ORDER : 1) By way of this revision, the revisioner/applicant has made the following prayer(s):- “i. Quash/set-aside the impugned order dated 04.03.2023 passed by the learned trial court i.e. First Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 49-A/2021 and consequently the application filed under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of CPC may kindly be pleased to allow and dismiss the suit as prayed in the said application. ii. quash/set-aside the order 12.05.2023, whereas directed to maintain status and not comply the order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 14 of SARFAESI, Act.” 2) The revisioner has challenged the order passed by the Ist Additional District Judge, Bilaspur dated 04.03.2023 whereby the application moved by the applicant/defendant No. 6 under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of the CPC was rejected. 3) Facts of the present case are that defendants No. 2, 3 & 4 applied for a loan before respondent No.6/Bank of Rs. 60 lakhs and immovable property i.e. building situated at Patwari Circle No. 21/25, Plot No. 60/13, Diverted Sheet No. 31/18, ad-measuring 2400 sq ft. was mortgaged belonging to the plaintiff/respondent No.1. 4) There is no pleading concerning the loan transaction, but it appears that the loan was sanctioned in the year 2018. The loan was not repaid by the borrowers, therefore, notices were issued to the borrowers under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, the Act, 2002). 5) The letter of confirmation of mortgage was prepared on 21.02.2018, a memorandum of entry was also reduced into writing on 20.03.2018 and on the same date, a letter of undertaking was executed. The general form of guarantee, declaration-cum-undertaking-cum-authority dated 20.03.2018 and request for sanction of cash credit limit 20.03.2018 were executed between the bank, borrowers and the plaintiff. 6) The bank issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, 2002 and thereafter, an application under Section 14 of the Act, 2002 was moved before the District Magistrate which was allowed vide order dated 30.01.2023. Though an order was passed by the District Magistrate to hand over the possession to the Bank, the same was not complied with as an order of status quo was passed by the Civil Court vide order dated 12.05.2023. Though an order was passed by the District Magistrate to hand over the possession to the Bank, the same was not complied with as an order of status quo was passed by the Civil Court vide order dated 12.05.2023. 7) Learned counsel appearing for the revisioner/Bank argued that just to avoid the refund of the loan amount, a civil suit was filed by the plaintiff/respondent No.1. He further argued that according to Section 34 of the Act, 2002, the civil suit is not maintainable. He also argued that an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was moved before the Ld. Trial Court but the same was rejected on the ground that since there is an allegation of fraud against the plaintiff/respondent No.1, the Civil Suit cannot be dismissed. In support of his arguments, Mr. Ruparel placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Jagdish Singh v. Heeralal and others, (2013) 11 AD (SC) 624; Electrosteel Castings Limited v. UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and others, (2022) 2 SCC 573 ; Sree Ananndhakumar Mills Limited v. Indian Overseas Bank and others, (2019) 14 SCC 788. 8) On the other hand, the learned counsels appearing for the respondents submitted that the plaintiff was never a part of any transaction between the bank and defendants No. 2 to 4. They further submitted that respondents No. 2 to 4 in collusion with the bank, fabricated certain documents and mortgaged the property of the plaintiff. They also submitted that a notice was issued by the bank on 21.01.2023, thereafter, a civil suit was filed. The plaintiff has sought a declaration to the effect that the entire transaction including the documents executed between defendants No. 2 to 4 are null and void. They further argued that the plaintiff never mortgaged his property and fraudulently, documents were prepared by defendants No. 2 to 4. They also argued that Section 34 of the Act, 2002 would not attract as there are allegations of fraud and the suit would not be barred before the learned Civil Court by virtue of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. They also argued that Section 34 of the Act, 2002 would not attract as there are allegations of fraud and the suit would not be barred before the learned Civil Court by virtue of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In support of submissions, they placed reliance on the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts in the matters of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. And others v. Union of India and others and other connected matters (2004) 4 SCC 311 ; Tajunissa and another v. Mr. Vishal Sharma and others [CS(OS)262/2019] decided on 04.01.2022; Aavas Financiers Limited (formerly known as AV Housing Finance Limited) v. Smt. Bhagwanti Mahawar, 2023 (iii) MPWN 43, Sau Rajani v. Sau Smita and another (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1016); Punjab National Bank v. R. Lalitha and others (CS No. 97 of 2022), decided on 25.09.2023. 9) I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein above and perused the documents placed on the file. 10) It is well settled that only the contents of the plaint have to be looked into while deciding the application moved under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. In para-6 & 7 the plaint, the plaintiff has stated that a proposal was given to the plaintiff to mortgage his property with Punjab National Bank and obtain a loan of Rs. 20 lakhs. It was also stated that out of 20 lakhs, the plaintiff would get 10 lakhs whereas defendant No.1 would get 10 lakhs. In para -7, the plaintiff further pleaded that the revenue documents like diversion, B-1, P-II, revenue entries, sanctioned map of the house, Aadhaar card, Pan card, GST no. etc. were supplied by the plaintiff himself to defendant No.1. In para-8, the plaintiff has further pleaded that the documents were signed by the plaintiff himself at PNB Branch, Vyapar Vihar, Bilaspur. It is clearly stated that the plaintiff had signed more than 50 documents. In para-9, it is pleaded by the plaintiff that as per the contention made by defendant No.1, only Rs. 20 lakhs were sanctioned, and at the same time, the signatures of the plaintiff were obtained on blank cheques. It is clearly stated that the plaintiff had signed more than 50 documents. In para-9, it is pleaded by the plaintiff that as per the contention made by defendant No.1, only Rs. 20 lakhs were sanctioned, and at the same time, the signatures of the plaintiff were obtained on blank cheques. 