schedule property and for costs. 3. Both the parties in the Appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. The brief averments of the plaint, in O.S. No.22 of 1997, are as under: The first defendant herein filed a suit in O.S.No.104 of 1975 on the file of the I Additional District Judge, Nellore against the defendants 2 and 3 for recovery of a sum of Rs.43,542.38 ps. on a mortgage of the plaint schedule property and obtained a decree. Subsequently the third defendant sold the same property to the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 14.04.1982 for a consideration of Rs.85,000/- and she also agreed to deposit the debt in O.S.No.104 of 1975. Relying upon the representation of the third defendant, the plaintiff developed the building, as it was originally in an extent of 29 ankanas into 48 ankanas. The third defendant has conceived an idea to deceive the plaintiff, she did not raise proper defense in the suit in O.S.No.104 of 1975 for compound interest with quarterly rests instead of for simple interest at 10.5% p.a. and she did not even defend the petition to amend the decree filed on 25.02.1985 claiming for quarterly compounding interest and she colluded with the bank officials. After the development made by the plaintiff, the value of the property was increased to a worth of more than Rs.10,00,000/-. The suit property was not tested before it was actually brought for sale nor retested. The decree holder in collusion with the J.Dr. After the development made by the plaintiff, the value of the property was increased to a worth of more than Rs.10,00,000/-. The suit property was not tested before it was actually brought for sale nor retested. The decree holder in collusion with the J.Dr. and in collusion with the intended auction purchaser valued at Rs.1,00,000/- and the Court Amin valued at Rs.2,50,000/- in collusion with the bank officials though it is actually worth is at Rs.10,00,000/-. By the time of auction on 12.03.1996 by undervaluing the bank officials played a fraud on the bank itself and in collusion with the intended purchaser enabling him to knock down the property for a sum of Rs.2,75,000/- as such the entire Court sale is vitiated by fraud. The plaintiff herein also filed claim petition in E.A.No.7 of 1996 and it was dismissed on the ground that there was no attachment and the remedy is by way of a separate suit and the same was also confirmed by the High Court. 5. The first defendant filed a written statement denying the contents of the plaint and further contended as under: - After passing the final decree, the plaintiff purchased the mortgage property from the judgment debtor on 14.04.1982, even if the said sale deed is true that he steps into the shoes of J.Dr. and he cannot claim any statutory title under the said sale deed, as such he happens to be party in the said suit. All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit as laid down in Section 47 C.P.C. so the suit is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. 6. The third defendant filed a written statement admitting the plaint schedule property was mortgaged to the first defendant bank and subsequently it was sold to the plaintiff under a sale deed dated 14.04.1982 for a sum of Rs.85,000/-, but she has no knowledge about any developments made by the plaintiff for the plaint schedule building, plaintiff knowing about the civil proceedings against the schedule mentioned property, he purchased the same with own risk and there is no collusion between the D.Hr. and J.Dr. or the intended purchasers. 7. and J.Dr. or the intended purchasers. 7. The fourth defendant filed a written statement denying the contents of plaint and further contended that the first defendant openly waived his right to seek execution of the decree in O.S.No.104 of 1975 against this defendant, even in the suit that no relief is sought against this defendant and whose presence has no useful purpose and the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs. 8. The fifth defendant filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint and further contended that the suit is not maintainable as per the provisions under Section 9, under Section 47 and Order XXI of Civil Procedure Code. This defendant purchased the plaint schedule property in Court auction on 12.03.1996 and the sale was knocked down in his favour as highest bidder. Subsequently the plaintiff filed E.A.No.7 of 1996 and the sale was stopped and after dismissal of E.A.No.7 of 1996 he preferred C.M.A.No.556 of 1996 on the file of the High Court and the same was dismissed. Later the sale was confirmed in favour of this defendant on 20.02.1997 and a sale certificate was issued on 03.03.1997 and as an auction purchaser he got right and title to the property. In pursuance of the said sale certificate this defendant also took delivery of possession of the property through Court and the tenants in the building obeyed the orders of the Court and attorned to this defendant. The plaintiff has not challenged the auction proceedings, as