JUDGMENT : 1. With the consent of learned advocates for both the sides, both the Revision Applications are taken up for final hearing analogously. 2. By way of present Revision Applications under section 397 read with section 401 of Cr.P.C., the original accused nos.2 and 3 have prayed to quash and set aside order dated 02.11.2023 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) below Exh.4 in Sessions Case No.265 of 2021. 3. Facts of the case are as under :- 3.1. Applicants - accused are father in law and mother in law of the complainant. Marriage of elder son of the applicants and complainant was solemnized on 24.06.2012. After 15 days of marriage i.e. on 13.07.2012 complainant deserted her matrimonial home by saying that she was never interested to marry and was forced by her parents to get marries. It is stated that out of wedlock, son Atharva was born on 30.09.2013. The applicants submit that they were being threatened by the complainant and her father of dire consequences and roping them in serious offence, whenever they tried to resolve the issue. Thereafter, the son of the applicants filed application seeking divorce before the Family Court, Pratapgarh (UP), wherein despite notice being served to complainant, she did not appear, pursuant to which ex-parte divorce decree was passed on 29.07.2015. Thereafter, the complainant did not challenge the said decree for more than one year and in the month of November, 2016 said decree was challenged only when the complainant came to know that original accused got married on 22.02.2016. Thereafter, with a view to harass the applicants, the complainant lodged FIR at Sola Police Station, Ahmedabad being I-C.R.No.214 of 2016, wherein the applicant along with other accused were granted anticipatory bail. Thereafter IO filed charge-sheet in the case which got culminated into Sessions Case No.265 of 2021. The other co-accused approached this Hon'ble Court for quashing the impugned FIR being Cr.M.A.No.23988 of 2017 and Cr.M.A.No.22118 of 2017. Said applications were allowed by this Court on 21.06.2019. The applicants also preferred quashing the FIR being Cr.M.A.No.2521 of 2022, wherein this Court has issued notice and in the meantime, also filed discharge application before the learned Trial Court. Said discharge application came to be rejected vide order dated 02.11.2023. Hence, both the Revision Applications. 4. Said applications were allowed by this Court on 21.06.2019. The applicants also preferred quashing the FIR being Cr.M.A.No.2521 of 2022, wherein this Court has issued notice and in the meantime, also filed discharge application before the learned Trial Court. Said discharge application came to be rejected vide order dated 02.11.2023. Hence, both the Revision Applications. 4. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that at earlier point of time, discharge application was moved before the learned Trial Court, which was denied without proper consideration and therefore, Criminal Revision Applications were preferred before this Court, whereupon, this Court vide order dated 25.09.2023 after referring the judgment of P.Vijayan v/s. State of Kerala [(2010) 2 SCC 135] remanded the matter to the learned Trial for deciding discharge application afresh. Subsequent thereto, learned Trial Court vide impugned order dated 02.11.2023 decided the discharge application afresh and partly allowed in favour of the petitioners discharging the accused no.2 under section 354(A)(i) and (ii) of the IPC but ordered to frame charge for the offence under sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and sections 307,323,406, 498(A), 506(2) read with section 114 of IPC, thereby learned Trial Court has grossly erred. He would submit that there is delay in lodging FIR, which is not considered by the learned Trial Court. It is submitted that allegations to attempt to murder was made 2 years prior to registration of FIR, yet same has not been considered by the learned Trial Court. It is highly improbable case. It is submitted that crucial evidence are missing in the case. There is no attempt to murder on the part of the petitioners and therefore, offence under section 307 of IPC is not attracted nor other offences are attracted. It is submitted that learned Trial Court has committed serious error while partly allowing the discharge application. It is submitted that in view of above, the petitions may be allowed and the petitioners who are in laws may be discharged from the accusation. 5. On the other hand, learned APP objecting present Revision Applications would submit that clear allegations are levelled in the charge-sheet against the accused. As per charge-sheet, Rs.5 lakhs has been paid to accused - Surendrakumar Mishra by the father of the complainant. This prima facie implies offence of dowry. 5. On the other hand, learned APP objecting present Revision Applications would submit that clear allegations are levelled in the charge-sheet against the accused. As per charge-sheet, Rs.5 lakhs has been paid to accused - Surendrakumar Mishra by the father of the complainant. This prima facie implies offence of dowry. It is further submitted that allegations of tantrum for bringing dowry of Rs.10 lakhs is maintained against the accused. There are allegations of giving ill-treatment both physical and mental are levelled in the charge-sheet papers. Another allegation of depositing Rs.1.50 lakhs in the account of accused - Surendrakumar Mishra is also made. It is submitted that so far as accused - Puspadevi is concerned, according to learned advocate, she has taken Trishul in her hand to sacrifice minor Atharva. There are allegations that accused no.2 has poured kerosene upon complainant and tried to ignite her and she was set to ablaze. The complainant received burn injuries. Therefore, looking to charges, prima facie case is made out against the accused. They are required to be tested during trial. There are sufficient evidence to send the accused for trial. Learned Trial Court has rightly dismissed the Revision Applications. 