JUDGMENT: (Venkata Jyothirmai Pratapa, J.) Impugning the Judgment and Decree dated 12.10.2018 passed in O.S.No.1650 of 2010 by the learned VI Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam,[Hereinafter ‘trial court’] the Defendant therein preferred the present Appeal. 2. Plaintiff filed the suit O.S.No.1650 of 2010 seeking eviction of the Defendant from the plaint schedule property and for damages at Rs.20,000/- per month from October, 2010 till the date of handing over the vacant possession. Appellant herein was the Defendant and Respondent herein was the Plaintiff. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to, as they were arrayed, before the trial Court. 3. The case of the Plaintiff, in brief, is as follows; 3.1. It is averred in the plaint that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the schedule property, situated in Prakasarao peta, Visakhapatnam, consisting of two shop rooms in the ground floor of the building and the Defendant has taken the said two shop rooms on lease, for the purpose of doing business in the name and style of “M/s. Dolls-n-Chic Boutique.” The tenancy is month to month on payment of Rs.11,753/- per month. It is stated that the Defendant was irregular in paying monthly rents. 3.2. The Plaintiff was advised to go for a new construction, since the building was more than thirty years old, vide report issued by the Andhra University College of Engineering, Visakhpatnam on 20.02.2010. 3.3. It is further stated that the Plaintiff has informed all the tenants including the Defendant to vacate the schedule property, for which the Defendant expressed his willingness but, later filed a suit in O.S.No.166 of 2010 on the file of the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, and obtained an ex-parte interim Order. 3.4. It is further stated that the Plaintiff got issued a legal notice on 26.07.2010 seeking the Defendant to vacate from the premises by September, 2010. In turn, the Defendant, has sent a reply along with a cheque No.021454 dated 23.09.2010 drawn on Central Bank of India, Visakhapatnam, for an amount of Rs.58,765/- towards arrears of rent payable from May, 2010 to September, 2010 and thereby, the Plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the Defendant by September, 2010. It is further stated that the Defendant did not choose to vacate the schedule premises. Hence, suit. 4. The case of the Defendant, in brief, is; 4.1. It is further stated that the Defendant did not choose to vacate the schedule premises. Hence, suit. 4. The case of the Defendant, in brief, is; 4.1. In the written statement, defendant admits the tenancy since 1989 on payment of monthly rent, the age of the building as 30 years and also of his business in the premises. He stated that the tenancy is in existence till the end of 2016 and he has paid Rs.25,000/- towards interest free refundable amount. 4.2. It is further stated that the schedule property is in good condition. The Inspection Report dated 20.02.2010 of the Andhra University College of Engineering is created for the purpose of the suit and that therefore, he is not liable to pay any damages. 4.3. It is further stated that on 01.04.2006, the Plaintiff gave a Memorandum of Understanding for continuing the lease in favour of the Defendant by enhancing the rent and the lease was extended till 2016 orally and rent was enhanced to Rs.11,753/- 4.4. It is the further case of the Defendant that the rents are being paid regularly and that since the Plaintiff received the cheque for Rs.58,765/-, she waived her right for seeking eviction. There is a demand from the Plaintiff to enhance the rent to a tune of Rs.30,000/- per month in February, 2010 and to pay further advance of Rs.1,50,000/-. As the Defendant expressed his inability to meet these demands, Plaintiff and her father tried to dispossess the Defendant from the schedule premises forcibly on 09.02.2010. To which, Defendant filed O.S.No.166 of 2010 for permanent injunction. 4.5. It is further stated that he is eking out his livelihood in the business being carried out in the schedule premises. If he vacates, he may lose his livelihood and there are no bona fides. He thus prayed for dismissal of the suit. Issues Framed by the Trial Court 5. In the light of the rival pleadings, learned trial court framed the following issues for trial; 5.1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get relief of evicting the Defendant from the suit schedule premises? 5.2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the damages as prayed for? 5.3. To what relief? Proceedings before the Trial Court 6. The suit went on trial. On behalf of the Plaintiff, P.W.1 was examined and documents Exs.A1 toA4 were marked. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get relief of evicting the Defendant from the suit schedule premises? 5.2. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to recover the damages as prayed for? 5.3. To what relief? Proceedings before the Trial Court 6. The suit went on trial. On behalf of the Plaintiff, P.W.1 was examined and documents Exs.A1 toA4 were marked. Coming to the evidence of the Defendant, D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and documents Exs.B1 to B4 were marked. D.W.2 though filed Chief Examination affidavit, did not turned up for cross-examination and hence, his evidence is eschewed. 