such the suit is not maintainable even under Section 9 or under Section 47 C.P.C., the plaintiff, who purchased the mortgaged property, nothing prevented him to exercise his right of redemption as provided in Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. Any improvement made either by mortgagor or mortgagee in the absence of any contract to contrary shall be with the mortgaged property. The alleged transfer in favour of the plaintiff by third defendant during lis-pendens the right of the first defendant brought the property to sale continues and the plaintiff is bound by said sale and he cannot maintain any separate suit. Since this defendant is an auction purchaser and after confirmation of sale he got a good title and steps into the shoes of D.Hr. and any dispute has to be decided in the execution proceedings itself. Since this defendant is an auction purchaser and after confirmation of sale he got a good title and steps into the shoes of D.Hr. and any dispute has to be decided in the execution proceedings itself. The plaint schedule building is an old construction and prayed the Court to dismiss the suit. After the death of fifth defendant, defendants 6 to 8 are added as his legal representatives and they have not filed any separate written statement. 9. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (i) Whether the defendants played fraud and got the plaint schedule property sold in Court auction? (ii) Whether plaintiff is entitled to set aside the Court sale? (iii) Whether the suit is not maintainable in view of Section 47 C.P.C. and Order 21 Rule 89 to 92 and Section 9 and 11 and in law? (iv) To what relief? 10. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the Plaintiff, PW1 to PW3 were examined and Ex.A1 to Ex.A9 and Ex.C1 to Ex.C3 were marked. On behalf of the Defendants, DW1 to DW3 were examined and Ex.B1 to Ex.B20 were marked. 11. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit with costs vide its judgment, dated 21.02.2004, against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellant/plaintiff in the Suit questioning the Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court. 12. Heard Sri Rama Mohan Rao Kotha, learned counsel for appellant/plaintiff and Sri Sai Gangadhar Chamarthy, learned counsel and Sri Y.V.Ravi Prasad, learned senior counsel for respondents. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff would contend that the trial Court wrongly came to conclusion that the suit is not maintainable. He would further contend that the trial Court without appreciating the evidence on record came to wrong conclusion that there is no collusion in between the bank officials and third defendant in the suit. He would further contend that the judgment passed by the trial Court is contrary to law and the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment passed by the trial Court. 14. He would further contend that the judgment passed by the trial Court is contrary to law and the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment passed by the trial Court. 14. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the trial Court and he further pleaded that the appeal may be dismissed. 15. Having regard to the pleadings in the Suit and the findings recorded by the trial Court and in the light of rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this court, the following points would arise for determination: 1. Whether the sale held on 12.03.1996 in favour of the 5th defendant in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 conducted by the I Additional District Judge, Nellore is liable to be set aside and whether the plaintiff is entitled for consequential relief of permanent injunction to restrain the 5th defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession in the plaint schedule property? 2. Whether the trial Court is justified in dismissing the suit in O.S.No.22 of 1997? 16. Point Nos. 1 and 2: The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that the 3rd defendant being the partner of the 2nd defendant obtained loan from the 1st defendant by mortgaging her title deeds of the plaint schedule property with the 1st defendant, when the defendants 2 and 3 failed to repay the loan amount taken under the mortgage, the 1st defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.104 of 1975 against the defendants 2 to 4 herein and subsequently the suit is decreed in favour of the 1st defendant herein. The plaintiff further pleaded that a preliminary decree was passed on 31.01.1976, the defendants therein failed to redeem the mortgage property and the final decree was obtained by the first defendant bank in the said suit and during the pendency of the execution proceedings the plaintiff herein purchased the mortgage property from 3rd defendant under Ex.A1 registered sale deed dated 14.04.1982 by the father of the plaintiff as a guardian for the plaintiff. The appellant further pleaded that the 1st defendant also brought the plaint schedule property for sale by filing various execution petitions and ultimately it filed E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 to realize the decree amount by selling the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff further pleaded that the bank officials colluded with the intended auction purchaser to enable him to knock away the property for the poultry amount of Rs.2,75,000/- and entire Court sale is vitiated by fraud. 