11) It is pleaded in para-13 that on 11.06.2019, when he returned from pilgrimage, he was informed by the Bank of Baroda and Punjab National Bank, that defendant No.1 had committed fraud with them. In para-14 of the plaint, when he inquired from Punjab National Bank (PNB), he was informed that his property had not been mortgaged and the loan had not been sanctioned. The plaintiff came to know that a loan of Rs.60 lakhs was sanctioned in favour of defendants No. 2 to 4 and the property of the plaintiff was mortgaged. 12) It is further pleaded that the plaintiff lodged an FIR against defendants No.1 to 6 and offences punishable u/s. 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 B, and 34 IPC were registered against them. In para-21, 22, 23 and 24, it is pleaded that various documents were executed on 20.02.2018, 21.02.2018 and 20.03.2018 and those documents were not signed by the plaintiff. 13) Section 34 of the Act, 2002 is reproduced herein below for reference:- “34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction.- No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).” 14) The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a similar issue in the matter of Electrosteel Castings Limited (supra) held that mere use of the word ‘fraud’ would not be sufficient without any particulars. The relevant paras -9, 10, 11 & 12 are reproduced as under:- “9. The relevant paras -9, 10, 11 & 12 are reproduced as under:- “9. Having considered the pleadings and averments in the suit more particularly the use of word ‘fraud’ even considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, we find that the allegations of ‘fraud’ are made without any particulars and only with a view to get out of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and by such a clever drafting the plaintiff intends to bring the suit maintainable despite the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which is not permissible at all and which cannot be approved. Even otherwise it is required to be noted that it is the case on behalf of the plaintiff – appellant herein that in view of the approved resolution plan under IBC and thereafter the original corporate debtor being discharged there shall not be any debt so far as the plaintiff – appellant herein is concerned and therefore the assignment deed can be said to be ‘fraudulent’. 10. The aforesaid cannot be accepted. By that itself the assignment deed cannot be said to be ‘fraudulent’. In any case, whether there shall be legally enforceable debt so far as the plaintiff – appellant herein is concerned even after the approved resolution plan against the corporate debtor still there shall be the liability of the plaintiff and/or the assignee can be said to be secured creditor and/or whether any amount is due and payable by the plaintiff, are all questions which are required to be dealt with and considered by the DRT in the proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. 11. It is required to be noted that as such in the present case the assignee has already initiated the proceedings under Section 13 which can be challenged by the plaintiff – appellant herein by way of application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the DRT on whatever the legally available defences which may be available to it. We are of the firm opinion that the suit filed by the plaintiff – appellant herein was absolutely not maintainable in view of the bar contained under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, as such the courts below have not committed any error in rejecting the plaint/dismissing the suit in view of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. Therefore, as such the courts below have not committed any error in rejecting the plaint/dismissing the suit in view of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. 12 In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, it will be open for the appellant herein to initiate appropriate proceedings before the DRT under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act against the initiation of the proceedings by the assignee – respondent No.1 herein under Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act inter alia on the ground: (1) that the assignee cannot be said to be secured creditor so far as the appellant is concerned; (2) that there is no amount due and payable by the plaintiff – appellant herein on the ground that in view of the proceedings under IBC against the corporate debtor and the corporate debtor being discharged after the approved resolution plan, there shall not be any enforceable debt against the appellant. If such an application is filed within a period of two weeks from today the same be considered in accordance with law and on merits after complying with all other requirements which may be required while filing the application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 15) In the matter of Sree Ananndhakumar Mills Limited (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme held that as there is a remedy available under Section 17 of the Act in favour of the party, the suit would be not maintainable. Para-6 reads as under:- “6. As we have held that under the provisions of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and thereafter under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, Respondent 2 has an