5.1. Upon such submissions, it is submitted to dismiss the Revision Applications. 6. Firstly, let refer to section 239 of Cr.P.C. "Section 239 : When accused shall be discharged - If upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." 7. What is material on reading section 239 of Cr.P.C. is that if charge against the accused are groundless, this can be observed by the learned Magistrate concerned recording his reasons for so doing. The language employed by the legislature indicates that when the Court thinks to discharge the accused, the Court is required to see charge-sheet or report under section 173 as true and find out whether facts disclose existence of ingredients of offence. 8. The language employed by the legislature indicates that when the Court thinks to discharge the accused, the Court is required to see charge-sheet or report under section 173 as true and find out whether facts disclose existence of ingredients of offence. 8. In the case of State by Inspector of Police, Chennai v/s. S. Selvi [ AIR 2018 SC 81 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the Court must proceed with presumption that material brought on record by prosecution are true and must evaluate such material with view to find out whether facts disclose existence of ingredients of offence. 9. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v/s. R. Soundirarasu [ (2023) 6 SCC 768 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court after referring to sections 227,228,239,240 and 245 of Cr.P.C., in para 53 to 70 has held as under :- "53. The aforestated Sections indicate that the CrPC contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Sessions under Section 227 in a case triable by it, cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. The three Sections contain somewhat different provisions in regard to discharge of the accused. As per Section 227, the trial judge is required to discharge the accused if “the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. The obligation to discharge the accused under Section 239 arises when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge under Section 245(1) is exercisable when “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted would warrant his conviction”. 54. Sections 227 and 239 respectively provide for discharge being made before the recording of evidence and the consideration as to whether the charge has to be framed or not is required to be made on the basis of the record of the case, including the documents and oral hearing of the accused and the prosecution or the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused and after affording an opportunity to the parties to be heard. On the other hand, the stage for discharge under Section 245 is reached only after the evidence referred to in Section 244 has been taken. 55. Despite the slight variation in the provisions with regard to discharge under the three pairs of Sections referred to above, the settled legal position is that the stage of framing of charge under either of these three situations, is a preliminary one and the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied — if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed. 56. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 SCC 561 , and referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 , and the State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 , it was held that at that stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:- "11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 57. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” 57. Then again in the case of Som Nath Thapa (supra), a three- Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i.e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32). "32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage." 58. In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) "7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 59. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476 , it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. 60. In the context of trial of a warrant case, instituted on a police report, the provisions for discharge are to be governed as per the terms of Section 239 which provide that a direction for discharge can be made only for reasons to be recorded by the court where it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. It would, therefore, follow that as per the provisions under Section 239 what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not that a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offences alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of that offence, and it is only in a case where the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he is to discharge the accused after recording his reasons for doing so. 61. Section 239 envisages a careful and objective consideration of the question whether the charge against the accused is groundless or whether there is ground for presuming that he has committed an offence. What Section 239 prescribes is not, therefore, an empty or routine formality. It is a valuable provision to the advantage of the accused, and its breach is not permissible under the law. But if the Judge, upon considering the record, including the examination, if any, and the hearing, is of the opinion that there is "ground for presuming" that the accused has committed the offence triable under the chapter, he is required by Section 240 to frame in writing a charge against the accused. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. The order for the framing of the charge is also not an empty or routine formality. It is of a far-reaching nature, and it amounts to a decision that the accused is not entitled to discharge under Section 239, that there is, on the other hand, ground for presuming that he has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX and that he should be called upon to plead guilty to it and be convicted and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. (See : V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, AIR 1980 SC 962 ). 62. Section 239 of the CrPC lays down that if the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused. The word 'groundless', in our opinion, means that there must be no ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The word 'groundless' used in Section 239 of the CrPC means that the materials placed before the Court do not make out or are not sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused. 63. The learned author Shri Sarkar in his Criminal P.C., 5th Edition, on page 427, has opined as:- "The provision is the same as in S. 227, the only difference being that the Magistrate may examine the accused, if necessary, of also S. 245. The Magistrate shall discharge the accused recording reasons, if after (i) considering the police report and documents mentioned in S. 173; (ii) examining the accused, if necessary and (iii) hearing the arguments of both sides he thinks the charge against him to be groundless, i.e., either there is no legal evidence or that the facts do not make out any offence at all." 64. In short, it means that if no prima facie case regarding the commission of any offence is made out, it would amount to a charge being groundless. 65. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. In short, it means that if no prima facie case regarding the commission of any offence is made out, it would amount to a charge being groundless. 65. In Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 545 , this Court has stated about the ambit of Section 251(A)(2) of the CrPC 1898, which is in pari materia with the wordings used in Section 239 of the CrPC as follows:- "It cannot be said that the Court at the stage of framing the charge has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it cannot be said that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities by relying on the documents referred to in S. 173 consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." 66. In para 16, this Court has stated as:- "16.... Under sub-sec. (2), if upon consideration of all the documents referred to in S. 173, Criminal P.C. and examining the accused, if considered necessary by the Magistrate and also after hearing both sides, the Magistrate considers the charge to be groundless, he must discharge the accused. This sub-section has to be read along with sub- sec. (3), according to which, if after hearing the arguments and hearing the accused, the Magistrate thinks that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chap. XXI of the Code within the Magistrate's competence and for which he can punish adequately, he has to frame in writing a charge against the accused. Reading the two subsections together, it clearly means that if there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the charges must be considered to be groundless, which is the same thing as saying that there is no ground for framing the charges." (Emphasis supplied) 67. Thus the word 'groundless', as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. Thus the word 'groundless', as interpreted by this Court, means that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. 68. This Court has again dealt with this aspect of the matter in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 . This Court has stated in the said case as:- "At this stage, even a very strong suspicion found upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charges against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence." 69. The suspicion referred to by this Court must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. Therefore, the words "a very strong suspicion" used by this Court must not be a strong suspicion of a vacillating mind of a Judge. That suspicion must be founded upon the materials placed before the Magistrate which leads him to form a presumptive opinion about the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged. 70. Section 239 has to be read along with Section 240 of the CrPC. If the Magistrate finds that there is prima facie evidence or the material against the accused in support of the charge (allegations), he may frame charge in accordance with Section 240 of the CrPC. But if he finds that the charge (the allegations or imputations) made against the accused does not make out a prima facie case and does not furnish basis for framing charge, it will be a case of charge being groundless, so he has no option but to discharge the accused. 71. Indeed in case where the Magistrate finds that taking cognizance of the offence itself was contrary to any provision of law, like Section 468 of the CrPC, the complaint being barred by limitation, so he cannot frame the charge, he has to discharge the accused. Indeed, in a case where the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence without taking note of Section 468 of the CrPC, the most appropriate stage at which the accused can plead for his discharge is the stage of framing the charge. He need not wait till completion of trial. Indeed, in a case where the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence without taking note of Section 468 of the CrPC, the most appropriate stage at which the accused can plead for his discharge is the stage of framing the charge. He need not wait till completion of trial. The Magistrate will be committing no illegality in considering that question and discharging the accused at the stage of framing charge if the facts so justify. 