JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. Respondent No.2 (informant) made a complaint to the police that he was married to petitioner No.3 on 8.3.2011. One son, Anyun Sharma was born to the parties on 22.10.2016 in a private hospital. The informant came to know after the birth of his son that the parents of Umang Sharma (wife of the petitioner) had mentioned that a girl Mishri Sharma was born to Umang and the informant on 30.8.2012 at his home i.e. Bhagat Kutir, Ward No.4, Vikas Nagar, Una. Shanti Swaroop, father-in-law of the informant reported the birth of Mishri in Nagar Panchayat, Chowari, in which report Suresh Kumar was shown as the father of Mishri Sharma. Umang Sharma was present on duty on 30.8.2012, before that day and after that day. Umang Sharma, Shant Swaroop and Vijay Kumari had forged the documents in connivance with the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat. Umang Sharma had taken maternity leave at the time of the birth of Anyun Sharma, whereas no such leave was taken at the time of the birth of Mishri. Whenever the informant goes to Chowari to meet his son, Umang Sharma and her parents do not allow him to enter the house. They threaten to call the police and kill the informant and his mother. The police registered the FIR based on the information of the informant. 2. The petitioners filed the present petition for seeking quashing of the FIR. It was asserted that the marriage between the informant and petitioner No.3 was solemnized on 8.3.2011. She was working on PTA basis in Chamba District. She continued to live with her parents at Chowari. The informant was visiting the petitioner No.3 in her parental home. The informant and petitioner No.3 mutually decided to adopt a child. Smt. Guddo Devi was pregnant and she had three children. She agreed to give her child for adoption. The informant agreed to this proposal. Guddo Devi gave birth to a female child on 30.8.2012. The informant asked the petitioner No.3 to bring the child to her home. He also advised her to get the name of the child registered at Chowari. He also instructed that the name of the child should not be entered into the family of Guddo Devi and no formal adoption deed should be prepared. The informant asked the petitioner No.3 to bring the child to her home. He also advised her to get the name of the child registered at Chowari. He also instructed that the name of the child should not be entered into the family of Guddo Devi and no formal adoption deed should be prepared. He was apprehensive that in case the real facts came to the knowledge of the child, it would affect her adversely. Petitioner No.3 got pregnant in the year 2016 and gave birth to a male child. The informant advised that the name of the child should be registered at Chowari. The informant started pressurising petitioner No.3 to hand over Mishri Sharma to her parents. Petitioner No.3 did not agree to this proposal. The informant reported the matter to the police. He subsequently said that he had withdrawn the complaint filed by him; however, the petitioners came to know from the summons that the complaint was not withdrawn and the challan was filed before the Court. The police did not conduct the investigation properly. The contents of the FIR do not disclose the commission of the offence. The informant knew about the facts and lodged a false FIR. The incident had not taken place at Una and the police at Una had no jurisdiction to carry out the investigation and file the challan. Learned CJM, Una also erred in taking the cognizance. Hence, the present petition was filed for quashing of the FIR and the proceedings arising out of the same. 3. The police filed a status report reproducing the contents of the FIR. It was asserted that the police conducted the investigation and obtained the documents. The police filed an application regarding the birth of Mishri Sharma and it was reported by Block Medical Officer, Chowari that petitioner No.3 had not delivered any child in Civil Hospital, Chowari. The comparison of the signatures of the father of petitioner No.3 was made with the application form and it was found that they were filled by the same person. It was found after the investigation that Umang Sharma, Shanti Swaroop Sharma and Vijay Kumar had mentioned the informant as the father of Mishri Sharma. Umang Sharma was on duty in August and had not taken any maternity leave. Guddo Devi stated that Umang Sharma and her parents had adopted the child when she was aged 12-15 days. It was found after the investigation that Umang Sharma, Shanti Swaroop Sharma and Vijay Kumar had mentioned the informant as the father of Mishri Sharma. Umang Sharma was on duty in August and had not taken any maternity leave. Guddo Devi stated that Umang Sharma and her parents had adopted the child when she was aged 12-15 days. Her name was recorded as the child of the informant. The offences punishable under Sections 420, 466, 468, 471, 506, and 120-B of IPC were made out against the accused. Hence, the challan was presented and filed before the Court. 4. Respondent No.2-informant also filed a reply making a preliminary submission regarding lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. It was asserted that the petitioner and the informant were married on 8.3.2011. Petitioner No.3 was a widow, whereas the informant was a divorcee. The informant was residing at Una, whereas petitioner No.3 was serving at Dhadu. She was residing in a rented accommodation near Chowari. The informant used to visit petitioner No.3. A son was born to the informant and petitioner No.3. The informant saw the child only on some occasions. Many persons used to visit the house of petitioner No.3 at that time. Subsequently, he came to know in the year 2018 that petitioners had given the impression that the child was born to the informant and petitioner No.3. Child is the biological daughter of Guddo Devi. The admission form only mentions the contact number of petitioners No.2 and 3 and not the name of the informant. The informant confronted the petitioners and they said that they wanted to bring up the child. They had used the name of the informant without his consent and he has to accept that he is the father of the child. When the informant refused, the petitioners did not allow him to meet his child. The informant never agreed to the adoption and a false story was propounded. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. I have heard Mr Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr Rakesh Chauhan, Advocate for the petitioners, Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No. 1-State and Ms Pragti, learned counsel for respondent no. 2. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that as per the FIR, the incident had taken place at Chowari. 2. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that as per the FIR, the incident had taken place at Chowari. The police of Police Station Una had no jurisdiction to carry out the investigation and submit the charge sheet before the Court. The contents of the FIR even if accepted to be correct, do not disclose the commission of any offence. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 7. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent no.1-State submitted that the petitioners in connivance with the biological parents of Mishri had mentioned the name of the informant as the father which is not correct. Sufficient evidence was collected by the Investigating Agency to show that petitioner No.3 was on duty and could not have given birth to any child. The petitioners also admitted in their petition that Mishri Sharma was born to Guddo Devi and not to petitioner No.3 which corroborates the version of the informant that he was wrongly mentioned as the father of the child. The challan has been presented before the Court and the remedy of the petitioner is to approach the learned Trial Court for seeking discharge. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. Ms. Pragti, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 adopted the submissions made by the learned Additional Advocate General for respondent no. 1-State and submitted that the preparation of the forged document is not disputed. The question whether the name of the informant was mentioned as the father of the child with his consent or not is a disputed question of fact that cannot be decided while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 10. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:- “17. 10. The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was observed at page 716:- “17. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27) “27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. Where the chargesheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debitojustitiaei. e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone, the courts exist. *** 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 11. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:- “26. Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”(emphasis supplied) 12. It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial based on evidence led before the Court. It was observed: “10. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of the trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going in detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”. 11. One other reason pointed by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 13. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed: 12. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.” 13. This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed: 12. The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [ (2019) 14 SCC 568 ], this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. 14. It is apparent from these judgments that power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 15. It was submitted that the police had conducted the investigations and presented the challan. The Court can quash the F.I.R. if the allegations do not constitute an offence or make out a case against the accused. However, it is not permissible for it to conduct a mini-trial to arrive at such findings. 15. It was submitted that the police had conducted the investigations and presented the challan. Hence, this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 that the High Court will continue to exercise the power even if the charge sheet has been filed. It was observed: “11. This being the factual backdrop, we may note at the very outset that the contention that the appellants' quash petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any event, as the chargesheet in relation thereto was submitted before the Court and taken on file, needs mention only to be rejected. It is well settled that the High Court would continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a petition filed under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the FIR even when a chargesheet is filed by the police during the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat ( (2011) 7 SCC 59 )]. This principle was reiterated in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home [ (2019) 11 SCC 706 ]. This issue, therefore, needs no further elucidation on our part.” 16. Thus, the submission that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised after filing of the charge sheet is not acceptable. 17. It was submitted that the police at Una did not have any jurisdiction to investigate the matter. The incident had taken place at Chowari and an investigation should not be conducted by the police at Chowari. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 that SHO has a statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence and the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:- “8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 that SHO has a statutory authority to investigate any cognizable offence and the investigation cannot be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was observed:- “8. In our view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant requires to be accepted. The limited question is whether the High Court was justified in quashing the FIR on the ground that the Delhi Police Station did not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the offence. From the discussion made by the learned Judge, it appears that the learned Judge has considered the provisions applicable to criminal trials. The High Court arrived at the conclusion by appreciating the allegations made by the parties that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction to entertain and investigate the FIR lodged by the appellant because the alleged dowry items were entrusted to the respondent at Patiala and that the alleged cause of action for the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC arose at Patiala. In our view, the findings given by the High Court are, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous because: (1) The SHO has statutory authority under Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate any cognizable case for which an FIR is lodged. (2) At the stage of investigation, there is no question of interference under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction. (3) After the investigation is over, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the cause of action for lodging the FIR has not arisen within his territorial jurisdiction, then he is required to submit a report accordingly under Section 170 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to forward the case to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. 9. This would be clear from the following discussion. Section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence. It reads as under: “156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.— (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.— (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 may order such an investigation as abovementioned.” 10. It is true that territorial jurisdiction also is prescribed under sub-section (1) to the extent that the officer can investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such police station would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. However, subsection (2) makes the position clear by providing that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called into question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered to investigate. After the investigation is completed, the result of such investigation is required to be submitted as provided under Sections 168, 169 and 170. Section 170 specifically provides that if, upon an investigation, it appears to the officer in charge of the police station that there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, such officer shall forward the accused under custody to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a police report and to try the accused or commit for trial. Further, if the investigating officer arrives at the conclusion that the crime was not committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station, then the FIR can be forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction over the area in which the crime is committed. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. 11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “jurisdiction of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials”. But this would not mean that in a case which requires investigation, the police officer can refuse to record the FIR and/or investigate it. 11. Chapter XIII of the Code provides for “jurisdiction of the criminal courts in enquiries and trials”. It is to be stated that under the said chapter there are various provisions which empower the court for enquiry or trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, enquired or tried. This would be clear by referring to Sections 177 to 188. For our purpose, it would suffice to refer only to Sections 177 and 178 which are as under: “177. Ordinary place of enquiry and trial.—Every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. 178. Place of enquiry or trial.— (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for an “ordinary” place of enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime. 13. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime. 13. This Court in State of W.B. v. S.N. Basak [ AIR 1963 SC 447 : (1963) 2 SCR 52 ] dealt with a similar contention wherein the High Court had held that the statutory powers of investigation given to the police under Chapter XIV were not available in respect of an offence triable under the West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Courts) Act, 1949 and hence the investigation was without jurisdiction. Reversing the said finding, it was held thus: “The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with the investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or the inherent power of the court under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the judiciary in regard to the statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. KhwajaNazir Ahmad [(1944) 71 IA 203, 212: AIR 1945 PC 18 ] (IA at p. 212) observed as follows— ‘The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act.’ With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the officer in charge of the police station.” 14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offence is disclosed the court will not normally interfere with an investigation into the case and will permit an investigation into the offence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, discloses the commission of an offence, the court does not normally stop the investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] It is also settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; it has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of the allegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370 , 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]. 15. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370 , 395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]. 15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of the investigation, the material collected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of the investigation that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceeding of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. 18. It was held in Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1 that once an investigation is commenced under Section 156(1), it cannot be interrupted on the ground that the Police Officer was not empowered. It was observed:- 24. From the aforesaid provisions it is quite clear that a police officer in charge of a police station can, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence which a court having jurisdiction over such police station can inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Subsection (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered under the section to investigate. Subsection (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation is commenced under sub-section (1), the same is not interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered under the section to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings clause” in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC to order an investigation under sub-section (1) of Section 202 CrPC, sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a complaint filed before him. 26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under Section 181(4) CrPC has not yet been reached. Prior to taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad had directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) CrPC and as it appears, a final report was submitted by the investigating agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since the alleged transactions had taken place within the territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action had arisen in the State of Gujarat and therefore, the investigation should be transferred to the police agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been entrusted with the investigation, had upon initial inquiries recommended that the investigation be transferred to the police agency of Mumbai. 27. In our view, both the trial court as well as the Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it was not within the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to refrain itself from holding a proper and complete investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 156 CrPC, the proceedings of the investigation could not be questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC without taking cognizance on the complaint and where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the Magistrate, a police officer empowered under subsection (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are unable to accept Mr Syed's submissions that the High Court had erred in upholding the order of the learned trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the submission that it was for the investigating officer in the course of the investigation to decide whether a particular court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not. 30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the stage of taking cognizance was yet to arrive. The investigating agency was required to place the facts elicited during the investigation before the court in order to enable the court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the part of the investigating agency to forward its report with the observation that since the entire cause of action for the alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation should be transferred to the police station concerned in Mumbai. 31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the process should issue on the facts disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his next course of action. 