17. The relief claimed by the appellant/plaintiff in the present suit is to set aside the sale held on 12.03.1996 in favour of the 5th defendant in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 conducted by the I Additional District Judge, Nellore on the ground that the entire sale is vitiated by fraud. The burden is on the appellant/plaintiff to prove that there was a collusion in between the first defendant bank officials and the fifth defendant auction purchaser. Therefore, the alleged fraud has to be proved by the plaintiff by producing the oral and documentary evidence. 18. The plaintiff in the suit filed his chief affidavit as PW1 by reiterating the contents of plaint in his evidence affidavit as PW1, in cross examination, he admits that he studied up to graduation and he passed S.S.L.C. in the year 1991, by that time he was aged about 15 years and he did not file his date of birth certificate into the Court and he did not file the original sale deed into the Court in respect of the suit schedule property. He pleaded ignorance about the sale transaction covered under Ex.A1. He further admits that he did not gone through the sale deed in Ex.A1 and he did not saw the original sale deed of Ex.A1 till now. He further admitted in his cross examination that his father purchased the property under Ex.A1 knowing the mortgage decree obtained by the first defendant. He further admits that he did not gone through the sale deed in Ex.A1 and he did not saw the original sale deed of Ex.A1 till now. He further admitted in his cross examination that his father purchased the property under Ex.A1 knowing the mortgage decree obtained by the first defendant. He pleaded ignorance about the deposit of balance sale consideration of Rs.62,000/- which was mentioned in Ex.A1 whether it was deposited in the bank or not and he also pleaded ignorance about the suit proceedings in O.S.No.104 of 1975 and he also pleaded ignorance about the filing of claim application in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Nellore and his father filed the said petition, by that time he was a minor. He further admits that the claim application filed by his father was dismissed by the executing Court and his father filed an appeal before the Hon'ble High Court and the said appeal was also dismissed confirming the order passed by the executing Court in claim application. He further admits that he was not present when the Court conducted auction of the suit property and also at the time of prosecuting the claim application. He further admits that the appeal filed by his father was dismissed in the High Court and he further admits the 5th defendant died during the pendency of the suit and the defendants 6 and 8 are in a possession of the suit property. In cross examination by the learned counsel for defendants 6 and 7, he admits that he became a major in the year 1993. He pleaded ignorance about the filing of the counter by 3rd defendant in E.P.No.8 of 1988 stating that she was the owner and possessor of the disputed property. He further admits that the Court Amin fixed the value of the property as Rs.2,50,000/- and in the year 1982 he purchased the suit property for Rs.85,000/- and the 5th defendant purchased the suit property for Rs.2,75,000/-. He further admits that he filed a claim application and also E.A.No.7 of 1996 in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 after attaining majority and the same was dismissed by I Additional District Judge, Nellore. He also filed C.M.A.No. 556 of 1996 in the High Court against the order passed in the claim application and the appeal was also dismissed. He also filed C.M.A.No. 556 of 1996 in the High Court against the order passed in the claim application and the appeal was also dismissed. He further admits that he did not file any application before the executing Court by agreeing to pay the entire sale warrant amount to set aside the sale. The evidence of PW1 fails to prove the alleged fraud as pleaded by the plaintiff. 19. PW2 is none other than the mother of the plaintiff. In cross examination, she admits that she has no recorded evidence with regard to suit property and she has no record to show that she acted as a guardian of the plaintiff when he was a minor. She further admits that the plaintiff is not aware of anything about the sale transaction and on her advise the plaintiff filed the suit and her husband does not know anything about the suit transaction, but she does not know the market value of the suit property and she does not know about the value assessed by the Court and decree holder with regard to suit property. In cross examination, she admits that the total extent of constructed building at present is 52 ankanams, which is inclusive of old constructed building and they extended in the year 1992 itself, two shops in front of the building with twin sheets and they also constructed a four ankanams of hall on the rear side of the old building. The evidence of PW2 is no way helpful to prove the alleged fraud as pleaded by the plaintiff/ appellant. 