JUDGMENT : Heard Ms. M. K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mrs. D. Das Barman, learned Additional Senior Government Advocate appearing for the respondent Nos. 1 and 4. Also heard Mr. B. Talukdar, learned Standing counsel, Elementary Education appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 5. 2. The petitioner by way of instituting the present proceedings prayed for a direction upon the Respondent authorities to place his case before the District Level Committee for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate grounds and thereafter basing on the said recommendation to appoint him against a post commensurating to his educational qualification on compassionate grounds. 3. As projected in the writ petition, the father of the petitioner namely Shri Rabindra Nath Roy @ Rabindra Nath Hazong (since deceased) while serving as an Assistant Teacher in Joyrampur M.E. School had died in harness on 21.10.2002. The petitioner being eligible had thereafter vide an application dated 03.01.2003 approached the Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Assam, Education Department praying for appointment on compassionate grounds. The petitioner had also submitted an application with all requisite particulars before the Block Elementary Education Officer, Dhemaji on the same date. 4. The application as submitted by the petitioner before the Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Assam, Education Department vide a communication dated 17.06.2005 was forwarded to the District Elementary Education Officer, Dhemaji for processing of the same in terms of the policy in place. 5. It is the contention of the petitioner that in spite of the direction from the Government vide the communication dated 17.06.2005 for processing of his case for appointment on compassionate grounds, the respondent authorities have not acted in the matter in terms with the policy and accordingly being aggrieved, the present proceedings have been instituted. 6. A perusal of the materials available on record including the pleadings of the petitioner reveals that the father of the petitioner had died in harness on 21.10.2002 and thereafter an application was filed by the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds on 03.01.2003. It is seen from the pleadings as brought on record that the petitioner was not aware anything as to how the matter was pursued by the petitioner and/or his family members after submission of the said application on 03.01.2003. The present writ proceedings were instituted on 06.12.2023. It is seen from the pleadings as brought on record that the petitioner was not aware anything as to how the matter was pursued by the petitioner and/or his family members after submission of the said application on 03.01.2003. The present writ proceedings were instituted on 06.12.2023. However in the writ petition, there is no mention as to in what manner the petitioner had pursued the matter w.e.f. 04.01.2003 till 06.12.2023. 7. It is a settled position of law that compassionate appointment is an exception to the General Rule that appointment to any public post in the service of the State has to be made on the basis of principle which accord with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Dependents of a deceased employee of the State are made eligible by virtue of the policy on compassionate appointment. The basis of the policy is that it recognizes that a family of a deceased employee may be placed in a position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of the employee while in service. It is the immediacy of the said need which furnishes the basis for the State to allow the benefit of compassionate appointment. The terms on which such application would be considered are subject to the policy which is framed by the State. In that sense, it is well settled principle of law that there is no right to compassionate appointment. 8. It is well settled by the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court that the object of grant of compassionate appointment being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, compassionate appointment cannot be claimed and/or offered after lapse of considerable amount of time and after the crisis is overcome. Appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. Compassionate appointment is also not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. 9. Appointment on compassionate ground is not a source of recruitment. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. Compassionate appointment is also not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. 9. In the case on hand it is seen that the father of the petitioner had expired on 21.10.2002 and thereafter the application staking a claim for appointment on compassionate grounds was made by the petitioner on 03.01.2003 and thereafter there is nothing brought on record to demonstrate as to how the matter was pursued till the present proceedings was instituted before this Court after around 20 years i.e. on 06.12.2023. Accordingly, in the case on hand, the sense of immediacy is lost and the sudden crisis that had arisen on the death of the father of the petitioner in the family has already been overcome by the petitioner and his family members. 10. In this connection reference is made to a recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Debabrata Tiwari and Others reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 219 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court upon considering the earlier decisions available in the matter had concluded as follows: “32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles emerge: i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e., to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis. iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its members, together with the income from any other source. 33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration. 34. 34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide the authorities’ decision in the matter. 35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. 36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, [1874] 3 P.C. 221 as under: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. v. Prosper Armstrong, [1874] 3 P.C. 221 as under: “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 . In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words: “9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. 38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words: “9. ... the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 ; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 . 40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 , wherein the following observations were made: "19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.” 11. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.” 11. Applying the ratio as contained in the decision of Debabrata Tiwari (supra) to the facts of the present case, it is found that after the purported submission of application by the petitioner, there is nothing on record to show that the family members of the petitioner were diligently pursuing the matter with the authorities and/or had agitated the matter on the failure on the part of the authorities to consider the case of the petitioner on compassionate ground. The petitioner and/or his family members having not pursued the matter diligently after the death of the government servant, at this distant point of time, no direction can be issued for consideration of such claim of the petitioner. The petitioner and his family members having been able to eke out a living even though not favoured with an appointment on compassionate ground, this Court does not think this is a fit case to direct the respondent authorities to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate grounds. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is devoid of any merit for which the same stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.