31. Section 156(3) CrPC contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether the process should issue on the facts disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case, there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his application for a loan with the Head Office of the Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the part of the investigating agency to make an observation that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, which was required to be transferred to the police station having jurisdiction to do so. 32. On the materials before him the learned Magistrate was fully justified in rejecting the final report submitted by the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime) and to order a fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any error in upholding the views expressed by the trial court. As mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) CrPC deals with the court's powers to inquire into or try an offence of criminal misappropriation or of a criminal breach of trust if the same has been committed or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the local jurisdiction of the said court. 33. The various decisions cited by Mr Syed, and in particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur case [ (1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] provide an insight into the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the investigating officer was entitled to transfer an investigation to a police station having jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to consider whether the investigating officer in respect of an investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) CrPC can file a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen outside his jurisdiction despite there being material available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested in the investigating authorities, under Section 156(1) CrPC, did not restrict the jurisdiction of the investigating agency to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike as in other cases, it was for the court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were placed before it.” 19. Even assuming that the police had no territorial jurisdiction it will not take away the jurisdiction of the Court taking the cognisance. In R.A.H. Siguran vs. Shankare Gowda 2017 (16) SCC 126 , the proceedings were quashed by the High Court on the ground that the police officer who had conducted the investigation was not competent to do so under provisions of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the investigation could not have been quashed on this ground. It was observed: “It is well-settled law that even if the investigation is not conducted by an authorized officer, the trial is not vitiated unless prejudice is shown. 10. In H.N. Rishbud and Anr. v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 , (1955) 1 SCR 1150 the question considered by this Court was whether after the court takes cognizance, a trial can be held to be initiated merely on the ground that investigation was invalid. Answering in the negative, this Court held that if the plea of invalidity of investigation is raised at a sufficiently early stage, the court, instead of taking cognizance direct reinvestigation by the competent investigating officer. But, after cognizance is taken the trial cannot be quashed for invalidity of investigation. 11. The observations in the said judgment are:- "9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. But, after cognizance is taken the trial cannot be quashed for invalidity of investigation. 11. The observations in the said judgment are:- "9. The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by the investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in an investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading "Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings". The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is, therefore, a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case, cognizance so taken is only in the nature of the error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case, cognizance so taken is only in the nature of the error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is in the following terms is attracted: "Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during the trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice." If therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to the investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Prabhu v. Emperor ( AIR 1944 PC 73 ) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. King ( AIR 1950 PC 26 ). These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of an investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both cases clearly show that the invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. 10. It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during the trial. 10. It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during the trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for. Such a course is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of the Code as appears from Section 202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order an investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the adoption of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent powers of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at the trial is virtually in the position of a Magistrate trying a warrant case. When the attention of the Court is called to such an illegality at a very early stage it would not be fair to the accused not to obviate the prejudice that may have been caused thereby, by appropriate orders, at that stage but to leave him to the ultimate remedy of waiting till the conclusion of the trial and of discharging the somewhat difficult burden under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of making out that such an error has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice. It is relevant in this context to observe that even if the trial had proceeded to a conclusion and the accused had to make out that there was, in fact, a failure of justice as the result of such an error, an explanation to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the fact of the objection having been raised at an early stage of the proceeding is a pertinent factor. To ignore the breach in such a situation when brought to the notice of the Court would be virtually to make a dead letter of the peremptory provision which has been enacted on grounds of public policy for the benefit of such an accused. It is true that the peremptory provision itself allows an officer of a lower rank to make the investigation if permitted by the Magistrate. It is true that the peremptory provision itself allows an officer of a lower rank to make the investigation if permitted by the Magistrate. But this is not an indication by the Legislature that an investigation by an officer of a lower rank without such permission cannot be said to cause prejudice. When a Magistrate is approached for granting such permission he is expected to satisfy himself that there are good and sufficient reasons for authorising an officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation. The granting of such permission is not to be treated by a Magistrate as a mere matter of routine but it is an exercise of his judicial discretion having regard to the policy underlying it. In our opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of the trial the Court have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer, as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act. It