20. PW3 is an advocate, who is practicing in Gudur Bar Association. In his evidence, he deposed that he was appointed as Advocate Commissioner in the suit proceedings and he gave notices to both the parties i.e., plaintiff and defendants before inspecting the suit locality, he did not give any notices to defendants 1 and 5. He deposed that he inspected the suit schedule property building bearing No.13/247, at that time the plaintiff, his family members and learned counsel for plaintiff alone were present and the defendants and their counsel were not present. He deposed that he inspected the suit schedule property building bearing No.13/247, at that time the plaintiff, his family members and learned counsel for plaintiff alone were present and the defendants and their counsel were not present. He further admits that he did not take the Court record along with him and he has no reason for not to prepare the plan or measure the schedule property and he did not ascertain the age of the ground floor, first floor and second floor and the plaintiff did not inform whether he made a new construction in the suit schedule building. He admits in his evidence in cross examination by the defendants 6 to 8 that he has not taken endorsement of 5th defendant's advocate by requesting him to give a notice to party. He did not record the measurements of the shed in front of the building. His evidence is no way helpful to prove the alleged fraud as pleaded by the plaintiff. 21. The learned senior counsel Sri Y.V.Ravi Prasad, on behalf of the respondents, would contend that the suit is not maintainable as per the provisions under Section 9 and Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code and Order 21 of Civil Procedure Code. He would further contend that the auction purchaser purchased the plaint schedule property in a Court auction on 12.03.1996 and the sale was knocked down in his favour as highest bidder and the plaintiff herein filed E.A.No.7 of 1996 and the sale was stopped and after dismissal of the said application, he preferred C.M.A.No.556 of 1996 before the Hon'ble High Court and the same was dismissed. Ex.A2 coupled with Ex.B3 clearly goes to show that the plaintiff herein filed a claim application vide E.A.No.7 of 1996 in the suit proceedings before the executing Court and the same was dismissed on merits, later, the plaintiff herein filed an appeal under C.M.A.No.556 of 1996 and this Court dismissed the said CMA No.556 of 1996. The material on record reveals that the sale was confirmed in favour of the 5th defendant on 20.02.1997 and the sale certificate was also issued on 03.03.1997 under Ex.B1. The material on record also further reveals that in pursuance of the said sale certificate, the 5th defendant also took delivery of possession and Ex.B10 reveals the same. The material on record reveals that the sale was confirmed in favour of the 5th defendant on 20.02.1997 and the sale certificate was also issued on 03.03.1997 under Ex.B1. The material on record also further reveals that in pursuance of the said sale certificate, the 5th defendant also took delivery of possession and Ex.B10 reveals the same. It is not in dispute that the appellant herein has not challenged the auction proceedings before the executing Court and the appellant who purchased the mortgage property nothing prevented him to exercise his rights of redemption as provided under Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act. 22. The material on record reveals that the suit in O.S.No.104 of 1975 was filed for recovery of money of Rs.43,542.38 ps, basing on the mortgage executed in favour of first defendant herein by the defendants 2 and 3. It is not in dispute that on 31.01.1976 a preliminary decree was passed in the aforesaid suit and final decree was also passed in the year 1976 and after passing final decree the third defendant sold the said property to the plaintiff herein, therefore, the plaintiff steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor. Subsequently, the first defendant filed E.P.No.8 of 1988 in OS.No.104 of 1975 on the file of I Additional District Judge, Nellore and a publication was also given for sale of the schedule property in OS.No.104 of 1975 in Eenadu Daily. The appellant/plaintiff herein filed E.A.No.7 of 1996 under Order XXI Rule 58 C.P.C. for claiming the property and the same was dismissed by the executing Court. Aggrieved against the said order, the appellant herein filed an appeal before this Court and the said appeal was dismissed by this Court on merits. Subsequently, an auction was conducted by the executing Court