adequate and efficacious remedy, we are inclined to permit Respondent 2 to have recourse to the said remedies and agitate before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal all issues that may be open in law. All objections as may be available to the appellant may also be raised before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal. The learned Debts Recovery Tribunal and thereafter the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, if required to be approached by Respondent 2, will decide the matter with utmost expedition. All objections as may be available to the appellant may also be raised before the learned Debts Recovery Tribunal. The learned Debts Recovery Tribunal and thereafter the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, if required to be approached by Respondent 2, will decide the matter with utmost expedition. Until the aforesaid proceedings are complete while confirming the auction-sale in favour of the appellant we direct the appellant not to encumber the property in question or to transfer it to any third party.” 16) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jagdish Singh (supra) held as under:- “21. Section 13, as already indicated, deals with the enforcement of the security interest without the intervention of the court or tribunal but in accordance with the provisions of the Securitisation Act. 22. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower’s debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realizing the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the “measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding “in respect of any matter” which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression ‘in respect of any matter’ referred to in Section 34 would take in the “measures” provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any “measures” taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. Civil Court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Civil Court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well. ” 17) Now dealing with the judgments relied on by the respondents. 18) In the matter of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 51 held as under:- “51. However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or their claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe, whatsoever or to say precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General as well appearing for the Union of India, namely V.Narasimhachariar (supra) p.135 at p.141 and 144, a judgment of the learned single Judge where it is observed as follows in para 22: 22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor can come to the Court before sale with an injunction for staying the sale if there are materials to show that the power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage. But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: 'Adams v. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49). But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity on the basis of which relief is sought: 'Adams v. Scott, (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49). I need not point out that this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be exercised by Courts only under the limited circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed and annul one of the chief securities on which persons advancing moneys on mortgages rely. (See Rashbehary Ghose Law of Mortgages, Vol.II, Fourth Edn., page 784).” 19) In the matter of Tajunissa (supra), the High Court of Delhi made the following observations in paras 21 & 24:- “21. To the statutory proscription engrafted in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, therefore, the Supreme Court has, in the afore- extracted passage from Mardia Chemicals (supra), chiseled out an exception, in a case in which "for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or his claim may be so absurd and untenable which may not require any probe whatsoever". 24. The expression "fraud", of which "fraudulent" is merely a derivative, is of wide amplitude, and one need search no farther, to appreciate its scope, than the following definition in cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Service Ltd (2010) 8 SCC 660 : "Fraud in the contemplation of a civil court of justice, may be said to include properly all acts, omissions and concealments which involve a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or an unconscientious advantage is taken of another." That the duty of a Bank, to its customers and clients, involves, fundamentally, an element of trust and confidence, "justly reposed" by the client in the Bank and its employees, is merely stating the obvious. Where, therefore, the plaintiffs allege that the Bank has, in collusion with other defendants, used documents, got fraudulently executed or (2010) 8 SCC 660 signed by the plaintiffs, to mortgage the plaintiffs' property with the Bank, fraud, quite plainly, is alleged. Where, therefore, the plaintiffs allege that the Bank has, in collusion with other defendants, used documents, got fraudulently executed or (2010) 8 SCC 660 signed by the plaintiffs, to mortgage the plaintiffs' property with the Bank, fraud, quite plainly, is alleged. The particular use of the word "fraud", mantra-like, is hardly required, where the elements of fraud are pleaded, as in the present case. 20) In the matter of Smt. Bhagwanti Mahawar (supra), the application moved under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC was rejected, it was a case where it was contended by the defendant that the civil suit was barred under the provisions of the MSMED Act, 2006. In paras-3, 6 & 8 it was held thus:- “3. Upon service of summons upon it, the defendant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC for rejection of the plaint submitting that the same is barred by virtue of provisions of Section 34 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ('the Act, 2002'). The plaintiff contested the application by filing her reply to the same. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that the suit instituted by plaintiff before the trial Court is very much maintainable as the same is founded upon allegations of fraud having been practiced by the defendant upon her. The claim is not entirely covered under the provisions of the Act, 2022 but is also beyond it. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mardiya Chemicals Limited and Others V/s. Union of India and Others, 2004 (4) SCC 31. 8. It is well settled that while considering an application Under Order 7 rule 11 of the CPC only the plaint allegations and the documents filed along with the plaint can be seen. The plaint allegations have to be taken to be true at this stage. The suit has been instituted by plaintiff on specific plea as regards fraud and deceit having been practiced upon her by the defendant. She has categorically pleaded that the defendant has committed certain acts fraudulently with the purpose of usurping the suit house which are null and void to begin with and not binding upon her. The suit has been instituted by plaintiff on specific plea as regards fraud and deceit having been practiced upon her by the defendant. She has categorically pleaded that the defendant has committed certain acts fraudulently with the purpose of usurping the suit house which are null and void to begin with and not binding upon her. The suit would hence be maintainable in view of the decision in the case of Mardiya Chemicals Limited (supra) in which it has been held that to a very limited extent, jurisdiction of the Civil Court can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured creditor is alleged to be fraudulent.” 21) In the matter of Sau Rajani (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-9 held as under:- “9. Sections 71 and 177 are extracted below: "71. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.-No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person from any Authority premises under this Chapter, or the recovery of the arrears of rent, compensation, amount or damages for use and occupation of such premises, or in respect of any order made or to be made or any action taken or to be taken by the competent Authority or the appellate officer in the exercise of any power conferred by or under this Chapter, or to grant any injunction in respect of such order or action. 177. Bar of jurisdiction.-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Authority or the Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act, to determine; and no injunction or stay shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect i posed tier taker this be"taken in pursuance of any power conferred or duty imposed by or under this Act.” (emphasis supplied) 16. In Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza (2010) 8 SCC 726 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try suits of a civil nature is expansive and the onus to prove the ouster of the jurisdiction is on the party that asserts it. In Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza (2010) 8 SCC 726 , a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try suits of a civil nature is expansive and the onus to prove the ouster of the jurisdiction is on the party that asserts it. The court observed that even in cases where the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by a statute, the test is to determine if the authority or tribunal constituted under the statute has the power to grant reliefs that the civil courts would normally grant in suits filed before them. The relevant observations are extracted below: “12. The well-settled rule in this regard is that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those entertainment whereof is expressly or impliedly barred. The jurisdiction of the civil courts to try suits of civil nature is very expansive. Any statute which excludes such jurisdiction is, therefore, an exception to the general rule that all disputes shall be triable by a civil court. Any such exception cannot be readily inferred by the courts. The court would lean in favour of a construction that would uphold the retention of jurisdiction of the civil courts and shift the onus of proof to the party that asserts that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted.” 13. Even in cases where the statute accords finality to the orders passed by the Tribunals, the court will have to see whether the Tribunal has the power to grant the reliefs which the civil courts would normally grant in suits filed before them. If the answer is in the negative, exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction would not be ordinarily inferred. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2) [ (2009) 4 SCC 299 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 812] a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed: (SCC pp. 302h-303a) “There is a presumption that a civil court has jurisdiction. Ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. In Rajasthan SRTC v. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2) [ (2009) 4 SCC 299 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 812] a three-Judge Bench of this Court observed: (SCC pp. 302h-303a) “There is a presumption that a civil court has jurisdiction. Ouster of civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred. A person taking a plea contra must establish the same. Even in a case where jurisdiction of a civil court is sought to be barred under a statute, the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction in (2010) 8 SCC 726 ; Also see Competent Authority, Calcutta under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 v. David Manthosh, (2020) 12 SCC 542 respect of some matters particularly when the statutory authority or tribunal acts without jurisdiction.” 