JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. Invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 374(2) of the CrPC, the sole appellant herein has preferred this appeal calling in question legality, validity and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 12-7-2018 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Link Court, Kurud, District Dhamtari, in Sessions Trial No.61/2017, by which the sole appellant herein has been convicted for murder of his wife under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life & pay fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month and rigorous imprisonment for three years & pay fine of Rs. 100/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month, respectively. 2. Case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 22-8-2017 at 11:00 a.m., at Village Tarragondi, Police Station Bhakhara, District Dhamtari, the appellant strangulated his wife Smt. Tarabai Nishad with the help of a rope and in order to screen himself from the offence, hanged the dead body and thereby committed the offence. Thereafter, the appellant himself reported the matter to the police pursuant to which morgue intimation was registered vide Ex.P-4 and FIR was lodged vide Ex.P-14. Inquest over the dead body of the deceased was conducted vide Ex.P-3. Dead body of deceased Smt. Tarabai Nishad was sent for postmortem to Community Health Centre, Kurud vide Ex.P-1A. Postmortem was conducted by a team of two doctors namely, Dr. U.S. Navratna (PW-1) & Dr. Saroj Diwan (PW-14) vide Ex.P-1 and cause of death was stated to be cardio respiratory arrest due to strangulation lead to constriction at air passages, death to be homicidal in nature and mode of death to be asphyxia. Rope was seized vide Ex.P-7 from the place of incident. 3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. After due investigation, the accused / appellant was charge-sheeted for offences under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court i.e. Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kurud, and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Dhamtari from where the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Link Court, Kurud, District Dhamtari received the case on transfer for trial. 4. The accused / appellant the guilt and entered into defence. 4. The accused / appellant the guilt and entered into defence. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as eighteen witnesses and exhibited 19 documents. The defence has neither examined any witness nor exhibited any document in support of its case. The accused / appellant was examined under Section 313 of the CrPC in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and false implication in the crime in question. 5. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted and sentenced the appellant for offences under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC, which is sought to be challenged by him by way of this criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC. 6. Mr. B.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that the trial Court in paragraph 21 of the judgment has only recorded four incriminating circumstances viz., (i) death of the deceased was homicidal in nature; (ii) the appellant has threatened the mother of the deceased to kill the deceased; (iii) medical officer has opined the death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature; and (iv) before the death of the deceased, the appellant used to torture the deceased and assault her, and held the same to be proved and only thereafter held that at the time of offence, the appellant was present in the house as per the statement of Deendayal Sahu (PW-12), but that has not been put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC which causes serious prejudice to the appellant and thereby he is entitled for acquittal as Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not have been competently invoked by the trial Court. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant is entitled for acquittal. 7. Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the State / respondent, would support the impugned judgment and oppose the appeal as also the submission made on behalf of the appellant and would submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. He would further submit that in view of the evidence available on record, the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC. He would further submit that in view of the evidence available on record, the trial Court is absolutely justified in convicting the appellant under Sections 302 & 201 of the IPC. He would also submit that it is a case where the appellant herein and the deceased (husband & wife) both were the only two inmates in the house of the appellant and therefore the trial Court has rightly invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act and as such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record carefully and thoroughly as well. 9. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence on record and taking into consideration the statements of Dr. U.S. Navratna (PW-1) & Dr. Saroj Diwan (PW-14), who conducted postmortem of the deceased vide Ex.P-1, considering that cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest due to strangulation lead to constriction at air passages, death was homicidal in nature and mode of death was asphyxia, came to the conclusion that death of the deceased was homicidal in nature which is correct finding of fact based on the evidence available on record. We do not find any infirmity in the said finding warranting any interference and we hereby affirm the said finding that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 10. It is a case based on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution was required to establish the five golden principles which constitute the panchsheel of a case based on circumstantial evidence as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 in which it has been held in paragraph 153 as under: - “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established : (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 11. The trial Court in paragraph 21 of the judgment has found proved the four incriminating circumstances and also held in paragraph 20 that as per the evidence of Deendayal Sahu (PW-12), who is an Ayurvedic doctor, it is clear that on the date of offence, he (PW-12) has visited the house of the appellant with him and found his wife to be dead by that time. The appellant has not explained in his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC as to how and in what circumstances, his wife died, even no question was put to him in this regard. However, the trial Court proceeded to convict him for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 12. Death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature has already been established to be the correct finding. However, the trial Court proceeded to convict him for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. 12. Death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature has already been established to be the correct finding. Even if it is held that the appellant has threatened the mother of the deceased to commit the murder of the deceased and has committed torture & cruelty upon the deceased, it would make no difference so far as authorship of the accused in the offence is concerned, for which the trial Court has relied upon the evidence of Deendayal Sahu (PW-12) that on the date of offence I.e. on 22-8-2017 at 10-10.30 a.m., Deendayal Sahu (PW- 12) visited the house of the appellant and checked the pulse of the deceased (wife of the appellant) and found her to be dead, at that time, the appellant was present. In that view of the matter, the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 13. The question is, whether the trial Court has rightly invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act? 14. In a recent decision in the matter of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing their earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, have held that Section 106 has to be applied in criminal cases with care and caution, and observed in paragraphs 41 to 48 as under:- “41. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. 42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden of the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused. 43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused gives an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams: “All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence.” 44. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams: “All that the shifting of the evidential burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence.” 44. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams—Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion—para 527 negative averments and para 528—“require affirmative counter-evidence” at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958. 45. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in question having regard to its nature is such as to be capable of being known not only by the accused but also by others if they happened to be present when it took place. 1958. 45. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in question having regard to its nature is such as to be capable of being known not only by the accused but also by others if they happened to be present when it took place. From the illustrations appended to the section, it is clear that an intention not apparent from the character and circumstances of the act must be established as especially within the knowledge of the person whose act is in question and the fact that a person found travelling without a ticket was possessed of a ticket at a stage prior in point of time to his being found without one, must be especially within the knowledge of the traveler himself: see Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, illustrations (a) and (b). 46. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with counter-vailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might have been rebutted. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil). Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil). Leland v. State reported in 343 U.S. 790=96 L.Ed. 1302, Raffel v. U.S. reported in 271 U.S. 294=70 L.Ed. 1054. WHAT IS “PRIMA FACIE CASE” IN THE CONTEXT OF SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT? 47. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view", or "based on first impression". According, to Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evi-Ideuce sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 48. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death.” 15. Very recently, in the matter of Anees v. The State Govt. of NCT, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 757 their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, have held in paragraphs 47 to 55 as under:- “47. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application to cases where the fact in question, having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable of being known not only to the accused but also to others, if they happened to be present when it took place. But Section 106 of the Evidence Act has no application to cases where the fact in question, having regard to its nature, is such as to be capable of being known not only to the accused but also to others, if they happened to be present when it took place. The intention underlying the act or conduct of any individual is seldom a matter which can be conclusively established; it is indeed only known to the person in whose mind the intention is conceived. Therefore, if the prosecution has established that the character and circumstance of an act suggest that it was done with a particular intention, then under illustration (a) to this section, it may be assumed that he had that intention, unless he proves the contrary. 48. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence, which if believed by the court, would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused, if in a position, should go forward with counter-vailing evidence, if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might arise therefrom. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may, therefore, as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [See : Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261] ii. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may, therefore, as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution [See : Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1261] ii. What is “ prima facie case ” (foundational facts) in the context of Section 106 of the Evidence Act? 49. The Latin expression prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression”. According to Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence” which in turn means “evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the case or charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. 50. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the accused. 51. The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. 52. To explain what constitutes a prima facie case to make Section 106 of the Evidence Act applicable, we should refer to the decision of this Court in Mir Mohammad (supra), wherein this Court has observed in paras 36 and 37 respectively as under: “36. In this context we may profitably utilize the legal principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows:“When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 37. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. But the section would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” (Emphasis supplied) 53. We should also look into the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Gulam Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 311 , wherein this Court made the following observations in paragraph 24 as under: “24. Even otherwise, in our view, this is a case where Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply. Krishnanand Chaudhary was brutally assaulted and then a chhura-blow was given on the chest. Thus chhura-blow was given after Bijoy Chaudhary had said “he is still alive and should be killed”. The appellants then carried away the body. What happened thereafter to Krishnanand Chaudhary is especially within the knowledge of the appellants. The appellants have given no explanation as to what they did after they took away the body. Krishnanand Chaudhary has not been since seen alive. In the absence of an explanation, and considering the fact that the appellants were suspecting the boy to have kidnapped and killed the child of the family of the appellants, it was for the appellants to have explained what they did with him after they took him away. When the abductors withheld that information from the court, there is every justification for drawing the inference that they had murdered the boy. Even though Section 106 of the Evidence Act may not be intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would apply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death. The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw a different inference. We, therefore, see no substance in this submission of Mr. Mishra.” (Emphasis supplied) 54. The appellants by virtue of their special knowledge must offer an explanation which might lead the Court to draw a different inference. We, therefore, see no substance in this submission of Mr. Mishra.” (Emphasis supplied) 54. Cases are frequently coming before the courts where the husband, due to strained marital relations and doubt as regards the character, has gone to the extent of killing his wife. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, like in the case at hand, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. 