in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 and the fifth defendant participated in the Court auction and the property was sold to the fifth defendant in a Court auction because he is the successful bidder. It is not in dispute that the appellant/plaintiff herein filed a claim application under E.A.No.7 of 1996 under Order XXI rule 58 C.P.C. and the same was dismissed by the executing Court on merits. It is not in dispute that the appellant/plaintiff herein filed a claim application under E.A.No.7 of 1996 under Order XXI rule 58 C.P.C. and the same was dismissed by the executing Court on merits. Aggrieved against the said order, the appellant herein filed C.M.A.No.556 of 1997 before this Court and the same was also dismissed by this Court by confirming the order passed in E.A.No.7 of 1996 which was remained unchallenged by the appellant herein. Furthermore, the sale of the schedule property was confirmed by the executing Court and sale certificate was also issued to the auction purchaser i.e., fifth defendant herein and by following due process, the possession was also delivered on 15.03.1997 by the executing Court Amin. The appellant/plaintiff herein after exhausting all the remedies before the executing Court filed the present suit for setting aside the Court sale dated 12.03.1996 conducted by the I Additional District Judge, Nellore in E.P.No.8 of 1988 in O.S.No.104 of 1975 on the ground of alleged fraud played by the defendants and for consequential permanent injunction restraining the 5th defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff to the plaint schedule property. 23. The learned senior counsel Sri Y.V.Ravi Prasad on behalf of the defendants 6 to 8 herein would contend that the present suit is not maintainable as per Sections 9, 47 and order 21 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code says as follows: Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree.-- (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. 2[Explanation 1.-- For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. 2[Explanation 1.-- For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. Explanation II.-- (a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) All questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.] It is well settled that all the disputes arose between the parties in executing Court shall be determined by executing Court alone and not by a separate suit as laid under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Court. Fact remains that the appellant herein claimed the schedule property before the executing Court. Being unsuccessful before the executing Court, the appellant herein filed the present suit. Order XXI Rule 90 of Civil Procedure Code defines as follows: Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud.-- (1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it. (2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. (3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up. There mere absence of, or defect in, attachment of the property sold shall not, by itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under this rule. There mere absence of, or defect in, attachment of the property sold shall not, by itself, be a ground for setting aside a sale under this rule. It is well settled that when a sale in execution of a decree is impugned on the ground that it is not warranted by the terms thereof, that question could be agitated, when it arises between the parties to the decree, only by an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and not in a separate suit. In the case of Merla Ramanna vs. Nallaparaju and others (1955) 2 SCR 938 , the Apex Court held as follows: In J. Marret vs. Md. K.Shirazi and Sons, AIR 1930 PC 86 (A), the facts were that an order was made by the execution Court directing, contrary to the terms of the decree, payment of a certain fund to the decree-holder. A separate suit having been instituted by the Judgment-debtor for recovery of the amount on the ground that the payment was not in accordance with the decree; it was held by the Privy Council that the action was barred under section 47. A case directly in point is Venkatachalapathy Aiyan vs. Perumal Aiyan. There the suit was to enforce a mortgage which related both to properties held in ownership by the mortgagor and mortgage rights held by him. In execution of the decree passed therein, the properties themselves and not merely the mortgage rights were sold. The judgment-debtor then sued for a declaration that what was sold was only the mortgage right and to recover possession of the properties. It was held that such a suit was barred under section 47. Vide also the decisions in Biru Mahata vs. Shyam Charan Khawas, 22, Cal 483 (C), Abdul Karim vs. Islamunnissa Bibi, AIR 1916 All 104 (D) and Lakshminarayan vs. Laduram, AIR 1932 96 (E). The position is, in our opinion, too well settled to be open to argument and it must accordingly be held that the present suit is barred under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code. 