16 The preamble to the Act states that it is an Act to “unify, consolidate and amend the laws relating to housing, repairing and reconstructing dangerous buildings and carrying out improvement works in slum areas”. The scheme of the statute provides that the Board constituted under the statute would have the power to repair and reconstruct dilapidated buildings, conduct structural repairs and evict persons from authority premises, among others. The objective of the bodies and authorities constituted under the Act is to ensure repairing and reconstructing buildings to provide housing. Undoubtedly, the competent authority has the jurisdiction to order eviction in terms of the provisions of Section 66. But that is not the frame of the suit or the relief which has been claimed by the appellant in the suit. The reliefs sought by the appellant in the plaint are: (i) the removal of the unauthorized construction; (ii) a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from constructing over the open site and causing ‘nuisance’; and (iii) restoration of the water connection as it was prior to the construction. The appellant instituted the suit for injunction because her easements were infringed by the illegal construction which the first respondent had erected on the open space. The reliefs claimed by the appellant are beyond the scope of the Act. A suit of this nature will be maintainable before the civil court and would not be barred by Section 71 or Section 177 of the Act.” 22) The High Court of Madras in the matter of Lalitha (supra), in paras 15 to 17 held as under:- “15. The reliefs claimed by the appellant are beyond the scope of the Act. A suit of this nature will be maintainable before the civil court and would not be barred by Section 71 or Section 177 of the Act.” 22) The High Court of Madras in the matter of Lalitha (supra), in paras 15 to 17 held as under:- “15. It is the consistent submission of Mr.K.V.Babu for Ms.Dipthi Munoth.A, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 10/plaintiffs 1 to 10 that the bar under Section 34 of the SARFEASI Act cannot totally bar the jurisdiction of the civil court if the remedy available under the Special Act is not adequate. The attention of this court was drawn to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Supreme Court in held in Sau Rajani Vs. Sau Smita and another (2022 SCC Online SC 10106). By citing the above judgment it is claimed that the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs 1 to 10 is beyond the scope of the Act and hence the civil court jurisdiction cannot be barred and the suit is maintainable before the civil Court. 16. A direct reference was made by this Court in State Bank of India Vs. Application No.3549 of 2022in CS.No.94/2022 G.Moorthi and another reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 863 with regard to bar under Section 34 of the SARFEASI Act and in the said case it is held that the bar is only in respect of any matter which the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal would have jurisdiction. In the said case the plaintiff has come out with a case for specific performance and the court has held that the plaintiff can maintain the suit only before the civil court and not before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. It is worthwhile to extract the relevant paragraphs of the above judgment which reads as under: “9. A reading of Section 34 would show that what is barred under the said provision are only proceedings, in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal, would have jurisdiction. The second limb of the Section only prohibits grant of an order of injunction, in respect of any action taken in pursuance of power conferred under the Securitisation Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. … “12. The second limb of the Section only prohibits grant of an order of injunction, in respect of any action taken in pursuance of power conferred under the Securitisation Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. … “12. From the above pronouncement of the Hon’ble Full Bench of this Court, it is clear that the bar enacted that any provision which creates a bar on the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be construed strictly and it would apply only to proceedings, which are completely covered by the bar. I have already extracted both Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest, Act 2002. The language of the both the provisions do not cover a dispute between third parties relating to specific performance of an agreement of sale. It may sometime happen that the jurisdiction will over lap and in deciding the question of specific performance, the Civil Court may also be compelled to decide on the validity of certain encumbrances created by the agreement vendor. Such question cannot be said to be Application No.3549 of 2022 in CS.No.94/2022 barred by the provisions of the two enactments referred to above..... 20. I have already adverted to the main prayer in the suit, which is one for specific performance. It cannot be granted by the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the present suit cannot be said to be barred either under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, or under Section 34 of SARFAESI Act. 17. So far as the allegation of fraud is concerned, especially when the fraud has been alleged against the bank itself, it is consistently held by both the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Court that the plaintiff's remedy lies only before the Civil Court. In this regard, it is relevant to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Supreme Court held in Mardia Chemicals Ltd and Ors Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311 . In the recent judgment of the High Court of Delhi rendered in the case of Tajunissa and Another Vs. In this regard, it is relevant to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Supreme Court held in Mardia Chemicals Ltd and Ors Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311 . In the recent judgment of the High Court of Delhi rendered in the case of Tajunissa and Another Vs. Vishal Sharma and others reported in 2022 SCC Online Del 18, it is held that if a fraud is alleged on the part of the secure creditor, the recourse to ordinary civil remedies cannot be denied to the plaintiffs.” 