JUDGMENT : (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) : Petitioner nos. 2 to 87 were engaged on contract as washerman in Indian Military Academy; while, petitioner no. 1 is Federation of Indian Trade Unions as per the description given in paragraph no. 4 of the writ petition. 2. According to petitioner nos. 2 to 87, they have completed more than 240 days in a calendar year, thus, they are entitled to benefit of various Labour Welfare Legislations and also for regularisation of their services. According to them, they raised demand for benefit of Labour Welfare Legislations and also for regularisation of their services, which was referred for conciliation, however, before conciliation proceedings could be concluded, petitioners were disengaged. Thus, feeling aggrieved, petitioners have approached this Court seeking the following substantive reliefs:- “(I) Issue writ rule or direction in the nature of certiorarified mandamus by declaring the order dated 13-06-2024 as contained to Annexure No 1 passed by the respondent is illegal void, unjust and arbitrary and to quash the same along with its effect and operation also after calling the entire records from the respondent or to mould the relief appropriately by safeguarding the interest of the petitioners. (II) Issue writ, rule or direction in nature of the mandamus by directing the respondent to allow to continue the petitioners as washer mans in the establishments of the respondent till the Industrial dispute raised by the petitioners will comes to its logical conclusion and also to comply the directions of the conciliation officer and State Labour Commissioner Central as highlighted in the body of the petition. (III) Issue appropriate order, writ, direction by directing the respondent not to engage or interpose any intermediary or contractor for the purpose of washing of clothing works which is being done by the petitioners directly and also to declare any such action of the respondent including any stipulation made in this regard for engaging intermediary or contractor during the pendency of Industrial Dispute as illegal, void, irrational and arbitrary and quash the same alongwith the effect and operation also after calling the entire record including such alleged stipulation engaging such contractor along with its effect and operation also.” 3. The order dated 13.06.2024, impugned in the writ petition, is on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The order dated 13.06.2024, impugned in the writ petition, is on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. Perusal thereof reveals that contract of service of the petitioners was last renewed w.e.f. 01.04.2024 upto 15.06.2024, and they were informed that no washerman will be employed after 15.06.2024 and the concerned officer was directed not to extend contract of any washerman after 15.06.2024. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since conciliation proceedings are going on, therefore, it was not permissible for the respondents to terminate the contract of service of washermen. He submits that the impugned order has been passed in violation of Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. He relied upon a judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Anaimalai National Estate Workers, Union, Valparai and Others Vs. Planters’ Association of Tamil Nadu, Coimbatore, and others reported in 2002 (4) L.L.N. 530 for contending that writ petition would be maintainable in case Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is violated, notwithstanding the statutory remedy available to the workmen under Section 33A of the said Act. 5. This Court is not impressed by the said submission. Admittedly, petitioners are seeking enforcement of rights available under Industrial Disputes Act and they also approached the forum available under the said Act, therefore, they have to seek remedy within the framework of the said Act. In the event of failure of conciliation proceedings, the dispute raised by petitioners shall be referred for adjudication to an Industrial Adjudicator constituted under Industrial Disputes Act. Thus, writ petition cannot be maintained for alleged violation of some provision of Industrial Disputes Act. 6. The grievance raised by petitioners against order dated 13.06.2024 appears to be erroneous, as their contract of service was last extended only upto 15.06.2024 and by the said order, petitioners were informed that their contract of service will not be extended after 15.06.2024. Thus, Section 33(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would not be attracted, as there has been no sudden change in the conditions of service applicable to petitioners by the said order. 7. Thus, Section 33(1) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would not be attracted, as there has been no sudden change in the conditions of service applicable to petitioners by the said order. 7. From perusal of the letter dated 21.06.2024 issued by Assistant Labour Commissioner, Central (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) and letter dated 20.06.2024 issued by Quarter Master, Indian Military Academy (Annexure-10 to the writ petition), it is revealed that the conciliation proceedings concluded on 13.06.2024; in such view of the matter also, Section 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 cannot be pressed into service for challenging the impugned order dated 13.06.2024. 8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496 has held that when the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under Industrial Disputes Act, then the only remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication done under the said Act. 9. In the case of Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corpn. Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, (2004) 4 SCC 268 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has disapproved the practice of High Court entertaining writ petition filed by the workmen for enforcement of rights created under Industrial Disputes Act. Paragraph nos. 11, 12, 13 & 14 of the said judgment are reproduced below:- “11. We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition of the respondent Union at all. The dispute was an industrial dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as well as Uttar Pradesh IDA, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the respondent Union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial Disputes Act. In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke [ (1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70] it was held that when the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under the Act. This was because the Industrial Disputes Act was made to provide “a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. This was because the Industrial Disputes Act was made to provide “a speedy, inexpensive and effective forum for resolution of disputes arising between workmen and their employers. The idea has been to ensure that the workmen do not get caught in the labyrinth of civil courts with their layers upon layers of appeals and revisions and the elaborate procedural laws, which the workmen can ill-afford. The procedures followed by civil courts, it was thought, would not facilitate a prompt and effective disposal of these disputes. As against this, the courts and tribunals created by the Industrial Disputes Act are not shackled by these procedural laws nor is their award subject to any appeals or revisions. Because of their informality, the workmen and their representatives can themselves prosecute or defend their cases. These forums are empowered to grant such relief as they think just and appropriate. They can even substitute the punishment in many cases. They can make and remake the contracts, settlements, wage structures and what not. Their awards are no doubt amenable to jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 as also to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, but they are extraordinary remedies subject to several self-imposed constraints. It is, therefore, always in the interest of the workmen that disputes concerning them are adjudicated in the forums created by the Act and not in a civil court. That is the entire policy underlying the vast array of enactments concerning workmen. This legislative policy and intendment should necessarily weigh with the courts in interpreting these enactments and the disputes arising under them”. [Ed.: So held in Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 at p. 91f to 92b in para 28 after quoting the principles enunciated in Premier Automobiles; as explained in (2002) 2 SCC 542 at 547.] 