24. The position is, in our opinion, too well settled to be open to argument and it must accordingly be held that the present suit is barred under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code. 24. In the case of Smt. Bhabani Dasya and others vs. Tulsi Ram Keot and others MANU/GH/0023/1990, the Apex Court held as follows: In so far as the next question is concerned, it may be clear that the plaintiff appellant made allegations of fraud and the settlement of the matter out of Court having not been found tenable, the sale on the said score could not be set aside. All that remained were matters relating to auction sale and execution, satisfaction and discharge of the decree. In so far as the irregularity or even fraud in relation to auction sale was concerned, the provision of Order 21, Rule 92(3) clearly barred the suit and the matter should have been agitated before the execution Court by an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code, which reads: "90. Application to set aside sale on ground of irregularity or fraud- (1) Where any immovable property has been sold in execution of a decree, the decree-holder, or the purchaser, or any other person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of assets, or whose interests are affected by the sale, may apply to the Court to set aside the sale on the ground of a material irregularity of fraud in publishing or conducting it. (2) No sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting it unless, upon the facts proved, the Court is satisfied that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud. (3) No application to set aside a sale under this rule shall be entertained upon any ground which the applicant could have taken on or before the date on which the proclamation of sale was drawn up." The sale was confirmed under O. 21, R. 92(1) of the Code and O. 21, R. 92(3) reads: "No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made." The order confirming the sale was against the present appellant who was the judgment-debtor. I have, therefore, no doubt that in relation to any allegation of irregularity and fraud relating to sale in execution, the suit did not lie, and the proper remedy was by application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. Besides, the matters raised by the plaintiff appellant relate to execution, satisfaction and discharge of the decree. Section 47 of the Code reads as under: Questions to be determined by the; Court executing decree- (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. For the aforesaid reasons, it is well settled that to invoke provisions of Order XXI Rule 90 of Civil Procedure Code, the following essentials are to be satisfied: (1) There must be a material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale. (2) Such material irregularity should have caused substantial injury. (3) Such substantial injury should have been caused on account of material irregularity alleged. In the case on hand, the appellant herein filed a claim application vide E.A.No.7 of 1996 before the executing Court and the same was dismissed on merits by the executing Court. Aggrieved thereby the appellant herein filed a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before this Court and the same was dismissed by this Court by confirming the order passed by the executing Court. The said orders are remained unchallenged. The contention of appellant is that schedule property was sold for merge price in a Court auction. But there must be sufficient material or proof to establish that omission to specify the accurate amount and in fact had resulted in securing of inadequate sale price at the Court auction and in the absence of such evidence the Court auction sale cannot be set aside on such a ground. It is needless to say that the mere inadequacy of price always cannot be a ground for itself for setting aside the sale. 25. It is needless to say that the mere inadequacy of price always cannot be a ground for itself for setting aside the sale. 25. It is also well settled that if the sale was irregular or such as caused substantial injury to the judgment debtor by reason of it being for a grossly inadequate consideration, it could be set aside on an application made under Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but that not having been done, it can be presumed that the price fetched at the auction sale was the best price that the property sold could fetch in the circumstances. 26. The learned counsel for appellant relied on a decision in Godavarthy Venkateswarlu vs. Kudithipudi Venkateswara Rao and another 2014 (3) ALD 294 . In that decision it was held as follows: As observed earlier, the decretal amount was only Rs.3,55,732/- and what is fetched in the auction is Rs.13,05,000/-. On the earlier occasion, the petitioner approached this Court and a specific finding was recorded in C.R.P.No.2620 of 2011 to the effect that the Executing Court did not follow the procedure under Rule 64 of Order XXI C.P.C., since it proceeded to sell the entire property, though part of it was sufficient to satisfy the decree. In Sai Enterprises v. Bhimreddy Laxmaiah, 2007:INSC:301 : (2007) 13 SCC 576 ), the Supreme Court categorically held that the Executing Court cannot sell any property over and above what is needed to satisfy the decree. It is not even mentioned that the E.P. Schedule land is indivisible. 