7. After hearing both the counsel and on appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial Court partly decreed the suit with costs and directed the Defendant to vacate the suit schedule property to the Plaintiff and to pay arrears of damages within 30 days from the date of receipt of the judgment and also awarded damages to a tune of Rs.9,000/- from October, 2010 till the date of delivery of possession of the suit schedule property to the Plaintiff. Grounds for Appeal 8. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfaction with the impugned Judgment and decree dated 12.10.2018, the Defendant preferred the present appeal on the grounds that the learned trial Judge failed to decided the essential points in controversy and failed to appreciate the issues in controversy and evidence on record in a right perspective and travelled beyond the scope of the case and committed error in admissions elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.1, that the observation regarding the arrears of rent is misconceived, that the observation relating to validity of notice issued under Ex.A1 is not tenable under law, that the Plaintiff has not properly valued the suit, that the plaint property damages were awarded without paying necessary Court fees and therefore, the decree cannot be executable, that the trial Judge fixed the damages at Rs.9,000/- per month to the claim of the Plaintiff against the evidence on record, that Plaintiff failed to adduce any evidence regarding prevailing rent of Rs.20,000/- by the date of the filing of the suit, and that observation of the trial Court regarding duration of lease is incorrect. 9. Heard Sri M.Radhakrishna, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Turaga Sai Surya, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 10. 9. Heard Sri M.Radhakrishna, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Turaga Sai Surya, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the material on record. Arguments Advanced at the Bar 10. Learned counsel for the Defendant/Appellant would submit that since it is a first appeal, re-appreciation of evidence would reveal that the way in which the learned trial Judge dealt with the matter, is not in accordance with law. It is submitted that the finding of the trial Court to the effect that the Defendant fell in arrears is not correct and that the Plaintiff herself in cross-examination admitted that there are no arrears of rent payable and her intention can easily be understood from her evidence that she wanted the Defendant to vacate from schedule premises. Learned counsel would submit that the Plaintiff is resident of Bangalore and being a land-lady, she has every right to issue notice to the tenant seeking eviction, but that cannot be misused by playing fraud on the Court. 11. Learned Counsel would further state that the Plaintiff has given other portions of the building to some others on rent and that the Defendant withdrew the injunction suit. It is also submitted that the observations of the learned trial Judge that the Defendant is a defaulter and the intention of the Plaintiff asking the tenants to vacate the premises, is for construction of a new building are all incorrect. Reliance is placed on the decision in Chapala Chinnabbayi and Ors. v. Naralasetti Anasuyama and Ors., AIR 2006 AP 142 On the point that subsequent happenings or events, which are relevant for disposal of the matter can be taken into consideration. Learned counsel would finally submit that nearly twenty-five persons are working in the boutique and that breathing time may be given in case of ordering eviction. 12. In contrast, learned counsel for Plaintiff/Respondent would submit that the Defendant is irregular in paying the rent which is very much visible in sending the cheque for Rs.58,765/- along with the reply notice. He would submit that the schedule property is situated in a busy locality and that the Plaintiff intended to construct a new building by demolishing the old building. He would submit that the schedule property is situated in a busy locality and that the Plaintiff intended to construct a new building by demolishing the old building. It is stated that the Plaintiff got issued a legal notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act for termination of the mandatory tenancy and that the Plaintiff is authorised to do so, vide law under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act for determination of lease. Learned counsel placed reliance on decision rendered in Badri Vishal v. Kshatriya Rajput Sabha a Regd. Society, rep. by its General Secretary, Sri T.Jaswanth Singh, 2018(2) ALT 736 and in Kethireddy Gopala Reddy v. Paluru Siva Prasad and Ors., MANU/AP/1644/2022 to support the issuance of the notice under Section 106 and its effect. Point for Determination 13. The points that would emerge for determination are; 13.1. Whether the Notice issued vide Ex-A1 is valid in the eye of law? 13.2. Whether acceptance of rent after the expiry of the lease period, would come in the way of Plaintiff/landlord in filing a suit for eviction? 