12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner. 13. 13. There is another aspect of the matter. Certified Standing Orders have been held to constitute statutory terms and conditions of service — D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd. [ (1993) 3 SCC 259 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 723] Although this statement of the law was doubted in Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 ] it was not deviated from. It was however made clear that Certified Standing Orders do not constitute “statutory provisions” in the sense that dismissal or removal of an employee in contravention of the Certified Standing Orders would be a contravention of statutory provisions enabling the workman to file a writ petition for their enforcement. This is what was said by this Court in Rajasthan Transport Corpn. [ (1995) 5 SCC 75 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1207 : (1995) 31 ATC 110 ] : (SCC p. 86, para 18) “Indeed, if it is held that certified standing orders constitute statutory provisions or have statutory force, a writ petition would also lie for their enforcement just as in the case of violation of the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Neither a suit would be necessary nor a reference under Industrial Disputes Act. We do not think the Certified Standing Orders can be elevated to that status. It is one thing to say that they are statutorily imposed conditions of service and an altogether different thing to say that they constitute statutory provisions themselves.” (emphasis in original) 14. Finally, it is an established practice that the Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 should have refused to do so where there are disputed questions of fact. In the present case, the nature of the employment of the workmen was in dispute. According to the appellant, the workmen had been appointed in connection with a particular project and there was no question of absorbing them or their continuing in service once the project was completed. Admittedly, when the matter was pending before the High Court, there were 29 such projects under execution or awarded. According to the respondent workmen, they were appointed as regular employees and they cited orders by which some of them were transferred to various projects at various places. Admittedly, when the matter was pending before the High Court, there were 29 such projects under execution or awarded. According to the respondent workmen, they were appointed as regular employees and they cited orders by which some of them were transferred to various projects at various places. In answer to this the appellants said that although the appellant Corporation tried to accommodate as many daily-wagers as they could in any new project, they were always under compulsion to engage local people of the locality where work was awarded. There was as such no question of transfer of any workman from one project to another. This was an issue which should have been resolved on the basis of evidence led. The Division Bench erred in rejecting the appellant's submission summarily as also in placing the onus on the appellant to produce the appointment letters of the respondent workmen.” 10. A full Bench of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Sri P. Pitchumani v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., (2004) 3 CTC 1 while considering the question of maintainability of writ petition at the instance of workmen has held as under:- “13. The apprehension of delay in adjudication by the forums created under I.D. Act cannot be a ground to invoke Writ jurisdiction. As already stated above, Writ jurisdiction can be invoked only when an action involves a public duty. However, in appropriate cases, the High Court can always fix a time for adjudicating the disputes.” 11. On the question of maintainability of writ petition, in a case where remedy is available to a workman under Industrial Disputes Act, Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangharsh Samiti, (2008) 12 SCC 675 that actions of the employer complained of by workmen could be examined by an appropriate court/tribunal under an industrial law and not by a writ court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph nos. 49, 50 & 51 of the said judgment are reproduced below:- “49. It is contended on behalf of the employees that the Corporation was not right when it stated that there was no work and several projects came to be closed. It was also contended that many employees were absorbed by the Corporation and there was an element of “pick and choose”. It is contended on behalf of the employees that the Corporation was not right when it stated that there was no work and several projects came to be closed. It was also contended that many employees were absorbed by the Corporation and there was an element of “pick and choose”. The said action was arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Regarding loss caused to the Corporation, according to the Samiti, it was the result of wrong and improper decisions of the Corporation and the State Government. Poor employees should not suffer on that count. 50. In our considered view, however, all such actions could be examined by an appropriate court/tribunal under the industrial law and not by a writ court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the impugned action of the Corporation of retrenchment of several employees is not in consonance with law, the employees are certainly entitled to relief from an appropriate authority. 51. If any action is taken which is arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise not in consonance with the provisions of law, such authority or court/tribunal is bound to consider it and legal and legitimate relief can always be granted keeping in view the evidence before it and considering statutory provisions in vogue. Unfortunately, the High Court did not consider all these aspects and issued a writ of mandamus which should not have been done. Hence, the order passed and directions issued by the High Court deserve to be set aside.” 12. Similar view has been expressed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575 . Paragraph no. 14 of the said judgment is reproduced below:- “14. In our opinion the writ petition filed by the appellants should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellants by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court entertained the writ petition. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction, and the discretion should not ordinarily be exercised if there is an alternative remedy available to the appellant. In this case there was a clear alternative remedy available to the appellants by raising an industrial dispute and hence we fail to understand why the High Court entertained the writ petition. It seems to us that some High Courts by adopting an over liberal approach are unnecessarily adding to their load of arrears instead of observing judicial discipline in following settled legal principles. However, we may also consider the case on merits.” 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Balco Captive Power Plant Mazdoor Sangh v National Thermal Power Corporation and others, (2007) 14 SCC 234. The said judgment is distinguishable on facts, as in that case, upon privatisation of a Public Sector Undertaking, which is ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution; services of its employees were transferred to a private concern without their consent. Status of employees of an instrumentality of State cannot be changed to private employment without their consent and writ petition would be maintainable against a Public Sector Undertaking, therefore, the ratio of the said judgment do not help petitioners. In fact, petitioners after setting in motion, the machinery provided under Industrial Disputes Act have approached this Court without waiting for the outcome of process, which was set in motion by them, therefore, this Court declines to entertain this writ petition. 14. Since petitioners have remedy available under Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, they shall be at liberty to pursue the matter before the forum available to them in law. 15. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.