JUDGMENT : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHASH CHAND 1. This Criminal Revision has been preferred against the impugned judgment dated 30.06.2023 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bokaro in Misc. Criminal Application No.316 of 2023 in connection with S.T. Case No.42 of 2023 arising out of Sector VI P.S. Case No.20 of 2022, whereby the learned Court below has rejected the discharge application of the petitioner. 2. The brief facts leading to this Criminal Revision are that the informant, namely, Reji K. John gave the written information with the police station concerned with these allegations that on 27.04.2022 in the night at 09:00 O’clock, he along with his friend Rajiv Kumar was going to Sector-VI shopping center, from there, they were coming back by his Scooty at 09:30 O’clock in the night, amid the way, near Sector-V/ C B-type quarter, one white colour Maruti Swift Car came, in which, Avinash Unnithan, Abhishek Unnithan, the petitioner herein and Sanjiv Kumar, all three were boarded and all three were made effort to intercept his Scooty. All three, who were boarded in the Swift Car asked to stop the Scooty but he did not stop the same. The car, which was being driven by Avinash Unnithan overtook their Scooty. Thereafter, the persons who were boarded in the Car with intention to cause his murder dashed from behind to the Scooty, whereby he and his friend Rajeev fell down and Rajeev sustained serious injury. Thereafter, the informant and his friend Rajeev both rushed to B.G.H. Hospital. Abhishek, Avinash and Sanjeev all three had earlier criminally intimidated him on the issue related to Shree Ayyappa Public School. The ribs and the left hand wrist of Rajeev Kumar were also fractured and he sustained grievous injury. On this, Case Crime No.20 of 2022 was registered under Sections 323, 325, 307, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code against the three accused persons, namely, Avinash Unnithan, Avinash Unnithan and Sanjiv Kumar with Sector-VI Police Station, Bokaro. 3. The Investigating Officer exonerated Sanjiv Kumar and Avinash Unnithan for lack of evidence while filed charge-sheet against only one accused, namely, Abhishek Unnithan, the petitioner herein for the offence under Sections 323, 325, 307, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate after conducting the enquiry committed the case for trial to the Court of Sessions Judge, Bokaro. 4. The learned Magistrate after conducting the enquiry committed the case for trial to the Court of Sessions Judge, Bokaro. 4. The trial commenced before the Court of Sessions Judge, Bokaro against the accused Abhishek Unnithan. During trial, the discharge application was moved on behalf of the accused Abhishek Unnithan, the same was rejected by the learned Court below by passing the impugned order dated 30.06.2023. 5. Aggrieved from the impugned order dated 30.06.2023, this Criminal Revision has been preferred before this Court on the ground that the learned Court below has rejected the application for discharge in mechanical way while there is no sufficient ground from the allegations made in the FIR and the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer. The impugned order suffers from irregularity since the learned Court below has ignored the materials available on record, from which, no charge against the petitioner is made out. In view of the above, prayed to allow this Criminal Revision and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Court below. 6. I have heard Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.Vijay Kumar Sinha, learned APP appearing on behalf of the State and perused the materials available on record. 7. It is the settled law that while framing charge, the Court has to take into consideration the allegations made in the F.I.R. and also the evidence collected by the I.O. i.e., oral or documentary during the investigation. If from the allegations made in the F.I.R. and the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer during investigation, there is sufficient ground to proceed, the Court should decline to allow the discharge application. If from the cumulative evidence i.e., oral and documentary collected during the investigation and the allegations made in the F.I.R., the Court is of the definite opinion that there is no ground to proceed against the trial; the application for the discharge may be allowed. It is also well settled law that while framing the charge the Court neither can appreciate the evidence nor can conduct the mini trial. The marshaling of the evidence or the appraisal of the evidence is not permissible at that stage. 8. It is also well settled law that while framing the charge the Court neither can appreciate the evidence nor can conduct the mini trial. The marshaling of the evidence or the appraisal of the evidence is not permissible at that stage. 8. Herein, it is pertinent to mention here the judicial pronouncement made by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which are being reproduced hereinbelow: 8.1 The Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Palwinder Singh vs. Balwinder Singh & Ors. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 504 at paragraph 13 has held as under : “13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it entered into the realm of appreciation of evidence at the stage of the framing of the charges itself. The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge while exercising power under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is limited. Charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that point of time. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi wherein it was held as under: “23. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. Satish Mehra case [Satish Mehra v. Delhi Admn. holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided.” 8.2 The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CBI v. Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff reported in (2009) 16 SCC 429 at paragraph 2 has held as under : “2. By the impugned order, the Special Court has discharged the accused Raghunath Lekhraj Wadhwa, Jitendra Ratilal Shroff and Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff from Special Case No. 4 of 1997. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the Special Court has virtually passed an order of acquittal in the garb of an order of discharge. By the impugned order, the Special Court has discharged the accused Raghunath Lekhraj Wadhwa, Jitendra Ratilal Shroff and Mukesh Pravinchandra Shroff from Special Case No. 4 of 1997. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it would appear that the Special Court has virtually passed an order of acquittal in the garb of an order of discharge. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of the charge, what is required to be seen is as to whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In our view, the Special Court was not justified in discharging the aforesaid accused persons.” 8.3 The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vikram Johar vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2019 SC 2109 at paragraph 19 has held as under : “19. It is, thus, clear that while considering the discharge application, the Court is to exercise its judicial mind to determine whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the Court is not to hold the mini trial by marshalling the evidence.” 