27. The learned counsel for appellant also placed another reliance in Sai Enterprises vs. Bhimreddy Laxmaiah and another, 2007:INSC:301 : (2007)13 SCC 576 . In that case it was held as follows: The provision contains some significant words. They are "necessary to satisfy the decree". Use of the said expression clearly indicates the legislative intent that no sale can be allowed beyond the decretal amount mentioned in the sale proclamation. (See Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma). In all execution proceedings, Court has to first decide whether it is necessary to bring the entire property to sale or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree. (See Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v. Pujari Padmavathamma). In all execution proceedings, Court has to first decide whether it is necessary to bring the entire property to sale or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree. If the property is large and the decree to be satisfied is small the Court must bring only such portion of the property the proceeds of which would be sufficient to satisfy the claim of the decree holder. It is immaterial whether the property is one or several. Even if the property is one, if a separate portion could be sold without violating any provision of law only such portion of the property should be sold. This is not just a discretion but an obligation imposed on the Court. The sale held without examining this aspect and not in conformity with this mandatory requirement would be illegal and without jurisdiction. (See: Ambati Narasayya v. M. Subba Rao and Anr., 1989:INSC:309 : 1989 Suppl. (2) SCC 693. The duty cast upon the Court to sell only such portion or portion thereof as is necessary to satisfy the decree is a mandate of the legislature which cannot be ignored. Similar view has been expressed in S. Mariyappa (Dead) by LRs. And Ors. v. Siddappa and Anr. The position was also highlighted in Balakrishnan v. Malaiyandi Konar. In the case on hand the appellant/plaintiff herein claimed a right in the plaint schedule property and filed E.A.No.7 of 1996 under order XXI Rule 58 of Code of Civil Procedure before executing Court and the same was dismissed, aggrieved thereby, the appellant herein preferred an appeal in C.M.A.No.556 of 1996 and the same was also dismissed by this Court by confirming the orders passed by the executing Court, the same is remained unchallenged. The appellant herein also failed to question the validity of the sale in the execution proceedings, the law is well settled that the remedy open to the appellant herein to question the validity of the sale only in the execution proceedings and not by way of separate suit. 28. The learned counsel for appellant also relied on a decision in Naseeb Khatoon vs. Syed Abdul Aziz and others 2014 (3) ALD 297 . The facts and circumstances in the cited decision are different to the instant case. 29. 28. The learned counsel for appellant also relied on a decision in Naseeb Khatoon vs. Syed Abdul Aziz and others 2014 (3) ALD 297 . The facts and circumstances in the cited decision are different to the instant case. 29. The learned counsel for appellant also placed another reliance in Ambati Narasayya vs. M.Subbarao and another 1989:INSC:309 : 1989 Supp (2) SCC 693. In that case it was held as follows: Order XXI Rule 64 C.P.C. enjoins that in all execution proceedings, the Court has to first decide whether it is necessary to bring the entire attached property to sale or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree. If the property is large and the decree to be satisfied is small, the Court must bring only such portion of the property, the proceeds of which would be sufficient to satisfy the claim of the decree holder. It is immaterial whether the property is one or several. Even if the property is one, if a separate portion could be sold without violating any provision of law only such portion of the property should be sold. This is not just a discretion, but an obligation imposed on the Court. The sale held without examining this aspect and not in conformity with this mandatory requirement would be illegal and without jurisdiction. In the case on hand, the appellant herein claimed the property before the executing Court. Having defeated thereby filed the present suit to question the sale held by the executing Court. The fact remains that the appellant herein filed a claim application for claiming the property and the same was dismissed on merits and the same was confirmed by this Court and the said orders are remained unchallenged and finally auction was conducted and the fifth defendant participated in the said auction and by following the procedure the sale was confirmed by the executing Court and the sale certificate was also issued to the 5th defendant and the property was also delivered by the Court Amin on 05.03.1997 and the delivery proceedings were recorded by the executing Court. 