is in the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise of the objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of the Act has to be decided and the course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined." 12. The above view has been repeatedly followed in subsequent decisions of this Court. In Union of India and Ors. represented through Superintendent of Police v. T. Nathamuni, (2014) 16 SCC 285 , the position was discussed as follows:- "12. It is clear that in the case of an investigation under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, an officer below the rank of Inspector cannot investigate without the order of a competent Magistrate. In the present case, the order of the Special Judge was obtained by filing an application. That order dated 24-9-2009 shows that it was passed on request and in the interest of justice, investigation pursuant to such order did not suffer from want of jurisdiction and hence, in the facts of the case, the High Court erred in law in interfering with such investigation more so when it was already completed. 13. The question raised by the respondent is well answered by this Court in a number of decisions rendered from a different perspective. 13. The question raised by the respondent is well answered by this Court in a number of decisions rendered from a different perspective. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorised by law has been held to be irregular. Indisputably, by the order of the Magistrate investigation was conducted by the Sub-Inspector, CBI who, after completion of an investigation, submitted the charge sheet. It was only during the trial, that an objection was raised by the respondent that the order passed by the Magistrate permitting the Sub- Inspector, CBI to investigate is without jurisdiction. Consequently, the investigation conducted by the officer is vitiated in law. Curiously enough the respondent has not made out a case that by reason of the investigation conducted by the Sub- Inspector a serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice has been caused. It is well settled that the invalidity of the investigation does not vitiate the result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. 14. In M.C. Sulkunte v. State of Mysore [ (1970) 3 SCC 513 ], the main question raised by the appellant in an appeal against the order of conviction was that the sanction to investigate the offence given by the Magistrate was not proper inasmuch as he had not recorded any reason as to why he had given permission to the Inspector of Police to investigate the offence of criminal misconduct of obtaining illegal gratification. Considering Section 5-A of the Act, Their Lordships observed: (SCC p. 517, para 15) "15. Although laying the trap was part of the investigation and it had been done by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, it cannot on that ground be held that the sanction was invalid or that the conviction ought not to be maintained on that ground. It has been emphasised in a number of decisions of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must be shown that there has been a miscarriage of justice as a result of an irregular investigation. The observations in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [1959 Supp (2) SCR 201], at pp. 210-11 to the effect that when the Magistrate without applying his mind only mechanically issues the order giving permission the investigation is tainted cannot help the appellant before us." 15. The observations in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [1959 Supp (2) SCR 201], at pp. 210-11 to the effect that when the Magistrate without applying his mind only mechanically issues the order giving permission the investigation is tainted cannot help the appellant before us." 15. In Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn [ (1971) 2 SCC 48 ], this Court was considering the question with regard to the irregularity in an investigation for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Following earlier decisions, this Court held: (SCC p. 52, para 14) "14. From the above proposition it follows that where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation will not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby and the accused has been prejudiced. Assuming in favour of the appellant, that there was an irregularity in the investigation and that Section 5-A of the Act was not complied with in substance, the trial by the Special Judge cannot be held to be illegal unless it is shown that miscarriage of justice has been caused on account of the illegal investigation. The learned counsel for the appellant has been unable to show us how there has been any miscarriage of justice in this case and how the accused has been prejudiced by any irregular investigation." 16. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], this Court while considering Section 5-A of the Act, held as under: (SCC pp. 384-85, para 119) "119. It has been ruled by this Court in several decisions that Section 5-A of the Act is mandatory and not a directory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality but that illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial and where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. See (1) H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [ AIR 1955 SC 196 ], (2) Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1961 SC 1762 ], (3) Munnalal v. State of U.P [ AIR 1964 SC 28 ], (4) Sailendranath Bose v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1968 SC 1292 ], (5) Muni Lal v. Delhi Admn. [ (1971) 2 SCC 48 ] and (6) Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [ (1972) 3 SCC 786 ]. However, in Rishbud case [ AIR 1955 SC 196 ] and Muni Lal case [ (1971) 2 SCC 48 ], it has been ruled that if any breach of the said mandatory proviso relating to the investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders as may be called for to rectify the illegality and cure the defects in the investigation." 17. In A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Admn [ (1973) 1 SCC 726 ], provisions of Section 5-A were again considered by this Court and held as under (SCC p. 735, para 15) "15. As the foregoing discussion shows the investigation in the present case by the Deputy Superintendent of Police cannot be considered to be in any way unauthorised or contrary to the law. In this connection, it may not be out of place also to point out that the function of investigation is merely to collect evidence and any irregularity or even illegality in the course of collection of evidence can scarcely be considered by itself to affect the legality of the trial by an otherwise competent court of the offence so investigated. In H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [ AIR 1955 SC 196 ], it was held that illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination of the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. When any breach of the mandatory provisions relating to the investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial the Court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such reinvestigation as may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer, as it considers appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This decision was followed in Munnalal v. State of U.P. [ AIR 1964 SC 28 ] where the decision in State of M.P. v. Mubarak Ali [ AIR 1959 SC 707 ], was distinguished. The same view was taken in State of A.P. v. N. Venugopal [ AIR 1964 SC 33 ] and more recently in Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [ (1972) 3 SCC 786 ]. The decisions of the Calcutta, Punjab and Saurashtra High Courts relied upon by Mr Anthony deal with different points: in any event, to the extent, they contain any observations against the view expressed by this Court in the decisions just cited those observations cannot be considered good law." 13. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings merely on the ground that the investigation was not valid. It is not necessary for this Court to go into the question raised by learned counsel for the appellants that there was no infirmity in the investigation.” 20. Therefore, it is not permissible to quash the proceedings at this stage simply on the ground that it was not conducted by a properly authorized person. 21. The challan has been filed for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 466, 468, 471, 506 and 120-B of IPC on the premise that the admission form of Mishri Sharma mentions the informant as her father, therefore, the document is forged. This document was forged by the petitioners and the forged document was used for cheating. 22. The term forgery has been defined in Section 463 of IPC as under: "463. This document was forged by the petitioners and the forged document was used for cheating. 22. The term forgery has been defined in Section 463 of IPC as under: "463. Forgery.--Whoever makes any false documents or electronic record part of a document or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery." 23. It is apparent from the definition that a person has to make a false document before he can be said to have committed forgery. Making a false document is defined in Section 464 of IPC. It reads as under: 464. Making a false document.—A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record— First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently— (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; (c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, With the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly.—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration. 24. 24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohammed Ibrahim versus State of Bihar 2009 (8) SCC 751 that the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had forged a document by creating a false document to establish the offence of forgery. A false document is when a document is executed claiming to be executed by someone else or authorised by someone else or a document is tampered or signatures are obtained by practising deception. It was observed:- “[10] An analysis of section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 10.1) The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 10.2) The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 10.3) The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not because of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. [11] In short, a person is said to have made a 'false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered with a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.” 25. In the cited case, the prosecution alleged that the accused had executed a sale deed regarding the property over which he had no right. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is a distinction between a document whose contents are false and a document which is itself false within the definition of Section 464 of IPC. In the cited case, the prosecution alleged that the accused had executed a sale deed regarding the property over which he had no right. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is a distinction between a document whose contents are false and a document which is itself false within the definition of Section 464 of IPC. A document containing false averment does not attract the provision of Criminal Law and the accused cannot be held liable for executing the sale deed by claiming to be the owner when he was not the owner. It was observed:- “[12] The sale deeds executed by the first appellant, clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of 'false documents'. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of complainant's land (and that accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor colluded with first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on the owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bonafide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under the first category of 'false documents', it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such a document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not an execution of a false document as defined under section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code is attracted”. 26. In Mir Nagvi Askari Vs CBI 2009 (15) SCC 643 the accused was charged with making false entries in the record of the bank. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that making wrong entries by itself will not attract criminal liability unless it is proved that the document was false within the meaning of Section 464 of IPC. It was observed:- “[229] A person is said to make a false document or record if he satisfies one of the three conditions as noticed hereinbefore and provided for under the said section. The first condition being that the document has been falsified with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document has been made by a person, by whom the person falsifying the document knows that it was not made. Clearly, the documents in question in the present case, even if it be assumed to have been made dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that they were made by or under the authority of someone else. [230] The second criterion of the section deals with a case where a person without lawful authority alters a document after it has been made. There has been no allegation of alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made. Therefore in our opinion, the second criterion of the said section is also not applicable to the present case. There has been no allegation of alteration of the voucher in question after they have been made. Therefore in our opinion, the second criterion of the said section is also not applicable to the present case. [231] The third and final condition of Section 464 deals with a document, signed by a person who due to his mental capacity does not know the contents of the documents which were made i.e because of intoxication or unsoundness of mind etc. Such is also not the case before us. Indisputably therefore the accused before us could not have been convicted for the making of a false document. [232] The learned Special Judge, therefore, in our opinion, erred in holding that the accused had prepared a false document, which clearly, having regard to the provisions of the law, could not have been done. [233] Further, the offence of forgery deals with the making of a false document with the specific intentions enumerated therein. The said section has been reproduced below. "463. Forgery.