8.4 The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another reported in 2010(2) SCC 398 at paragraphs 11 and 25 has held as under : “11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 25. As discussed earlier, Section 227 in the new Code confers special power on the Judge to discharge an accused at the threshold if upon consideration of the records and documents, he finds that “there is not sufficient ground” for proceeding against the accused. In other words, his consideration of the record and documents at that stage is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, his consideration of the record and documents at that stage is for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228, if not, he will discharge the accused. This provision was introduced in the Code to avoid wastage of public time when a prima facie case was not disclosed and to save the accused from avoidable harassment and expenditure.” 8.5 The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Jit Tejpal vs. The State of Goa & Anr. reported in 2019(4) East Cr C 208 (SC) at paragraphs 9.1 to 9.5 has held as under : “9.1 In the case of N. Suresh Rajan (Supra) this Court had an occasion to consider in detail the scope of the proceedings at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 CrPC. After considering earlier decisions of this Court on the point thereafter in paragraph 29 to 31 this Court has observed and held as under: "29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat vs. State of U.P. [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52 ], in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507] : (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case [ (2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52 ], SCC p. 482, para 15) "15. 11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. (Onkar Nath case [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507], SCC p. 565, para 11)" (emphasis in original) 31. (Onkar Nath case [ (2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507], SCC p. 565, para 11)" (emphasis in original) 31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310], relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it "considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless". The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction". 31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay [ (1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256]. The same reads as follows: (SCC pp. 755-56, para 43) "43. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of prima facie case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed." 9.2 In the subsequent decision in the case of S. Selvi (Supra) this Court has summarised the principles while framing of the charge at the stage of Section 227/228 of the CrPC. This Court has observed and held in paragraph 6 and 7 as under: "6. This Court has observed and held in paragraph 6 and 7 as under: "6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments including [Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609], Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State of Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310], Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI [Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371], State vs. A. Arun Kumar [State vs. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505], Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta vs. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265], State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688], Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs vs. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial. 7. In [Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371], this Court on consideration of the various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, laid down the following principles: (SCC pp. 376-77, para 21) "(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face 8/31/23, 3:08 PM Tarun Jit Tejpal VS State Of Goa about: blank 8/10 value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."" 9.3 In the case of Mauvin Godinho (Supra) this Court had an occasion to consider how to determine prima facie case while framing the charge under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In the same decision this Court observed and held that while considering the prima facie case at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227 of the CrPC there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 9.4 At this stage the decision of this Court in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad (Supra) is also required to be referred to. In that aforesaid decision this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of enquiry at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In paragraphs 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision are as under : "11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on the contentions urged for the parties, provides: "227. In paragraphs 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision are as under : "11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on the contentions urged for the parties, provides: "227. Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." 12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257 ], Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope of the said sections observed: [SCR p. 259 : SCC pp. 41-42 : SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36, para 4] Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously Judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 13. In Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229 ], Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles: [SCR pp. 234-35 : SCC p. 9 : SCC (Cri) pp. 613-14, para 10] " (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused had been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." 14. These two decisions do not lay down different principles. Prafulla Kumar case [ (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229 ] has only reiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case [ (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257 ]. In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into." 9.5 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and considering the scope of enquiry at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 if the CrPC, we are of the opinion that the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on merits, at this stage, are not required to be considered. Whatever submissions are made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial. Some of the submissions may be considered to be the defence of the accused. Some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. Some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. On considering the material on record, we are of the opinion that there is more than a prima facie case against the accused for which he is required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against the accused and therefore the learned Trial Court has rightly framed the charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for.” 9. In support of the allegations made in the FIR, the re-statement of the informant was recorded in paragraph No.4 of the case diary under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in which, he reiterated all those allegations as made in the FIR. 10. In paragraph No.9 of the case diary, the statement of Shivdashan was recorded, in which, he stated that he had received telephonic information from Reji K. John over the phone that Avinash and Abhishek had dashed their car to his Scooty near Sector-VI shopping center, having received information, he along with Tulsi Dharamal Pillai reached at that place, where it was told by them that while they were coming, dashed by the accused persons, wherein Reji K. John sustained simple injury while Rajeev had sustained grievous injury and they rushed to the Hospital. The ribs and the bone of the left hand wrist of Rajeev were fractured and also sustained head injury. 