13.3. Whether the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 12.10.2018 passed by the trial court is sustainable on facts and on law or any interference is required in this Appeal? Determination by the Court 14. A First Appellate Court is the last court on facts. Bearing the same in mind, this Court has gone through pleadings and evidence on record, This Court feels it not necessary to reiterate the entire evidence. However, reference shall be made as and when necessity arises. It is beneficial to recollect the undisputed facts of the case, which are: 14.1. The Plaintiff is the absolute owner of the schedule property consisting of two shop rooms in the ground floor of the building bearing D.No.28-2-70/1 & 2 with two electricity service connections situated in Prakasaraopet, Visakhapatnam with specific boundaries mentioned in the schedule. 14.2. The Defendant has taken lease of the schedule property and doing business in the name and style of M/s.Dolls-n-Chic Boutique. 14.3. It is an undisputed fact that the lease is month to month basis and agreed rent was Rs.11,753/- as on the date of filing of the suit. 14.4. 14.2. The Defendant has taken lease of the schedule property and doing business in the name and style of M/s.Dolls-n-Chic Boutique. 14.3. It is an undisputed fact that the lease is month to month basis and agreed rent was Rs.11,753/- as on the date of filing of the suit. 14.4. It is also not in dispute that after receiving the legal notice from the Plaintiff, the Defendant got issued a reply along with a cheque for an amount of Rs.58,765/- towards arrears of rent from May, 2010 to September, 2010. 14.5. The schedule building is thirty years old and there were exchange of notices between the parties. 14.6. The Defendant filed a suit for injunction against the Plaintiff, vide OS No.166 of 2010 on the file of the Court of I Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam. Determination by the Court 15. There is no dispute about the fact of issuing notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act, vide Ex. A1 dated 26.07.2010 granting 15 days time for terminating the tenancy. Ex. A1 Notice and its validity must be seen in the light of the principles embodied in Section 106 of T.P. Act. At this juncture, it is relevant to state few judicial precedents on Section 106 and analyse its character. 16. It is a settled principle of law that in the absence of contract or local law or usage to the contract, lease of an immovable property for purposes other than agricultural or manufacturing, shall be deemed to be lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by issuance of 15 days’ notice. It is in this context that, Section 106 of the T.P. Act indicates that a landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice, if it is a premises occupied on monthly tenancy and by giving 6 months’ notice if the premises are occupied for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, and on expiry thereof respectively, proceedings could be initiated. In the instant case, the undisputed fact remains that the tenancy is month to month. This is in view of the averments made in the plaint and written statement and also on the evidence adduced by the parties. This would lead to an inference that the landlord is well entitled to terminate the tenancy by issuing a quit notice of 15 days. 17. This is in view of the averments made in the plaint and written statement and also on the evidence adduced by the parties. This would lead to an inference that the landlord is well entitled to terminate the tenancy by issuing a quit notice of 15 days. 17. In Jiwan Dass v. LIC, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694 the Hon’ble Apex Court had an occasion to reiterate this settled principle and to observe that the Section 106 does not contemplate of giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Law is also well settled that a quit notice issued under Section 106 should not be construed in a hair split manner or with hyper-technical approach to find out loopholes therein. Quit Notice under Section 106, may, notwithstanding erroneous particulars, is still good and effective in law, so long as the recipient is not misled. 18. It is relevant at this juncture to refer to the decision in Badri Vishal (referred supra), which is relied on by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff to substantiate the validity of the notice issued under Section 106, in the light to Amendment to the T.P.Act. The relevant para 13 reads thus; “13. In addition, it is important to note that Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was amended in the year 2002 by Act 3 of 2003, which came into effect on 31.12.2002. By this amendment, the requirement that the notice to quit should be co-terminus with the end of month of tenancy has been taken away. Now, as per the applicable amended Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 15 days notice is enough to terminate the tenancy. This amendment came into force even before the judgment was delivered in this case on 25.02.2003 and the amendment makes it clear that it is applicable to all suits and proceedings pending as on 31.12.2002. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the notice dated 26.01.1999 is correct and valid both as per the old Section 106 and new Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Sub-section (3) also mentions that a notice is not invalid if the period mentioned therein is short and where suit is filed after expiry of the period. Therefore, the rigor of old Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been substantially relaxed by the amendment in 2002. “ (emphasis supplied) 19. Sub-section (3) also mentions that a notice is not invalid if the period mentioned therein is short and where suit is filed after expiry of the period. Therefore, the rigor of old Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act has been substantially relaxed by the amendment in 2002. “ (emphasis supplied) 19. Further, reliance was placed on Kethireddy Gopala Reddy (referred supra), the relevant extracts from this decision are at paras 21 and 22, which read thus; “21. A perusal of the above recitals in Ex.A-2 notice would indicate that landlord determined the lease and is not intended to extend the lease further. In the absence of contract or local law or usage to the contract, lease of an immovable property shall be deemed to be lease from month to month terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by 15 days notice. Ex. A-1 is original lease agreement dated 31.05.1994 and both Plaintiff and 1st Defendant admitted about execution of lease agreement dated 31.05.1994. Learned senior counsel for the Appellant would contend that since Ex.A-1 is not registered document, Court cannot look into contents of Ex.A-1, in view of bar under Section 17 of the Registration Act. In the absence of Ex.A-1, since there is no contract as contemplated under Section 106 of the T.P.Act, lease between the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant should be treated as lease of immovable property from month to month. If the lease is treated, in this case on hand, is one under month to month, notice issued under Ex.A-2 is a valid notice directing the 1st Defendant to vacate the premises by 10.06.2009. Notice was issued under Ex A-2. Thus, the notice issued under Ex A-2 is in accordance with Sec 106 TP Act and Plaintiff validly determined the lease. Once the lease was determined, tenant will not be allowed to squat on the property. Even under Sec 108(q) the lessee on the determination of lease bound the put the lessor into possession of the property. 22. Trial Court considered the effect of notice under Section 106 of the T.P.Act and decreed the suit eventually and also directed the 1st Defendant to pay Rs.66,240/- with interest @6% p.a. Lower appellate Court, being final fact finding Court confirmed the said finding.” (emphasis supplied) 20. 22. Trial Court considered the effect of notice under Section 106 of the T.P.Act and decreed the suit eventually and also directed the 1st Defendant to pay Rs.66,240/- with interest @6% p.a. Lower appellate Court, being final fact finding Court confirmed the said finding.” (emphasis supplied) 20. It is trite to note the difference between the position as under the T.P.Act and the Rent Acts in determination of lease. Under the former, determination of lease by the landlord is necessary so as to recover possession, whereas under the latter, it is necessary that the landlord fits in his case under the relevant requirements stipulated in the provisions therein. Therefore, in view of the legal position referred supra, the Ex. A-1 Notice sent by the Plaintiff to the Defendant under Section 106 T.P. Act, determining the lease is a valid one and a bare reading of the provision and the decision in Jiwan Dass contemplate that no reasons need be mentioned in such notice. More so, on this count, prima facie the argument of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the plaintiff filed by the suit for ejectment of fraudulent grounds of re-construction of the building and on no arrears on the part of the defendant would stand negated. 21. Plaintiff as P.W.1 reiterated the averments made in the plaint in her chief examination affidavit stating that the Defendant failed to vacate the premises despite several demands and also issued legal notice dated 26.07.2010 thereby terminating the tenancy and demanded the Defendant to vacate the premises and hand over the vacant possession by 30.09.2010. The Defendant got issued a reply refusing to vacate the premises, as such, she filed the suit before the trial Court. 22. Coming to the cross-examination, P.W.1 admitted that she gave a General Power of Attorney to her father relating to the schedule property, that the Defendant has been running a boutique in the schedule premises, that her father issued receipts in proof of payment of rents by the Defendant and two receipts, which were confronted by P.W.1 are issued by her brother, Phanindra, in proof of payment of rents by the Defendant in respect of the schedule property. These rent receipts are marked through P.W.1 vide Exs.B1 and B2. 