23) Admittedly, the applications for the grant of loan were moved by defendants No. 2 to 4 in the month of February, 2018. A perusal of the pleadings would make it amply clear that certain documents were executed at that time, some documents were executed on 20.01.2018 and others on 20.03.2018, though the plaintiff has denied his signature over those documents, this denial was made after a lapse of 3 years in the year 2021 when the Civil Suit was filed; particularly, after receipt of a notice issued by the concerned Bank. 24) The plaintiff has raised the ground of fraud in his civil suit. He has sought relief of declaration that the entire transactions between defendants No. 2 to 4 and 6 were forged and without obtaining conscious consent, his property was mortgaged. In paras 6, 7, and 8 of the plaint, the plaintiff has accepted the fact that to obtain a loan from PNB. of Rs. 20 lakhs, he signed certain documents. 25) Section 34 of the Act, 2002 bars the jurisdiction of civil court. It clearly says no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered. 26) Section 17 of the Act, 2002 deals with the application against measures to be covered against secure debtors, which reads as follows:- 17.1. It clearly says no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered. 26) Section 17 of the Act, 2002 deals with the application against measures to be covered against secure debtors, which reads as follows:- 17.1. Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, [may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed,] [Substituted by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 (30 of 2004), Section 10, for "may prefer an appeal" (w.r.e.f. 21.6.2002).] to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken: [Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.] [Inserted by the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 (30 of 2004), Section 10 (w.r.e.f. 21.6.2002).] [Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under this sub-section.] * * 17.3. [If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,- (a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and (b) restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and (c) pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13.]” 27) A bare reading of Section 17 of the Act, 2002 would make it clear that the relief sought by the plaintiff in the civil suit pending before the competent Civil Court can be sought before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Section 17(3) says that if the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person; the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, by order declare the transaction or measures null and void, and has further power to restore the possession of secured assets of the mortgagee or secured creditors. 28) In the case of Mardia Chemicals (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given little room for interference to exercise power either under Article 226 or otherwise. If there are allegations with regard to fraud, the civil suit would be tenable. A similar view has been taken in the judgments passed by various High Courts as relied on by the learned counsel for respondent No.1. If there are allegations with regard to fraud, the civil suit would be tenable. A similar view has been taken in the judgments passed by various High Courts as relied on by the learned counsel for respondent No.1. 29) From a bare reading of the contents of the plaint, particularly paras 6 & 7, it is apparent that the petitioner signed certain documents, those documents were placed before the bank to get a loan of Rs. 20 lakhs, but the plaintiff never inquired whether Rs. 20 lahks were sanctioned in his favour or not, and after receipt of notice u/s 13(2) of the Act, 2002, the civil suit was filed after a lapse of 3 years and the delay part has not been explained, though this issue is not involved in the present case, in order to show bonafide, the plaintiff ought to have stated the facts with regard to limitation. 30) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Electrosteel Castings Limited (supra), in clear terms, held that the use of the word ‘fraud’ would not be sufficient without any particulars. 31) In the year 1991, the Narasimhan Committee - I (On the Financial System) ob-served that the borrowers obtain stay orders from the Civil Court therefore the Banks and other Financial Institutions face difficulty in recovering Non-Perform-ing Assets (NPAs). Thus, to strengthen this process, Debts Recovery Tribunals were set up in the year 1993 and the loan recovery process was made beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. Further, in 1998, the Narasimhan Committee-II (Banking Sector Reforms) observed that Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) need to be strengthened with a law, therefore the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 was en-acted. 32) Some of the major objectives of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 are as follows:- (i) To provide a mechanism for banks and other financial institutions to re-cover secured assets; (ii) To reduce the time and cost of recovery of secured assets; (iii) To protect the interests of borrowers and depositors; and (iv) To promote financial stability. 33) The particulars and material facts pleaded by the plaintiff in the civil suit, in the opinion of this Court, are not sufficient to get out of the bar put under Section 34 of the Act, 2002. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision is allowed. 33) The particulars and material facts pleaded by the plaintiff in the civil suit, in the opinion of this Court, are not sufficient to get out of the bar put under Section 34 of the Act, 2002. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision is allowed. The order passed by the learned Ist Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, dated 04.03.2023 is hereby set-aside, and the application moved by the applicant under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of the CPC is hereby allowed. Consequently, the civil suit of the plaintiff pending before the learned Civil Court is hereby dismissed.