30. 30. The present suit was filed by the appellant herein before the trial Court by alleging that the fifth defendant played fraud and purchased the property in a Court sale and obtained a sale deed from the executing Court i.e., I Additional District Judge's Court, Nellore and the appellant herein questioning the sale held on 12.03.1996 on the ground of alleged fraud. Admittedly, the alleged fraud as pleaded by the appellant herein is not at all proved by the appellant herein by producing oral and documentary evidence. In fact, no evidence was produced by the appellant/plaintiff herein to show that the entire auction proceedings are vitiated by fraud played by the decree holder, judgment debtor and the auction purchaser. On considering the entire material on record, the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the finding given by the trial Judge, accordingly, the point Nos. 1 and 2 are answered. 31. I.A..No.1 of 2024: This application is filed by the appellant/plaintiff to receive certain documents i.e., sl. Nos. 2 to 4 of index as additional evidence in the present appeal proceedings. The first document sought to be received as additional evidence is copy of the order in C.R.P.No.231 of 1986 of this Court. The material on record reveals that the appellant herein mentioned in the para No.5 of the plaint itself that "the third defendant have been sold the scheduled property to the plaintiff herein seems to have conceived an idea to deceive the plaintiff/appellant and she did not raise proper defense to the claim of the plaintiff for a compound interest with quarterly rests from the date of the suit". In the same para it was further pleaded that she also did not defend the petition to amend the decree filed on 25.02.1985 subsequent to the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff claiming quarterly compound interest and she did not prosecute the Civil Revision Petition against the amendment of decree ordered by the Court below before the High Court. The aforesaid averments in the plaint itself clearly goes to show that the plaintiff herein is having knowledge of the said proceeding in C.R.P.No.231 of 1986 at the time of filing of the suit itself in the year 1997. The fact remains that the present application is filed in the year 2024. The aforesaid averments in the plaint itself clearly goes to show that the plaintiff herein is having knowledge of the said proceeding in C.R.P.No.231 of 1986 at the time of filing of the suit itself in the year 1997. The fact remains that the present application is filed in the year 2024. As stated supra, even though the appellant is having knowledge about the order in C.R.P.No.231 of 1986 at the time of filing of the suit itself, but he wantonly did not produce the same before the trial Court. In the part No.4 of the affidavit of the petitioner, the petitioner herein stated that he engaged an advocate before the trial Court, the said counsel has not properly advised him and guided him, as a result, he could not place the relevant document before the trial Court and he has not been properly advised by the said counsel and that he changed his advocate. Order XLI Rule 27 reads as follows: 27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if- (a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Whenever additional evidence is allowed to the produced, by an Appellate Court, the court shall record the reason for its admission. The aforesaid explanation offered by the petitioner is not sufficient to establish the ingredients under order XLI rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code. The second document to receive as additional evidence is copy of the order in C.M.P.No.17878 of 1990. The respondents herein filed the said document and marked as Ex.B5 before the trial Court. The aforesaid explanation offered by the petitioner is not sufficient to establish the ingredients under order XLI rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code. The second document to receive as additional evidence is copy of the order in C.M.P.No.17878 of 1990. The respondents herein filed the said document and marked as Ex.B5 before the trial Court. Another document sought to be received as additional evidence is copy of the counter filed by the judgment debtor in E.P.No.8 of 1988. The respondents herein filed the said counter before the trial Court and got exhibited as Ex.B8. Therefore, question of receiving the said 2 documents again does not arise since those are marked as Ex.B5 and Ex.B8 respectively before the trial Court. Therefore, there are no grounds to allow this petition. 32. In the result, A.S.No.1893 of 2004 and I.A.No.1 of 2024 in A.S.No.1893 of 2004 are dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.