23. P.W.1 further stated that the Defendant has been in possession of the property as a tenant since 1989. These rent receipts are marked through P.W.1 vide Exs.B1 and B2. 23. P.W.1 further stated that the Defendant has been in possession of the property as a tenant since 1989. Since she is residing at Bangalore, her father used to negotiate with the Defendant on the tenancy, quantum of rent and its enhancement. After receiving the report from the Department of Civil Engineer, Andhra University, she addressed a letter to the Municipal Commissioner, Visakhapatnam. She admits that the schedule property is in existence since seven rainy seasons, from the date of submitting application to the Municipal Commissioner. The Defendant paid advance amount of Rs.50,000/- i.e., Rs.25,000/- towards advance amount at the time of inception of tenancy and Rs.25,000/- in the year 2006, when they executed the memorandum of understanding, The Defendant has been regularly paying rents and there are no arrears of rent. There are no arrears of rent since 2010. She further admits that the Defendant sent a cheque for Rs.58,765/- along with reply notice and the said cheque was encashed by her. 24. Learned counsel for the Defendant would submit that when P.W.1 herself admitted that there were no arrears of rent, the finding of the learned trial Judge that the Defendant committed default in payment of rent is not correct. Be that as it may, the very admission of P.W.1 that she has received Rs.58,765/- at a time, through a cheque sent by the Defendant along with the reply notice itself indicates that the Defendant fell in arrears of rent, irrespective of any further reason. Admittedly, the lease entered between the parties expired by 2008 and the rent was enhanced in 2008 and then in 2010. They used to enhance the rent at 15% for every two years. 25. Coming to the evidence of the Defendant as D.W.1, he reiterated his contentions in the written statement and in his Chief Affidavit. He stated that the present rent at the time of filing of the suit was Rs.11,753/-, which itself is very high. D.W.1 says that it is a very busy locality. 26. Coming to the cross-examination, D.W.1 says that the property which is in occupation, consists two shop rooms and the last enhanced rent is Rs.11,753/- per month during the year 2006 since then he has been paying the same rent till date. D.W.1 says that it is a very busy locality. 26. Coming to the cross-examination, D.W.1 says that the property which is in occupation, consists two shop rooms and the last enhanced rent is Rs.11,753/- per month during the year 2006 since then he has been paying the same rent till date. D.W.1 further admits that as on the date, each shop room will fetch not less than Rs.10,000/- per month, which was the position as on the date of giving deposition i.e, 16.03.2018. The fact remains that the evidence of P.W.1 as well as the evidence of D.W.1 as on the date of giving their evidence i.e., in the year 2018 itself shows that the premises may fetch Rs.20,000/- rent per month, as such, awarding damages after expiry of tenancy at Rs.9,000/- is not on higher side. 27. According to D.W.1, he never committed any default in payment of rents. But the landlord refused to receive the rents. So he has sent a cheque along with his notice vide Ex.A.4. The fact remains that the said rent is for the period of May 2010 to September, 2010. As rightly argued by the leaned counsel for the Plaintiff, when the landlord refused to receive rent, the Defendant could have sent the rent by way of cheque through registered post with acknowledgement due. Admittedly, that was not done by the Defendant. There is no proof that the landlord refused to receive the rent because the Plaintiff received the cheque along with reply notice and encashed the same. Such being the case, the oral evidence of D.W.1 that the landlord refused to receive the rent for five months and he sent a cheque along with reply notice, and as such the right of the landlord to seek ejection is waived, has no legs to stand. In Sri K.M. Manjunath v. Sri Erappa. G (Dead) Through Lrs. 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 561 the Hon’ble Apex Court while reiterating the position of law laid down in Shanti Prasad Devi v. Shankar Mahto, (2005) 5 SCC 543 held that the mere acceptance of rent by the landlord after expiry lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of the lease. In Shanti Prasad Devi (referred supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows; “18. In Shanti Prasad Devi (referred supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows; “18. We fully agree with the High Court and the first appellate court below that on expiry of period of lease, mere acceptance of rent for the subsequent months in which the lessee continued to occupy the lease premises cannot be said to be a conduct signifying “assent” to the continuance of the lease even after expiry of lease period.” (emphasis supplied) 28. Further, D.W.2 is a third party, whose shop is located at a distance of 300 meters to the suit schedule property deposed that the Plaintiff ’s father tried to dispossess the Defendant from the schedule property on 09.02.2010. 