--Whoever makes any false documents or electronic record part of a document or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery." [234] However, since we have already held that the commission of the said offence has not been convincingly established, the accused could not have been convicted for the offence of forgery. The definition of "false document" is a part of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read together. [Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration, 1963 Supp2 SCR 585]”. 27. It was further held that in the absence of the document being forged a person cannot be convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 471 of IPC. It was observed:- “[235] Accordingly, the accused could not have been tried for an offence under Section 467 which deals with forgery of valuable securities, will etc. or Section 471, i.e., using as genuine a forged document or Section 477-A, i.e, falsification of accounts. The conviction of the accused for the said offences is accordingly set aside”. 28. This question was also considered in Sheila Sebastian versus R Jawaharaj & Anr ETC. or Section 471, i.e., using as genuine a forged document or Section 477-A, i.e, falsification of accounts. The conviction of the accused for the said offences is accordingly set aside”. 28. This question was also considered in Sheila Sebastian versus R Jawaharaj & Anr ETC. 2018 (7) SCC 581 and it was held that unless the ingredients of Section 464 of IPC are satisfied a person cannot be convicted for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 465 of IPC. It was observed:- “[26] The definition of "false document" is a part of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read together. 'Forgery' and 'Fraud' are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case at hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial Court that the respondents have made any false document or part of the document/record to execute the mortgage deed under the guise of that 'false document'. Hence, neither respondent no.1 nor respondent no.2 can be held as makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In such an event the trial court, as well as the appellate court, misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settled legal position and we find no reason to interfere with the same”. 29. In the present case, the allegations in the complaint are that the contents of the admission form are false inasmuch as they mention the informant as the father which is an incorrect fact. Even if it is accepted to be correct, the same will not make the document a forged document since there is no allegation that it was purported to be written by some person by whom it was not written or that it was altered after it was written or its execution was obtained under the circumstances enumerated in Section 465 of IPC. Therefore, the document does not specify the requirement of it being a forged document. Hence, the offences punishable under Sections 466, 468, and 477 of IPC are not made out as per the allegations made in the FIR even assuming them to be correct. 30. Therefore, the document does not specify the requirement of it being a forged document. Hence, the offences punishable under Sections 466, 468, and 477 of IPC are not made out as per the allegations made in the FIR even assuming them to be correct. 30. The ingredients of cheating were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241 as under: “10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property; or (b) the person so deceived should be intentionally induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) in cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind, reputation or property. 11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [ (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15) “15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.” (emphasis supplied) 12. Finding that the ingredients of the offence of cheating and its allied offences had not been made out, this Court interfered with the order of the High Court and quashed the criminal proceedings. 13. In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [ (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] this Court in para 7 has stated thus: (SCC pp. 696-97) “7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must ‘dishonestly’ or ‘fraudulently’ induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116] a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, ‘mens rea’ on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1954 SC 724 : 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.” (emphasis supplied) 14. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [ (1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] dealing with the effect of existence of arbitration clause in the agreement on criminal prosecution on the ground that civil proceedings are also maintainable, this Court has held that quashing of FIR or a complaint exercising power under Section 482 CrPC should be limited to a very extreme exception; merely because an act has a civil profile is not enough to stop action on the criminal side. It is further held that a provision made in the agreement for referring the disputes to arbitration is not an effective substitute for a criminal prosecution when the disputed act constitutes a criminal offence. 31. A similar view was taken in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 as under: “4. “Cheating” is defined in Section 415 of the Penal Code, 1860 which provides as under: “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” 5. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860 deals with the offences against properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the definition relates to property, the second part does not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below: “415. … intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.” 6. This part speaks of intentional deception which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. This part speaks of intentional deception which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of a dominant motive of the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such an act or omission should have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or property. 7. As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must “dishonestly” or “fraudulently” induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do a thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [ AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116: 1956 SCR 483 ] a guilty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure the conviction of a person for the offence of cheating, “mens rea” on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B. [ AIR 1954 SC 724 : 1954 Cri LJ 1806] that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered. 8. Thus, so far as the second part of Section 415 is concerned, “property”, at no stage, is involved. Here it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant, as a result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as a result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram [(1882) 2 AWN 237], it was held by Mahmood, J.: “That to palm off a young woman as belonging to a caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defined in Section 416 of the Penal Code, 1860, which must be read in the light of the preceding Section 415.” 