72. The real test for determining whether the charge should be considered groundless under Section 239 of the CrPC is that whether the materials are such that even if unrebutted make out no case whatsoever, the accused should be discharged under Section 239 of the CrPC. The trial court will have to consider, whether the materials relied upon by the prosecution against the applicant herein for the purpose of framing of the charge, if unrebutted, make out any case at all. 73. The provisions of discharge under Section 239 of the CrPC fell for consideration of this Court in K. Ramakrishna and others v. State of Bihar and another, (2000) 8 SCC 547 , and it was held that the questions regarding the sufficiency or reliability of the evidence to proceed further are not required to be considered by the trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482. It was observed as follows:- “4. The trial court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As observed by this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, [ 1999 (3) SCC 259 ] the High Court or the Magistrate are also not supposed to adopt a strict hypertechnical approach to sieve the complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is charge. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage.” 74. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage.” 74. In the case of State by Karnataka Lokayukta, Police Station, Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 , this Court observed and held in paragraph 25 as under:- “25. The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29) “29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.”” 10. What appears from above observations and findings by the Hon'ble Apex Court, whereby, the Hon'ble Apex Court has surveyed various judgments that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In other words, the Court is not required to find out that accused is to be acquitted or convicted. The Court has to weigh evidence and material on record in limited space as to see that sufficient grounds exists to send the accused for trial. 11. Learned Trial Court has observed following reasons while partly allowing the discharge application :- "5. Upon hearing Ld. Advocate for respective sides and upon going through the papers produced with chargesheet as well as documentary list produced by Ld. APP, it is apparent that the complainant has made allegations against all three accused (as well as against those accused whose quashing petitions have been allowed by the Hon’ble High Court). It is true that no contemporary medical papers respecting any of the incidents narrated by the complainant have been produced with the charge-sheet but the fact remains that when the child of complainant was merely aged about 1 or 2 days he had blood in his vomit and was hospitalized and as admitted by the accused themselves and from the treatment papers produced by them it is clear that incident as alleged indeed took place and therefore the said incident cannot be dismissed as imaginary. That apart as far as incident concerning the accused No.3 wielding trishul and attempting to sacrifice the said minor child on 20/07/2014 and upon hue and cry raised by the complainant, accused No.3 pouring kerosene on her and accused No.1 throwing matchstick on her are concerned, the said incidents are supported not only by statements of neighbours but also by police control message received by the Sola Police Station on that very day at about 13.49 hours which ultimately was settled at the police station. Therefore, the allegations pertaining to attempt to murder punishable under Section 307, inflicting cruelty punishable under Section 498(A), causing hurt punishable under Section 323, Insult intended to provoke punishable under Section 504 and administering threat punishable under Section 506, to or in respect of complainant as well as her child are made out against all three accused. Therefore, the allegations pertaining to attempt to murder punishable under Section 307, inflicting cruelty punishable under Section 498(A), causing hurt punishable under Section 323, Insult intended to provoke punishable under Section 504 and administering threat punishable under Section 506, to or in respect of complainant as well as her child are made out against all three accused. That apart as far as provisions of Section 354(A)(i) and (ii) are concerned, the said allegations were made against present accused No.2 and accused No.4 (whose name have already been quashed by Hon’ble High Court) without any material to support the said allegation and the said order has not been challenged by the complainant. Hence, it would be safe to say that the ingredients of said offence have not been made out towards any of the accused." 12. Clear finding has been recorded by learned Trial Court against accused nos.2 and 3. According to this Court finding given by the learned Trial Court qua both the accused, there are sufficient material on record to send the accused for trial. No error much less error of law has been crept in the impugned order. Role of both the accused are stated in commission of offence and clearly reveals in charge-sheet papers. Thus, it cannot be said that there are not sufficient material against the accused to proceed further. 13. In view of above, both the Revision Applications are dismissed.