29. D.W.3 is also a third party. He was examined to speak to the fact that the Plaintiff ’s father along with a group of eight people tried to dispossess the Defendant from his shop. It was elicited in his cross-examination that his house is situated two kilometers away from the schedule property. He pleaded ignorance as to the land owner of the schedule premises, the Plaintiff ’s father, the exact date on which the Plaintiff came to the schedule property and tried to dispossess the Defendant and the suit filed by whom and against whom. He further stated that he got acquaintance with the Defendant through his father since his childhood and is in habit of meeting the Defendant once in six months. 30. D.W.4 is also third party. According to him, he is a bulk supplier of Readymade Garments i.e., women wear to the Defendant. He explained about the furnishing facilities in the shop and he further stated that the Defendant is attending for painting works and maintenance of the shop as per requirement since ten years and as observed by him, the shop room is in very good condition. In cross-examination, he stated that he has no knowledge whether the Defendant is doing business in his own house or rented house. He pleaded ignorance as to the facts of the suit and issues held between the parties. 31. D.W.5 is also a third party and a Government registered valuer of GVMC Approved Structural Engineer. According to him, the Defendant approached him to inspect the shop. He has inspected the shop on 18.8.2018 and stated that the age of the building is 30-35 yeas. 31. D.W.5 is also a third party and a Government registered valuer of GVMC Approved Structural Engineer. According to him, the Defendant approached him to inspect the shop. He has inspected the shop on 18.8.2018 and stated that the age of the building is 30-35 yeas. He deposed that the condition of the shops is good and suitable for habitation. He has not observed any dampness/seepage of rain water in inside of roof slab and brick walls. Through this witness, Ex. A3 is marked, which is a structural stability certificate issued by him. Ex. B4 is the photographs of the premises. In cross-examination, D.W.4 says that one of the friends of the Defendant introduced him to the Defendant. He also stated that he has no knowledge that the petition filed by the Defendant seeking appointment of a civil engineer to obtain structural stability report regarding the schedule premises was dismissed by Court. He did not follow any method except physical examination of the premises to issue Ex.B3-report. He has gone through the certificate issued by the Structural Engineer, Andhra University. The witness adds that the said report was wrongly issued. He cannot say whether the schedule premises is having strength to construct additional floors or not unless structural analysis done. He also deposed that he could not say whether the existing RCC building wall would withstand construction of two floors, unless structural analysis done. 32. The evidence of D.W.5 is of no use. The evidence of D.W.3 is no way helpful to the case of the Defendant since the Defendant himself withdrew the suit filed by him, seeking permanent injunction. The evidence of D.W.4 is hardly helpful to the Defendant ’s case. The fact remains that it is not a petition filed under Rent Control Act. The issue involved is terminating the lease by issuing a Notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Admittedly, it is a monthly tenancy and Ex.A.1 /notice has been issued in the month of July, 2010 demanding the tenant to vacate the premises by September, 2010. In fact, more than 30 days notice was issued in the present case. Such being the case, the land owner need not establish that the premises is required for further construction or the Defendant committed default in payment of rent. Admittedly, the period of lease expired by September 2010 followed by Ex. In fact, more than 30 days notice was issued in the present case. Such being the case, the land owner need not establish that the premises is required for further construction or the Defendant committed default in payment of rent. Admittedly, the period of lease expired by September 2010 followed by Ex. A1/notice that has been issued. Therefore, decreeing the suit in favor of the Plaintiff and ordering eviction of the Defendant is on correct lines. Therefore, no circumstances warrant interference of this Court in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 33. In result, the Appeal Suit is dismissed and the Judgment and Decree dated 12.10.2018 passed in OS No.1650 of 2010 by the learned VI Additional Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapantam, is hereby confirmed. The Defendant is directed to vacate the schedule premises within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No order as to costs. As a sequel, pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.