11. In paragraph No.10 of the case diary, same kind of statement was given by Tulsidharan Pillai, who also accompanied Shivdharan after having received a phone call and Shivdashan went to the place of occurrence and took the injured person to the hospital. 12. 11. In paragraph No.10 of the case diary, same kind of statement was given by Tulsidharan Pillai, who also accompanied Shivdharan after having received a phone call and Shivdashan went to the place of occurrence and took the injured person to the hospital. 12. In paragraph No.31 of the case diary, the statement of the injured Rajeev Kumar was recorded, in which, he stated that on 27.04.2022 in the night at 09:00 O’clock he along with his friend Reji K. John was coming by the Scooty from the shopping center while at 09:30 O’clock when they reached near Cricent School, a while colour Maruti Car, in which, Abhishek, Avinash, both were boarded having opened the glass of the car, hurled abuse to them in Kerala language and asked to stop the Scooty but he asked his friend not to stop the same, therefore, they were overtook the Scooty and dashed near Sector-VI Shambhu More to the Scooty. Those, who were boarded in the Car with intention to commit murder dashed the Scooty from behind, whereby he and his friend sustained injury, his ribs and left-hand wrist fractured and also sustained head injury. His friend sustained simple injury. They rushed to the Hospital by Shivdashan and Tulsidharan. There was dispute that the accused persons were having enmity on account of Sree Ayyappa Public School. 13. The injury report of Bokaro General Hospital of the injured Rajeev Kumar is shown at paragraph Nos.48 and 59 of the case diary, in which, injury No.1, Lacerated wound left hand 3x2 cm Dorso-lateral region; injury No.2, Abrasion on left elbow, left forearm and left shoulder and; injury No.3, Xray No.71562 dated 27.04.2022 shows fracture 5th metacarpal bone left hand and 6” to 9” rib fracture left side. 14. In view of paragraph No.59 of the case diary, the injuries are grievous in nature caused by hard and blunt object. 15. In view of the statement of Suresh Babu and Pankaj Kumar, both the accused, namely, Avinash Unnithan and Sanjeev Kumar were exonerated by the Investigating Officer due to lack of evidence while the charge sheet was filed against Abhishek Unnithan. 16. 15. In view of the statement of Suresh Babu and Pankaj Kumar, both the accused, namely, Avinash Unnithan and Sanjeev Kumar were exonerated by the Investigating Officer due to lack of evidence while the charge sheet was filed against Abhishek Unnithan. 16. From the allegations made in the FIR and the evidence collected by the Investigating Officer, it is found that there is evidence against the petitioner Abhishek Unnithan against whom the injured Rajeev Kumar and the informant Reji K. John, both have specifically stated that while they were coming by the Scooty, three persons, who were boarded in the White Colour Swift Car, Abhishek Unnithan after having opened the window of the Car had asked them to stop the Scooty but the same was not stopped by them. The statement of informant, namely, Reji K. John and the injured, namely, Rajeev Kumar both had also corroborated the statement of Shivdashan and Tulsidharan, who immediately reached at the place of occurrence after having received the phone call and took both the injured persons to the hospital. They also corroborated the prosecution story though their source of knowledge is what was told by both the injured to them. The injury report is also there, where the injured Rajeev Kumar has sustained grievous in injuries 6th to 9th ribs and the 5th metacarpal bone of the left hand was also fractured. The injury report is shown at paragraph No.59 of the case diary. 17. Abhishek Unnithan and Avinash both were boarded in the car having opened the glass of the window had abused them in Kerala language and asked to stop the scooty but the same was not stopped on insistence of Rajiv Kumar, who was pillion rider on the scooty. Therefore, the car was overtook by the driver of the car and dashed the scooty near Shambhu More and it is stated that those, those who were boarded in the car had intention to commit murder but nothing is stated by both the injured witnesses in regard to the intention of those persons, who were boarded in the car including the petitioner. The only role attributed to the petitioner is that he was boarded in the car and hurled abuse in Kerala language and asked to the scooty driver Reji K. John and Rajiv Kumar both to stop the scooty. The only role attributed to the petitioner is that he was boarded in the car and hurled abuse in Kerala language and asked to the scooty driver Reji K. John and Rajiv Kumar both to stop the scooty. Thereafter, the driver of the car dashed to the scooty from behind. There is no evidence collected by the Investigating Officer that the petitioner was driver of car, who dashed to the scooty. There is also no evidence in regard to the exhortation on behalf of the petitioner or abetting the driver of the car to dash the same to the scooty. From the allegations made in the FIR, no offence under Sections 323, 325 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. But from the allegations made in the FIR and the re-statement of the informant Reji K. John the only offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is made out. 18. In view of the allegations made in the F.I.R., the cumulative evidence collected by the I.O. during investigation i.e., oral as well as documentary and the settled propositions of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, there is no evidence against the petitioner in regard to the commission of alleged offence under Sections 323, 325 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The only offence, which is made out from the allegations made in the FIR and the re-statement of the Reji K. John, under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is made out against the petitioner. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the learned Court below needs interference and this Criminal Revision deserves to be allowed partly. 19. Accordingly, this Criminal Revision is, hereby, partly allowed to the extent that the offence under Sections 323, 325 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out and the offence under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code is affirmed. As such, the impugned order passed by the learned lower Court is set aside to that extent. 20. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned Court concerned through ‘FAX’