32. In the present case, there is nothing to show which person was induced to deliver any property. Even if it is accepted as correct that a misrepresentation was made regarding the paternity of a girl, there is no evidence the school would not have given admission to her but for the representation made in the admission form. No other fact was disclosed that the accused had made a misrepresentation of any kind to any person and that person was induced to deliver the property to the petitioners. 33. The FIR has also been lodged for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC. 34. Criminal intimidation is provided in Section 503 of IPC as under:- 503. Criminal intimidation Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation-A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section. 35. It is apparent from the bare perusal of this Section that a person should have threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property, or the person or reputation of any person to whom that person is interested. 35. It is apparent from the bare perusal of this Section that a person should have threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property, or the person or reputation of any person to whom that person is interested. Such threat of injury should have been with an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do. The complainant did not state that any alarm was caused in his mind. He has not stated that he was prevented from doing something, which he was legally bound to do or omitted to do. Hence, the necessary ingredient of Section 503 of IPC is not satisfied. 36. It was laid down by this Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract Section 506 of IPC. It was observed: 21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie, that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case), intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party i. e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his exclusive property would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation. 37. Similar is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vikram Johar Versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr 2019 (14) SCC 207 wherein it was held:- [24] In another judgment, i.e., Manik Taneja and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Another, 2015 7 SCC 423 , this Court has again occasion to examine the ingredients of Sections 503 and 506. In the above case also, the case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 I.P.C. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paragraphs Nos. 11 and 12:- "11. In the above case also, the case was registered for the offence under Sections 353 and 506 I.P.C. After noticing Section 503, which defines criminal intimidation, this Court laid down the following in paragraphs Nos. 11 and 12:- "11. Xxxxxxxxxxxxx A reading of the definition of "criminal intimidation" would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. 12. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "criminal intimidation". The threat must be with the intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But the material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the mind of the second respondent causing obstruction in the discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of the appellants posting a comment on Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC." [25] In the above case, an allegation was that the appellant had abused the complainant. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506. The Court held that the mere fact that the allegation that the accused had abused the complainant does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 506. xxxx [27] Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is an offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande (supra) has also to be applied when the question of finding out whether the ingredients of offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes, 27th Edition with regard to proof of offence states the following: - "....The prosecution must prove: (i) That the accused threatened some person. (ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested; (iii) That he did so with the intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat." A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above. 38. This position was reiterated in Mohammad Wajid Vs. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951 and it was held that the intent to cause alarm to another is necessary to attract the offence punishable under section 506 og IPC. It was observed:- 26. Section 506 reads thus:— “Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. 38. This position was reiterated in Mohammad Wajid Vs. State of U.P. 2023 SCC Online SC 951 and it was held that the intent to cause alarm to another is necessary to attract the offence punishable under section 506 og IPC. It was observed:- 26. Section 506 reads thus:— “Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. — Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with a fine, or with both; If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.— And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.” 27. An offence under Section 503 has the following essentials:— 1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. 2) The threat must be with intent; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. 28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised self-control or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant. 29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:— “To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant. 39. In the present case, the complaint does not mention that any alarm was intended to be caused or was in fact caused. The allegations are happily vague. It was only mentioned that whenever the informant goes to Chowari to meet his son, the petitioners do not permit him to enter inside the house. They quarrel with him, abuse him and threaten to call the police. They also threaten to kill him and his mother. The date, time and place of the incident were not mentioned. It was also not mentioned which of the petitioners had abused the informant or had given threats as mentioned in the complaint. It was also not mentioned that any alarm was caused to the informant by the threats advanced by the petitioners. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 506 of IPC are also not satisfied. 40. The FIR has also been lodged for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC, however, it has not been mentioned as to what kind of illegal act was done by the petitioners. If the illegal act was entering the name of the informant in the school record of Mishri, the same is not an offence as shown above. Hence, no offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC is made out. 41. In view of the above, the complaint does not disclose the commission of any cognisable offence. If the illegal act was entering the name of the informant in the school record of Mishri, the same is not an offence as shown above. Hence, no offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC is made out. 41. In view of the above, the complaint does not disclose the commission of any cognisable offence. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and FIR No. 360 of 2018, dated 22.7.2018, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 and 120-B of IPC, registered at Police Station Una, District Una, H.P. and the consequent proceedings arising out of the same are ordered to be quashed.