55. If an offence takes place inside the four walls of a house and in such circumstances where the accused has all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at a time and in the circumstances of his choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead direct evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. It is to resolve such a situation that Section 106 of the Evidence Act exists in the statute book. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra), this Court observed that a Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. The Court proceeded to observe that a Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character, which is almost impossible to be led, or at any rate, extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence, which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. Returning to the facts of the case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite established that death of the deceased was homicidal and the appellant has treated her with cruelty and also threatened her, but the fact remains that the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act in view of the statement of Deendayal Sahu (PW-12) who was the treating Ayurvedic doctor of the deceased and who has medically checked her pulse and found her dead, at that time, the appellant was present, however, surprisingly, the trial Court did not put this incriminating circumstance of the statement of Deendayal Sahu (PW- 12) to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the CrPC seeking his explanation as to how and in what circumstances his wife has died, which the appellant was obliged to offer explanation. In this regard, recent decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine SC 609 may be gainfully noticed herein in which principles relating to Section 313 of the CrPC have been culled out by their Lordships in paragraph 17 of the report which states as under: - “17. The law consistently laid down by this Court can be summarized as under: (i) It is the duty of the Trial Court to put each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused specifically, distinctively and separately. The material circumstance means the circumstance or the material on the basis of which the prosecution is seeking his conviction; (ii) The object of examination of the accused under Section 313 is to enable the accused to explain any circumstance appearing against him in the evidence; (iii)The Court must ordinarily eschew material circumstances not put to the accused from consideration while dealing with the case of the particular accused; (iv) The failure to put material circumstances to the accused amounts to a serious irregularity. It will vitiate the trial if it is shown to have prejudiced the accused; (v)If any irregularity in putting the material circumstance to the accused does not result in failure of justice, it becomes a curable defect. However, while deciding whether the defect can be cured, one of the considerations will be the passage of time from the date of the incident; (vi) In case such irregularity is curable, even the appellate court can question the accused on the material circumstance which is not put to him; and (vii)In a given case, the case can be remanded to the Trial Court from the stage of recording the supplementary statement of the concerned accused under Section 313 of CrPC. (viii)While deciding the question whether prejudice has been caused to the accused because of the omission, the delay in raising the contention is only one of the several factors to be considered.” 17. In the instant case, statement of Deendayal Sahu (PW-12) was very pertinent which implicates the appellant in the offence in question as immediately before the incident, the appellant was present and that persuaded him to call the doctor and Deendayal Sahu (PW-12) found the deceased to be dead, as such, the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It was the duty of the trial Court to put this incriminating circumstance to the accused seeking his explanation that just before the incident he was present in the house and he could have given his explanation that the doctor has never examined the deceased and he (appellant) was not present in the house. This has caused serious prejudice to the appellant to explain that he was present or not. This incriminating circumstance which was not put to the accused cannot be taken against him as the incident is of 22-8-2017 i.e. seven years prior and more particularly, the prosecution except proving the nature of death, has not brought out any circumstance like ill-behaviour of the appellant with the deceased or threatening of the deceased. In that view of the matter, conviction and sentences imposed upon the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC are liable to be set aside and they are hereby set aside. Consequently, conviction and sentences imposed upon him under Section 201 of the IPC are also set aside. He is acquitted of both the charges on the ground of benefit of doubt. Consequently, conviction and sentences imposed upon him under Section 201 of the IPC are also set aside. He is acquitted of both the charges on the ground of benefit of doubt. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 18. The criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 19. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned and to the Superintendent of Jail where they are lodged and suffering jail sentence, forthwith for necessary information and action, if any. 20. However, before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to notice pertinent direction/observation by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raj Kumar (supra) by making following observations in paragraphs 23 & 24 of the report: - “23. In many criminal trials, a large number of witnesses are examined, and evidence is voluminous. It is true that the Judicial Officers have to understand the importance of Section 313. But now the Court is empowered to take the help of the prosecutor and the defence counsel in preparing relevant questions. Therefore, when the Trial Judge prepares questions to be put to the accused under Section 313, before putting the questions to the accused, the Judge can always provide copies of the said questions to the learned Public Prosecutor as well as the learned defence Counsel and seek their assistance for ensuring that every relevant material circumstance appearing against the accused is put to him. When the Judge seeks the assistance of the prosecutor and the defence lawyer, the lawyers must act as the officers of the Court and not as mouthpieces of their respective clients. While recording the statement under Section 313 of CrPC in cases involving a large number of prosecution witnesses, the Judicial Officers will be well advised to take benefit of subsection (5) of Section 313 of CrPC, which will ensure that the chances of committing errors and omissions are minimized. 24. In 1951, while delivering the verdict in the case of Tara Singh 1951 SCC 903 : 1951 SCC OnLine SC 49, this Court lamented that in many cases, scant attention is paid to the salutary provision of Section 342 of CrPC of 1898. We are sorry to note that the situation continues to be the same after 72 years as we see such defaults in large number of cases. We are sorry to note that the situation continues to be the same after 72 years as we see such defaults in large number of cases. The National and the State Judicial Academies must take a note of this situation. The Registry shall forward a copy of this decision to the National and all the State Judicial Academies.” 21. Paragraphs 23 & 24 of Raj Kumar’s case (supra) squarely apply to this case as important incriminating circumstances were not put to the accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C appropriately. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Director (Prosecution) and also to the Director, Chhattisgarh State Judicial Academy, for taking further needful action.