JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J 1. This criminal appeal filed under Section 374(2) of CrPC at the instance of the accused-appellant herein is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.10.2018, passed by the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja (C.G.), in Sessions Case No.505 of 1994 (State of Chhattisgarh v. Bhushan Singh and others), whereby he has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.100/- and, in default of payment of fine amount, sentenced to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 months. 2. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 15.06.1993, at about 03:30 PM, in front of the office of Shyam Jal Sansadhan Mandal, Gandhi Nagar, Ambikapur, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Ambikapur, District Surguja (CG), the accused appellant herein along with 08 other co-accused (who stand acquitted by the learned trial Court) firstly constituted unlawful assembly and shared common intention of killing one Nilesh Singh and, in furtherance thereof, assaulted Nilesh Singh (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) by means of iron rod, due to which, he suffered grievous injuries and died on the same day and, thereby said to have committed offences under Sections 148, 302/149 (in alternative 302) & 352/149 (in alternative 352) of IPC. 3. It is further case of the prosecution that when Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) reported the matter to the police, merg intimation (Ex.P/37) and FIR (Ex.P/26) were registered and wheels of investigation started running, in which, summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/01 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/02. Panchnama and spot map were also prepared vide Ex.P/22 & Ex.P/28 respectively. The dead-body of deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. M.K. Jaiswal (PW-08) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/11), cause of death of the deceased is coma due to shock as a result of head injury. The appellant-accused was arrested and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P/29. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, weapon of the offence i.e. rod has been seized vide Ex.P/30. However, the aforesaid seized rod has not been sent for chemical analysis nor any FSL report has been brought on record for the reasons best known to the prosecution. The appellant-accused was arrested and his memorandum statement was recorded vide Ex.P/29. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, weapon of the offence i.e. rod has been seized vide Ex.P/30. However, the aforesaid seized rod has not been sent for chemical analysis nor any FSL report has been brought on record for the reasons best known to the prosecution. Test Identification Parade was also conducted vide Ex.P/08, wherein acquitted co-accused, namely, Amrit Relwani was identified. After statements of witnesses were recorded and completion of the investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the appellant alongwith other acquitted co-accused in the competent criminal court having jurisdiction and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which, the appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated. 4. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 19 witnesses and exhibited 37, whereas the appellant-accused in support of his defence, though not examined any witness but exhibited 02 documents. 5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, proceeded to convict only the present appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced him as mentioned herein-above, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 6. Mr. V.K. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the said offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that the testimony of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) has partly been relied upon by the learned trial Court while convicting the present appellant only, whereas his testimony has partly been disbelieved while acquitting other 08 similarly situated co-accused persons, therefore, in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13 followed in the matter of Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State of Gujarat (2023) 9 SCC 164 , the testimony of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) has to be scrutinized by circumspection and has to be corroborated in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, which in this case is completely missing. Though in the present case, iron rod has been seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant, but witnesses to said memorandum (Ex.P/29) and seizure (Ex.P/31), namely, Ravindra Singh and Pitambar Singh have not been examined by the prosecution and, even the Sub-Inspector, who has affected the aforesaid memorandum and seizure, namely, R.K.S. Jaisindhu has also not been examined before the Court, which is clearly mentioned in Para-32 of the impugned judgment. Hence, in absence of such corroboration in material particulars, the present appeal deserves to be allowed and the appellant is liable to be acquitted of the said charge on basis of benefit of doubt. 7. Per-contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. In view of the statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/11), wherein it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is coma due to shock as a result of head injury, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. M.K. Jaiswal (PW-08). Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/11) and the statement of Dr. M.K. Jaiswal (PW-08), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 10. Now, the next question would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the author of the crime in question or not? 11. We hereby affirm the said finding. 10. Now, the next question would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the author of the crime in question or not? 11. In the case at hand, the conviction of the appellant is based on sole testimony of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12), who on the date and time of the offence was also present on the spot alongwith the deceased and the accused persons (including appellant), as he has accompanied the deceased to the office of Superintending Engineer, Gandhi Nagar, Ambikapur (place of incident). Further, FIR (Ex.P/15) has also been lodged at the instance of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) on 15.06.1993, wherein he has implicated the name of present appellant as also that of other co-accused persons, but in his statement before the Court, he only identified/implicated the present appellant while refused to identify other co-accused persons, which was made basis by the learned trial Court to acquit other co-accused persons [Para-46 of the judgment]. As such, it is clear that the learned trial Court has relied upon the testimony of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) to base the conviction of the appellant herein for the offence in question. 12. In this regard, decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Vadivelu Thevar (supra) followed in the matter of Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi (supra) deserves to be noticed herein below profitably: “10..... On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established: (1) As a general rule, a court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witness outweighs the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon, for example in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. (3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. 11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon 1 AIR 1957 SC 614 plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that “no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact”. The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar's Law of Evidence — 9th Edn., at pp. 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that “Evidence has to be weighed and not counted”. Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence, where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of a participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.” 13. A careful perusal of the above-quoted principle would show that their Lordships have classified the oral testimony of a eye-witness in three categories: (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. Their Lordships have further held that in first two categories, there is no difficulty in coming to its conclusion on either way about the guilty of the accused, but in the third category the courts has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. As such, in view of aforesaid legal position, we shall now come back to the facts of the present case to find out whether the statement of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12), which has partly been relied upon by the learned trial Court to convict the appellant, is further corroborated in material particulars or not. 14. In shape of corroboration, first of all, pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/29, iron rod has been seized vide Ex.P/30 and, as per query report (Ex.P/12), it has been opined by Dr. M.K. Jaiswal (PW-08) that the injuries found/inflicted over the body of the deceased might be possible by the said iron rod. 14. In shape of corroboration, first of all, pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellant recorded vide Ex.P/29, iron rod has been seized vide Ex.P/30 and, as per query report (Ex.P/12), it has been opined by Dr. M.K. Jaiswal (PW-08) that the injuries found/inflicted over the body of the deceased might be possible by the said iron rod. However, witnesses to said memorandum and seizure, namely, Ravindra Singh and Pitambar Singh have not been examined and the learned trial Court has also recorded its finding in this regard in Para-32 of the impugned judgment, which reads as under: ^^32@& izdj.k esa vfHk;kstu dks lk{; gsrq i;kZIr volj fn;s tkus dsmijkar Hkh mifujh{kd vkj0ds0,l0 t;flU/kq dk lk{; vfHk;kstu }kjkizdj.k esa ugha djk;k x;k gS rFkk eseksjs.Me izn'kZ ih0&29 rFkk tIrhi=d izn'kZ ih&30 ds Lora= lkf{k;ksa jfoUnz flag dh QkSr gks tkus ,oaihrkEcj flag ds vne irk gks tkus ls mudk ijh{k.k Hkh izdj.k esa ugha gqvk gSA ftlls mDr nLrkostksa dh varZZoLrq izdj.k esa izekf.kr ughagksdj izdj.k esa vuqla/kkudrkZ vf/kdkjh }kjk dh xbZ eseksjs.Me ,oa tIrhdh dk;Zokgh lansg ls ijs izekf.kr ugha gks ldh gSA** 15. The aforesaid finding of the learned trial Court clearly states that as witness No.01 to memorandum (Ex.P/29) and seizure (Ex.P/30), namely, Ravindra Singh has died and witness No.02, namely, Pitambar Singh could not be served, therefore, the said witnesses could not be examined and, further, the Sub-Inspector, namely, RKS Jaisindhu, who has affected the said memorandum (Ex.P/29) and seizure (Ex.P/30), despite giving several opportunity, could not be examined by the prosecution and, consequently, said memorandum (Ex.P/29) and seizure (Ex.P/30) could not be proved in accordance with law by the prosecution. 16. At this stage, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Baliraj Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2017) 14 SCC 291 may be noticed herein-below, in which, their Lordships have held that non-examination of the police officer who conducted seizure and subsequent improvement by one of the eye-witnesses casts a serious doubt on the prosecution’s case and observed in Para-13 as under: “13.…. It is settled proposition in criminal jurisprudence that ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. It is settled proposition in criminal jurisprudence that ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eyewitnesses[Solanki Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 2 SCC 174 ]. In this case the nature of injury, contradiction about the time of arrival of the witnesses, contradictions between the ocular and medical evidence, non-examination of Police officer who conducted seizure and subsequent improvement by one of the eye witness casts a serious doubt on the prosecution’s case. ” 17. In the present case also, except query report (Ex.P/12), wherein it has been opined that the injuries found/inflicted over the body of the deceased might be possible by the iron rod, which is said to have been seized from the appellant, there is no legal evidence available on record to show that it is only the present appellant who has caused the said injuries over the body of the deceased for the simple reason that on account of non-examination of the police office- RKS Jaisindhu and witnesses-Ravindra Singh and Pitambar Singh, the memorandum (Ex.P/29) of the appellant and seizure (Ex.P/30) of iron rod could not be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As such, though the testimony of Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) has been partly relied upon by the learned trial Court in order to convict the present appellant only, but his version could not be corroborated in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as held in Vadivelu Thevar (supra). Moreover, similarly situated co-accused persons, who have been named by Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) while lodging FIR (Ex.P/15), have been acquitted by the learned trial Court by giving them benefit of doubt on the ground that they have not been implicated/identified by Ajay Kumar Singh (PW-12) in his statement recorded before the Court, therefore, in light of the decision of Vadivelu Thevar (supra) and Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi (supra) same benefit of doubt shall also have to be extended in favour of the appellant herein and, consequently, he is liable to be acquitted of the charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. We hereby hold accordingly. 18. We hereby hold accordingly. 18. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC, as imposed upon him by the learned trial Court, is hereby set aside. He is acquitted of the said charges on the basis of benefit of doubt. Since the appellant is in jail, we direct that he be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter/crime. 19. This criminal appeal is allowed. 20. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned as well as to the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is languishing for necessary information and action, if any.